President
Nixon's Speech on "Vietnamization," November 3, 1969.
Good evening, my fellow Americans:
Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all
Americans and to many people in all parts of the world the war in
Vietnam.
I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about
Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government
has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be
asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and
peace unless they know the truth about that policy.
Tonight, therefore, I
would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of
many of you listening to me.
How and why did America get involved in
Vietnam in the first place?
How has this administration changed the policy
of the previous administration?
What has really happened in the
negotiations in Paris and on the battle-front in Vietnam?
What choices do
we have if we are to end the war?
What are the prospects for peace?
Now,
let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on
January 20.
-The war had been going on for 4 years.
-31,000 Americans
had been killed in action.
-The training program for the South Vietnamese
was behind schedule.
-540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to
reduce the number.
-No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris
and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace
proposal.
-The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from
many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.
In view of these
circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering
the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.
From a political
standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After
all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could
blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as
the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to
avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war.
But I had a greater
obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the
next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next
generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the
world.
Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether
some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The
question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war.
The
great question is: How can we win America's peace?
Well, let us turn now to
the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in
Vietnam in the first place?
Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the
logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a
campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and
supporting a revolution.
In response to the request of the Government of
South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment
to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist
takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to
Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American
combat forces to South Vietnam.
Now, many believe that President Johnson's
decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. Any many
others I among them have been strongly critical of the way the war has been
conducted.
But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war,
what is the best way to end it?
In January I could only conclude that the
precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not
only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of
peace.
For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would
inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their
takeover in the North 15 years before.
-They then murdered more than 50,000
people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.
-We saw a
prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the
city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign
of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in
mass graves.
-With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of
Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the
million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the
Communists took over in the North.
For the United States, this first defeat
in our Nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American
leadership, not only in Asia but through-out the world.
Three American
Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood
what had to be done.
In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic
eloquence and clarity, said: "... we want to see a stable government there,
carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence.
"We believe
strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my
opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of
South Vietnam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay
there."
President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same
conclusion during their terms of office.
For the future of peace,
precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.
-A
nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its
friends.
-Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question
would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not
yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.
-This would spark violence
wherever our commitments help maintain the peace in the Middle East, in
Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.
Ultimately, this would
cost more lives.
It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.
For
these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by
immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American
policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront....
We Americans are a
do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people.
Instead of teaching
someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been
carried over into our foreign policy.
In Korea and again in Vietnam, the
United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the
men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against
Communist aggression.
Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam,
a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was
traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: "When you are trying to
assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them
fight the war but not to fight the war for them." ...
Well, in accordance
with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for
future American policy toward Asia:
-First, the United States will keep all
of its treaty commitments.
-Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear
power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose
survival we consider vital to our security.
-Third, in cases involving
other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance
when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to
the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of
providing the manpower for its defense.
After I announced this policy, I
found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and
other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this
new direction in American foreign policy.
The defense of freedom is
everybody's business not just America's business. And it is particularly the
responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous
administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we
are Vietnamizing the search for peace.
The policy of the previous
administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility
for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress
the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend
themselves when we left.
The Vietnamization plan was launched following
Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a
substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese
forces.
-After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally
bringing men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn
from South Vietnam including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.
-The
South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have
been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American
troops.
Two other significant developments have occurred since this
administration took office.
-Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is
essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less
than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.
-Most
important United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to
the lowest point in 3 years.
Let me now turn to our program for the
future.
We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with
the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground
forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly
scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from
weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American
withdrawal can become greater.
I have not and do not intend to announce the
timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for this decision
which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions,
the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.
One of
these is the progress which can be or might be made in the Paris talks. An
announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove
any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait
until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.
The other two factors on
which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity
and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And
I am glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has
been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for
withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now
than when we made our first estimates in June. Now, this clearly demonstrates
why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.
We must retain the
flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at the
time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.
Along with this
optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave one note of caution.
If the
level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our
timetable accordingly.
However, I want the record to be completely clear
on one point.
At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was
some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the
enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam they would stop the
shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no
misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal
program.
We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of
our casualties, and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those
factors.
If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we
are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious
decision by the enemy.
Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume
that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that
increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall
not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that
situation.
This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy, which, as
Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am making in meeting my
responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may
be.
My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said
that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war. -I
can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam
without regard to the effects of that action.
-Or we can persist in our
search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or
through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary a
plan in which we will withdraw all our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in
accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to
defend their own freedom.
I have chosen this second course.
It is not
the easy way.
It is the right way.
It is a plan which will end the war
and serve the cause of peace not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the
world.
In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I
mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.
Far more
dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction
would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the
consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive
recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.
We have faced other crises
in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and
taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has
been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was
right.
I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan
for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different
conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.
In San Francisco a few
weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading: "Lose in Vietnam, bring
the boys home."
Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any
American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of
view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of
office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority
who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting
demonstrations in the street.
For almost 200 years, the policy of this
Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress
and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however
fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this
Nation has no future as a free society.
And now I would like to address a
word, if I may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly
concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.
I
respect your idealism.
I share your concern for peace.
I want peace as
much as you do.
There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war.
This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved
ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very
little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I
signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the
day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.
-I want to end
the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam. -But I want to
end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and
their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the
world.
-And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so
that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often
directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be
turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a
better life for all people on this earth.
I have chosen a plan for peace. I
believe it will succeed.
If it does succeed, what the critics say now won't
matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won't matter.
I know it
may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days.
But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion. Two hundred years ago
this Nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions
in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the
world. And the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for
the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American
people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free
world leadership.
Let historians not record that when America was the most
powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and
allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be
suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.
And so tonight to you, the
great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support.
I
pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we
could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to
keep that pledge.
The more support I can have from the American people, the
sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the
less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.
Let us be united for peace.
Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam
cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do
that.
Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very desk, President
Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world.
He said: "This is the war to end war." His dream for peace after World War I
was shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and Woodrow Wilson
died a broken man.
Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the
war to end wars. But I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end
this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which
Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated
the goal of a just and lasting peace.
As President I hold the
responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the
Nation along it.
I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this
responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command in accordance
with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your
prayers.
Thank you and goodnight.
SOURCE: Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, pp. 901-909.