The Chartered Institute of Transport in the UK
The Transport Planning Lecture 1998
"Road Pricing: Can it really happen?"
Dr George McL Hazel
Director of City Development, The City of Edinburgh Council
"The [last] 25 years....however tortuous and difficult they may have seemed, have been the easy politics of the environment. The next 25 years will be dominated by the need to tackle the hard politics of the environment."
This 1997 statement by Tom Burke, former adviser to the Secretary of State for the Environment, is quoted in the Henley Centre’s report "Planning for Local Change", 1998, which highlights the increasing importance of "sustainability" as a key driver of public policy. The Henley Centre report emphasises the significance of transport within the sustainability agenda, and the quotation above is equally true in relation to the politics of transport, particularly in our cities.
Policy changes that have taken place over the last 25 years have been incremental in nature, and the way in which the transport system has evolved has been seen to bring major benefits, with few apparent losers. Corrective measures, where they have been necessary, have been applied to one-off problems. Wider negative impacts have been hidden and dispersed, often affecting the less well-off in society most severely and reinforcing the market pressures towards greater car ownership and use that have been the dominant feature of this period.
A combination of factors is now bringing about an agenda for radical change away from dependence on the car. Environmental issues are predominant in driving this change, but concerns about congestion, the economic health of cities, road safety, personal health, and social exclusion are also important. The eventual outcome of a period of several years of prevarication and tortured debate has been John Prescott’s Integrated Transport White Paper, which reflects the new agenda and introduces new opportunities to bring about the necessary change.
In this paper I will examine the potential use of road pricing - one of the tools necessary for the implementation of the new agenda, but one which highlights the fact that we are now having to deal with the "hard politics" of transport. Successful implementation of this type of measure will depend critically on taking a new approach to public involvement. Without achieving consensus, no politician will take the risk of moving forward with road pricing, there will be little restraint on car use, and we would be unlikely to achieve the change in transport patterns that I believe is essential to the continuing economic success of this country.
In 1950 there were 4 million vehicles on Britain’s roads. Today there are 25.6 million. In 1950 the average distance travelled was 8 km a day compared with 40km today. John Adams of University College, London forecasts that this figure could be 100km by 2025 under current trends. Car ownership continues to grow, and is growing particularly fast in cities. Edinburgh experienced an increase in car ownership per head of 47% between 1981 and 1991, compared to 29% for the UK as a whole. At the same time the mileage per vehicle continues to increase.
In parallel to growth in car use, there has been a substantial decline in the use of public transport, especially buses within our cities. Bus and coach travel for the UK has declined by about 30% in 25 years; but in spite of this, the vast majority of the growth in car traffic is new trips that were simply not made before. Acquiring a car does not mean simply getting off the bus and into the car instead: it brings about a transformation to lifestyle.
In response to these trends, local authorities and national government have attempted to provide greater capacity for motorised traffic where pressures are greatest, and to limit traffic in some city centres through parking controls and pedestrianisation. Ever reducing public finance for transport has been concentrated primarily on roads. There has been minimal public investment in public transport, and very little attempt to manage the road infrastructure in its favour. Professional traffic engineers managed the road network on efficiency criteria based on the basis of throughput of vehicles - not efficiency in moving people.
In the public perception, everything has worked towards the car culture, reflected in Mrs Thatcher’s belief in "the great car economy". Motoring costs have reduced relative to inflation, while public transport costs have increased significantly (see Table 1) as the system was been left to sink or swim in the market after 1985. The image of the car has been sold as the image of tomorrow, providing a lifestyle of freedom and independence. Modern developments for offices, shops and leisure activities increasingly located outside conventional city centres where car access was easy (but of course public transport could not be provided effectively).
Table 1 Trends in private and public transport costs 1984-1994
|
|
Cost index 1994 (1984=100) |
Change in cost 1984-1994 relative to RPI All Goods and Services |
|
All goods & services |
162 |
- |
|
Private All motoring costs |
158 |
-2% |
|
Petrol and oil |
138 |
-15% |
|
Public Rail fares |
191 |
+18% |
|
Bus fares |
201 |
+24% |
There have of course been downsides to these changes over many years - accidents, congestion and environmental problems are not new. But the policies adopted to tackle these have, to date, been the "easy politics" referred to in the introduction. Road safety has been tackled by engineering measures to vehicles themselves, and also to the road system by increasing segregation of people from traffic. Congestion has been tackled by investing in increased capacity at pinch points or indeed wholesale construction of new strategic routes. Environmental issues have been dealt with on a one-off basis, such as the removal of lead from petrol when the relationship between lead and children’s development became understood.
Other effects, rather more intangible, have not been tackled in a positive way or even seen necessarily as problems by the public or transport planners. For example, the relationship between traffic and economic health has generally been perceived as beneficial, traffic growth being an indicator of economic health rather than a threat to it. The link between travel habits and health and social problems has been largely unrecognised, although growing car dependency and less walking and cycling is clearly a factor in inadequate exercise. Lack of access to a car is increasingly limiting access for low income groups and non-car users (children, elderly etc) to essential activities, including education and jobs, as these activities move to locations that are less accessible by public transport, as public transport levels of service decline, and as public transport becomes more expensive.
There clearly have been losers from the way in which urban transport has evolved. However, the losses have been very gradual, and indirect rather than the result of specific and identifiable actions. Those affected may not even be aware of the change or its underlying causes. The losers are dispersed, and tend to be those with less voice in the corridors of power. Overall, the perception of the public at large seems until recently to have been that any drawbacks from the growth in car use are considerably offset by the benefits.
In recent years however, attitudes have been changing, led largely by environmental concerns. Radical opponents to road building have taken the headlines, closely followed by the scientific community coming to agree that global warming was a real threat to the future of us all. These concerns have resulted in political action.
This year has seen another crop of floods, droughts, tornadoes and record weather conditions of one kind or another. The risk that this is simply the start of a potentially more widespread set of catastrophes resulting from global warming has over the last five years led politicians throughout the world to set themselves targets for reducing the emission of greenhouse gases. Transport is currently the fastest growing source of CO2 emissions.
At the same time, the economic impacts of congestion have given rise to increasing concern in the business community. The competitiveness of a dense and congested country such as the UK could be affected by reduction in business efficiency resulting from congestion. Furthermore, the indirect economic effects are becoming more obvious. In our cities, competitive pressures to attract business, jobs and visitors has led to an awareness that the quality of life on offer is an important factor in locational decisions and is dependent on traffic intrusiveness, congestion and pollution amongst other things.
The costs caused by high traffic levels are a burden on the community as a whole. The National Health Service has to pick up much of the bill for treatment of accident injuries and ill-health resulting from pollution; business and its customers pay for the costs caused by the inefficiencies of congestion; we all pay to insure and repair damage caused by extreme weather conditions due to global warming. These are real, money, costs and the existing system that imposes these costs on the community at large rather than on the cause, is unfair.
The growing realisation that current transport trends were not sustainable in either environmental or economic terms has led the European Commission and a number of national governments including that of the UK to undertake a radical change in policy direction. The EU has produced policy statements on a "Citizen’s network" - a transport system available to all that reduces the need for car dependency - and on "Fair and Efficient Pricing" to ensure that road users pay the full costs - including external cost - of their journeys, and has legislated on air quality. In the UK, the previous government introduced a UK strategy for sustainable development, which amongst other things led to the production in July the Integrated Transport White Paper.
The relatively small scale measures being undertaken currently in the UK to try and mitigate the effects of traffic and slow down growth are having limited impact, even in the cities in which they are being applied. In Edinburgh, which I believe has been one of the leading cities in this respect, there appears to be increasing public concern, and awareness, of increasing problems of congestion. But the measures being taken to improve the effectiveness of public transport are seen as insufficient to compensate for perceived (rather than actual) restraints on car use.
There currently exists a dichotomy of view. The classic opinion that "we must all use our cars less, but I cannot do without mine" is widely held. At the same time there is widespread awareness that "we cannot go on as we are", and that environmental and congestion problems are becoming very pressing. The indications are that the approach to transport policy of the last five years or so will not resolve this dilemma, that the individual will not feel motivated to change her or his travel decisions, even when aware of the global need for action. The "easy politics" that have been adopted up to now are unlikely to achieve traffic reduction.
The only way forward I believe, is to enter the arena of "difficult politics". To do this we need to have a goal and a vision that will justify the risk. At the global level that goal may well be the survival of the planet, but a more positive and immediate vision is needed to inspire people. In transport terms, this might be an alternative to the car dominated city that is clean, pleasant, safe and enjoyable. A city with a healthy lifestyle, quiet streets and a relaxed atmosphere. A city with congestion at a minimum, little pollution and high air quality. A city for people, with space to mix and exchange ideas, business and culture, resulting in a strong economy, with access to jobs for all its citizens.
To achieve such a vision will indeed be difficult. Not only will it need money, planning and a consistent approach over a long time frame, but it will need a new mindset by professional transport planners. There is no doubt that both carrot and stick will be needed to achieve the transition, and that the measures adopted will need to be robust. I believe that a key tool in this process will be the application of charges on road users that will:
a) Relate the cost to the user of individual journeys more closely to the costs imposed (internal and external) - the stick;
b) Provide the funds that will be essential for upgrading the alternative choices to the motor car - the carrot.
However this key tool is undoubtedly "difficult politics". Experiences elsewhere in Europe have shown that there are huge hurdles to its successful introduction. These are not the technological hurdles on which huge resources have been focused over recent years, but political ones.
In western Europe, road pricing has been successfully introduced only in Norway. There have been high profile failures in Stockholm and in the Netherlands. Apart from that, a number of trials have been carried out, primarily to test the technology, and in one or two cases to test behavioural responses by a very limited number of volunteers. The lessons of Stockholm in particular have been well documented and provide a useful case study, whilst Norwegian studies give a profile of (the only) successes in Europe.
Stockholm
The proposal in Stockholm aimed to introduce road pricing as a means to finance a package of measures, including a controversial road scheme. It failed because it did not recognise sufficiently the importance of securing comprehensive public and political support. The proposal was negotiated as a complex agreement between the leadership of the major political parties. However:
"Stockholm spent 20 years and $1billion before thinking again".("Living with the car", The Economist, December 1997)
Norway -success story
Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim all have toll rings aimed at raising funds which were initially directly used to finance road construction. The political situation for introducing tolls in urban areas was ripe in Norway because the majority of road building money was being directed to rural areas at the expense of urban roads. Pressure was growing to deal with urban road issues including traffic safety, capacity and environment standards. The first toll ring was opened in Bergen in January 1986. The Oslo ring was opened in 1990 and Trondheim in 1991. The introduction of road tolling in Norway enabled early implementation of new road infrastructure. The choice presented was to wait a long time for new "free" roads or benefit from new roads now by paying a charge for the privilege. Residents of Skye will know the logic without necessarily agreeing with it
Public attitude surveys before and after the introduction of tolls were carried out in Oslo and Trondheim, in both cases showing a significant shift towards acceptance after the scheme was introduced (and some of the benefits came on stream).
Percentages of all citizens opposing the scheme:
|
|
Before (1988/9) |
After (1995/1998) |
|
Oslo |
65% |
55% |
|
Trondheim |
66% |
33% |
Looking simply at motorists, a similar change took place although the percentage opposed was slightly higher.
Research into the development of road user charging so far has reached a very powerful conclusion:
"Urban road pricing can be accepted only if there are very strong advantages to be supported by a majority of citizens. This will only happen if there are important improvements to the quality of life and to the level of service of the town’s transport system." (Source: Marc Ellenberg, "Urban Road Pricing in European Cities: The Way Forward", PTRC/AET Sept 1998).
But in order to gain acceptance it is not sufficient just for transport planners to understand the advantages and effects on a city’s transport system and quality of life. These advantages have to be demonstrated to the public, to business and to other interest groups - and these groups must have ownership of the concept, it cannot be imposed from above.
Four key areas need to be developed to ensure that transport planners, in coming forward with new concepts where there may be perceived to be significant losers from change, do this in partnership with the outside world. These are:
1 Understanding of the principles underpinning acceptability
Public attitudes are determined by a mixture of strongly held principles that are pretty much unshakeable, and of perceptions of a particular issue that are based on evidence - subjective or objective - that may be subject to reasoning and debate. The key principles that particular transport policies will have to meet in order to gain acceptability have to be understood. These are likely to include the notions of fairness, transparency, and security, and these need to be translated into the implications for different types of policy. On the other hand perceptions that do not reflect a full understanding of the relationships and impacts that are known to exist can be the subject of efforts to achieve consensus through correction of those perceptions.
Only if better understanding can be gained in these areas can we be reasonably sure that policymakers are addressing the issues that really concern people, are tackling perceptions rather than principles in awareness-raising and educational activities, and are demonstrating those benefits of change that people want to know about, and in language they can understand.
2 Better understanding the relationships between policy options and key principles seen as important by the public
Following on from the previous item, the way in which proposed policy changes may impact on people’s main concerns and priorities needs to be clearly understood and explained. Evaluation of options needs to incorporate all these issues, and comprehensive reconsideration of the approach to evaluation and assessment is essential.
This potentially leads to a very wide range of questions. Impacts can be categorised into a number of areas, and some of those where further research is likely to be needed might include the following list, which is not comprehensive:
Who are the losers and the gainers from any change, defined in social terms (for example the "marginal motorist", socio-economic groups, geographic terms (one area benefiting at the expense of another), demographic categories (families as compared to single people). Many other definitions could be developed. Consideration needs to be given to which are the most important, which affect notions of "fairness".
The economic impacts, both localised and over a wide geographical area (regional, national or international) of physical changes, of changes to accessibility, and of changes to environmental quality are still not well understood, and need further major study. Understanding of the effect on both small and large businesses of these changes will not only provide the basis for assessing overall economic impact, but will be essential to gain the acceptance of business.
Policy measures implemented in particular areas may affect land use and locational policy within that area, or they may cause shifts in locational decisions between different areas particularly if local authorities compete to attract development through non-sustainable transport policies. For example restraint measures such as parking restrictions or road user charges in city centres may stimulate peripheral development, or may stimulate moves by businesses to a less restrictive city. Approaches to location decisions by business, and ways of reducing competitive pressures achieving a "lowest common denominator" position need to be examined.
There is an understanding by health professionals of the effect of present transport trends on health. However this understanding is less amongst transport professionals, and certainly amongst the public at large. This issue could be a key factor in the development of public awareness and acceptance of the need for change to current trends, but it needs considerable development to improve understanding and communication of these linkages.
Environmental impacts have been the subject of extensive research, as has their inclusion in evaluation techniques. However the treatment of environmental impact in a holistic way, incorporating both global and local impacts, and quantifiable and non- quantifiable elements remains difficult.
New approaches to provision of transport services and infrastructure have raised issues in terms of the objectives of the providers in relation to public aspirations. These matters become even more significant when new sources of funding are discussed, either through private sector investment, or through new charges or levies on road users.
3 Packaging, combining and phasing policy measures
One of the failures of today’s transport planning techniques is the subjective and rather arbitrary approach to generation of options. Not only is linear thinking prevalent, for example in respect to the adoption of major infrastructure investment as the only option for improving public transport, but the way in which measures are packaged, combined and phased to achieve interim acceptability as well as long-term goals is barely considered at all.
A more integrated approach linking option generation with evaluation parameters may well be able to produce solutions that will be much more effective than those generated from the solely engineering- or finance-oriented approaches. These issues become even more significant when dealing with the relationship between investment, funding and car user restraint measures. Getting the phasing of such measures wrong is very likely to set back progress towards sustainable transport.
As a topical example, one could postulate two, staged, approaches to a long term objective of achieving traffic restraint combined with a substantially improved public transport network for a city:
|
Option 1 |
Option 2 |
|
Phase 1 objective: Stabilise current modal shares |
Phase 1 objective: Start restraint of car use |
Step 1: Initial investment in improved public transport, funded through borrowing based on future revenue from road user charges Step 2: Impose road user charges at low level primarily to fund the investment rather than reduce traffic per se |
Step 1: Impose road user charges at levels that start to reduce car use. Step 2: Investment in public transport using some of the charge receipts |
|
Phase 2 objective: Achieve long term traffic reduction target |
Phase 2 objective: Achieve long term traffic reduction target |
Step 3: Increase road user charge in steps linked to investment in public transport and environmental improvement. |
Step 3: Increase road user charges but with no direct linkage to further investment. |
Of these two very simplified options I would have little hesitation in saying that the first will be more likely to gain public acceptance than the second. We need techniques both to generate such options and to examine the acceptability and other impacts of them holistically.
4 Better techniques for collaboration with the public, business and interest groups
New and radical approaches to working with people on the development of transport strategies in terms of the aspects discussed in the previous three sections are required. A new language needs to be developed to help understanding, involvement and commitment, which may need to draw on marketing techniques rather than on conventional technical approaches to consultation. There needs to be examination of ways in which the widest possible audience for such approaches can be developed.
In particular, new tools could be used to work with people in an interactive way to examine the consequences both to individuals and to the wider community of alternative policies and strategic decisions. Some form of simulation, for example, that produces outputs that are meaningful to the individual and easy to understand would allow people to test for themselves the consequences of particular actions.
Edinburgh has been perceived as being at the forefront of the development of new approaches to urban transport policy, and as highlighting the need for a holistic approach to tackling the issues. The City of Edinburgh Council’s moving FORWARD transport strategy has been seminal in this respect. But it is now time to review and update that strategy, which included a short term action plan aimed at stabilising traffic levels by 2000. Longer term targets required the reduction of car traffic by 2010, and much more radical measures than those adopted to date will be needed to achieve this. Yet concern about traffic levels is as great if not greater now that it was in 1994 when the strategy was launched. This may well be an issue of perception rather than fact.
At the same time public funding for transport investment has reduced signficantly over the period. The use of the new charging powers outlined in the Transport White Paper appears to be the only way out of the dilemma.
However, discussion of new revenue-raising powers has identified two essential prerequisites if there is to be any chance of implementation:
·
Acceptance of the principle of hypothecation by both central government and local authorities - by the former to give local authorities control of the revenues raised; by the latter to ensure the funds are used for transport rather than other local authority services.·
Acceptance of the principle of additionality, again by both central government and local authorities - ensuring that the funds raised are not simply substituted for other sources of funding.A further requirement is likely to be to ensure that at least some of the investment in alternatives to the car is in place before road user charging is introduced. To achieve such up-front funding will require new approaches to financial engineering which may well have repercussions in terms of the accountability and transparency of the arrangements set up.
The public and political sensitivity of these matters means that the focus for producing a new transport strategy for the city potentially incorporating road user charging will be around the development of a wide range of partnerships. Partnerships are needed with the public, with business and with neighbouring local authorities many of whose citizens will be very much part of the strategy. Partnership will be required with the private sector particularly in relation to financial matters. Partnership will be needed with central government and the Scottish parliament to ensure an acceptable statutory framework. And partnership will be needed with academic institutions and other public bodies to support the development of the programme.
Innovative approaches to developing many of these partnerships will be needed, and this process has already been started in the city. However, firm decisions on any major development programme towards road user charging will not be made until next year.
Looking back at transport planning highlights of the 1960’s and early 1970’s - in particular the Smeed Report of 1964 - one can find a wealth of statements by professionals about the desirability of road pricing as the most rational and effective mechanism for managing congestion, congestion being the inefficient use of a scarce resource: roadspace. More than thirty years on this mechanism is still not in place.
The main reason it is not in place is nothing to do with technology. It is due to the high political risk perceived by politicians of making a decision to impose restraint on car use - politicians do not see any votes in it.
Until there is a reasonable consensus coming from the public and the business community, politicians will continue to take this view. The key task for transport planners wanting to take forward the government’s "New Deal for Transport" will be to translate the professional view of the benefits that can be achieved for society from these measures into a language and a context that is understood and can be accepted by the public.
Road Pricing: can it really happen? I believe the answer is "yes". But only if it has supporting it:
16/11/98