The twenty-one year freeze: Australia's
relations with the
Democratic Republic of Korea.
(by Adrian Buzo)
Introduction
The stagnation of the relationship between Australia and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is striking in an era
of
rapid political and economic change in the Asia-Pacific region.
Relations have been frozen since the expulsion of the staff of the
Australian Embassy in Pyongyang on 8 November 1975. While the two
countries have continued to recognise each other, for over twenty
years they have not exchanged diplomatic representation. In recent
years, Australia has limited official contact to talks between
middle-level officials on an irregular basis with no fixed agenda,
and
has thus largely limited the scope of relations to the non-official
sphere. There is little evidence of debate within Australia on
whether
the current state of affairs serves the national interest, and the
purpose of this paper is, therefore, to outline the background to
current Australian policy and look at some options for the future.
Background
In November 1972, a significant change occurred in Australian
politics
when the Australian Labor Party was elected to office for the first
time in twenty-three years. This was a period of considerable
change
in the region, marked by the steady withdrawal of the US and its
allies, including Australia, from the Vietnam War, and by US-China
rapprochement. The abatement of US--China hostility, soon to be
followed by Japanese reconciliation with China, seemed to herald
the
dawning of a new era of intra-regional cooperation. In inter-Korean
affairs the 4 July 1972 Joint Statement by the Republic of Korea
and
the DPRK had opened an avenue for substantive political talks
between
the two countries and seemed part of the general trend.
The previous Liberal-Country Party Coalition government in
Australia
had followed a policy of refusing to extend recognition to the
three
communist countries in the Asia-Pacific region--the People's
Republic
of China (PRC), the then Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and
the
DPRK. The incoming Labor government reversed this policy as a
matter
of priority and rapidly negotiated agreement on diplomatic
recognition
with the PRC and DRV. The case of the DPRK presented more of a
challenge because it was difficult to fit the DPRK into the picture
of
emerging change in the region. The 4 July Agreement between the two
Koreas had been a promising start, active DPRK diplomacy within the
Non-Aligned Movement suggested a more outward-looking foreign
policy
than in previous years, and recent major DPRK purchases of Western
plant and technology had given rise to expectations of an opening
up
of its economic system. Nevertheless, evidence of change from past
policies of intransigence and confrontation seemed less clear-cut.
Most important from Australia's point of view, there had been no
movement in the DPRK's stance on reunification where, despite the 4
July Agreement, the DPRK continued to deny the legitimacy of the
Republic of Korea (ROK) government. The DPRK's allies, led by the
Soviet Union and China, backed this up with a policy of continuing
non-recognition of the ROK. Therefore, if Australia were to move
toward recognition of the DPRK it would have to do so unilaterally.
This would be against the wishes of the ROK, Japan and the US, and
the
benefit to Australia's national interest in this was far from
clear.
However, the case for extending recognition was a strong one. There
was certainly no question that the DPRK government exercised
effective
authority in the northern part of the Korean peninsula, and the
Whitlam government did not rule out diplomatic relations with
countries on the grounds of ideological or political differences.
Moreover, Australia felt that the continuing diplomatic isolation
of
the DPRK was anomalous and that wider acceptance Of the current
reality of two Korean governments would contribute to the peace and
stability of the peninsula without prejudicing future moves toward
reunification. As Albinski has noted, Australian thinking on the
DPRK
embodied 'both pragmatic and idealistic connotations'.(n1)
Accordingly, negotiations proceeded slowly and the two parties
reached
agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations on 31 July
1974.(n2) The DPRK proceeded to establish a resident embassy in
Canberra on 31 December 1974, and the Australian Embassy in
Pyongyang
opened on 30 April 1975. Six months later, however, the DPRK
abruptly
withdrew from Canberra and shortly afterwards expelled the
Australian
Embassy from Pyongyang.(n3) The DPRK did not break off relations
but
its actions left the two countries without accredited envoys.
The DPRK accused the Australian authorities of adopting an
unfriendly
attitude toward the DPRK Embassy in Canberra and also made
allegations
against the staff of the Australian Embassy in Pyongyang, but has
never offered a rational explanation for its actions. Beyond the
stated reasons for the DPRK's action, it is probable that
Australia's
lobbying in favour of a pro-ROK resolution (and thus against a
competing pro-DPRK resolution) on the Korean Question at the 30th
session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 30),
especially
during the period August-October 1975,(n4) gave serious offence.
The
UNGA 30 debate seemed to bring home to the DPRK that Australia was
not
going to reduce significantly the level of its diplomatic support
for
the ROK and, in DPRK eyes, this was an unacceptable 'two Koreas'
policy. There were clearly broad misunderstandings on the direction
of
each other's foreign policy, and differences in policy, not to
mention
diplomatic style, were simply too great to sustain relations at the
resident embassy level.
It is impossible to tell whether specific incidents involving the
two
countries' missions were a factor in the DPRK's move, but some
further
comment on the issue of diplomatic style is in order. The DPRK
tended
to interpret the mere establishment of diplomatic relations with
Australia as a partisan act. It clearly expected the Australian
government to be supportive of specific DPRK policies and
activities,
and anticipated a dividend in the form of a reduction in the level
of
Australian support for the ROK. It was no doubt disappointed at
Australia's actual performance.
In the case of the DPRK mission in Canberra, this writer was aware
at
the time of DPRK dissatisfaction at the travel restrictions imposed
on
its diplomats although, of course, far more stringent restrictions
were placed upon Australian diplomats in Pyongyang. The DPRK also
seemed to expect more assistance from the Australian government in
its
propaganda activities and probably resented occasional polite,
official admonishments when these activities involved the
slandering
of the ROK. Meanwhile, in Pyongyang, the DPRK was openly surprised
at
Australia's stance at UNGA 30. it repeatedly stressed to Australian
diplomats that it did not insist on support for the pro-DPRK
resolution but it asked Australia not to oppose the DPRK position.
As
it became clear during September 1975 that Australia had
fundamental
problems with the pro-DPRK resolution, the DPRK openly stated that
the
Australian position would have a serious effect on bilateral
relations. It is consistent with this stance that in early October
the
DPRK should have ordered its mission in Canberra to prepare for a
quick exit.
Australian policy toward the DPRK 1975-95
The expulsion of the Australian Embassy from Pyongyang coincided
with
the dismissal from office of the Labor government and the return to
power of the Liberal--Country (now National) Party Coalition
government (1975-83). Whether the DPRK assumed that the new
government
would be hostile to the DPRK or not, there was little contact
between
the two parties for a number of years.(n5) Gradually, however, and
especially after the Australian Labor Party returned to power in
March
1983, the DPRK made a number of low level official approaches to
the
Australian government aimed at resuming relations. It is not clear
why
the DPRK sought to resume relations since its foreign policy had
undergone little or no modification in the years since 1975.
Certainly, however, the DPRK had ceased to attach much importance
to
United Nations-based diplomacy after UNGA 30 and this reduced the
possibility for conflict. Moreover, the DPRK may have had in mind a
more measured, circumspect relationship involving non-resident
embassies and regular visits to Australia by officers from the DPRK
Embassy in Jakarta.
The incoming Labor government did not assign a high priority to the
matter and, in any case, the Rangoon bombing which occurred seven
months later in October 1983, effectively precluded any positive
Australian response for some time afterward.(n6) In the wake of the
bombing Australia joined a broad cross-section of countries in
applying sanctions to the DPRK which included placing a series of
restrictions on official contacts. For the next five years
Australia
limited contact to the non-official sphere, allowing visits to
Australia by DPRK citizens only for the purpose of business or
cultural activities, or else to attend multilateral meetings. The
Australian government did not interfere with private commercial
activities involving the DPRK but in any case these were of little
significance during this period.
Australia now proceeded to develop three interrelated conditions
for
resuming official relations with the DPRK. They were that the DPRK
should renounce hostile actions against the ROK and engage in
negotiation to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula, that the
DPRK
should demonstrate a willingness to abide by accepted norms of
international behaviour, and that Australia would need to be
convinced
that there was scope for a constructive bilateral relationship. On
16
October 1984, the then Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, described
government policy as follows:
It is the Australian Government's view that, in the long term, the
DPRK must be brought into a more cooperative relationship with the
region. But DPRK cooperation can only mean something if it starts
with
the ROK. In the meantime, Australia is not prepared to examine the
question of restoring diplomatic relations with Pyongyang until it
renounces hostile action against Seoul and abides by
internationally
accepted norms of behaviour. We consider that dialogue between the
two
Koreas should be encouraged as a means of reducing the problems of
a
very tense peninsula. We have supported Seoul's proposals for
direct
contacts with the DPRK and would like to see implementation of
confidence-building measures which have been proposed within the
framework of the Military Armistice Commission and elsewhere.(n7)
This approach and the hierarchy of inter-Korean, international, and
bilateral interests that it contained set the tone for the years
that
followed. Since Australia's bilateral interest in the DPRK was (and
still is) negligible, the question of a resumption of ties was
closely
linked to developments on the Korean peninsula itself, with the
possibility of increased contact very consciously linked to the
DPRK
playing a positive role in the reduction of tensions between the
two
Koreas. The general international behaviour of the DPRK was a
further
significant issue because, apart from the Rangoon bombing, over a
period of years the DPRK had acquired a dubious record. It was a
delinquent debtor, a supporter and practitioner of international
terrorism, and the behaviour of its diplomats had given rise to a
series of incidents in a number of countries involving the
smuggling
of drugs, currency and arms.
The diplomatic effect of the Rangoon bombing was prolonged. By the
second half of 1988, however, there were signs of marginal
improvement
in the situation on the Korean peninsula. In July 1988, ROK
President
Roh Tae-woo's Nordpolitik made clear the ROK's interest in having
its
allies develop contact with the DPRK in order to complement the
ROK's
own push toward ties with the Soviet Union and China. The ROK was
able
to stage the 1988 Olympic Games without incident and the favourable
publicity that it generated underlined the advancing international
status of the ROK. Accordingly, Mikhaii Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk
declaration in September 1988 reversed long-established Soviet
policy
on Korea and foreshadowed formal trade relations with Seoul. There
were also signs that China was reassessing its Korea policy, and
the
US had opened non-official talks with the DPRK in Beijing on 31
October 1988.
At the same time, however, there were no signs of change to basic
DPRK
political and diplomatic strategies. Traditional ideological
parameters guided relations with its principal adversaries, there
were
no significant changes in the Korean Workers' Party (KWP)
politburo,
no stirring of ideological debate within the country, foreign trade
initiatives of 1984 had not been followed up, and the Third Seven
Year
Plan (1987-93) was premised on continued application of traditional
remedies to its economic problems. In inter-Korea relations, signs
of
change were limited to the inauguration of small-scale, indirect
inter-Korea trade and a short and inconclusive period of
negotiation
on inter-parliamentary talks, which began in November 1988.(n8)
The sense of positive movement among the allies of the two Koreas
was
sufficient for Australia to make a more positive response to what
had
been periodic DPRK overtures. Accordingly, in January 1989, two
Australian diplomatic officers from the Australian Embassy in
Beijing
took up a recent DPRK invitation to visit Pyongyang where they met
with their counterparts in a move that Foreign Minister Senator
Gareth
Evans described at the time as 'testing the water'.(n9) Senator
Evans
went on:
Our basic position is--as we have told them--that our attitude to
North Korea will depend (a) on overall developments in the Korean
Peninsula and the state of the developing relationship with the
South
Koreans; second, it will depend on their international behaviour
....
and thirdly, it will depend on our level of confidence that there's
something in it for Australia, that there's a basis for a
constructive
relationship. And that's not unimportant given their record for
debt
repayment and so on in the past if you are contemplating the
restoration of an economic or trade relationship. So there are a
lot
of caveats, there's a lot of 'ifs' and 'buts'..It's essentially
exploratory but it's aimed at reducing the level of tension and
again
opening up dialogue.(n10)
In talks with their Australian counterparts, the DPRK
representatives
revealed a considerable interest in moving rapidly toward a
resumption
of full diplomatic ties. They made a number of proposals covering
diplomatic and trade activities, most notably the re-establishment
of
resident embassies in each other's capitals, the opening of a
non-diplomatic DPRK trade office in Australia, the conclusion of a
trade agreement, the provision of a $10m trade credit to finance
imports from Australia, continuing visits by Australian diplomats
stationed in Beijing to Pyongyang and an upgrading of the official
bilateral dialogue channel, which was being conducted at the
Counsellor level.
The Australian government assessed these proposals and also
undertook
a general review of its DPRK policy in February 1989. This review
reaffirmed the basic principles for conducting relations with the
DPRK, and found that the thrust of the DPRK proposals were too
sweeping to accord with Australia's interests which did not favour
early movement on upgrading relations. In the economic sphere the
small-scale, sporadic nature of Australia DPRK trade, the fact that
the DPRK was in default on loans totalling over $1 billion to
international banking consortia of which Australian banks were
members, plus the DPRK's generally dubious record as an
international
trader provided little impetus for responding positively to the
DPRK's
trade proposals. In the diplomatic sphere the government saw the
main
benefits of closer contact with the DPRK in terms of the general
reflection this would have on Australia's international standing as
a
country interested in monitoring closely events in Korea, and was
also
concerned to contribute where it could to reduce tensions. It noted
that Australia seemed to be seen by the DPRK in a different, more
conciliatory light than other Western nations such as the UK and
Germany, both of whom had been rebuffed in recent efforts to
improve
ties with the DPRK. The review attributed this to several factors:
the
DPRK did not see Australia as a major player on the Korean
peninsula;
it felt less threatened by Australia; it saw Australia as having a
relatively independent foreign policy stance; and there were no
major,
intractable issues in bilateral relations. The sum was an
assessment
that the DPRK might well see. Australia as a relatively undemanding
entry point for developing ties with the West.(n11)
However, the government's view of its balance of interest was that
Australia should not get too far out in front of the US and Japan.
It
should pursue contact that was constructive for both parties and
not
unilaterally offer what might be seen as diplomatic encouragement
to
the DPRK in advance of any clear sign of change to its basic
policies.
Accordingly, the Australian government encouraged the DPRK to
continue
Counsellor-level diplomatic dialogue on an exchange of information
basis, but advised that a resumption of a full diplomatic
relationship
was not yet appropriate. The DPRK's trade-related proposals were
not
rejected outright but were turned back into this dialogue.(n12)
The cautious Australian response to. DPRK overtures enabled
official
contacts to proceed, but Canberra avoided making any specific
commitments to normalising relations. These official contacts
gained
some press attention in November 1990, when Michael Costello, then
Deputy Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
and
Trade (DFAT) took advantage of a visit to Pyongyang for discussion
with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, to meet with
his--Costello's--counterpart in the DPRK Foreign Ministry.(n13) As
a
result of this meeting, Australia subsequently agreed to receive a
KWP
delegation, headed by a Party Secretary and Candidate Politburo
member
Kim Yong Sun, for party-to-party talks with the Australian Labor
Party. In addition, there was further contact with Australian
politicians and officials at the Interparliamentary Union
Conference,
held in Pyongyang 29 April-5 May 1991, where again the DPRK put
forward some specific proposals to upgrade ties. The Australian
government again responded in accordance with the February 1989
review.
There had been no sign of change to the Australian position by mid
1991 when the nuclear issue began to emerge as a crucial
determinant
of Australia's DPRK policy.(n14) The US and its allies had begun to
voice concern about the DPRK's nuclear facility at Yongbyon in 1989
on
a number of grounds, especially the failure of the DPRK to conclude
its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency
(IAEA) despite having a clear obligation to do so under the terms
of
its membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In
April
1991, Japan announced at the IAEA that the signature by the DPRK of
the safeguards agreement would be a precondition for the
normalisation
of bilateral relations, and Australia now took the same view.
In addition, representations to the Australian government at this
time
by the Australian banks owed some $55m in long-standing defaulted
debt
by the DPRK, resulted in the debt issue now being articulated as a
specific bilateral problem which would need to be resolved before
steps could be taken to upgrade relations. By October 1991, press
reporting on the now imminent visit by Kim Yong Sun identified the
safeguards issue and the DPRK's $55m debt to Australian banks as
major
difficulties in the relationship.(n15) When Kim called on Senator
Evans in early November 1991, the Minister told him that Australia
was
unlikely to agree to renew diplomatic ties `until Pyongyang signed
nuclear safeguard agreements and began repaying a $55 million debt
to
Australian banks'.(n16)
Although Kim Yong Sun had been by far the most senior DPRK official
to
visit Australia since 1975, the nuclear issue now overshadowed all
else and so this visit did not generate any momentum for further
contact or discussion. While the situation appeared to improve when
the DPRK signed its IAEA safeguards agreement on 31 January 1992,
the
level of disagreement with IAEA inspection teams over access to
disputed sites grew steadily and, on 12 March 1993, the DPRK
announced
its withdrawal from the NPT. Australia reacted strongly to the DPRK
move, with Senator Evans commenting:
I think it's crucial that the international community put its full
weight behind redressing the situation because it's a very
dangerous
one in terms of the long-term stability, not only of the region but
of
the world at large... This is probably the biggest, most difficult,
most sensitive, most important arms control issue now on the
international agenda, and for that reason the North Korean
situation
simply has to be addressed head on.(n17)
Australia took a leading role in the IAEA response, drafting the
subsequent resolution noting the DPRK's non-compliance with the NPT
and referring the matter to the United Nations for further action.
Yet
despite DPRK awareness of Australia's activist role in the IAEA,
diplomatic overtures continued, and by the end of 1993, DPRK
ambassadors in Bangkok and Jakarta had approached Australian
representatives to discuss improvement of bilateral relations,
including a proposal to receive a DPRK government delegation in
Australia. In December 1993, Canberra again conducted a policy
review,
and agreed to receive a delegation at no higher than Vice Foreign
Minister level to discuss regional, nuclear, and bilateral issues,
provided that discussions would constitute an advance on each
side's
established position. Canberra also reaffirmed three preconditions
to
upgrading ties improvement in the DPRK's relations with the ROK; a
satisfactory resolution of the nuclear issue; and evidence that the
DPRK was addressing the problem of its debt to international and
Australian banks. It also reserved the right to reschedule the
visit
depending on developments in the ongoing DPRK-US and DPRK-ROK
negotiating processes.(n18)
Reports of these contacts surfaced in the Australian press in
January
1994, and an idea of the level of interest generated by the issue
of
Australia-DPRK ties can be gained from this coverage. In a page one
banner headline story titled `North Korea in secret talks to
restore
ties' on 20 January 1994, the Australian reported the substance of
the
DPRK approaches and Canberra's response, including the
preconditions.
The newspaper observed:
... it is understood that if North Korea could meet these
conditions,
there would be considerable sympathy within the Department of
Foreign
Affair's for a restoration of diplomatic relations. Such a move
would
fit with Canberra's long-standing desire to entice North Korea out
of
its self-imposed isolation and back into the mainstream of
international economic and political affairs.(n19)
In an editorial `Time to draw in Pyongyang' on 24 January, the
Sydney
Morning Herald likewise commented: `The possibility that Australia
might play a role in the induction of North Korea into the
international community is to be welcomed'. It went on to endorse
the
preconditions laid down by Canberra, noting that, `in the light of
the
other momentous changes in the international landscape in recent
years, these conditions are not as unrealistic as they would once
have
seemed'.(n20) But overall, the signs were that the two countries
were
heading for an impasse. The dialogue had become a reiteration of
fixed
positions, while the Australian preconditions, however practical,
called for what was tantamount to a basic revision of the DPRK's
foreign policy.
There had been no further opportunity for dialogue with the DPRK
before the nuclear crisis of May-June 1994 effectively ended any
prospect of receiving the proposed Vice Ministerial
delegation.(n21)
This crisis was triggered by the DPRK's unilateral downloading of
spent fuel from its Yongbyon reactor without full inspection by the
IAEA. The US responded to the DPRK action by seeking support for
international economic sanctions on the DPRK, and the DPRK in turn
announced that it would regard sanctions as equivalent to an act of
war. The Australian response, through Senator Evans, was to express
doubt that `the kind of graduated sanction strategy that is being
talked about would achieve anything practical or simply be an
expression of displeasure'.(n22) In the event, the visit of Jimmy
Carter to Pyongyang on 16-17 June removed the immediate cause of
the
crisis by securing the DPRK's agreement to further negotiation with
the US.(n23)
But the June 1994 crisis did not pass before it had revealed
differences of emphasis in the Australian and US preferred
strategies
for dealing with the DPRK. Senator Evans's reservations about the
implementation of sanctions followed previous public reservations
expressed by the Australian Ambassador to Washington, Don Russell,
and
reflected Australian concerns that declaration of sanctions would
significantly escalate tensions but, given doubts about Chinese
compliance, were unlikely to achieve their objective of
containment.
In addition, as one US commentator noted, the Australian agenda in
the
region contained different points of emphasis to that of the US. In
its hierarchy of interests Australia was more focused on the
regional
implications of a US-DPRK stand-off than was the US, and more
attentive to the cautious approach of Japan, the ROK and especially
China to containing the DPRK threat. The US, on the other hand, was
impelled to a harder line for domestic considerations, and also
because it attached greater significance to the global issue of
non-proliferation--especially the doomsday scenario of the DPRK
supplying missiles and nuclear warheads to states such as Iran and
Libya.(n24)
Future relations
In 1995 and 1996, Australia-DPRK diplomatic relations remained
confined to occasional informal contact at the middle-level
official
level. A full resumption of ties is no more in prospect now than at
any time in the past twenty years and this state of affairs seems
destined to continue for the foreseeable future. With the steady
growth of Australian political and economic interests in the
region,
and in particular in the ROK, regional considerations loom ever
larger
in Australian calculations, and these interests are likely to
dictate
the course of action. Moreover, as long as the DPRK declines to
meet
internationally acceptable standards of behaviour over issues such
as
nuclear non-proliferation, biological and chemical weapons,
terrorism,
human rights and the resolution of trade and commercial disputes,
Australia sees pressing ahead with bilateral relations as not only
hazardous in itself but also contrary to its international
commitments
on these issues.
For the present, the combined weight of these regional and
international levels of interest more than counterbalances any new
bilateral objectives. The conventional wisdom of the
carrot-and-stick
approach of rewarding what are assessed as positive DPRK moves and
standing firm in the face of what is viewed as continuing
intransigence will almost certainly continue to prevail.(n25) In
fact,
time is against the DPRK here, for as the years pass it loses more
and
more economic and political ground to its neighbours, and therefore
also loses effective advocacy within Australia. The scope for
improvement of relations under these circumstances is limited. It
seems likely, therefore, that the sporadic dialogue will go on,
occasional DPRK visitors will continue to come to Australia on
trade,
cultural and academic business, but that Australia-DPRK relations
will
remain in a holding pattern.
Clearly, this pattern could only be broken by the DPRK. Most
external
observers assess that the DPRK cannot continue to maintain its
present
system and sooner or later this must undergo fundamental change. A
positive scenario would see the country's leadership opting for
such
change without much further ado. This would entail, for example,
the
effective implementation of the Geneva Framework Agreement,(n26)
productive negotiations with the ROK, other confidence-building
measures in the region such as dialogue with Japan, and
wide-ranging
measures aimed at the reform of the DPRK economy. From Australia's
point of view any reasonable combination of these moves would go a
considerable way toward relieving the regional and international
impediments to a resumption of ties. On the other hand, a more
negative scenario would see change coming only after continuing
decline, and perhaps even after some form of full-blown systemic
crisis within the DPRK. In that case, if the DPRK became
increasingly
unable to adequately feed, clothe and house its citizens, then this
would pose a humanitarian dimension to the problem of dealing with
the
DPRK. This concern is far from academic, for the provision of
humanitarian aid to the DPRK in the wake of the disastrous August
1995
floods has already become the subject of political debate and
difference between the ROK, Japan and the US, and there may be far
more serious aid issues to address in the years ahead.(n27)
The DPRK's regional neighbours (or at least most of them) obviously
hope for the reform-without-crisis scenario, but we should not
overlook the fact that signs of significant movement toward reform
would still pose challenges to Australian diplomacy. The history of
inter-Korea talks is littered with agreements that were hailed as
breakthroughs at the time but which rapidly became dead letters the
4
July 1972 Joint Communique, the 1985 exchange of home visits, the
December 1991 Joint Agreement, have all proven to be examples of
the
`talk' phase of a fight-talk-fight pattern that makes evaluation of
the significance of any one passage of negotiation a difficult
task.(n28) This observation also applies to the much-vaunted, but
so
far sterile, DPRK-Japan and DPRK-US talks in recent years. The
challenge to Australia is therefore one of accurate assessment of
potential for real change within the DPRK, for while it would be
incumbent upon Australia to contribute where it could to any
momentum
for positive change on the Korean peninsula, the record suggests
that
one cannot rely on the fact of negotiation alone for evidence of
fundamental change to DPRK objectives. In assessing the potential
for
genuine reform in the DPRK Australia requires a broader definition,
capable of transcending the level of negotiation tactics. This
involves assessment of DPRK policy across a range of domestic and
foreign policy issues. Leadership and Politburo changes in
particular
are important indicators, for past assessments of the potential for
reform in the DPRK have generally contained the flawed expectation
that significant reform could issue out of traditional ideological
parameters and an unchanged leadership configuration.
But it is the reform-through-crisis, or else crisis pure and
simple,
scenario that would pose the greater challenge, for it is still
possible to envisage the country degenerating into conditions of
widespread destitution under a continuation of current
policies--whether from ideological conviction or political
paralysis.
At some point in this decline Australia would reach the stage where
it
could only continue to apply the current carrot-and-stick approach
at
the cost of pointlessly contributing further to the misery of the
DPRK
population. If the regime will not relent, then must not the
outside
world perforce relent on humanitarian grounds at some stage?
Despite
the obvious risks of diversion to military use, and hence the
possibility of objections from the DPRK's major adversaries, the
provision of substantial humanitarian aid would then constitute an
appropriate response.
In fact, either scenario would almost certainly bring the
humanitarian
aid question to the fore, for the economic situation in the DPRK
will
remain serious for the foreseeable future. Not only is its basic
economic structure far more distorted than in any other former
command
economy,'(n29) but also practically all governmental functions are
so
firmly tied to the present political order that serious questions
must
be asked about the ability of coherent governmental authority to
survive rapid change. Moreover, although we can still only guess at
the effects of isolation and intense indoctrination on DPRK
society,
it is clear that twenty-two million DPRK citizens have been
aggressively indoctrinated into a harsh, predatory view of the
outside
world and instilled with a deep fear and contempt for capitalism in
general, and for the US, Japanese and ROK capitalist states in
particular. They are also without any experience of a market
economy
system, and have largely been deprived of training in the use of
advanced technologies.
Ironically, having demonised capitalism for decades, the DPRK is
now
on the verge of self-fulfilling prophecy, for when the DPRK comes
to
disavow its rigid isolationism and adopt market economy measures,
its
citizens will be exposed to the full rigours of capitalism in an
international economy which they will have little to offer except
cheap labour. In any scenario for opening up the DPRK economy the
bulk
of the population will begin near the bottom of the Asia-Pacific
economic hierarchy. The spectre of large numbers of people with
little
or no training of relevance to a modern market economy, operating
in a
climate of desperation or privation, will constitute a potential
burden of some magnitude on the conscience as well as the economies
and administrations of the DPRK's neighbours.
Conclusion
The unspoken assumption behind the diplomacy of the DPRK's major
adversaries, a diplomacy that Australia strongly supports, is that
strong countervailing pressure to a range of unacceptable DPRK
policies may help to contain their effect and eventually channel
Pyongyang in more productive directions. The preconditions
currently
advanced by Australia for resuming relations reflect this outlook
and
at the same time serve fundamental foreign policy interests, most
notably strong support for measures likely to reduce tension on the
Korean peninsula, and support for nuclear non-proliferation, it
accords with the current situation where Australia has practically
no
bilateral economic interests in the DPRK, apart from securing
recovery
of debts owed to Australian banks, and few political or consular
interests involved that might counterbalance its other interests in
the region. It also reflects the Australian assessment that the
initiative for progress toward these goals lies with the DPRK and,
despite the many unknowns surrounding the current leadership
configuration in the DPRK, there is no sign that any interest in
such
progress exists in Pyongyang.
Meanwhile, change to the current terms of the Australia-DPRK
relationship must await significant developments in the DPRK. For
the
present we are left with the core dilemma of dealing with a regime
whose basic foreign policies are unacceptable to the broad
international community and whose current international commercial
behaviour all but precludes economic, trade and investment links.
This
leaves the potential for developing ties confined almost entirely
to
initiatives in fields such as education, academic exchanges,
culture
and sport, all of which rely substantially on non-government
initiative and support.
The stakes in Korea remain high. The Korean War is still far from
over--literally, because there is only a ceasefire in operation,
and
psychologically, because although the DPRK can no longer achieve
its
objective of reunification under the leadership of the KWP, its
very
identity as a state is inextricably bound up in the struggle
against
the South. It seems psychologically and ideologically incapable of
accepting that there could be life beyond this struggle.
But the increasingly dysfunctional nature of the DPRK state has
produced a situation where the DPRK is no longer an adversary pure
and
simple, for while it continues to pose a serious military threat to
its neighbours it also poses a major humanitarian challenge. The
issue
for the ROK, Japan, the US and their allies is, therefore, no
longer
simply to withstand the DPRK challenge but to both withstand it and
comprehend the dimensions of the human disaster that has already
occurred in the DPRK. Should the Korean peninsula manage to avoid a
military catastrophe, and should the DPRK somehow manage to shed
its
identity as a war-making state, the future will still bring
overwhelming humanitarian and social problems within the DPRK. It
would be prudent policy for the governments in the region to give
thought in the present to the intricate question of how to effect a
soft landing for the people of the DPRK.
(*) Swinburne University of Technology and Monash University,
Melbourne. The author wishes to thank Moira Smythe and Jeff
Robinson
of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for their
cooperation
and assistance.
(n1) Henry S. Albinski, Australian External Policy under Labor.'
Content, Process and the National Debate (St Lucia: University of
Queensland Press, 1977) p. 148.
(n2) For the Australian government announcement and the joint
communique of the two parties see, Australian Foreign Affairs
Record
45, 7 (July 1.974) pp.491-2.
(n3) For the detailed response of the Australian Minister for
Foreign
Affairs, Senator D.R. Willesee, to the expulsion see, Australian
Foreign Affairs Record 46, 11 (November 1975) pp.658-9. The embassy
staff left Canberra without warning, sending a diplomatic note
accusing the Australian government of unspecified unfriendly
actions
towards the DPRK mission via commercial mail, presumably en route
to
Canberra Airport. However, according to the then Maltese High
Commissioner to Australia, Joseph Forace, they had planned their
departure some time in advance. Forace was a neighbour of the DPRK
charge d'affaires, he was accredited to Pyongyang from Australia,
and
in various ways also acted as mentor and friend to the DPRK
mission.
In a subsequent conversation Forace told this writer that the
charge
had advised Forace of the mission's impending departure some three
weeks prior to the actual date.
Forace's account is significant in the light of speculation that a
somewhat bizarre sequence of events involving the DPRK embassy in
the
last week of its sojourn in Australia influenced the decision to
leave. Since these events have entered into Canberra diplomatic
folklore, we may note them briefly here, following an account
subsequently given to this writer by the then ROK Ambassador to
Australia. A few days before the DPRK departure, a DPRK Embassy
driver
was involved in a single car accident near the residence of the ROK
Ambassador. The first person on the scene happened to be the ROK
Ambassador. The driver, who was unhurt, immediately recognised the
Ambassador and fled on foot. The following day, a DPRK diplomat
visited the local Mercedes Benz dealer and sought to purchase a
replacement off the showroom floor for cash. The dealer advised
that
he would have to order one from Sydney since the particular car the
diplomat wished to purchase had already been sold--to the ROK
Embassy.
Why, then, did the DPRK leave the way it did? The DPRK has never
offered any explanation, but to this writer it: seems plausible
that
DPRK diplomats were under orders to effect a sudden evacuation in
countries where relations turned unfriendly. The DPRK's record
clearly
indicates a belief in the predatory nature of international
transactions, whether diplomatic or commercial, and it may have
believed that its diplomats could have been held against their will
had they sought to leave in a regular fashion. Moreover, the DPRK
may
have seen this manner of departure as a deliberate expression of
displeasure with Australia. In this connection, it is worth noting
that shortly afterwards, the DPRK mission in Buenos Aires effected
a
similar departure after a bilateral dispute between the DPRK and
Argentina.
(n4) On the Korean Question at UNGA 30 see, B.C. Koh, `The Battle
Without Victors: The Korean Question in the UN General Assembly',
Journal of Korean Affairs V, 4 (January 1976) pp.43-63.
(n5) The DPRK's uncomplicated view of competing party politics
emerged
during official talks between Senator Willesee and then DPRK
Foreign
Minister Ho Dam in May-June 1975, in which this writer
participated.
When the Australian side suggested that its mission in Canberra
should
endeavour to establish contact with the Liberal Party, then in
opposition, in order to ensure that bilateral relations proceeded
smoothly should there be a change of government, Ho expressed
surprise
that the Australian government would wish it to have dealings with
its
'enemies'.
(n6) On 9 October 1983, seventeen senior ROK officials, including
four
Cabinet ministers, and four Burmese were killed when a bomb was
detonated at the beginning of an official ceremony at the Martyrs
Mausoleum in Rangoon. The officials were accompanying President
Chun
Doo Hwan on the first leg of a tour of Southeast Asian nations and
Australia. Chun, the intended victim of the bomb, escaped injury,
evidently because the bomb was detonated prematurely. After an
official investigation, on 4 November the Burmese authorities
pronounced themselves satisfied that DPRK commandos were
responsible
for the 9 October bombing. The Burmese government then proceeded to
expel the DPRK Rangoon mission and withdraw diplomatic recognition
of
the DPRK.
(n7) Speech delivered to the Sir Hermann Black Contemporary Asian
Affairs Forum at the University of Sydney. It should also be noted
that the speech was delivered in the context of a particularly
active
and encouraging phase of inter-Korean negotiations.
(n8) On the course of the parliamentary talks see, Dong-Bok Lee,
'North-South Korean Parliamentary Talks: Positions of Two Sides and
Prospects', Korea and World Affairs 12, 4 (Winter 1988) pp.782-808.
(n9) Interview with ABC/Radio Australia Beijing correspondent
Trevor
Watson in Beijing, 30 January 1989 (CRS A9737; 92/060089 DFAT),
(n13) See Hanguk Ilbo (8 November 1990); and Canberra Times (7
November 1990) for reports on Costello's 'secret talks' with the
DPRK.
(n14) For background to the DPRK's nuclear program see, Andrew
Mack,
`North Korea and the Bomb', Foreign Policy 83 (Summer 1991) pp.
87-104; James Cotton, `North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions', Adelphi
Paper
275 (March 1993) pp. 94-106; and Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig,
`North Korea's Nuclear Program' in Young Whan Kihl (ed.), Korea and
the World Beyond the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).
(n15) Australian (24 October 1991).
(n16) Australian Financial Review (6 November 1991). Also see,
Australian (6 November 1991). While the visit was a non-government
visit Evans received a courtesy call from Kim. Concerning the debt
issue, the ANZ bank had acquired an exposure of approximately A$50
million and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia an exposure of
approximately A$5 million as a result of participation in bank
consortium loans originally made in the 1970s. In September 1991,
the
ANZ, as the leader of one of the bank syndicates, instituted legal
proceedings in the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to force
the DPRK government to resume interest payments (suspended in 1984)
and commence principle repayments. ANZ officers assessed that the
DPRK
banking officials with whom they were dealing understood the issues
involved but that their political masters did not. It therefore
sought
DFAT's assistance in communicating the serious ramifications of a
successful ICC action to the DPRK at the highest possible level. It
was under these conditions that Senator Evans raised the issue with
Kim Yong Sun. in more recent public statements of Australia's
position
the debt issue has again tended to recede to the background.
(n17) Interview with ABC Radio New York correspondent Matt Peacock,
broadcast on the ABC program AM on 2 April 1993. Cable from
Canberra
to Foreign Min Abroad, 2 April 1993 (CRS A9737; 92/060089, DFAT).
(n21) Passing mention should be made of a visit by the DPRK
Committee
for the Promotion of External Economic Cooperation 1-4 February
1994.
The purpose of the visit was to attract Australian investment to
the
Rajin-Sunbong Free Economic and Trade Zone, which had been
proclaimed
in December 1991. However, at the time of writing no Australian
companies had invested in the Zone.
(n22) `Australia Keeps Check on Korea Crisis', Australian Financial
Review (24 June 1994).
(n23) The visit eventually led to a US-DPRK Framework Agreement,
signed in October 1994, which to date has essentially contained the
crisis within an ongoing negotiation process. For an account of
this
crisis and its outcome see, James Cotton, `The North Korea/United
States Nuclear Accord: Background and Consequences', Korea Observer
XXVI, 3 (Autumn 1995) pp. 321-44.
(n24) `Australia Keeps Check on Korea Crisis'.
(n25) `Carrot-and-stick' may overstate Australia's options since
the
only real stick that Australia possesses is, of course, support for
US-initiated moves against the DPRK. Perhaps a more accurate
description of the Australian option would be the old classroom
maxim
of `praise-and-ignore'.
(n26) See footnote 23.
(n27) Australia, too, has already become active. On 18 September
1995,
it announced a contribution of A$100 000 in emergency relief
assistance to the DPRK and, following revelations that flood damage
had been more serious than at first assessed, announced a further
contribution of A$500 000 on 17 January 1996.
(n28) On the pattern of DPRK negotiation see, Jong-Hwan Song, `How
the
North Korean Communists Negotiate: A Case Study of the South-North
Korean Dialogue of the Early 1970s', Korea and World Affairs 8, 3
(Fall 1984) pp. 610-64.
(n29) Beginning with the size of the military-industrial sector,
estimated to be four times larger in proportional terms to that of
the
former Soviet Union at its height. See, Marina Trigubenko,
`Industry
of the DPRK: Specific Features of the Industrial Policy, Sectoral
Structure and Prospects', in Pukhan kyongje ui hyonhwang gwa
chonmang
(Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1991).