This research explores the evolution of the Soviet Union's Korea
          policy between 1985 and 1991, focusing on the correlation tween
          Gorbachev's shifting power position within the Soviet
          leadership and the development of the Soviet Union's new policy
          toward the two Koreas. Soviet leaders utilized policy issues
          (foreign and domestic) to mobilize support in their internal
          power struggle. Conversely, they needed to establish a firm
          power base before launching new policies. Thus, power and
          policy in the Soviet political system often enjoyed a mutually
          reinforcing relationship, and foreign policy issues became
          entangled in the domestic political process. As Gorbachev's
          power position improved and his reform policy (new political
          thinking) was refined, Soviet policy toward the two Koreas
          correspondingly evolved in three phases: (1) Gorbachev rising:
          the formulation of the new political thinking (March
          1985-summer 1988); (2) Gorbachev ascendant: the implementation
          of new political thinking (fall 1988-summer 1990); and (3)
          Gorbachev in decline: the continuing momentum of the new policy
          (fall 1990-December 1991). In late 1990-1991, Soviet Korea
          policy was characterized by an undisguised tilt toward Seoul
          Nevertheless, the Soviets did not consider Soviet relations
          with the two Koreas to be a zero-sum game. Moscow sought to
          establish a balanced relationship with both Pyongyang and
          Seoul, and hoped to play an active role in peace and security
          on the Korean peninsula.       

   In a span of six years, Gorbachev's foreign policy behavior against a
   backdrop of constantly shifting internal and external conditions led
   to revolutionary changes in international relations that were
   tantamount to a general upheaval of seismic proportions. The historic
   changes sweeping across the world during this period transformed
   Soviet relations with the two Koreas as well. In the pre-Gorbachev
   era, Soviet foreign policy toward North and South Korea unequivocally
   tilted toward the North. Moscow had maintained friendly and
   cooperative relations with Pyongyang based on identical ideological
   interests and complementary strategic interests. On the other hand,
   Moscow had continued to express a hostile attitude toward Seoul while
   allowing only limited private contacts with South Koreans. The Soviets
   had blindly supported North Korea's official policy and refused to
   recognize South Korea as a legitimate member of the international
   community.
  
   After Gorbachev rose to power, Moscow's "love-hate relationship" with
   North and South Korea began to reverse. Moscow increasingly alienated
   its traditional ally--North Korea--and cultivated friendship and
   cooperative relations with its former enemy--South Korea. This
   research explores the evolution of the Soviet Union's Korea policy
   between 1985 and 1991, focusing on the correlation between Gorbachev's
   shifting power position within the Soviet leadership and developments
   in the Soviet Union's new policy toward the two Koreas.
  
   POWER AND POLICY IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
  
   Soviet leaders viewed the outside world through the ideological prism
   of Marxism-Leninism. Based on their own interpretation of
   Marxist-Leninist ideology, they prescribed different strategies and
   tactics for Soviet foreign policy. Gorbachev's "new political
   thinking" on international relations contained new elements that
   radically departed from past interpretations of Marxist-Leninist
   ideology.[1] New political thinking should be understood in the broad
   context of the Soviet leader's efforts to revitalize the Soviet system
   through reform. Under Gorbachev, domestic needs took precedence over
   foreign policy considerations.
  
   Gorbachev's new political thinking inevitably affected the pattern of
   Soviet interactions with Northeast Asian countries, including the two
   Koreas. Moscow critically reevaluated its past policies toward these
   countries and sought to establish itself as a new actor in the region.
   The primary goal of this new policy was not to diminish the influence
   of the United States since Moscow now considered U.S.-USSR cooperation
   as its highest priority. Rather, it was primarily aimed at the Soviet
   Union as a new full-fledged member of the region that would share its
   prosperity. Gorbachev's Korean policy was an integral component in the
   overall restructuring of Soviet foreign policy and the reestablishment
   of its role in the international community.
  
   The new political thinking vis-a-vis the two Koreas was as follows.
   First, de-ideologization of Soviet foreign policy meant de-emphasizing
   ideological ties with its traditional ally, North Korea, which had
   been a drain on its resources, and emphasizing economic and political
   ties with capitalist South Korea for economic gain and political
   influence. Second, the renunciation of the principle that "war is the
   midwife of revolution" led the Soviets to object to the North Koreans'
   revolutionary war against the South. The possibility that a local war
   in Korea might escalate into an all-out war involving the Soviet Union
   precluded any Soviet involvement in North Korea's war efforts. Third,
   the principle of peaceful coexistence between different socioeconomic
   systems implied that the Soviet Union should recognize South Korea as
   a legitimate member of the international community. Thus, the new
   political thinking called for the establishment of normal
   state-to-state relations with South Korea.
  
   Gorbachev's new foreign policy, like his overall reform program at
   home, affected the interests of individual Soviet leaders differently.
   The nature of its impact (or perceived impact) on their material
   interests and ideological values differed in degree and intensity
   depending on the nature of the groups or groupings to which they
   belonged. Those who saw hope and personal enhancement in perestroika
   and the new political thinking joined the reformers led by Gorbachev.
   Those who perceived drastic reform as a direct threat to their
   interests formed an informal coalition against Gorbachev and his
   reform policies.[2] The polarization within the Soviet leadership
   extended to foreign policy issues.
  
   Consequently, two opposing groupings of individual leaders and
   institutions congealed into "the new political thinkers" and "the old
   political thinkers." The former grouping drew its membership from
   Gorbachev's inner circle, reform-minded academics, and intelligentsia
   who believed in political and diplomatic solutions to inter-state
   conflicts on the basis of balance of interests and compromises. They
   emphasized the de-ideologization of Soviet foreign policy. The
   membership of the latter grouping matched that of the
   "military-industrial complex." The old political thinkers considered
   the world to be divided into two confronting political systems and
   searched for ways to settle regional conflicts by strengthening the
   military and political positions of socialism while weakening those of
   capitalism.
  
   Soviet leaders were engaged in a constant struggle for power because
   the Soviet system lacked an institutionalized process of leadership
   succession. In that absence of an orderly succession of leadership,
   the Soviet Union inevitably became involved in the informal process of
   competition and maneuvering between opposing factional and
   institutional leaders. Soviet leaders utilized policy issues (foreign
   as well as domestic) to attract potential allies and followers and to
   mobilize their support in their internal power struggle. Conversely,
   they needed to establish a firm power base and maintain widespread
   support within the leadership before launching new policies,
   especially if the new policies were to transform the overall structure
   of Soviet society, which would pose a direct threat to the power and
   interests of the "ruling" class. Thus, power and policy in the Soviet
   political system often enjoyed a mutually reinforcing relationship,
   and foreign policy issues became entangled in the domestic political
   process.
  
   As Gorbachev's power position improved and his reform policy (new
   political thinking) was refined, Soviet policy toward the two Koreas
   was inevitably altered. Accordingly, Soviet policy toward the two
   Koreas correspondingly evolved in three phases: (1) Gorbachev rising:
   the formulation of the new political thinking (March 1985-summer
   1988); (2) Gorbachev ascendant: the implementation of new political
   thinking (fall 1988-summer 1990); and (3) Gorbachev in decline: the
   continuing momentum of the new policy (fall 1990-1991).
  
   GORBACHEV RISING: THE FORMULATION OF NEW POLITICAL THINKING (MARCH
   1985-SUMMER 1988)
  
   Between March 1985 and summer 1988 the center of power and authority
   in the Soviet Union resided in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
   (CPSU), particularly the Politburo and, to a lesser extent, the
   Central Committee of the CPSU. Once appointed as general secretary of
   the party in March 1985, Gorbachev swiftly moved to consolidate power
   by skillfully winning allies and putting friends in important
   positions and by removing his opponents and critics from power. Power
   was the ultimate means of bringing the new political thinking into
   reality.
  
   Consequently, Gorbachev's Soviet Union "experienced an unprecedented
   upheaval in turnover in its leadership, comparable only to the
   dramatic turnovers during the mid-1930s, but without the tragedy of
   the purges."[3] Gorbachev promoted his own appointees to Politburo
   membership, replacing Brezhnev holdovers. At the end of 1988, nine of
   the eleven full members (excluding Gorbachev) of the Politburo were
   Gorbachev's appointees. All eight candidate members were his own
   appointees and supporters.[4] The almost complete elimination of
   Brezhnev holdovers from the Politburo did not result in a total
   consensus on the new Soviet foreign policy within the leadership. The
   new Politburo members who had been appointed or promoted by Gorbachev
   had different ideas about the speed and extent of reforms to be
   pursued by the Soviet Union. The Politburo was still torn.[5]
  
   The Secretariat of the Central Committee also experienced high
   turnover. Of the five senior secretaries (secretaries who were
   simultaneously full members of the Politburo) in 1980, Gorbachev was
   the only survivor, and five of the six junior secretaries were
   Gorbachev appointees. However, Gorbachev was less successful in
   replacing the Central Committee with his own people; in the Central
   Committee, only 60 percent of the full members and 44 percent of the
   candidate members brought in during 1981 were replaced in 1986.
   Consequently, the Central Committee became a center of resistance to
   Gorbachev's reform.[6]
  
   It was not until mid-1988 that Gorbachev consolidated his power within
   the Soviet leadership. Until then, he had to accommodate the
   conservative leaders' position in regard to Soviet policy toward East
   Asian countries, including the two Koreas. During this period, Soviet
   foreign and security policy was determined by the majority opinion of
   the Politburo where the conservative hard-liners were challenging his
   power and obstructing his reform policies. Furthermore, internal and
   external conditions were not ready for a new policy in Korea.
   Internally, the communist-dominated "old" society remained largely
   intact; externally, the cold war atmosphere still persisted. The time
   for the implementation of new political thinking in the Korean
   peninsula had not yet arrived.
  
   The first years of Gorbachev's reign were a transitional period in
   Soviet policy toward the two Koreas from old thinking to new thinking.
   During this period, supporters of the two contradicting positions
   coexisted, adding confusion and ambiguity to Soviet policy toward the
   Korean peninsula. As a natural corollary, Gorbachev's policy toward
   the Korean peninsula in this period was largely a residual
   continuation of his predecessor's.
  
   In Search of a New Relationship with Seoul
  
   Gorbachev does not seem to have had a clear-cut policy toward South
   Korea in the first three years of his rule. Gorbachev's policy toward
   Seoul appears to have followed the "muddling through" found in the
   past.[7] Between 1985 and the summer of 1988, Gorbachev's new
   political thinking vis-a-vis Seoul was being formulated at the
   conceptual level. In the meantime, the Soviet Union was continuing the
   "old" policy toward Seoul, i.e., limited relations with Seoul at the
   unofficial level.[8]
  
   Gorbachev's new political thinking called for the recognition of
   existing realities. One of these realities was South Korea's rise to
   regional power status, sustained by its rapid economic growth.
   Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech on July 26, 1986, expressed Soviet
   readiness to develop relations with every state in the Asia-Pacific
   region. By doing so, Gorbachev implied his willingness to improve
   relations with South Korea. However, in his Vladivostok speech,
   Gorbachev did not make any overtures toward Seoul, and mentioned South
   Korea only in the context of a possible regional settlement. In the
   speech, Gorbachev was still expressing support for North Korea's
   position on unification and on the nuclear-free zone on the Korean
   peninsula.[9]
  
   As late as May 1988, Moscow was still expressing concern about an
   anti-Soviet military alliance among the United States, South Korea,
   and Japan.[10] The expressed hostility toward Seoul was partly due to
   frustration about its deteriorating strategic position in Northeast
   Asia, and partly intended to keep North Korea from tilting further
   toward China.[11] Besides, it reflected the pervasive influence of the
   "old political thinkers" in Soviet society and the intimate
   party-to-party relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang.
  
   Nevertheless, the Soviets steadily increased the level of
   nonpolitical, unofficial contact with the South Koreans and
   demonstrated a flexible and pragmatic attitude toward Seoul, that
   reflected the increasing influence of Gorbachev and his new political
   thinking in the Soviet foreign policy community.[12] The Soviet
   handling of a fishing boat violation in Soviet waters was a good
   example. A South Korean fishing boat and its twenty-six crew members
   were seized by a Soviet naval vessel in October 1986, for operating
   illegally within the Soviet 200-mile exclusive fishery zone. The
   Soviet authorities showed a businesslike attitude in resolving this
   matter and promptly released the crew members upon payment of a
   fine.[13]
  
   Another illustration of changing Soviet attitudes toward South Korea
   was the handling of the repatriation of the ethnic Koreans residing on
   Sakhalin Island. Whenever South Korea raised the question of
   repatriation, Soviet officials in the past had replied that a Korean
   had not applied for repatriation. In March 1988, Soviet officials
   stated in a newspaper interview that Korean residents in Sakhalin
   could go to South Korea via Japan and could choose to live in South
   Korea.[14] In December 1988, the Soviet Union allowed eighty-two
   Koreans to return permanently to South Korea. Other evidence of the
   Soviet Union's flexible and pragmatic policy toward Seoul was Soviet
   participation in various athletic competitions hosted by South Korea.
   From March 1985 until January 12, 1988, Moscow dispatched more than
   thirteen different sports delegations to Seoul for competition in
   South Korean sporting events. [15]
  
   Economic exchanges were another indication of Soviet diplomatic
   flexibility in dealing with Seoul. Indirect trade at the nonofficial
   level between the two countries steadily increased in 1985-1988. The
   total trade volume between Seoul and Moscow amounted to $57 million in
   1984. It more than doubled in 1985 to $122 million due mainly to
   Gorbachev's increasingly flexible trade policy toward Seoul. Bilateral
   trade continued to increase, jumping from $164 million in 1987 to $290
   million in 1988.[16]
  
   Residual Continuation of the Old Ties with Pyongyang
  
   Gorbachev initially continued his predecessor's policy toward North
   Korea, which revolved around bilateral military cooperation to counter
   the strategic encirclement of the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia.
   Consequently, military cooperation between the two communist allies
   increased conspicuously.
  
   Kim Il Sung's five-day visit to Moscow that started on May 23, 1984,
   was a turning point in Soviet-North Korean relations.[17] This was
   Kim's first visit to Moscow since 1961.[18] After the visit, Moscow
   resumed its shipment of advanced weapons and military equipment to
   Pyongyang for the first time since 1973.[19] In exchange for these
   advanced weapons, Moscow received direct access to North Korean
   airspace and military facilities.
  
   Soviet First Deputy Premier Gaidar Aliyev led the Soviet delegation to
   a celebration of the 40th anniversary of Korea's liberation in August
   1985.[20] Since brief visits by Premier Alexei Kosygin in 1965 and
   President Nikolai Podgorniy in 1969, no high-ranking Soviet leader had
   visited Pyongyang. Gromyko was expected to visit Pyongyang, but Aliyev
   went instead. The Soviet delegation led by Aliyev consisted mainly of
   the elements of the military-industrial-party apparatus complex of the
   Soviet Union. Aliyev's hard-line rhetoric against the perceived threat
   to Soviet security reflected the functional and ideological interests
   of the complex, which emphasized military preparedness to counter
   capitalist encirclement and ideological unity with socialist
   countries, including North Korea.
  
   Kim Il Sung made a five-day trip to Moscow in October 1986 for the
   second time in two years. The summit signified efforts to renew and
   increase mutual interests. Military matters almost certainly topped
   the agenda. After Kim's visit in 1986, the Soviets agreed to supply
   MiG-29 and SU-25 aircraft, SA-5 air defense missiles, and the Tin
   Shield advanced radar designed for early warning, target acquisition,
   and ground control.[21] The supply of the sophisticated weapons seems
   to have been the price for Moscow's continuing access to North Korea's
   territory and military facilities; by November, Soviet military
   utilization of North Korean airfields and ports increased visibly.
  
   The Soviet quest for a closer military relationship with North Korea,
   however, did not derive from renewed Soviet interest in an aggressive
   and expansionist policy in East Asia, but by the same token, there was
   no sign that "Pyongyang was ready to become a stage for the Soviet
   Union to act out an aggressive role."[22] The two communist allies
   reached a common conclusion that a "marriage of convenience" was
   necessary due to their deteriorating strategic positions.
  
   The two communist neighbors embraced one another for different
   reasons. From the Soviet perspective, the supply of advanced military
   hardware and the resumption of economic assistance to Pyongyang were
   necessary to exercise political influence over North Korea and to
   restore military balance on the Korean peninsula.[23] In Pyongyang's
   calculation, the tilt toward Moscow was deemed necessary to catch up
   with Seoul in military and economic modernization, place a brake on
   China's tendency to increase contacts with Seoul, and free itself from
   the diplomatic isolation imposed upon it as a result of its terrorist
   activities.
  
   Despite the seemingly harmonious relationship, Moscow and Pyongyang
   had differences over Gorbachev's reform and North Korea's succession
   issue. Gorbachev's perestroika and new political thinking were frowned
   upon and opposed by North Korea. During Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow
   in 1986, Gorbachev reportedly lectured him on the deplorable state of
   North Korea's economy: "Kim was literally called to the Kremlin and
   was told by Mr. Gorbachev to improve his economy. In fact, Kim got the
   same kind of scolding as Truong Chinh (the Vietnamese chief who
   succeeded Le Duan) for mismanagement of the economy and mishandling
   Soviet aid."[24] Furthermore, the Soviets refused to openly endorse
   the succession of North Korean President Kim Il Sung's son and
   anointed heir, Kim Jong II. Soviet scholars openly criticized Kim Il
   Sung's political ideas, and claimed that the idea of Chuche
   (self-reliance) was diametrically opposed to the "new political
   thinking."[25]
  
   Military exchanges between Moscow and Pyongyang continued into
   1987-1988. In May 1987, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy,
   Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, led a naval delegation to North Korea.[26]
   A detachment of Soviet warships under the flag of Admiral G. A.
   Khavatov, commander of the Pacific Fleet, visited the Port of Wonsan
   in May 1988, on an official friendly visit.[27] Moscow's military
   moves in North Korea suggested that Gorbachev's leadership had not yet
   departed from Brezhnev's longstanding policy of acting as a stabilizer
   on the peninsula.
  
   From 1985 to early 1988, Soviet foreign policy toward the two Koreas
   was in transition. New Soviet leader Gorbachev was groping for a new
   relationship with Seoul and Pyongyang. The Kremlin was redefining its
   national interests in East Asia. Gorbachev began to critically
   reassess its traditionally friendly ties with Pyongyang, which had
   been a political and economic bur, den to his country, and to search
   for increased economic ties with Seoul, which would benefit his reform
   policy.
  
   The Soviet Union upgraded its relations with Pyongyang while
   increasing economic exchanges with Seoul at the unofficial level. This
   seemingly contradictory policy may be ascribed to two factors.
   Gorbachev had not yet firmly established a new policy toward North and
   South Korea, although he clearly enunciated the broad framework for
   the new Soviet policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, he had
   yet to firmly consolidate power within the Soviet leadership, and
   consequently faced formidable opposition and resistance to a reformist
   foreign policy.
  
   GORBACHEV ASCENDANT: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW POLITICAL THINKING
   (FALL 1988-SUMMER 1990)
  
   By mid-1988, General Secretary Gorbachev had established himself as
   the predominant leader in the Kremlin. Still, his reform program was
   obstructed by persistent resistance from conservative party leaders.
   Gorbachev came to realize that the powers of party general secretary
   were not adequate to implement his reform policy successfully and that
   the communist party apparatus was not the vehicle for a solution, but
   part of the problem. In 1988-1990, the Soviet leader shifted the power
   center from the party to the state by restructuring party and state
   institutions and creating new structures and, by doing so, tried to
   further enhance his power position and promote his reform program.
  
   The 19th All-Union Party Conference of June 1988 introduced drastic
   changes in the party structure.[28] Gorbachev substantially weakened
   the power of the Central Committee Secretariat through structural
   changes at the Central Committee Plenum in September 1988, in order to
   eliminate the resistance of the party machine to his reform.[29]
  
   In late 1988, Gorbachev moved to assume direct control over the state
   organs. The first sign came with Gorbachev's election as chairman of
   the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in October 1988, whereby he
   assumed the role of head of state while retaining the position of
   general secretary. After assuming the chairmanship of the Presidium of
   the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev pushed through the adoption of proposals
   to create new legislative bodies--the Congress of People's Deputies
   and a restructured Supreme Soviet, whose members were elected by the
   Congress of People's Deputies. In May 1989, the newly created Congress
   of People's Deputies elected Gorbachev as chairman of the Supreme
   Soviet (the new legislative body), thereby granting broad domestic and
   foreign policymaking powers to the Soviet leader. Finally, at the
   initiative of Gorbachev, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies
   approved the creation of an executive presidency and abolition of the
   communist party's monopoly of power in March 1990,[30] and elected
   Gorbachev the first executive president of the country. As president
   of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was accorded a wide range of executive
   powers. The creation of the presidency shifted the center of power
   from the party to state authority. The communist party was deprived of
   its monopoly of power and became a political party within a system
   that still did not allow other political parties to function.
  
   As Gorbachev accumulated power through personnel changes and by
   restructuring the Soviet political process and system, his new
   political thinking was being sequentially implemented into Soviet
   foreign policy. Soviet policy toward the Korean peninsula transformed
   accordingly.
  
   Realization of Gorbachev's New Policy Toward Seoul
  
   During 1988-1990 objective national interests and economic gains,
   instead of ideological principles and geostrategic considerations,
   became the driving force behind a new Soviet policy toward Seoul.
  
   The economic complementarily of South Korea and the Soviet Union
   contributed to a mutual interest in economic cooperation and trade.
   The Soviet Union possessed potential markets and rich natural
   resources (especially in East Siberia and the Maritime Province), as
   well as high-level basic technology and science, while South Korea had
   consumer goods, industrial technology, and marketing experience. The
   Soviet Union was an especially attractive partner for South Korea as a
   source of raw materials, including natural gas, coal, and oil. Moscow
   intended to channel South Korea's investment into the development of
   natural resources, the creation of a social infrastructure in the
   Soviet Far East, and increased production of consumer goods.
  
   The potential for mutually beneficial economic relations was not the
   only factor that prompted Soviet economic cooperation with Seoul. The
   stagnation in Soviet-Japanese trade contributed to Moscow's move
   toward closer economic ties with Seoul. Despite repeated requests from
   the Soviet Union to participate in development projects in Siberia,
   Japan refused to make a substantial investment in the region for
   political reasons. The Japanese insisted on the return of the four
   disputed Kurile Islands, which were seized by the Soviet Union after
   World War II, as the precondition for starting massive economic
   cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Soviets were hoping that South
   Korean-Soviet economic cooperation would not only replace Japan's role
   but also exert pressure on Japan to reconsider its position.[31]
  
   Furthermore, Gorbachev was eager to join the Asia-Pacific community
   with the help of South Korea. In his scheme, South Korea would serve
   as the bridge linking the Soviet Union with those in the dynamic
   economic club in the Pacific rim.
  
   In 1988, the economic relations with Seoul that had been maintained at
   the private, unofficial level developed into formal relations. In his
   Krasnoyarsk speech on September 16, 1988, Gorbachev noted for the
   first time his willingness to develop economic ties with Seoul: "I
   think that, in the context of the general improvement of the situation
   on the Korean peninsula, possibilities may open up for establishing
   economic ties with South Korea."[32] The statement symbolized the
   application of the new political thinking to relations with South
   Korea. In fact, the idea of building economic relations with Seoul had
   long been considered by the Soviet leadership.[33]
  
   Tho Seoul Olympiad, held on September 17-October 3, 1988, provided a
   good excuse for the Soviets to establish political contacts with the
   South Koreans. Moscow's decision to participate in the Seoul Olympics
   was secretly reached in November 1985 when sports ministers from
   thirteen Soviet-bloc nations met in Vietnam. "Publicly, they declared
   their support for Pyongyang's demand for co-hosting but privately they
   decided to attend the Seoul Games, no matter what finally
   happened."[34] On January 11, 1988, Moscow officially announced its
   intention to participate in the 24th Olympiad in Seoul.[35]
  
   Pyongyang's vehement protests notwithstanding, Gorbachev decided to
   participate in the Seoul Olympics in order to seek new opportunities
   in Seoul even at the risk of neglecting Soviet obligations toward
   North Korea. Soviet participation in the Olympic games was based on a
   number of considerations: Moscow did not want to damage improving
   relations with the West and Asia by boycotting the Olympics; the
   remarkable economic performance and skilled diplomacy of South Korea
   favorably affected the Soviet decision to join the Seoul Olympics; and
   Seoul also was viewed as an attractive trading partner and economic
   model for the Soviet economy.[36]
  
   However, the Soviet elite was still divided between the new political
   thinkers, who energetically promoted closer ties with Seoul, and the
   conservative leaders, who were reluctant to fully endorse Moscow's new
   policy toward Seoul. First, Soviet media coverage of South Korea prior
   to and during the Seoul Olympics indicates that Soviet society was not
   fully open-minded toward South Korea. Throughout the run-up to the
   Olympics, no informative material appeared in the Soviet media beyond
   the current political events occurring in the host country.[37]
   Second, the decision by the Soviet authorities to print commemorative
   stamps for the 24th Seoul Olympiad without mentioning the host city,
   Seoul, was another sign of the persistent influence of the
   conservative leaders in the USSR.[38]
  
   Nevertheless, the Seoul Olympiad served as the catalyst for improved
   relations between Moscow and Seoul. The exchange of trade offices
   between the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) and the Soviet
   Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) that followed soon after the
   Olympics was a direct result of government-to-government contacts and
   negotiations between the two countries prior to and during the Seoul
   Olympiad.[39] For all practical purposes, the Soviet Union granted de
   facto recognition to South Korea when it exchanged trade offices
   endowed with consular functions. The Soviet side, however, emphasized
   the unofficial nature of the trade offices, claiming that the Soviet
   CCI, which had reached the agreement with the South Korean side, was
   not a government organization.[40]
  
   Soon thereafter, however, Moscow expressed its intention to upgrade
   its relations with Seoul to a political level. In an effort to
   initiate political relations with Seoul, the Kremlin decided to invite
   to Moscow Kim Young Sam, president of the opposition Reunification
   Democratic party (RDP). Subsequently, Kim Young Sam in his capacity as
   the president of the opposition Reunification Democratic party (RDP)
   visited Moscow on June 2-10, 1989, at the invitation of the IMEMO (the
   Institute for World Economics and International Relations of the USSR
   Academy of Sciences)[41] Kim's Moscow visit marked the beginning of
   the normalization process between the two countries. During Kim's
   visit, the Soviets agreed in principle to normalize relations with
   Seoul. However, at that time, a detailed discussion was not held in
   regard to a concrete timetable for the normalization.[42]
  
   The exchange of consular departments was another significant step
   toward Moscow-Seoul normalization. The two countries agreed to
   exchange diplomats who would establish consular departments in Moscow
   and Seoul by endowing the two countries' trade missions, which had
   opened earlier, with consular functions.[43] The Soviet side
   maintained that the exchange of consular departments did not imply the
   establishment of official consular relations with Seoul. Although the
   exchange of consular departments clearly indicated the political
   relations between the two countries, the bilateral relations remained
   at the nonofficial level as long as the Kremlin insisted on the
   non-official nature of the relationship.
  
   In early 1990, the Kremlin openly expressed its willingness to
   establish a formal diplomatic relationship with Seoul. The real
   breakthrough occurred during Kim Young Sam's second visit to Moscow on
   March 20-27, 1990. In contrast to his first Moscow visit, Kim was
   invited in his capacity as co-chairman of South Korea's ruling
   Democratic Liberal party (DLP).[44]By inviting a leader of South
   Korea's ruling party, the Kremlin clearly recognized the political
   entity of the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, Gorbachev expressed his
   belief that no obstacle existed to diplomatic relations between the
   two countries.[45] Nevertheless, the Kremlin did not provide a clear
   timetable for normalization.
  
   In fact, the timing of normalization emerged as a thorny issue between
   the two countries because of their different goals and priorities.
   South Korea's goal was to conclude final diplomatic relations with the
   USSR at the earliest date as part of its nordpolitik.[46] The South
   Koreans believed that economic profits were secondary to political
   gain, i.e., diplomatic relations. Therefore, Seoul preferred to go
   directly to ambassador-level diplomatic ties without going through
   consulate-level ties.
  
   On the other hand, the Soviets were interested primarily in the
   successful implementation of their reform program and Siberian
   development. The Soviets were eager to first get a commitment from
   South Korea to provide investment and technology to improve their
   deteriorating economy. By this time, the Kremlin had clearly discarded
   its previous position on a strict separation between economics and
   politics, and was pursuing a new policy vis-a-vis South Korea that
   linked economics and politics. The Soviets now tried to extract as
   many economic concessions from South Korea as possible, in exchange
   for granting diplomatic recognition to the country.
  
   Kim's second Moscow visit was soon followed by the first summit
   between South Korean President Roh Tae Woo and Soviet President
   Gorbachev in June 1990 in San Francisco. At the San Francisco meeting,
   the two presidents agreed in principle on the exchange of diplomatic
   recognition. On September 30, 1990, a South Korean-Soviet foreign
   ministerial meeting was held at the UN and diplomatic relations were
   formalized.
  
   The movement of Soviet foreign policy toward normalization with Seoul
   since 1988 can be seen as a result of Gorbachev's strengthened power
   position and the victory of his new political thinking.[47]
   Gorbachev's new policy toward South Korea met, however, with
   substantial resistance from conservative Soviet leaders. The
   "military-industry-party apparatus complex" opposed the new policy
   concerning South Korea. When Novoe Vrerniya published its interview
   with South Korean politician Kim Young Sam in October 1988, Ignatenko,
   its chief editor, received numerous phone calls complaining about the
   editorial decision.[48] The invitation to Kim Young Sam for a Moscow
   visit was approved by the Central Committee following a controversial
   debate. Furthermore, the Politburo was split over the issue of
   normalization with Seoul, as Aleksandr Yakovlev revealed.[49]
  
   Widening Distance in Moscow-Pyongyang Relations
  
   Soviet reform policy and its tilt toward Seoul emerged as the major
   source of conflict and friction in Moscow-Pyongyang relations in
   1988-1990. Nevertheless, the Kremlin chose not to totally alienate
   Pyongyang; instead it sought to maintain political influence through
   diplomatic persuasion and military/economic assistance. During this
   period, Soviet diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis Pyongyang were remarkable
   in two respects: (1) the efforts to persuade Pyongyang's hard-line,
   conservative communists to adopt Soviet-style reform, and (2) the
   continued consultations with North Korean leaders in an effort to
   allay their anxiety and misgivings in regard to Seoul-Moscow
   normalization.
  
   The Soviets made deliberate efforts to keep the North Koreans informed
   about the new policy toward Seoul and sought Pyongyang's understanding
   in advance. The Soviets discussed their participation in the 1988
   Seoul Olympics beforehand with the North Koreans. In an attempt to
   assuage Pyongyang's anxiety over Soviet participation in the Seoul
   Olympics, the Kremlin reassured North Korean Foreign Minister Kim
   Young Nam, who was visiting Moscow in May 1988, of its intent not to
   establish a diplomatic relationship with Seoul.[50]
  
   Parallel with consultations, the Soviets attempted to persuade the
   North Koreans to adopt reform policies. KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov was
   sent as head of the Soviet delegation for the 40th anniversary of
   North Korea's founding in September 1988 to discourage Pyongyang from
   disrupting the Seoul Olympics.[51] While in Pyongyang, the Soviets
   repeatedly underlined the importance of political thinking in the
   current international environment and underscored peaceful settlement
   of the Korean problem.[52]
  
   Shevardnadze's visit to Pyongyang in December 1988 was intended to
   increase North Korea's understanding about .the direct economic
   relations between Seoul and Moscow that rapidly expanded after the
   Seoul Olympics. At that time, the Soviet foreign minister assured
   North Korean leaders that, despite the direct economic relations, his
   country would not establish a formal diplomatic relationship with
   Seoul.[53] The North Korean leadership apparently accepted the
   inevitable movement toward closer economic relations between Moscow
   and Seoul. Thereafter, Pyongyang shifted its policy directions from
   thwarting any official contacts between Seoul and Moscow to foiling
   Soviet diplomatic recognition of Seoul.[54]
  
   The issue of Seoul-Moscow normalization became a source of great
   friction between Moscow and Pyongyang. On September 2-3, 1990,
   Shevardnadze visited Pyongyang after his trip to China to inform the
   North Korean leadership of the imminent conclusion of diplomatic ties
   with Seoul. After Shevardnadze informed North Korean leaders of Soviet
   policy to open diplomatic ties with Seoul, he received a six-item
   memorandum from the North Korean side that listed grounds for opposing
   the Soviet move. Among others, the memorandum indicated North Korea's
   willingness to develop nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union opened a
   diplomatic relationship with South Korea.[55]
  
   The Soviet Union continued its strategic cooperation with the DPRK.
   Moscow continued to supply new-type weapons to North Korea in
   19881990.[56] A continued shipment of military items from Moscow to
   Pyongyang partly resulted from earlier commitments[57] and partly
   stemmed from the persistent influence of the military-industrial-party
   apparatus complex within Soviet society that favored continuing
   military ties with North Korea. The Soviets also probably wanted to
   maintain some degree of political influence over the recalcitrant ally
   while restoring the military balance on the Korean peninsula that was
   tilting in Seoul's favor.[58]
  
   GORBACHEV IN DECLINE: THE CONTINUING MOMENTUM OF NEW POLICY (FALL
   1990-1991)
  
   The domestic crisis that loomed large by late 1990 increasingly
   narrowed Gorbachev's latitude of policy choice. Deteriorating economic
   conditions at home and the spreading secessionist movements by various
   constituent nationality groups within the Soviet Union posed a direct
   threat to its territorial integrity and constitutional order. Over the
   years, the Soviet leader destroyed the "old system" by undermining the
   authority of the CPSU and the centrally planned economic system
   without creating a viable alternative. Through his reforms, Gorbachev
   inadvertently encouraged a radical devolution of central power to the
   republics and regional governments and eventually destroyed the very
   political structure on which his own power depended.[59] The
   potentially formidable powers of the president as stipulated in the
   new Soviet Constitution became increasingly unusable. It is
   paradoxical that the moment. Gorbachev's constitutional power reached
   its apex, his real power began to erode rapidly.
  
   Faced with domestic turmoil and crisis, Gorbachev turned to
   conservative forces in fall 1990. Gorbachev changed his policy goals
   from perestroika and glasnost to social order and territorial
   integrity. Gorbachev's highest priority now shifted from the
   implementation of a reform policy to preservation of his political
   power and arresting of the Soviet Union's disintegration. Gorbachev's
   lean toward the right became obvious by November 1990. As a result,
   the conservative hard-liners gained considerable influence over Soviet
   policy, both domestic and external.[60] In spring 1991, Gorbachev
   again shifted to a neutral position between right-wing conservatives
   and left-wing reformists. The Soviet leader made a last-ditch effort
   to arrest further devolution of power from the center to the republics
   and to reverse the secessionist movements sweeping throughout the
   country by concluding a new union treaty with Republican leaders that
   would form a new type of Soviet federalism, replacing the 1924 Union
   Treaty. Under the new union treaty, the power and autonomy of the
   republics were to increase substantially and the authority of the
   central government was to be reduced substantially. The conservatives
   found the new union treaty to be a direct threat to their own
   interests. In August 1991, when the conclusion of a new union treaty
   was imminent, the "military-industrial-party apparatus complex"
   rebelled and attempted a military coup against Gorbachev. After the
   abortive coup, power and political authority further shifted from the
   center to the Soviet constituent republics and secessionist movements
   intensified throughout the country. Gorbachev became incapacitated as
   the Soviet leader and Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian
   republic, emerged as the most powerful political figure in the Soviet
   Union and completely overshadowed Gorbachev. Finally, the state of the
   Soviet Union ceased to exist after the leaders of the three Slavic
   republics formed the Commonwealth of Independent States on December 8,
   1991, declaring their independence from the Soviet Union.
  
   The internal crisis during this period led Gorbachev to became
   increasingly preoccupied with domestic problems. Soviet foreign policy
   became increasingly de-ideologized, leaving the Kremlin without
   specific guidelines for foreign policy. Consequently, Gorbachev's new
   foreign policy was set adrift. During this period, the new political
   thinking increasingly became obsolete as a guide to Soviet foreign
   policy as improvised pragmatism took over.
  
   Forging Cooperative Relations with Seoul
  
   After the relations between Moscow and Seoul normalized in September
   1990, Gorbachev's policy toward Seoul centered around economic issues:
   early implementation of pledged South Korean economic assistance to
   the Soviet Union, and an expansion of trade and economic cooperation.
   In the midst of rapidly deteriorating economic conditions and
   political instability at home, Gorbachev turned to foreign countries,
   including South Korea, for economic assistance that was deemed
   necessary to boost his political influence and authority.
  
   South Korean President Roh Tae Woo paid a four-day official visit to
   Moscow in December 1990 to hold the second summit with Gorbachev.
   During the Moscow summit, the two sides firmly established a legal and
   institutional framework for bilateral relations by signing the
   intergovernmental documents that contained the concrete thrusts of the
   bilateral ties.[61] The third summit between Roh and Gorbachev took
   place on Cheju Island off the southern coast of South Korea in April
   1991. Gorbachev's Cheju visit resulted in numerous agreements and
   promoted further friendly ties between Seoul and Moscow. Gorbachev's
   primary concern was the promotion of bilateral economic cooperation
   and trade. Gorbachev asked Rob to multiply bilateral trade and to
   expedite pledged economic aid to the Soviet Union. The two agreed to
   multiply trade tenfold over the next five years in order to assist the
   Soviet Union's faltering economy.[62]
  
   In return for economic cooperation, Rob sought Gorbachev's help in
   securing peace on the Korean peninsula. Roh's major concern was to
   secure Soviet support for South Korea's bid to join the UN and Soviet
   cooperation for the resolution of North Korea's nuclear weapons
   development program.
  
   In the past, the Kremlin had blindly supported North Korea's objection
   to the two Koreas' separate entries into the UN. The exchange of
   diplomatic ties between Seoul and Moscow in September 1990, however,
   made Soviet objections to South Korea's entry into the UN obsolete.
   The Soviet Union's recognition of South Korea as a member of the
   international community made it unlikely that it would veto South
   Korea's bid to join the international organization as a member of the
   world community. During the Cheju summit in April 1991, Roh and
   Gorbachev agreed that if North Korea continued its objection to the
   simultaneous admission of the two Koreas into the UN, it would be
   necessary for the ROK to join the UN alone.[63] Gorbachev endorsed
   South Korea's campaign to gain membership in the United Nations.
   Subsequently, Seoul and Pyongyang applied for UN membership as
   separate political entities and became members of the international
   organization in the fall of 1991.
  
   The Kremlin also showed keen interest in North Korea's nuclear
   development program and made sincere efforts to prevent the
   recalcitrant regime from acquiring nuclear bombs. The prospects of
   nuclear-armed North Korea at its Far Eastern border were terrifying to
   the Soviet leaders.
  
   North Korea started its nuclear development program with Soviet help
   in the early 1960s at Yongbyon, some sixty miles North of
   Pyongyang.[64] North Korea's nuclear program depended heavily on
   technology and nuclear materials from the Soviets. The Soviets offered
   to supply North Korea with nuclear technology and materials in
   exchange for the North's signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
   (NPT). Subsequently, North Korea signed the NPT in December 1985. By
   doing so, Pyongyang pledged not to manufacture or acquire any nuclear
   weapons. After signing the NPT, North Korea delayed signing a
   safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
   (IAEA) for international inspection of its nuclear facilities and
   materials, disregarding its obligation to do so within eighteen months
   of signing the NPT. North Korea accelerated its nuclear weapons
   development program independently, after the Soviet Union cut its
   material and technical support for Pyongyang's nuclear program in
   1990. Boris Pankin, Soviet foreign minister, revealed in October 1991,
   that the Soviet Union had urged North Korea to sign the nuclear
   safeguards accord at an early date during contacts at all levels, and
   stated that it would continue to urge Pyongyang to do so.[65]
  
   Sharp Reductions in Moscow's Aid to Pyongyang
  
   In late 1990-1991, the Kremlin was seeking to reestablish its
   relationship with Pyongyang. The prominent changes in bilateral
   relations included drastically reduced aid from Moscow to Pyongyang
   and reinterpretation of the bilateral military alliance treaty of
   1961.
  
   After normalization between Seoul and Moscow, Soviet relations with
   North Korea continued to degenerate. To the Soviets, Pyongyang was no
   longer a military ally, but a normal neighboring state.[66] Between
   Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit in early September 1990 and
   Russian President Yeltsin's special envoy Igor Rogachev's visit in
   January 1992, no high-ranking Soviet official went to North Korea. The
   lack of high-ranking personnel exchanges was a good indication of
   friction between the two countries.
  
   Moscow did not discard its ties with Pyongyang completely; it chose to
   maintain some ties with North Korea. The Soviets were still providing
   limited economic and military aid to the North Koreans in order to
   retain some political influence over the recalcitrant regime and to
   maintain military balance on the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, the
   amount of Soviet aid to Pyongyang decreased drastically after 1990 as
   a result of Seoul-Moscow normalization and deteriorating economic
   conditions in the USSR. Economic ties with North Korea had been a
   drain on the Soviet economy. By April 1991, North Korea's debt to the
   Soviet Union amounted to $4.6 billion.[67] In the past, Pyongyang
   could pay in its own currency (won) or get credit for imports. From
   January 1991 on, the Soviet Union demanded payment in hard currency in
   accordance with a trade agreement signed between the two countries in
   November 1990. This seriously hurt North Korea's economy, as more than
   fifty percent of its total annual trade up to 1991 was with the USSR.
   Bilateral trade dropped sharply to 400 million rubles in 1991 from
   1.34 billion rubles in 1990. During the first half of 1991, the
   North's crude oil imports from the Soviet Union were 45,000 tons,
   compared with 440,000 tons in the same period of the previous
   year.[68]
  
   After Seoul-Moscow normalization, a reexamination of the 1961 Treaty
   of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and
   North Korea emerged as a delicate issue in the Seoul-Moscow
   relationship. South Korea expressed strong misgivings about Article 1
   of the treaty, which stipulated automatic military involvement of the
   parties in case of war.[69] The automatic involvement clause has been
   considered a threat to the security of East Asia because inter-Korean
   conflicts were likely to escalate into international conflicts
   involving major powers.
  
   In January 1991, a Soviet military delegation led by First Deputy
   Defense Minister General Konstantin Kotechev, while visiting
   Pyongyang, stated that the treaty of mutual assistance with Pyongyang
   should be administered in accordance with the national interests of
   the two countries.[70] In late December 1991, Russian Foreign Ministry
   official Valeri Ermolov stated that dissolution of the Soviet Union
   would inevitably lead to a review of the 1961 treaty with Pyongyang
   and that Article 1 of the treaty should be revised or eliminated.[71]
   Russian officials concurred with the South Koreans that Article 1
   should be reinterpreted in view of the changed circumstances of the
   relationship. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Panov further clarified
   that Russia would come to the aid of North Korea only when the latter
   was under "unprovoked attack."[72]
  
   Soviet-North Korean military cooperation continued in early 1991, but
   at a substantially reduced scale. The Soviet Union ceased joint
   military exercises with North Korea after 1989 and stopped supplying
   North Korea with offensive weapons after establishing diplomatic ties
   with Seoul in September 1990.[73] The Soviet Union repeatedly
   pronounced its intention to continuously sell defensive weapons to
   North Korea in order to maintain a military balance on the Korean
   peninsula.[74]
  
   Gorbachev's vacillation from the right to the center between fall 1990
   and August 1991 and all the domestic turmoil and upheavals following
   the abortive coup of August 1991 did not leave a visible mark on
   Soviet foreign policy toward the two Koreas. Five factors contributed
   to the relative continuity and consistency of the Soviet Union's Korea
   policy during this period. First, Seoul and Moscow had developed
   interdependent and mutually beneficial economic ties. Because Seoul
   had already pledged $3 billion in economic aid to the USSR,
   Seoul-Moscow relations were economically beneficial to the Soviet
   Union. Expansion of economic relations with Pyongyang would simply
   increase the burden on the Soviet economy.
  
   Second, unlike the Soviet relationship with Japan, there were no
   salient issues between the Soviet Union and South Korea that might
   become a source of conflict, except North Korea's displeasure, which
   was marginalized. Thus, Soviet policy toward Seoul was hardly
   susceptible to domestic pressure from conservative and
   ultra-nationalist leaders who advocated the maintenance of law and
   order internally and the preservation of territorial integrity and the
   restoration of the powerful Soviet empire externally. The cooperative
   and relatively stable relations between Moscow and Seoul during this
   period were in stark contrast to the friction and fluctuations in
   Moscow-Tokyo relations resulting from the increasingly formidable
   influence of conservative leaders and Russian nationalist groups who
   constantly obstructed the Kremlin's efforts to reach a compromise on
   the Kurile Islands issue.
  
   Third, the gap between the Soviets and the North Koreans in terms of
   mutual attitudes and perceptions was widening as Soviet society
   democratized and adopted political pluralism while North Korean
   society stuck to a totalitarian communist system. Furthermore, the
   traditional friendship that characterized Moscow-Pyongyang relations
   was evaporating rapidly as the ideological unity and party-to-party
   connections between the two former communist countries was no longer
   relevant after the disempowerment of the CPSU and economic reform in
   the Soviet Union.[75]
  
   Fourth, once Moscow and Seoul established a formal diplomatic
   relationship through a mutual exchange of recognition, there was no
   way to return to the past. Juridically, Soviet recognition of the ROK
   as a legitimate political entity was irreversible. After Moscow-Seoul
   normalization, the Soviet Union maintained normal state-to-state
   relations with South Korea, which practically precluded the
   possibility of returning to the "honeymoon" with North Korea it had
   experienced during the cold war era.
  
   Finally, Pyongyang's nuclear issue remained the major obstacle to the
   improvement of Pyongyang-Moscow relations. The prospects of nuclear
   proliferation on the Korean peninsula and the resultant military
   buildup and instability in Northeast Asia loomed large in Moscow's
   strategic calculations. Since stability and nuclear nonproliferation
   on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia are Gorbachev's highest
   priority, his endeavor to re-establish a normal relationship with
   North Korea was overshadowed by the North Korea nuclear issue.
  
   CONCLUSION
  
   Soviet foreign policy was closely related to Gorbachev's power
   position within the leadership. A new foreign policy based on the new
   political thinking could be implemented only after Gorbachev amassed
   enough power to overrule the old political thinkers. Gorbachev's
   foreign policy toward the two Koreas often seemed to be contradictory
   and inconsistent. Incompatible views and interests between reformers
   and conservatives within the Soviet leadership and their relative
   power position were largely responsible for this perception.
  
   Moscow-Pyongyang relations gradually deteriorated as Gorbachev's new
   policy placed less emphasis on traditional ideological and military
   ties with Pyongyang and more emphasis on economic and political ties
   with Seoul. In late 1990-1991, Soviet Korea policy was characterized
   by an undisguised tilt toward Seoul, often at the expense of
   Pyongyang.
  
   Nevertheless, the Soviets did not consider Soviet relations with the
   two Koreas to be a zero-sum game; they sought to forge a formal
   political relationship with Seoul without abandoning their traditional
   neighborly ties with Pyongyang. Thus, Gorbachev's new policy toward
   the Korean peninsula sought to establish a balanced relationship with
   both Pyongyang and Seoul. At the same time, Gorbachev hoped to play an
   active role in peace and security on the Korean peninsula, which was
   essential to the stability of Northeast Asia and a prerequisite for
   the successful implementation of his reform program at home.
  
   The new political thinking, which emphasized national interests and
   pragmatism, served as the guiding principle in the pursuit of new
   policy. The new political thinking's role in Soviet foreign policy
   fluctuated. It initially set new directions and goals for Soviet
   foreign policy and led to revolutionary changes in Soviet foreign
   relations, including normalization between Moscow and Seoul. As events
   unraveled rapidly in the Soviet Union, the new political thinking
   became obsolete and was no longer able to guide Soviet foreign policy.
  
   In retrospect, Gorbachev's "new political thinking" was initially
   formulated within the context of being the most up-to-date version of
   Leninist ideology. It emerged, first, as a transition from Leninist
   ideological epistemology to more traditional modes of cognitive
   analysis, and second, as a bridge between the Soviet past and the
   post-Soviet future. Once the USSR collapsed into its component parts,
   the last tie with the Leninist legacy was sundered and the "new
   political thinking" automatically lost its reason for existence and
   evaporated. Nobody talks about the "new political thinking" in the
   former Soviet Union any longer, now that thinking in the former Soviet
   Union is no longer constrained by an official ideology. With the
   ouster of Gorbachev and the break-up of the USSR, "new political
   thinking" passed into history, but the policies it yielded continued
   to be developed by Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Federation.
  
   NOTES
  
   1. For the new political thinking, see Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika:
   New Thinking for Our Country and the World, new and updated ed. (New
   York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1988), pp. 121-238; Mikhail Gorbachev,
   The August Coup: The Truth and the Lessons (New York: HarperCollins
   Publishers, Inc., 1991); Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to
   Freedom, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Free Press, 1991).
  
   2. Shevardnadze recalled how the prospects of the Soviet-American
   rapprochement in the first years of Gorbachev's rule led to the
   formation of a conservative coalition: "After all, the very attempt by
   the two leaders [Gorbachev and Reagan] to make a quick, long-distance
   gain frightened many people and activated forces that were alarmed by
   a rapprochement between the USSR and the United States" (Eduard
   Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, p. 89).
  
   3. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," in Roy Macridis,
   ed., Foreign Policy in Worm Politics: States and Regions, 7th ed.
   (Englewood Cliffs, N J: Prentice Hall, 1989), p. 211.
  
   4. Steven L. Burg, "The Soviet Union: Politics and Society in Flux,"
   in Roy C. Macridis, ed., Modern Political Systems: Europe, 7th ed.
   (Englewood Cliffs, N J: Prentice Hall, 1990), p. 403.
  
   5. Yegor Ligachev and Victor Chebrikov, two of Gorbachev's appointees,
   were opposed to Gorbachev's "radical" reforms and espoused a slower
   and less extensive approach to reforms. Boris Yeltsin, Gorbachev's
   appointee and proponent for "radical" reforms, was removed from the
   post of candidate member of the Politburo after denouncing Ligachev
   for obstructing reforms (the so-called "Yeltsin Affair"). Ligachev,
   with other like-minded leaders, continued to advance conservative
   views on perestroika and the new political thinking and applied a
   brake to Gorbachev's reform efforts.
  
   6. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," in Roy C. Macridis,
   ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics: States and Regions, p. 212.
  
   7. Cf. Peter Berton, "The Soviet Union and Korea: Perceptions,
   Scholarship, Propaganda," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies (spring
   1986), p. 25. Yu-Nam Kim argued that the Soviet Union as of late 1989
   did not have a concrete plan for the Korean question because it had
   not established a firm and stable relationship with other major powers
   in East Asia, i.e., the United States, Japan, and China (Yu-Nam Kim,
   "Soryon'ui kugdong kunsa'anbo chungchaekkwa hanbandon'ui anbo," Miso
   yongu [Seoul], vol. 3 [1989], p. 80).
  
   8. In the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet detente in the early 1970s, for
   the first time the Soviet Union and South Korea made personal contacts
   and exchanges. Nevertheless, Moscow had strictly limited its relations
   with Seoul to an unofficial, nonpolitical level, insisting on
   separating politics from economics.
  
   9. For the full text of the Vladivostok speech, see Pravda, July 29,
   1986, p. 1; The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, August 27, 1986,
   pp. 1-9; "From the Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok, July
   28, 1986," in Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: Documents and
   Materials (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1988), pp.
   16-28.
  
   10. Moscow International Service, May 5, 1988, in FBIS-SOV-88-092, May
   12, 1988, p. 25.
  
   11. Peter Berton, "The Soviet Union and Korea: Perceptions,
   Scholarship, Propaganda," p. 22.
  
   12. Beginning with Seoul's participation in the International
   Geological Congress held in Moscow in the summer of 1984, exchanges
   resumed between South Korea and the Soviet Union that had been
   suspended after the Soviets shot down a Korean airliner in September
   1983 (The Korea Times, June 4, 1985, p. 1).
  
   13. Yonhap, November 21, 1986, in FBIS-APA-86-226, November 24, 1986,
   p. E8.
  
   14. The Korea Herald, March 13, 1988, p. 1.
  
   15. The Korea Herald, December 12, 1987, p. 1.
  
   16. "Pukbang Tonggye," Pukbang Kyungche (Seoul) (June 1991), p. 154.
  
   17. Soviet relations with North Korea, which had been "cool" in the
   1970s, improved remarkably in the mid-1980s.
  
   18. Kim Il Sung, however, went to Vladivostok in 1966 to meet with
   then General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.
  
   19. Dong-A Ilbo, May 3, 1985, p. 1, in FBIS-APA-85-087, May 6, 1985,
   p. El. While visiting Moscow in September 1981, then North Korean
   Prime Minister Li Jong-ok requested the delivery of advanced Soviet
   MiG-23s, pointing to President Reagan's decision to sell F-16s to
   South Korea. Moscow agreed to provide MiG-23s to North Korea on the
   condition that Pyongyang grant overflight rights for Soviet warplanes
   and permit installation of Soviet intelligence and communications
   equipment in North Korea. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail
   Kapitsa discussed the sale of MiG-23s, T-72 tanks, and an advanced
   combat helicopter with North Korean leaders during his fifteen-day
   visit to Pyongyang in November 1984, according to Vastly Matuzok, a
   translator at the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, who defected to South
   Korea during the Kapitsa visit (Richard Nations, "Militant
   Brotherhood--Kim Tilts to Moscow," Far Eastern Economic Review, June
   20, 1985, p. 32).
  
   20. See Richard Nations, "Love Boat to Wonsan," Far Eastern Economic
   Review, August 29, 1985, pp. 22-23.
  
   21. Rajah Menon, "New Thinking and Northeast Asian Security," Problems
   of Communism (March/June 1989), p. 26.
  
   22. Edward Olsen, "Keeping North Korea Out of Soviet Hands," Far
   Eastern Economic Review, May 14, 1987, p. 41.
  
   23. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
  
   24. South China Morning Post, November 1, 1986, p. 1, in
   FBIS-AFA-86-213, November 4, 1986, p. D2.
  
   25. Dae-Sook Suh, "Changes in Sino-Soviet Policies Toward Korea and
   Implications for the United States," paper delivered at the Cato
   Institute Conference on the U.S.-South Korean Alliance, The Capitol
   Hilton, Washington, DC, June 21, 1990, pp. 12-13.
  
   26. Krasnaya Zvezda, May 12, 1987, in FBIS-SOV-87-096, May 19, 1987,
   p. C1.
  
   27. Krasnaya Zvezda, May 9, 1988, p. 5, in FBIS-SOV-88, May 10, 1988,
   p. 18.
  
   28. During the conference, Gorbachev attempted without success to
   remove the party from day-to-day involvement in government and to
   institute in the Soviet system a separation of powers among three
   branches of government.
  
   29. In the Central Committee Plenum of September 30, 1988, Gorbachev
   succeeded in removing six holdovers from the Brezhnev era, including
   Andrei Gromyko. Gorbachev also removed his major rival, Igor Ligachev,
   from the influential post of party second secretary. Gorbachev's
   emasculation of the party institutions invited sharp criticism from
   conservative party members (Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev Faces Revolt in
   Party Apparatus," Report on the USSR [August 11, 1989], pp. 7-10).
  
   30. For the constitutional changes approved by the Congress of
   People's Deputies, see Izvestiya, March 16, 1990.
  
   31. Chart Young Bang, "Prospect of Korean-Soviet Economic Cooperation
   and Its Impact on Security and Stability of the Korean Peninsula," The
   Korean Journal of International Studies, vol. 19, no. 3 (autumn 1990),
   pp. 320-321.
  
   32. Mikhail Gorbachev, "Krasnoyarsk Speech," The Current Digest of the
   Soviet Press, vol. 40, no. 38 (October 19, 1988), p. 7.
  
   33. V. Shipayev, "Page Tree Mailbag: From Silence to Contracts,"
   Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 25, 1988, p. 3, in FBIS-SOV-88-209,
   October 28, 1988, p. 17.
  
   34. Christian Science Monitor, January 13, 1988, p. 8. As late as late
   1984, the Soviet Union was expressing reservations about its
   participation in the upcoming Seoul Olympics. On November 19, 1984, in
   the first public criticism, M. Gramov, president of the Soviet
   National Olympic Committee, told a delegation of Japanese members of
   Parliament that South Korea was an inappropriate site for the Olympics
   because of the U.S. troop presence and CIA operations in the country.
   He also opposed Seoul's hosting of the 1988 Olympics by citing threats
   made by terrorists against Soviet athletes (Therese Orbrecht,
   "Breaking the Ice," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 11, 1985, p.
   17).
  
   35. The Soviet decision was reportedly made by the communist party's
   ruling Politburo after Gorbachev's visit to Washington in December
   1987 (Christian Science Monitor, January 13, 1988, p 8).
  
   36. Cf. James W. Riordan, "Korea-Soviet Relations," Korea & World
   Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4 (winter 1988), pp. 759-762; George F. Kunadze,
   "USSR-ROK: Agenda for the Future," in ROK-USSR Cooperation in the New
   International Environment (Seoul, Korea: Institute of Foreign Affairs
   and National Security, 1991), p. 82.
  
   37. James W. Riordan, "Korea-Soviet Relations," p. 776.
  
   38. This decision drew criticism from the Soviet government organ,
   Izvestiya. See The Korea Times, September 15, 1988, p. 7, in
   FBIS-SOV-88-180, September 16, 1988, p. 12.
  
   39. Washington Post, September 11, 1988; New York Times, September 14,
   1988. According to Valeri Nazarov, head of the USSR Chamber of
   Commerce and Industry, the practical work of establishing trade and
   economic ties between the Soviet Union and South Korea began after
   Gorbachev's speech in Krasnoyarsk (Moscow Domestic Service, April 3,
   1989, in FBIS-SOV-89-064, April 5, 1989, p. 18).
  
   40. Tokyo NHK General Television Network, January 4, 1989, in
   FBIS-SOV-89-003, January 5, 1989, p. 11.
  
   41. The question of Kim's planned Moscow visit was discussed in
   October 1988 in the Central Committee of the CPSU. Two questions were
   raised at the Central Committee: what format and procedure should be
   taken to invite a politician from a country that had no diplomatic
   relations with the USSR; and, what benefits and losses would result
   from an invitation to Kim? The Kremlin decided that Kim would not be
   invited by the Soviet government or the CPSU, but by a research
   institute involved in Soviet foreign policy, the IMEMO (Tong'il Minchu
   Tang [Reunification Democratic Party], Pyonghwa'wa tongil'ui
   yomyon'eul an'go [Seoul, 1989], pp. 16-18).
  
   42. The Soviet side simply stated that Seoul-Moscow normalization
   would take place in the near future (interview with Chung Jae Moon
   [then South Korea's Parliamentarian, and Kim Young Sam's confidante
   who was sent to Moscow as Kim Young Sam's secret envoy on several
   occasions to prepare for Kim's Moseow visits] in June 1991 in Seoul).
  
   43. Yonhap, March 23, 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-057, March 23, 1990, pp.
   10-11.
  
   44. The ruling party (Democratic Justice party) and two opposition
   parties (Reunification Democratic party and New Democratic Republican
   party) merged into the Democratic Liberal party (DLP) in January 1990.
  
   45. See Minchucha'yutang [Democratic Liberal party], Hanbando
   tong'ilgwa sekae'pyonghwa'ui yomwon'ul an'go [In Pursuit of Korean
   Unification and World Peace](Seoul, April 1990), p. 4.
  
   46. For South Korea's Nordpolitik, see Seung-Ho Joo, "South Korea's
   Nordpolitik and the Soviet Union (Russia)," The Journal of East Asian
   Affairs, vol. 7, no. 2 (summer-fall 1993), pp. 404-450.
  
   47. In addition, U.S.-Soviet detente, Sino-Soviet normalization, and
   the ongoing inter-Korean dialogue all provided favorable conditions
   for Moscow-Seoul normalization.
  
   48. Tong'il Minchu Tang (Reunification Democratic party), Pyonghwa'wa
   tongil'ui yomyon'eul an'go [In Search of Korean Unification and World
   Peace], pp. 17-18.
  
   49. Yakovlev made this statement during his talk with Kim Young Sam in
   March 1990 (Dong-A Ilbo [New York Edition], March 24, 1990).
  
   50. Joachim Glaubitz, "The Soviet Union and the Korean Peninsula,"
   Aussenpolitik (Hamburg), vol. 43, no. 1 (1992), pp. 83-84.
  
   51. President Andrei Gromyko's scheduled visit to Pyongyang in
   September 1988 was canceled at the last minute, and KGB Chief
   Chebrikov came to Pyongyang as his substitute to the dismay of North
   Koreans (Tokyo, Kyodo in English, in FBIS-SOV, September 12, 1988, p.
   23).
  
   52. Pravda, September 9, 1988, p. 1, in FBIS-SOV-88-175, September 9,
   1988, p. 18.
  
   53. Izvestiya, January 5, 1989, in FBIS-SOV-89-006, January 10, 1989,
   pp. 20-21.
  
   54. Vasily V. Mikheev, "A Korean Settlement: New Political Thinking
   vs. Old Ambitions," Korea & World Affairs (winter 1989), p. 677.
  
   55. Moscow Television Service, October 1, 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-191,
   October 2, 1990, p. 19; Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to
   Freedom, p. 164. According to Vladimir O. Rakhmanin, who accompanied
   Shevardnadze on the Pyongyang trip, the North Koreans expressed their
   intent to manufacture nuclear weapons clearly during the talks
   (interview with Rakhmanin in January 1993 at The Pennsylvania State
   University).
  
   56. Andrey Pichugin, Mosckovskiye Novosti, Moscow International
   Service, September 13, 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-179, September 14, 1990,
   p. 10.
  
   57. Mikhail L. Titarenko, "New Trends in Asian-Pacific International
   Situation and their Impacts on Soviet-South Korean Relations,"
   Sino-Soviet Affairs, vol. 14, no. 2 (summer 1990), p. 22; Dae-Sook
   Suh, "Changes in Sino-Soviet Policies Toward Korea and Implications
   for the United States," pp. 12-13.
  
   58. Parris Chang, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Korea," in William J.
   Taylor, Jr. el al, eds. The Korean Peninsula (Boulder, CO: Westview
   Press, 1990), p. 168.
  
   59. See "Mikhail Gorbachev Interviewed in Munich," RFE/RL Research
   Report, vol. 1, no. 12 (March 19, 1992), p. 55.
  
   60. For the role of the conservatives in Soviet foreign policy, see
   Suzanne Crow, "The Twilight of All-Union Diplomacy," RFE/RL Research
   Report, vol. 1, no. 1 (January 3, 1992).
  
   61. For the full text of the joint communique issued at the Moscow
   summit, see Pravda, December 15, 1990, pp. 1, 5, in FBIS-SOV-90-243,
   December 18, 1990, pp. 16-18.
  
   62. New York Times, April 21, 1991; Chosun Ilbo (New York Edition),
   April 22, 1991, p. 1.
  
   63. Seoul KBS-1 Television Network in Korean, April 20, 1991, in
   FBIS-EAS-91-077, April 22, 1991, pp. 21-22.
  
   64. Valery Denisov, "The Problem of Nuclear Nonproliferation in
   Korea," International Affairs (Moscow) (8.1994), p. 35. For North
   Korea's nuclear program, see Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, "The
   Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: Problems and Prospects,"
   Arms Control (London), vol. 14, no. 2 (August 1993), pp. 65-92.
  
   65. Chosun Ilbo, October 3, 1991, p. 31. Yielding to mounting
   international pressure, North Korea belatedly signed the safeguards
   agreement in January 1992, six years after signing the NPT.
   Differences over the issue of the IAEA inspection of two suspected
   nuclear waste sites in North Korea led to heightened tensions in Korea
   and in Northeast Asia in 1993-1994. Finally, U.S.-North Korea
   high-level talks in Geneva resulted in a compromise solution to the
   North Korea nuclear issue on October 21, 1994. Thereby, North Korea
   pledged to totally abandon its suspected nuclear weapons program in
   exchange for economic and technical assistance, including the
   construction of two light water nuclear reactors (LWR), and improved
   relations with the United States. Cf. Michael R. Gordon, "US-North
   Korea Accord Has a 10-Year Timetable;" and Alan Riding, "US and NK
   Sign Atom Pact," New York Times, October 22, 1994.
  
   66. Byung-joon Ahn, "Soviet-South Korean Relations," Asian Survey,
   vol. 31, no. 9 (September 1991), p. 822.
  
   67. The heavy debt partly resulted from North Korea's arms imports
   from the USSR. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, North Korea
   purchased an average of $200 million worth of military hardware from
   the Soviet Union annually, but since the mid-1980s the amount
   increased to $400 million with an accumulated total of more than $3
   billion for the decade (Far Eastern Economic Review, May 23, 1991, p.
   17).
  
   68. The Korea Times, October 19, 1991, p. 2, in FBIS-EAS-91-204,
   October 22, 1991, p. 22.
  
   69. Article 1 of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual
   Assistance Between the USSR and the DPRK stipulates: "Should either of
   the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition
   of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other
   Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other
   assistance with all the means at its disposal."
  
   70. Joachim Glaubitz, "The Soviet Union and the Korean Peninsula," p.
   90.
  
   71. Yonhap, December 24, 1991, in FBIS-EAS-91-247, December 24, 1991,
   p. 19.
  
   72. In July 1992 the Russian Foreign Ministry announced its intention
   not to repeal the Pyongyang-Moscow treaty, and harshly criticized
   Seoul's pressure on Russia to rescind it. The Russian Foreign
   Ministry's announcement came in response to the South Korean Defense
   Ministry's demand in early July to abrogate the 1961 Moscow-Pyongyang
   treaty (Izvestiya, July 31, 1992, p. 6; Chosun Ilbo, July 30, 1992).
   Subsequently, the treaty was extended for another five years.
  
   73. Seoul KBS-1 Television Network, November 6, 1991, in
   FBIS-EAS-91-217, p. 28.
  
   74. Moscow International Service in Korean, January 24, 1991, in
   FBIS-SOV-91-020, January 30, 1991.
  
   75. Vastly Mikheyev, "New Soviet Approaches to North Korea," Korea &
   World Affairs, vol. 15, no. 3 (fall 1991), pp. 447-448.
  
   ~~~~~~~~
  
   By Seung-Ho Joo
  
   Seung-Ho Joo is an assistant professor in the Political Science
   Department at the University of Minnesota--Duluth.