Return to
*North Korean Studies*
By Andrei Lankov, Asia Times On-line
SEOUL, 25 Dec. 2004 - Back in the 1970s, when I was a teenager in the then Soviet Union in my native Leningrad, many barbershops stocked copies of Korea magazine, a lavishly illustrated North Korean propaganda monthly. What was such a publication doing in the barbershops? The answer, I suspect, would be quite embarrassing for its editors: it was subscribed to in order to amuse the patrons who were waiting for a haircut.
The magazine was heavily subsidized by Pyongyang, so its annual subscription rate was dirt-cheap while its content was both bizarre and funny. Thus the magazine, which was published to inspire worldwide love and admiration for the Great Leader and his son and successor, the Dear Leader, was often (I would say from my experience, in most cases) subscribed to by people who saw it as a laughingstock and opened its pages only to make fun of the Great Men. The North Korean propaganda appeared very weird to the Russians - not least because it looked like a grossly exaggerated version of their own official propaganda. The grotesquely bad Russian translation of the texts also provided unintended comical effects.
This remarkable magazine is warmly remembered by ex-Soviet people of middle age, many of whom still can easily quote more weird sentences from memory. Sets of this venerable monthly are kept by some Russian families, and there are even a couple of Russian websites where sarcastic webmasters have collected particularly bizarre and/or comical quotations from Korean propaganda materials (see, for example, http://kimirsen.by.ru and http://www.aha.ru/~zentsov/korea.htm).
All this took place in the 1970s when the Soviet press still occasionally extolled the virtues of the "easternmost socialist country". But this was an official policy. Common people had quite different opinions on this matter - and, for a change, their views were not that much different from the actual views of the government, even if grand strategy made the usual diplomatic lies unavoidable.
Of course, nobody could do research on how foreign countries were perceived by the Soviet public: in a communist society everybody was supposed to adore the official allies and hate the official enemies, switching one's emotions according to ever-changing international alliances. Nonetheless, it is possible to provide a brief and impressionistic review of how the Soviet/Russian view of North Korea has evolved from 1945 to 2004. In a nutshell, North Korea's image evolved from that of a "heroic country" to that of a "comical and weird Stalinist theme park" - and then went halfway back.
Until 1945, Korea was not well known in Russia. It began to feature prominently in Soviet media only after 1945, when a number of Soviet journalists were dispatched to North Korea to write about a newly acquired junior ally. The journalists produced the usual set of sugary stories about the great gratitude the Koreans allegedly felt toward their Soviet liberators as well as about the enthusiasm with which they were engaged in the socialist construction.
The Korean War, of course, boosted interest in things Korean. According to the official Soviet version, the war was started by the "US imperialists and their South Korean puppets", and North Korea was portrayed as a victim of international aggression. Horror stories about US atrocities flooded the press as well.
The participation of Soviet military pilots in dogfights over Korea was not admitted at that time, but rumors about their deeds circulated widely and inspired much admiration for "our boys" (as a matter of fact, the Soviets believed - and Russians still sincerely believe - that they had the upper hand in the air war in Korean skies and "taught the Yankee a good lesson"). Few if any Soviet people had sympathy for the Americans, seen as "aggressors". However, most Soviet people did not care much about Korea, unless they were afraid that the Korean War would lead to an all-out nuclear confrontation. In spite of all the officially professed internationalism, the average Soviet man or woman was not terribly interested in the "Orient", and treated it with a measure of paternalistic arrogance.
Soon after the end of the Korean War, references to North Korea nearly disappeared from the Soviet press. This silence had political explanations: from the late 1950s, Kim Il-sung was building his "juche-style" Stalinism while the original Stalinism was being dismantled in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Moscow was unhappy about such developments, but was unwilling to express its disapproval openly since critical statements would have led to further deterioration of its already strained relations with Pyongyang. The government-controlled press could write neither bad nor good things about North Korea. Thus newspapers largely remained silent and only occasionally published something positive about, say, a new Pyongyang stadium.
In spite of this official blackout, rumors about North Korea circulated widely among educated Soviet people. They were aware of Kim Il-sung's deification, police omnipresence, and strained relations with Moscow. To a large extent, the North Koreans damaged their own standing by flooding the USSR with exceptionally bad propaganda, the above-mentioned Korea monthly being the most notorious.
After Josef Stalin's death and Nikita Khrushchev's reforms of the late 1950s, the Soviet people began to discuss political and social questions again - not in the press, of course, but in the privacy of their kitchens and bedrooms. A new generation of Soviet intellectuals looked at North Korea with great unease. For them, Pyongyang embodied everything that was wrong about the communist system. It appeared a caricature of the USSR. Unlike the West, where many intellectuals toyed with Maoism and similar versions of the extreme left, virtually nobody in Soviet intellectual circles of the 1960s or 1970s felt positive toward either Mao Zedong nor Kim Il-sung. The memories of Stalin's terror were too fresh to make the East Asian Stalinists appear attractive.
Of course, the Soviet intellectual world of the 1960s and 1970s did not consist of liberal-minded intellectuals alone, even if the latter dominated educated discourse. There were also hardliners and nationalists, hawkish admirers of a strong state. In this group, however, North Korea also did not enjoy much popularity. The hardliners were probably quite happy by Kim's Stalinist policies, but they did not like his intense nationalism or his anti-Russian tendencies.
Officialdom, including a majority of diplomats and Leonid Brezhnev himself, was not fond of Pyongyang either: they disapproved its brutal and inefficient Stalinism and they also saw it as an unreliable, costly and scheming ally.
From around 1970, more daring journalists even made hints at more sensitive topics - such as Kim's personality cult or lingering militarism. The hints had to be subtle, but when a Soviet television audience of the late 1970s saw how North Korean kindergarten kids enthusiastically performed a dance called "My Heavy Machine-Gun", the bizarreness of the situation was for everybody to see. No doubt such an effect was intended by the producers of that documentary.
The official "wall of silence" collapsed around 1988, but this did not result in much surprise or shock. People knew already. The press basically reran the stories that had circulated as rumors since long before.
Moscow's foreign policy in the first post-Soviet years was based on the assumption that Russia should join the Western world unconditionally, and thus North Korea was seen as a partner both doomed and embarrassing. Its immediate collapse was widely expected.
Kim Il-sung died a peaceful death in 1994, and the widely expected violent collapse of his regime never happened, but even this non-event produced some good literature in Russia. Lev Vershinin, a historian and a good writer, authored Endgame, a novel that described a violent collapse of an imaginary communist dictatorship. The country of the novel had features that reminded readers of Romania, Cuba and North Korea at the same time. Even geographic names were deliberately mixed against all laws of linguistic history, so that the capital of this imaginary country had the Korean-sounding name of T'aedongan and the place of the Stalinists' last stand was called Munch'on. Around the same time, Igor Irteniev, arguably the most popular Russian satirical poet of the 1990s, mockingly wrote of an event everybody expected to take place soon: "I still cannot sleep without a sedative / in the darkness of the night / when I imagine what happens to Kim Il-sung / in the blood-stained hands of the executioners."
But this mood began to change around 1995 when new voices came to be heard in Russia as well. These voices presented a more positive approach to North Korea.
This reflected the general change of mood in Russia. A large and increasing part of its population began to see the US-led West not as a friendly force but as a crafty rival, preying on Russia's weakness. The pro-Western enthusiasm of the early 1990s waned and was replaced by deep suspicions - not only in government offices but also in the popular psyche. Thus the geopolitical opponents of the West, the assorted "pariah states", began to attract some sympathy in Russia, and unabashed national egoism came to be seen as the only rational strategy.
Official policy toward North Korea also began to turn around. By 1997-98 it became clear that Pyongyang would not collapse any time soon, so the restoration of working relations with North Korea was a necessity, especially against the backdrop of Russia's efforts to develop a more independent political line. In academic articles, the critique of North Korea was toned down and augmented with a critique of the alleged Western insensibilities in dealing with this very peculiar society.
It's worth noticing that the human-rights issue does not play a major role in Russian foreign policy. A period of idealistic enthusiasm in the early 1990s proved to be short, so few people in Russia take seriously statements about human rights. Neither the Russian government nor the Russian public shows any enthusiasm for crusades in the name of human rights in distant lands. It is well known that North Korea is notorious for its disregard for human rights, but Russians could not care less. Their position is simple: first, it is North Korea's internal affair; second, if North Koreans themselves live under such a regime, who are we to pass judgments on their behalf?
And there are of course people who are sincere admirers of the Kims' regime, even if their numbers are small. For some Russian leftists, the regime is seen as a living example of communist resilience. They did not question the right of the government to starve half a million or a million people to stay in power. They either deny the facts (half a million dead? Washington's propaganda, of course!) or present the deaths as voluntary sacrifices made by the patriotic Korean people. But actually Korean domestic politics is not very important to the Russian Pyongyang-worshippers: it is the "anti-imperialist" stance of North Korea that really matters for the Russian left.
Fortunately, the general Russian public is still skeptical of the North Korean regime and does not harbor many illusions about its true nature. But nobody in Russia wants to build policy on the basis of ideology these days. Russians have had enough of ideology over the past century, so now they prefer interests, pure and simple. And to remind themselves of the past, many people still look through old, slightly yellowed pages of Korea monthly.
Dr Andrei Lankov is a lecturer in the faculty of Asian Studies, China and Korea Center, the Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea, and his thesis focused on factionalism in the Yi Dynasty. He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia. He is currently on leave, teaching at Kookmin University, Seoul.
Ирина ДРОБЫШЕВА, Золотой Рог #99, 23 декабря 2004 г .
Вчера во Владивостокском институте международных отношений ДВГУ успешно прошла защита кандидатской диссертации "РФ и КНДР: опыт, проблемы и перспективы сотрудничества". И, пожалуй, впервые здесь присутствовали представители дипломатических кругов, что лишний раз подчеркивает актуальность темы не только для науки, но и для живой практики.
В современных международных отношениях Северо-Восточная Азия занимает особое положение как место соприкосновения стратегических и геополитических интересов мировых держав, а активизировавшиеся связи между Россией и КНДР - составная часть международной деятельности стран СВА.
Особый интерес к теме вызван еще и тем, что КНДР - страна достаточно закрытая, а соискателем степени кандидата политических наук стала известная журналистка Ольга МАЛЬЦЕВА, неоднократно бывавшая в КНДР в составе делегаций во главе с полпредом Константином ПУЛИКОВСКИМ.
В августе 2002 г. она освещала визит главы КНДР по Дальнему Востоку и дважды брала интервью у Ким Чен Ира. Она и журналист Леонид ВИНОГРАДОВ помогали полпреду написать книгу "Восточный экспресс. По России с Ким Чен Иром", ставшую настоящим бестселлером. В этом году вышла книга ее собственных впечатлений от поездок в КНДР и встреч с северокорейским лидером. Она называется "Вальс с Ким Чен Иром". Книгу отличает хороший слог, искренность и отсутствие категоричных суждений по поводу увиденного. И ее тоже невозможно было найти в свободной продаже. Она переведена на корейский и издана в Южной Корее.
Оппоненты отметили особую ценность исследования как в использовании огромного количества российских и иностранных источников, так и в возможности задать интересующие исследователя вопросы лидеру КНДР. При этом автор не обходит острых углов в современных российско-северокорейских отношениях и правильно определяет стратегические цели России на Корейском полуострове, которые должны быть сконцентрированы на создании всеобъемлющей системы коллективной безопасности на полуострове для обеспечения стабильности на российском Дальнем Востоке.
By Andrei Lankov, Asia Times On-line
SEOUL, 7 Dec. 2004. - One of the most common descriptions of North Korea is a "Stalinist state". Indeed, for decades this unfortunate country could be seen as an embodiment of Stalinism - actually, in many regards it was far more Stalinist than Josef Stalin's Russia itself. But this is hardly the case any more.
Despite talk of the tyrannical Hermit Kingdom with its human-rights abuses, the past decade has witnessed the steady disintegration of the system that was founded by the late Great Leader, Kim il-sung. Actually, one has to stretch the definitions in describing North Korea of 2004 as "Stalinist". Clearly North Korea is still run by a repressive regime that treats its population with remarkable brutality. But many major peculiarities of Stalinism are now disappearing from North Korea.
Its centrally planned economy is in great disarray. Its Leninist party has nearly ceased to operate, with military and "normal" state bureaucracy assuming many of its functions. Private enterprise is tolerated and even cautiously encouraged. And of course, its old system of political control is visibly crumbling. Reports from visitors, defectors and foreign visitors leave no doubt that North Korea is still very repressive and restrictive. But it is also clear that it is much less repressive and restrictive than it was 15 years ago, let alone in its worst times of terror and brainwashing in the 1970s.
Analysis of these increasingly numerous reports creates a remarkable picture of a slowly disintegrating system of "thought control", once the world's most effective. Its slow-motion demise is probably not a result of deliberate decisions, but rather a product of the growing impotence of the government and its inability to find enough resources - from economic to human resources - to maintain its old structures or control. After all, efficient supervision costs money, and Pyongyang is desperately short of money.
As a former citizen of a communist country, the Soviet Union, this analyst can confirm that Western radio propaganda broadcasts greatly contributed to the demise of the communist camp. But it seems that these days in North Korea most subversive information is spread largely in visual, video, not audio channels. The first VCRs turned up in the North around 1990, but for a decade they remained beyond the wildest expectations of the average North Korean.
The situation changed around 2000 when northeast China was flooded with cheap DVD players and newer VCRs. Old machines are now sold very cheaply by their owners, and then smuggled to North Korea via its porous (essentially, uncontrolled) border with China. In North Korea the used VCRs are resold at high premiums, but a machine still only costs the equivalent of US$35 or $40 - definitely within the reach of a more successful North Korean family. VCRs are largely used for copying and watching tapes of South Korean TV soap operas, which have become major hits in North Korea in the past few years. The South Korean actors and actresses are much admired, and their hairstyles and fashions are eagerly imitated by the Pyongyang youth.
The more affluent, better-educated and younger segments of the population are more eager to fall under the spell of this "imperialist pollution" - much like the former Soviet Union, where in the 1970s and early 1980s the scions of the party bosses were avid watchers of James Bond movies and proud consumers of Levi Strauss' blue jeans. Younger North Koreans are no different, and it is the youth from the best universities, largely well-connected - spoiled brats, some say - who now sport the eccentric haircuts and outfits straight from the Seoul TV shows. Even a few North Korean students have dyed their hair, mimicking South Korean fashion. (Visitors from the North didn't say whether anyone they saw dyed his or her hair green or adopted a punk hair style, but anyone apart from the severe, heretofore unchanging norm is notable).
Of course, the North Korean authorities are not very happy about these developments, which would be unthinkable merely 10 years ago. They launched a few crackdowns - or rather attempted crackdowns, since their efforts did not quite work out as intended. The steady erosion of old Stalinist values also influenced the attitudes of lower-level officialdom and police. Young policemen sabotaged the recent crackdowns, visitors reported, being unwilling to arrest boys for wearing clothes that departed from the ubiquitous dark suit and dark tie or Mao-type outfit.
It is difficult to estimate the extent to which South Korean TV dramas and movies are impacting the North Korean world view. They give a relatively truthful picture of daily life in Seoul, but it is not clear to what extent these dramas are believed: after all, North Korean films have always grossly exaggerated the living standards of the North, so it is likely that North Koreans assume that the same is the case with South Korean productions - more exaggerations.
Perhaps few North Koreans believe that every South Korean family has its own car (even if it really is the case). But there is no doubt that it is dawning on them that the South is not exactly a land of hunger and desperation. This is certain to have political consequences in the not too distant future, since the myth of South Korean poverty has been fundamental to the survival of the North Korean state. Pyongyang has always based its claims for legitimacy on being a better type of Korean government, supposedly delivering the quality of life that would be unavailable in the "exploited" and "impoverished" South. If the North Korean populace learn about South Korean prosperity, then the Pyongyang government is in deep trouble - as the fate of the much more successful East German government demonstrated: the economic gap between North and South Korea is much greater than was once the case in Germany. According to current estimates, the per capita gross national product (GNP) in the South is 10 to 20 times higher than in the North.
Many more cracks are opening in the self-imposed information blockade so painstakingly constructed and maintained by Pyongyang for decades. The radio sets sold inside Korea are still permanently altered and sealed, so they can be used only for listening to the official Pyongyang broadcasts, but that does not really matter since cheap transistor radios are smuggled across the Chinese border. These radios are common enough: in 2003 a poll confirmed that 67% of defectors from North Korea had been listening to foreign and South Korean broadcasts before they fled. Of course, this is not very representative: the willingness to defect obviously makes a person more interested in listening to foreign broadcasts. Nonetheless, it's clear: information is spreading inside the North.
Political relaxation is noticeable as well. Take the story of Yi Yong-guk, the former bodyguard of the Beloved Leader himself, Kim il-Sung. Disappointed about the North Korean system, he fled to China and attempted to defect to South Korea: things went wrong, he was caught by North Korean agents in China and deported. In the times of Kim il-sung, the fate of such a high-profile defector was easily predictable: torture and execution awaited a person who betrayed the personal trust of the leader. But in the relatively more liberal 1990s, Yi was treated with surprising leniency: he was sent to prison camp and then released (yes, released) following a special order by the current Dear Leader, Kim Jong-il. Needless to say, he used the opportunity to repeat his escape - and he eventually reached Seoul.
North Koreans are also much less reserved in casual interactions with foreigners. In the 1970s, even an innocent question asked by a foreigner could make a North Korean run away, literally; in the 1980s a few minutes of small talk were seen as acceptable, and now interaction with foreigners can last for a relatively long time.
The daily controls are crumbling as well - and in a long run this is probably even more important. In the old times, a worker had to spend a few hours every day on ideological indoctrination sessions in which he or she was expected to memorize many speeches of both the Great Leader and his son, the Beloved Leader. Now it is getting increasingly difficult to ensure that people attend these boring functions. The same is true in regard to many other public rituals which used to define the daily life of North Koreans: tributes to the portraits and statues of the Great Leader, mass rallies, and so on. The more privileged people still have to attend, since they have something to lose, but the North Koreans at the bottom of the official hierarchy, and those outside the hierarchy entirely, do not care any more.
Indeed, a worker from a long-defunct factory is aware that the state bureaucracy has neither the means to reward his "politically correct behavior", nor the means to punish his refusal to participate in a state ritual. If such a person survives economically, it is largely through small-scale business activities and handicraft. He or she is independent of the crumbling state-run economy and hence is immune to subtle threats and incentives of promotion/demotion, increase/decrease in rations etc, which had ensured daily compliance for decades. In this new situation, many minor transgressions are likely to remain unpunished and even go unnoticed and unheeded by authorities. It is all relative in this repressive states, but the controls are loosening.
Will North Korea survive such a liberalization? It is commonly assumed that such a survival is possible - after all, post-Mao Zedong China survived easily and flourished. But there is a major difference: the Communist Party government of China did not have an affluent and democratic "another China" just across the border (except for Hong Kong, of course). In the Korean case, the impoverished Northerners are likely to see unification with the South as an easy and quick fix to their manifold problems. Only their ignorance about South Korean prosperity, combined with the fear of persecution keeps them from following the example of East Germans. But what will happen when this ignorance and fear are gone? Will the government be able to find some substitute, or at least provide economic growth fast enough and sufficient to silence the voices of protest? This seems rather unlikely.
And of course there are booming markets and the growth of private businesses - but the economic collapse of the regime is the topic for another day.
Dr Andrei Lankov is a lecturer in the faculty of Asian Studies, China and Korea Center, The Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State University with a PhD in Far Eastern History and China, with emphasis on Korea, and his thesis focused on factionalism in the Yi Dynasty. He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia. He is currently on leave, teaching at the Kookmin University, Seoul.
A 14 October Chosun Ilbo report has noted a new spirit of openness amongst DPRK students arriving in Russia for the new semester which started in September. Fluent in English and other foreign languages, and sophisticated in manner, the 20 new DPRK students have surprised professors at the People’s Friendship University and other Russian educational institutions accepting DPRK students.
Gone is the reluctance to mingle with other students, replaced by a new vibrancy that sees DPRK students better-dressed than their predecessors, with female students in particular smartly made up.DPRK students returned to Russian universities in 2002 after a twelve-year hiatus. DPRK students can also be found attending Siberian State Transport University and Omsk State University, the Chosun Ilbo report added. (DPRK Business Review, Novemebr 2004)
21.12.2004, Приморский край
Первое в Приморье уголовное дело по факту убийства по мотиву национальной ненависти расследуется краевой прокуратурой. Как сообщили информационному агентству "Дейта.RU" в пресс-службе прокуратуры, в производстве отдела по расследованию особо важных дел прокуратуры Приморского края находится уголовное дело по обвинению Ивана НАЗАРЕНКО, 1985 года рождения, в совершении двух убийств по мотиву национальной ненависти.
В ходе следствия установлено, что И. Назаренко 20 августа 2004 года после 18 часов в районе дома № 243 по улице Калинина во Владивостоке, стремясь учинить физическую расправу с ранее не знакомым ему гражданином Китая Ли Жэньцзю с целью убийства нанёс ему не менее двух ударов ножом в область спины, от который потерпевший скончался.
Кроме того, И. Назаренко 4 сентября 2004 года около 17 часов у гаражных боксов в районе дома № 25 по улице Садовой во Владивостоке совершил
убийство гражданина КНДР Ким Сен Су в связи с его национальной принадлежностью, нанеся ему не менее четырёх ударов ножом в жизненно-важные органы потерпевшего – область грудной клетки и голову.
Ивану Назаренко предъявлено обвинение в совершении двух преступлений, предусмотренных пунктом «л» части второй статьи 105 Уголовного кодекса Российской Федерации (убийство по мотиву национальной ненависти). Материалы уголовного дела свидетельствуют о том, что обвиняемый поддерживает движение скинхедов. По делу проводятся необходимые оперативно-следственные мероприятия. Устанавливается круг лиц, с которыми общался обвиняемый. Проведена лингвистическая и судебно-медицинские экспертизы, назначена комплексная амбулаторная психолого-психиатрическая экспертиза.
by Vostok Media, "Vladivostok Novosti" November 4, 2004
Three North Korean diplomats and their Russian driver got into a road accident in Partizansky County of the Primorye region on Tuesday, one North Korean man survived, the other three people died on the spot, traffic police said. The car carrying the North Koreans drove into an oncoming lane and collided head-on with a heavy truck, said Yuri Oborin, the regional traffic police chief. According to him, there was clear evidence of the diplomats' driver fault who decided to overtake a slow-moving vehicle and broke the rules driving into the central strip of the road.
The diplomats were on their way to the Far Eastern city of Nakhodka where North Korea has a consulate. The North Korean diplomat who survived the accident was rushed to hospital with heavy injuries. Traffic police identified the driver but did not report his name to the press. The names of the North Koreans were not released either. In February 2004 a diplomat from the North Korean consulate in Nakhodka was taken to local hospital in serious condition following a car accident. The crash occurred when the consul, Kim Sen Hu, turned over his Toyota car on the icy Nahodka-Lazo highway in Primorye's Partisansky district. The other passenger, an employee of the Consulate General, Kim En Chan, died in the accident.
NAKHODKA, November 4, 2004 (Itar-Tass) - Two North Korean diplomats having the consular rank and a guest of the North Korean Consulate General in Nakhodka (Russia’s Far East) have died in a head-on car collision on the Nakhodka-Vladivostok highway. The car accident took place near the Novo-Litovka settlement, Partizansk district, some 20 kilometres off Nakhodka, on November 2. One of the diplomats was driving.
According to traffic police of the Partizansk district, a car with diplomatic number plates drove in the oncoming lane and collided with a car with several Russian citizens.
The North Korean diplomats and their guest died instantaneously and the Russians were rushed to hospital with severe injuries.
The Consulate General of North Korea in Nakhodka told Itar-Tass the bodies of the dead diplomats and their guest will be taken to Pyongyang. North Korean Consulate General staff members have expressed profound regret over the accident.
It is not the first tragic incident with personnel of the North Korean Consulate General in Nakhodka.
Two years ago in a similar accident one North Korean diplomat died and another one got severe injuries as their car overturned in the vicinity of the Sergeyevka village, also in Partizansk region. During the accident the road was entirely lonesome. Local traffic police officers arrived at the conclusion that the driving diplomat lost control of the vehicle at a high speed and the car fell of the road into the ditch. The North Korean Consulate General in Nakhodka has not disclosed the names of the diplomats killed in the road accident.
by Yoo Chul-jong, Joong Ang Ilbo, 3 November 2004
A senior Russian government official said yesterday that the United States has rejected a request for political asylum from a North Korean man who sought refuge at the US consulate in Vladivostok. The man, who has not been named, entered the US consulate on Oct. 26, in what is believed to be the first time a North Korean has asked for asylum at a foreign mission in Russia.
"The US side asked South Korea if it intends to accept the defector, but South Korea also rejected the request," the Russian source said. The official said the North Korean had worked as a logger in Russia. When his contract expired recently, he was supposed to return to his home country, but instead he sought asylum, the Russian official said.
"The United States is considering whether to hand him over to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or to Russia," the Russian official said. Russia would have no choice but to repatriate him to North Korea because of a treaty between the two countries, the source said.
"The United States appears to have made the rejection fearing that granting asylum to the defector would prompt a surge of people seeking refuge at American missions in Russia and China," the source said.
A spokesman with the US consulate in Vladivostok confirmed the North Korean was still inside the mission, but refused to say whether the defector has asked for political asylum or whether the United States has rejected his request. A South Korean Foreign Ministry official said he had no information about the US and South Korean rejection of the North Korean's asylum bid. The North Korea Human Rights Act, signed by US President George W. Bush on Oct. 19, allows North Korean defectors to seek political asylum in the United States, but has no specific guidelines for dealing with asylum seekers overseas.
16 October 2004, The People's Korea
On the occasion of the 56th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the DPRK and Russia, Pyongyang and Moscow on October 12 celebrated the anniversary and said that both sides will develop bilateral friendly relations in the future.
Newspapers of the DPRK on October 12 dedicated articles to the 56th anniversary. Rodong Sinmun, organ of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, said in its article that the opening of diplomatic ties between the two countries on October 12, 1948 was an event of weighty significance in the development of friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries.
The article also said as follows:
The two countries have deepened their friendly ties, closely cooperating with each other in different fields, political, economic, cultural, etc. on the principles of equality, independence and mutual benefit, and now the DPRK-Russia friendly relations are developing in conformity with the desire and interests of the two peoples.
It is the desire of the Russian people and the policy of the Russian government to build a powerful Russia and achieve national unity and social stability and development.
Now social and economic development is being made by the efforts of the Russian government and people. Deep concern is shown in the increase of its defense capabilities. The military equipment of the Russian army is being modernized and its combat capability is growing. Work is in progress to wipe out the separatist gang and ensure social stability in Chechnya.
In the international arena, Russia rejects a unipolar world and seeks its multipolariation and is striving to ensure regional stability and global peace. Russia pays due attention to the improvement and development of relations with the countries of the commonwealth of independent states and European countries. The Korean people are interested in the affirmative developments in Russia.
Meanwhile, Minju Joson, organ of the DPRK government, states that it is the common desire and demand of the two peoples to continue to develop the friendly relations between the two countries and the DPRK-Russia friendship will make a further favorable development by the joint efforts of the two peoples.
Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Andrei Gennadiyevich Karlov hosted a reception at the Russian embassy in Pyongyang on the evening of October 12 to celebrate the 56th anniversary of the opening of the DPRK-Russia diplomatic ties. Present on invitation were Kung Sok Ung, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Hong Son Ok, vice-chairwoman of the Korean Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and chairwoman of the DPRK-Russia Friendship Association, Kim Yong Jae, vice-minister of Foreign Trade, Kim Jong Sik, vice-chairman of the Pyongyang City People’s Committee, and officials concerned.
by Clay Moltz, The DPRK Briefing Book, September 7th, 2004
The admission by North Korea in October 2002 that they may be pursuing an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment program presents yet another obstacle to the goal of a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula. Evidence indicates that the technology that North Korea is developing for uranium enrichment is the gas centrifuge. If North Korea were to disavow its uranium enrichment program, it will have to take significant steps to assure the international community of its commitment. The process of verifiable dismantlement of a gas centrifuge program has some precedent in the experience of Iraq and South Africa. In addition, the North Korean case presents specific obstacles. The inspection body will have to make decisions on the amount of information that North Korea needs to provide, in particular, how much information do the inspectors need about the design of the enrichment equipment; research, testing, and development activities; and production-scale activities. The verification tasks will also include methods to verify both the correctness and completeness of a declaration, the role of procurement information in verifying the dismantlement of a program, the amount and type of access to sites and facilities, and procedures for interviewing officials and scientists in the enrichment program. It will be critically important to identify steps aimed at ensuring irreversibility of the enrichment program. This may include the destruction of equipment, components, and documents, and the installation of ongoing monitoring activities. Because this type of verification task is unprecedented, it is now necessary to design a verifiable dismantlement procedure that takes the steps necessary to create a transparent dismantlement process and ensure that a proliferant state cannot reconstitute the enrichment program without timely detection by the international community.
As an occupying power after World War II, a close ally of neighbouring North Korea for 45 years, and now a country enjoying good relations with both North and South Korea, Russia has significant economic, political, and strategic interests on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, there are thousands of North Korean workers in the Russian Far East; Russo-North Korean trade relations are improving; and there are ambitious projects to establish economic links with South Korea using North Korean territory to transship natural gas southward and to connect Asia with Europe through the Trans-Siberian railroad. Russia is therefore highly concerned about the recent turn of events on the Korean Peninsula and what it perceives as the U.S. escalation of tensions over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. As one retired Russian general warns: "A frightened cat becomes a tiger."[1] Like many states, Russia sees the solution to the current crisis in a negotiated settlement, believing that threats, sanctions, and accusations are counter-productive. At the same time, President Vladimir Putin is firmly opposed to acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, a circumstance that would greatly complicate Russia's security interests in Northeast Asia.
The History of Soviet/Russian Ties with North Korea
For over four decades, the Soviet Union had an essentially "frozen" policy on the Korean Peninsula--firmly backing Pyongyang. But in the past 15 years, beginning with Mikhail Gorbachev's dramatic foreign policy reforms in the late 1980s, Moscow's policy toward the Korean Peninsula has undergone major changes. After initially boosting military aid to Pyongyang, Gorbachev reduced defense, industrial, food, and energy support to zero by the end of his term. At the same time, Moscow carried out a surprising rapprochement with former Soviet enemy South Korea. Gorbachev was rewarded with almost $1.5 billion in credits from Seoul to help his declining economy.
After the Soviet break-up in December 1991, Russia's first post-communist president, Boris Yeltsin, continued a pro-South Korean line, strictly circumscribing Russian ties with Pyongyang. Moscow allowed its security agreement with Pyongyang to lapse, deleting all mention of Russian military aid in an eventually renewed treaty, even in case of a direct attack on the North. Similarly, trade with North Korea dropped from $3.5 billion in 1988 to below $100 million by the mid-1990s. Trade with South Korea, by contrast, surged to $3.2 billion in 1995. Yet, the relationship was not all roses. Russia's economic ties with Seoul eventually reached a plateau, as South Korean companies began to recognize the difficulties of working in Russia's chaotic economy. Debt issues also began to plague the relationship, with Moscow proving unable to repay the South Korean credits granted under Gorbachev. By the late 1990s, therefore, Moscow began to reassess its pro-South policy and a number of academics--along with communists in the Duma-- began to call for a more "balanced" policy on the Korean Peninsula. Key issues included: recognition that the initial benefits of the pro-South Korean policy had been oversold, a feeling that Russian interests were neglected in the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, frustration resulting from Russia's exclusion from the Four-Party Talks (seen as a factor of the demise of Russian influence over Pyongyang), and negative domestic fallout from an embarrassing spy scandal involving South Korean agents active in Russia.
Under President Putin, who made a highly visible trip to Pyongyang in 2000 and hosted two return visits by Kim Jong-Il in 2001 and 2002, relations with North Korea have received a considerable elevation in importance. Nevertheless, the new relationship with Kim is based not on Russian largesse, as in the past, but a new policy of "pragmatism" on the part of Moscow. Putin recognizes that key Russian political and economic objectives in the Far East--reducing tensions, re-establishing Russia's presence in Asia, and fostering development of the Russian Far East--cannot be achieved without some sort of re-engagement with the North. However, ambitious Russian hopes in early 2003 of "brokering" a deal to break the deadlock in the current crisis have not been achieved, despite Moscow's attempts at shuttle diplomacy by sending its deputy foreign minister to Pyongyang for six hours of talks (over four days) with Kim Jong-Il in mid-January. One problem is the fact that bilateral trade, while recovering, still remains at only $115 million per year, thus limiting Moscow's leverage over its erstwhile ally.[2]
Current Russian-DPRK Relations and Considerations for U.S. Policy
The current North Korean nuclear crisis is testing the durability not only of Russia's new policy toward Pyongyang, but also Russia's relationship with the United States. Although Presidents Putin and Bush have seemed to see eye-to-eye on an increasing number of issues since 9/11, leading to a significant warming in relations, conflicts over the conduct of the war in Iraq, Washington's irritation with alleged Russian weapons transfers to Baghdad, and disputes over the
post-war role of U.N. weapons inspectors have begun to reintroduce tensions into the relationship. While the prospect of worsening relations clearly worries Moscow much more than it does Washington, Russia has its limits. As one Russian expert notes, Moscow stood firm in the run-up to the Iraqi conflict, when many assumed that President Putin would back down under pressure from the United States.[3] Still, Russia is likely to try to split the difference between the two sides and maintain reasonable relations with both its neighbor (North Korea) and its strategic partner (the United States). Russian policy would likely lean toward the United States if North Korea moves forward with reprocessing and nuclear weapons development. On the other hand, a strong U.S. push for sanctions backed by the threat of a pre-emptive U.S. attack on North Korea (in case of further nuclear developments in Yongbyon) could push Russia closer not only to North Korea and China, but also possibly to South Korea, to the ultimate detriment of U.S. interests.
Although the Russian Foreign Ministry has in recent months supported the principle of initial bilateral talks between Pyongyang and Washington, Moscow also wants to become involved directly in any broader Korean Peninsula settlement. As Deputy Foreign Ministry Alexander Losyukov commented recently on the necessary follow-on work after the trilateral Beijing meeting: "At further stages, it will be beneficial and logical if other countries...join in. A multisided discussion is necessary."[4] Thus, one commonality that Moscow and Washington currently share (although for different reasons) is their call for eventual multilateral talks to resolve the crisis. Russian support for such an approach dates back as early as March 1994, when Moscow called for a "multilateral conference" to bring about a comprehensive settlement to Korean Peninsula issues in the face of the apparent failure of bilateral U.S.-North Korean efforts at that time to end the then-ongoing crisis of 1993-94. Russia opposed the "back channel" deal that led to the U.S.-brokered Agreed Framework, which Moscow saw not only as a U.S. tactic to exclude it from the Korean Peninsula but also a "stab in the back" by Pyongyang, after Moscow was forced for financial reasons to cancel plans dating from the mid-1980s to build light-water reactors for North Korea (leaving Moscow holding a large debt--repudiated by Pyongyang--for work already completed on the project). Later, Moscow did not fail to notice the snub implicit in the Four-Party Talks (involving the United States, DPRK, China, and South Korea) during the mid-1990s, which excluded Moscow (and, in its view, notably failed).
Today, the Bush administration's apparent aim in pursuing an international approach is to rally pressure from multiple capitals to force North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program, even to the point of "breaking" the regime with punitive sanctions. Moscow believes it deserves a seat at the table, not only because of its role as a border state, but also as a country that has full diplomatic relations with both sides (which the United States, South Korea, and Japan lack) and one that sits on the U.N. Security Council. Moscow has not hesitated to enunciate its views on the issues, which have not often coincided with those of the United States. Moscow favors negotiations and a gradual reduction in tensions, leading eventually to U.S.-DPRK diplomatic normalization, security guarantees to both North and South by outside and neighboring powers, a broad package of economic aid (though not provided by Russia), and the reintroduction of U.N. inspectors.[5] A key guideline behind Russia's approach--similar to that of China and South Korea--is to prevent hundreds of thousands (or possibly millions) of starving North Korean refugees from flooding into its territory in the case of a sudden collapse of the DPRK government or the initiation of military hostilities. As a senior Russian official noted recently, "We have to think of preventive measures to defend our interests and...to defend our populations in territories contiguous to Korea in case of a serious conflict in that region."[6] Unlike China, however, newly democratic Russia has no political motives that would cause it to support continuation of Kim Jong-Il's communist regime.
Russia has proposed its own variant of a settlement (in cooperation with some supporters in South Korea), which would involve using Russian natural gas--subsidized by the South--as a carrot for weaning Pyongyang off its dangerous nuclear addiction. Since the Iraqi conflict, however, Washington has dropped mention of Russia in references to "key states" (South Korea and Japan) that need to be added to the current trilateral talks,[7] suggesting that the Bush administration's previous commitment to include Moscow in settling the Korean crisis may now be in doubt.
Given these factors, the overlap of U.S. and Russian positions on the crisis may be fleeting. Washington may decide to close ranks with its "real" allies and "punish" Moscow for its failure to side with the United States on Iraq. Russia may heed the calls of analysts in its press warning of a "North Korean Chernobyl" in case of U.S. action against Yongbyon and try to build a coalition of states (including China, South Korea, and Japan) against possible war on the Korean Peninsula.[8] While Russia is not in a position to block U.S. military action, Washington cannot ignore Moscow's perspective with impunity. Russia may not be critical to the success of initial talks with the North, but a failure to engage Moscow later on could create serious difficulties for the United States as it seeks to bring about a broader settlement on the Korean Peninsula, including coming up with an economic and security framework for alleviating Pyongyang's current concerns. Such structures are likely to be a prerequisite for North Korea's willingness to destroy its nuclear weapons program and engage in future missile restraint. By contrast, a badly worsened U.S.-Russian relationship and aggressive U.S. policies on the Peninsula could lead Moscow to revert to old policies of limited military assistance and running U.N. interference for Pyongyang, particularly if Moscow is excluded from future multilateral talks. Such a dynamic would greatly compound current U.S. difficulties in dealing with the current crisis.
These factors suggest the sagacity of involving Moscow in ongoing efforts to alleviate the North Korean nuclear crisis. Russia is eager to play a positive role in any future settlement, particularly if it is engaged on the ground floor. A more measured and consultative U.S. policy (even in the presence of bilateral differences) is likely to bring Russia along. In this manner, the United States could use Moscow's considerable knowledge of North Korean politics, economics, and security matters to its own benefit, while helping to convince Pyongyang that it does not have a soft landing waiting for it in the arms of Russia.
[1] Gen. (ret.) Alexander Zarubin, "The Korean Peninsula: From Inter-Korean Confrontation to a System of Cooperative Security," in Moltz and Mansourov (eds.), The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 215.
[2] Pyotr Goncharov and Alexander Smotrov, "Russian Expert: Moscow Has No Instruments to Influence North Korean Leader," RIA Novosti (Moscow), April 3, 2003.
[3] Comment by Russian expert on Korea, Alexander Mansourov, April 22, 2003, phone interview with author.
[4] Russian Dep. For. Minister Alexander Losyukov quoted in "Moscow Hopes China, North Korea, U.S. Relieve Nuclear Arms Concerns," Interfax (Moscow), April 19, 2003.
[5] For a range of Russian views on the Korean Peninsula crisis, see Cristina Chuen, "Russian Responses to the North Korean," website of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies at:
http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/rusdprk.htm
[6] Russian Dep. For. Minister Alexander Losyukov quoted in "Deputy FM: Russia planning for Korean Peninsula 'worst-case scenarios'," Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey (Military New Agency)(Moscow), April 11, 2003.
[7] Daily State Department Press Briefing by Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher, Washington, DC, April 21, 2003, at:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/19778.htm
[8] Aleksey Bogaturov, "Voyna v Irake okonchatelno spustila kurok yadernogo rasprostaneniya" (War in Iraq finally releases the trigger on nuclear proliferation) Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), April 15, 2003.
Pyongyang, September 5 (KCNA) -- A celebration meeting was held by the Party for Peace and Unity of Russia on August 31on the occasion of the 56th anniversary of the foundation of the DPRK. Chairperson of the party S. Z. Umalatova said in a report that with the foundation of the DPRK the political situation of East Asia had been radically changed. She went on:
Under the leadership of President Kim Il Sung the protracted struggle of the Korean people to liberate the country from the Japanese occupiers was concluded with victory and a genuine people's country was built in the land of Korea, so that the road of socialist development was opened in this region.
The DPRK has covered the road of new development under the leadership of Kim Jong Il, a great successor to the idea and cause of Kim Il Sung.
Through the Russia visit of Kim Jong Il not only the Russian people but the whole world have come to know clearly that he is steering the world.
The DPRK is now displaying its might as a powerful socialist country which has the people single-heartedly united around the leader and the invincible revolutionary armed forces. Speakers praised the state building exploits of Kim Il Sung and the Songun leadership exploits of Kim Jong Il. They stressed that new victories and successes are always in store for the DPRK and the Korean people invariably holding high the socialist banner.
A message of greetings to Kim Jong Il was adopted at the meeting.
TASS News Agency reported that Russia is preparing for a new round of six-nation talks on the DPRK nuclear issue, expecting it to be
held in later September, a high-ranking Russian expert in problems of the Korean Peninsula told Itar-Tass on Thursday. He said Moscow "has readiness
for participating in the new meeting of the 'six' at the level of deputy foreign ministers". "We consider necessary observance of accords of the
previous round on holding a new round of the talks in September in a six-party format. With consideration for complexity of the discussed
problems, the negotiation process should not be interrupted," the expert said. Commenting on the PRC's recent contacts with representatives of the
DPRK, the US and other participants in the talks, the source said a "date of the conduction of the round has not been determined yet".
("RUSSIA PREPARING FOR NEW ROUND OF TALKS ON NKOREA NUCLEAR ISSUE ", 2004-09-02)
Yonhap reported that some sort of agreement was reached between DPRK and Russian leaders on linking an envisioned inter-Korean railway with Russia's Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), a ROK businessman said Thursday. "I heard the chairman of North Korea's National Defense Commission, Kim Jong-il, and Russian President Vladimir Putin have reached some kind of agreement on linking the railways," Kim Yoon-kyu, head of Hyundai Asan, said at a seminar. He did not specify the details of the agreement. The ROK and DPRK are seeking to reconnect the Donghae (East Sea) rail line, which was severed shortly before the 1950-53 Korean War, and ultimately, link it to the TSR. The Donghae line, if reconnected, would connect the ROK's eastern port city Gangneung across the demilitarized zone to the DPRK's east coast city Chongjin. ("N.KOREA, RUSSIA REACH AGREEMENT ON RAIL LINK: S.KOREAN BUSINESSMAN", 2004-08-26)
Yonhap reported that the DPRK government recently made its first purchase of farming tractors from Russia and intends to purchase 1,000 units in the near future, a government official here said Thursday. The DPRK already purchased 10 Russian tractors and plans to purchase an additional 40 units this year after testing whether they operate adequately under warm weather conditions, the official said. ("N KOREA IMPORTS FARMING TRACTORS FROM RUSSIA FOR FIRST TIME ", 2004-08-26)
Its artistes impressively represented the peculiar national emotion and traditional lifestyle of Russians and detailed aspects of their life and custom of other nations of the world in their performance. The performance was acclaimed by the audience. Among the audience were Choe Thae Bok, secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, officials concerned, creators and artistes in the field of culture and arts and working people in Pyongyang. Also among the audience were Manager of the company Elena Scherbakova and Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Andrei Karlov.
The Korean-American human rights activist Reverend Douglas Shin has launched a new website, www.BackToPyongyang.org. The site includes some "unpublished material" on North Korean drug trafficking and alleged terrorist links. The reverend is very much in favor of regime change, and highly critical of the current South Korean administration's policies of engaging North Korea. In relation to North Korea's illicit drugs trade in Russia, Reverend Shin provides the following information:
"...Ministry of People’s Security (new name for the police) utilizes its Reungra Trading General
Bureau’s 4 branches in Russia including those in Krasnoyarsk, Blagovescensk, and
Vladivostok. Although these branch offices appear to deal in legitimate items such as construction materials, fine
arts, and marine products, but in reality are tied to Russian mafia that sell North Korea's drugs.
State Security Agency operates 3 export units in Shinuiju, Chongjin, and Hamhung with the last
one being the largest and run by Hwang Nam (an alias, mid 40s) who has previously led the drug export
to China. They used the airliner between Khabarovsk and Pyongyang, and the international train
between Moscow and Pyongyang. The special train exclusively for the highest-level use has one car
designated for the State Security Agency, and the North Koreans used this particular car for drug export.
North Korea’s Siberian lumberjacks sometimes colluded with locomotive engineers of the
international train they ride, to smuggle drugs..."
by Anna Shkuropat, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, July 2002
|
View Full Paper (PDF—532kb) |
Russian policy in Northeast Asia since 1991 reflects a new strategic engagement, with important implications for Russia's partners in the region and for U.S. policy. This paper sets out to address the underlying factors: Russia's objective of greater integration into the world economy as a means of economic and political tran-sition, Russia's new diplomacy with emphasis on supporting national interests and multilateral approaches, a shift in Russia's strategic view of the Russian Far East and Pacific Russia, and the new dynamism in the government under President Putin to pursue a constructive course in support of national interests and stable political relationships.
This paper then seeks to position Russia within the region, and offers a new definition of Pacific Russia, a concept that covers both the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia and discusses some of the most significant economic relationships in a Northeast Asia and Pacific context. A final section takes an overall policy perspective and identifies some of the policy implications that flow from the analysis, particularly in terms of Russia's new emphasis on multilateral processes and mechanisms.
Overall, the paper argues that to date the Russia factor has either been completely ignored or given insufficient attention in much of the analysis on Northeast Asia, and that this needs to be corrected, both in the collection of information for analysis and in the development of policy towards the region...
09-02-2004. Впервые в истории отношений Российской Федерации и Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики четко определена и юридически оформлена государственная граница между двумя государствами. Об этом сообщили в МИД РФ.
Сегодня в российском внешнеполитическом ведомстве замминистра иностранных дел России Александр Лосюков и посол КНДР в Москве Пак Ы Чун подписали протокол между правительством РФ и правительством КНДР о демаркации государственной границы. Этот документ является дополнительным протоколом к протоколу между правительством СССР и правительством КНДР о демаркации советско-корейской государственной границы.
"Дополнительный протокол фиксирует результаты проведенной Смешанной комиссией в 2000-2003 годах работы по завершению демаркации и первой совместной проверке прохождения российско-корейской государственной границы", - говорится в сообщении МИД РФ.
Работу над этим документом проводила действовавшая с 1986 года смешанная российско-корейская демаркационная комиссия, передает РИА "Новости".
(in Russian)
Marina Kukla, Graduate Student, FESU
I am majoring in the economy of South Korea and its economic ties with Russia. Thanks to the Korea Foundation, I have been given a great opportunity to work on my research on "The Economic Interests of the Republic of Korea Towards the Russian Far East," while staying in Korea.
My research involves the investigation of opinions of South Korean scholars and businessmen about the present state and the future of economic relations between South Korea and Russia. For this research, my reference materials include Korean monographs, articles, and reports. I have also interviewed Korean and Russian businessmen about the current economic situation and recent cooperation between Russia and Korea.
Economic Situations of Korea and Russia
South Korea is not endowed with abundant natural resources. On the other hand, Russia is rich in natural resources, especially in the Far East, which is in close proximity to South Korea. The most important of these resources are oil and natural gas. Most Korean businessmen are very interested in the cooperative development of natural resource industries in Russian territory. Thus far, Middle Eastern countries have been the main exporters of oil and gas to Korea. The Korean government and Korea's business leaders see cooperation with Russia's Far East as a means of diversifying their sources of energy.
South Korea has depended on exports for its economic growth, but the recent economic slowdown has forced Korea to search for new export markets. Russia, despite Its social and economic problems, still remains a promising market for Korean goods.
Over the past several decades, wages in Korea have increased significantly, forcing some labor-intensive industries to move abroad, including the eastern territories of Russia.
Continuous efforts to develop economic cooperation between North and South Korea have been a significant factor affecting the relationship between Russia and South Korea. Since Russia's Far East is the closest region for both the North and South (except China), three-party economic cooperation is taking on added relevance. In particular, three-party cooperation is essential to specific projects that have been actively discussed for years.
Development of Energy Resources
With the globalization of the world economy, the most promising forms of cooperation between Russia and South Korea lie in the implementation of joint investment projects related to the development of oil and gas reserves and gas and electricity transmission systems.
Eastern regions of Russia, while rich in potential resources and boasting a favorable geopolitical location, have problems attracting foreign investors and the technology required for the development of raw materials and minerals. The solution to these problems will help to promote the social-economic stabilization of Russia and South Korea, the elimination of regional disparity in Russia, the development of a transport and energy infrastructure, and enhancement of the competitiveness of eastern Russia.
There are three main projects being discussed in Korea regarding the Eastern Russian territories of Sakha, Irkutsk and Sakhalin. Sakhalin has become more and more important during recent years not only for Korea, but for other Asia-Pacific Rim (APR) countries as well. Sakhalin's vast resources are estimated to include 1 billion tons of oil and 3.5 billion tons of gas. It is a small wonder why Korean, Japanese, and American investors are interested in developing this area.
It's clear that, in the case of developing oil and natural gas in Eastern Russia, there must be a means of transporting these resources to East Asia. While there are a number of projects in development for the construction of a pipeline, almost all of them plan to go through North Korea, which will require Pyeongyang's cooperation.
Trans-Siberian and Trans-Korean Railways
Many countries are interested in connecting the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) and the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR), especially South Korea, which would stand to gain much through the more economical transportation of export goods to Europe. This single railway would be able to carry cargo from Busan to Germany with virtually no transshipment in only 15 days. At present, the traditional route by sea takes 45 days. The entire route will be electrified, with fiber optic communications being installed for handling all logistical services, including cargo-tracing systems.
The main problem in connecting the TSR and the TKR is not only political, but economic as well. In order to connect the two railways, the TKR must be reconstructed. The North Korean railway must be upgraded in order to connect the Russian and South Korean lines, which will require large-scale investment. Current political uncertainty, in particular concerning North Korea's nuclear weapons development, makes the future of this promising project hard to predict.
Economic cooperation between South Korea and Russia's Far East, then, seems to depend on South Korea's ability to secure the cooperation of North Korea.
Technology is another important field that could benefit from economic cooperation between Russia and South Korea. Russian excels in the fundamental sciences while Korea has a wide range of experiences in the practical application of scientific knowledge in industry. Cooperation in science and technology will enable Korea's fundamental science and technology and Russia's industrial technology to advance simultaneously.
Of course, there are other potential fields of economic cooperation between the two countries, such as trade, investment, and finance, but according to Korean scholars and businessmen, there are not many projects in these fields under discussion for mutual cooperation.
Korean Understanding of the Russian Economy
Most Koreans don't know much about the Russian economy. When I first came here three months ago, I was somewhat surprised to hear many Koreans complaining about the recent state of the Korean economy. Although I was aware of an economic slowdown, I never thought that the situation was that problematic. Sometimes, I even heard that Russia's economic situation was much better than Korea's, because Russia's recent economic growth has resulted from development of its natural resources. Although some economic indexes in Russia are rather optimistic, observers of the Russian economy must consider the following.
The most important thing to remember in understanding Russia's economic situation is the vastness of Russia's territory. Economic, political, and social situations vary in different regions of the country. While in Korea, I've been asked many questions by Koreans and foreigners about Russia and Russians: its weather, climate, habits, the problems of common people. It is not easy for me to give simple answers, as there may be a plethora of responses for one question from the points of view of different regions. Korean businessmen and economists should understand such regional characteristics of Russia when dealing with the Russian economy.
Pyongyang, February 24 (KCNA) -- Vladislav Prokopenko, military attache of the Russian embassy here, hosted a reception at the Taedonggang Club for the Diplomatic Corps Monday evening on the occasion of the "Day of Defenders of the Motherland" of Russia. Present on invitation were Jong Chang
Ryol, vice-minister of the People's Armed Forces, Colonel General Pak Sung Won and other generals and officers of the Korean People's Army, diplomatic envoys of various countries and military attaches of different embassies here. Present there were Andrei Karlov, Russian ambassador, and staff members of the Russian embassy here. Speeches were made there.
Pyongyang, February 24 (KCNA) -- Leader Kim Jong Il's famous work "Abuses of Socialism Are Intolerable" was published in pamphlet by the "Primorskoye Morskoye Parakhodstvo" Publishing House in Russia on February 18. The work, brought out on March 1, Juche 82 (1993), lays bare the reactionary nature and falsehood of the sophism of the imperialists and renegades of socialism calling socialism "totalitarian," "barracks-like" and "administrative and commanding". The work clarifies the issue of making socialism conviction and morality, the issue of giving full play to the superiority of socialism and other principled matters in defending and accomplishing the cause of socialism.
Pyongyang, February 21 (KCNA) -- Ambassador Andrei Karlov and staff members of the Russian embassy here visited the national fine art exhibition celebrating February 16, the birthday of leader Kim Jong Il, on February 20. They looked round with deep emotion the paintings showing the immortal exploits Kim Jong Il performed in glorifying the dignity and honor of Kim Il Sung's Korea and implementing the human cause of independence with his extraordinary political ability and the features of the army and people of Korea demonstrating heroic feats in the struggle to build a great prosperous powerful nation under the Songun policy of the Workers' Party of Korea. The ambassador wrote in the visitor's book that through the visit he deeply felt once again the deep respect of the Korean people for Kim Jong Il.
Pyongyang, February 19 (KCNA) -- Leader Kim Jong Il's famous work "Respecting the Forerunners of the Revolution Is a Noble Moral Obligation of Revolutionaries" was published in pamphlet by the Paleya Publishing House of Russia on February 12. The work, brought out on December 25, Juche 84 (1995), says that to respect the revolutionary forerunners is the demand of the revolution and the noble moral obligation of revolutionaries. The work clarifies the principled matters arising in establishing the moral traits of respecting the revolutionary predecessors and developing sound moral and obligatory relations between the people.
Pyongyang, February 17 (KCNA) -- Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission, today received Elena Scherbakova, head of the Moiseyev State Academy Folk Dance Troupe of Russia, on a visit to the DPRK. Present there was Russian Ambassador E.P.to the DPRK Andrei
Karlov. Kim Jong Il warmly welcomed the visit of the troupe to the DPRK and had a warm and friendly talk with the guest. The head of the troupe conveyed to Kim Jong Il a congratulatory letter from Igori Moiseyev, founder and permanent leader of the troupe, and presented him with a gift of the troupe.
Pyongyang, February 17 (KCNA) -- Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission, today enjoyed an art performance given by the Moiseyev State Academy Folk Dance Troupe of Russia on a visit to the DPRK. When he appeared in the auditorium of the theatre, the entire audience enthusiastically welcomed him with a thunderous applause.
He was accompanied by Kim Yong Chun, member of the NDC of DPRK and chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, Yon Hyong Muk, vice-chairman of the NDC of the DPRK, and other senior officials of the Party and army, senior officials of power, administrative and economic institutions and in the fields of science, education, culture and arts, public health and the press and servicepersons.
Elena Scherbakova, head of the troupe, and Ambassador Andrei Karlov and staff members of the Russian embassy here were among the audience. The troupe widely known to the Korean people through a series of performances put on the stage Russian dances "Summer" and "Kalmyk Dance", a Moldavian dance suit, a Spanish dance, a Greek dance, Nanai folk game "Two Boys at Wrestling", a one-act ballet drama and other numbers. It successfully represented the optimistic life, national emotion and peculiar aspects of living of Russians and various nations through refined artistic skills and graceful and enthusiastic rhythms. The high level of its representation clearly showed the appearance of the troupe with a long history and tradition. The performance ended with a chorus "Our Friendship Will Be Everlasting" with the warm DPRK-Russia friendship prevailing in the theatre. Kim Jong Il sent a floral basket to the artists congratulating them on their successful performance.
Pyongyang, February 16 (KCNA) -- Chairman Kim Jong Il of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea today received a congratulatory message from Russian President V. Putin on the occasion of his birthday. The message extends sincere congratulations to Kim Jong Il.
It says:
Russia highly appreciates your role for the strengthened good-neighborly and cooperative relations with our country, the continued pursuance of the policy of inter-Korean reconciliation and approach and the socio-economic growth in the
DPRK. I wish you good health and fresh success in your activities for the well-being of your people, the increased traditional Russo-Korean friendly relations and the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue.
Pyongyang, February 15 (KCNA) -- The National Defence Commission of the DPRK hosted a reception at the People's Palace of Culture on Feb. 14 in honor of the State Academic Moiseyev Dance Company led by Elena Scherbakova, director of the dance company. Ji Jae Ryong, vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, in a speech said that the dance company widely known to the world for its energetic art activities and refined skill is popular among Koreans.
The company has positively contributed to promoting friendship among world people and developing the genuine art through the truthful representation of national customs and optimistic life of people of various countries in dance pieces, he stressed. Elena Scherbakova in a speech said that the company was pleased to come to the DPRK to give performances at the time when the Korean people are celebrating the birthday of Kim Jong Il, chairman of the National Defence Commission of the DPRK.
All the members of the company warmly congratulate Kim Jong Il on his birthday and wholeheartedly wish him success in his work for the well-being and prosperity of the country, she added. Present there on invitation were Andrei Karlov, Russian ambassador to the DPRK, and embassy officials. Jong Ha Chol, secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK, officials concerned and artistes were present there.
Pyongyang, February 14 (KCNA) -- The State Academic Moiseyev Dance Company headed by Elena Scherbakova, director of the dance company, arrived here today. It was greeted by Ji Jae Ryong, vice-department director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, and officials concerned, Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Andrei Karlov and staff members of the Russian embassy here.
By Lawrence Sheets, NPR Radio report, February 12, 2004
The legend surrounding the birth of North Korea's Kim Jong Il is extraordinary. But outside North Korea, few take that legend seriously.
NPR's
Lawrence Sheets traveled to a humble Russian farming town to learn about the real birthplace of the North Korean leader...
Pyongyang, February 8 (KCNA) -- Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, yesterday sent a message of condolence to Russian President V. V. Putin as regards big human casualties caused by a terrorist act in Moscow. Expressing deep condolence to the President and, through him, to the victims and their bereaved families, the message said that the DPRK, which takes it as a consistent principle to fight against all forms of terrorism, resolutely denounces the incident as a base act of terrorists to destroy the stability of Russia. The message expressed the belief that under his guidance, the Russian leadership would clear the aftereffects of the terrorist act at an early date and conduct an active work for the security of the people and thus achieve peace and stability of the country.
Moscow, January 31 (KCNA) -- A meeting was held in Moscow on Jan. 28 under the sponsorship of the Party for Peace and Unity of Russia on the occasion of the birthday of leader Kim Jong Il. Sazhi Zaindinova Umalatova, chairwoman of the Party for Peace and Unity of Russia, in a report said that the Songun policy set out by Kim Jong Il is an all-powerful treasured sword for firmly protecting the sovereignty and security of the country and the nation in the world today when the imperialists are getting more undisguised in their military ambition.
Hailing the Songun policy as a patriotic policy leading the Korean nation to prosperity, she expressed belief that the Korean people led by Kim Jong Il would achieve greater success in building a great prosperous powerful socialist nation under the uplifted banner of the Juche idea. The vice-chairman of the Party for Peace and Unity of Russia in a speech said that all the successes made by the DPRK in the relations with other countries would have been unthinkable without the iron will and extraordinary diplomatic strategy of Kim Jong Il, adding that it is by no means fortuitous that many Russians unanimously praise him as the most informal, dearest and greatest man.
A representative of the youth organization of the Party for Peace and Unity of Russia in a speech said that the reverence for Kim Jong Il is growing deeper among the Russian youth day by day, extending to him warm congratulations and best wishes for his good health on his birthday on the behalf of the Russian youth.
A congratulatory message to Kim Jong Il was adopted at the meeting.
Pyongyang, January 29 (KCNA) -- The Russian ambassador to the DPRK arranged a friendly gathering at his embassy Wednesday evening on the occasion of the New Year, Juche 93 (2004). The participants looked round pictures showing the feats of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il in boosting Korea-Russia friendship and saw a message of greetings to Kim Jong Il from Russian President Putin and a Korean documentary film. Speeches were made there.
Pyongyang, January 24 (KCNA) -- Though the present international situation is complicated and the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula is still tense, support of Russians to the Korean people is consistent, said Yeliseyev, head of the Song and Dance Ensemble of the Russian Ministry of Interior, on Jan. 12. He noted that after reading the joint New Year editorial of the DPRK, he came to know better the strength and validity of the Songun politics pursued by leader Kim Jong Il and is deeply sympathetic to it.
He went on: I, as a soldier, believe that the Korean people, true to the Songun politics, will successfully carry out the tasks laid down in the joint editorial. I and members of the ensemble invariably respect and revere Kim Jong Il and make all possible efforts to support the DPRK. A future performance of our ensemble in the DPRK will be one for support to the Korean people advancing under the Songun leadership of Kim Jong Il.
Pyongyang, January 21 (KCNA) -- Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Andrei Karlov sponsored a friendly meeting at the Russian embassy this evening on the occasion of the New Year Juche 93 (2004). Present on invitation were Choe Thae Bok, chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, Deputies Hong So Hon, Choe Jong Son and Kim Kwang Chol and other officials concerned. Staff members of the Russian embassy were also present there. The participants went round photos showing immortal exploits performed by President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il in boosting the DPRK-Russia friendship.
They saw a Korean documentary film showing Kim Jong Il receiving a congratulatory message and a gift sent by Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich
Putin. Speeches were made there. They deepened the friendship, underscoring the need to boost the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries which grow stronger as the days go by.
Pyongyang, January 16 (KCNA) -- The DPRK Foreign Ministry arranged a friendly meeting with staff members of the Russian embassy here on Jan. 15 on the occasion of the New Year Juche 93 (2004). Present on invitation were Ambassador Andrei Karlov and staff members of the Russian embassy. Kung Sok Ung, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, and other officials concerned were present there. Speeches were made at the meeting. They talked about the need to boost the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries favorably developing day by day under the deep care of leader Kim Jong Il and President V. V. Putin.
Pyongyang, January 15 (KCNA) -- Andrei Karlov, Russian ambassador to the DPRK, arranged a friendship meeting at his embassy here on Jan. 14 on the occasion of the New Year Juche 93 (2004). Present on invitation were Minister of People's Security Choe Ryong Su, Lieutenant Generals Ri Yong Il and So Chun Bong and other generals and officers of the ministry. Staff members of the embassy were present.
The participants in the meeting looked round photographs showing immortal exploits performed by President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il in boosting the DPRK-Russia friendship. Then they appreciated a DPRK documentary film showing Kim Jong Il receiving a message of greetings and a gift presented by Russian President V.V.
Putin. Speeches were made there. They deepened friendly feelings, stressing the need to boost the friendly and cooperative relations between the DPRK and Russia which are growing stronger under the deep care of Kim Jong Il and V. V. Putin.