McClellan and the use of Jominian Military Tactics

author, Steven Carlino

General George B. McClellan is one of the most misunderstood military minds in the history of warfare. Many Civil War biographers see McClellan as a genius, while other historians see him as being completely incompetent. Personally I see McClellan as a great strategist and tactician out of place and time. If one placed McClellan on the open European battlefields of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, he would be seen as one of the greatest military leaders in the history of warfare.

George McClellan graduated number one in his class from West Point in 1846. The son of a prominent East Coast family, McClellan was soon sent to fight in the Mexican War. Educational thought at West Point during McClellan’s time was focused on engineering. Sylvanus Thayer, superintendent of West Point, believed that professional military officers could productively contribute to the country by being trained engineers. The actual military strategy that was taught revolved around theory and doctrine developed by French military thinkers included Henri Jomini. Jomini’s beliefs were brought to West Point by Dennis Hart Mahan, the protégé of Thayer.

Jominian tactics call for preferences of "maneuver versus the direct strategic approach with victory by massive frontal assaults." These tactics are concerned with the seizure of city and place rather than the defeat of the opposing army. Mahan was considered the leading Napoleonic-style tactician and was studied by every student at West Point. Therefore, Jominian tactics were learned by every cadet of the period including McClellan, Ulysses S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, and William T. Sherman.

After McClellan’s experience in the Mexican War, he had the opportunity to observe European military developments as part of an military commission in 1855-1856. During the Crimean War, McClellan noticed that warfare had shifted from frontal assaults to entrenched fortifications. Grouped together with Mahan’s teachings and Jominian theory, McClellan developed his own strategic style revolving around Napoleonic ideals combined with the enhancement of field fortification.

McClellan learned his great organizational skills from the Prussian General Staff. He was always interested in setting up a similar chain of command within the United States Army. On July 27, 1861 McClellan took command of the Army of the Potomac and found it in complete disarray. At this point McClellan struggled to develop an army under the Prussian model. While it is often overlooked, McClellan was responsible for taking an army in total disorganization after its’ defeat at Bull Run and turning it into a formidable fighting force.

McClellan’s tactics are obvious from his early campaigns in the war. Intrusted with moving a large Confederate force out of present day West Virginia, he was able to use well-entrenched defensive positions to his advantage. He moved with quickness and efficiency in this first campaign. His actions were much different in western Viriginia, when contrasted with his stagnant movements on the Virginian peninsula.

The Peninsula Campaign was devised as a plan to travel around the heavily fortified Confederate areas leading Southwest from Washington to Richmond. The plan called for an amphibious landing of Union troops near the James River, an inlet of the Chesapeake Bay. The landing of troops would be easy for the Union to accomplish since they had already successfully blockaded the Confederate coast. After the Union soldiers landed, McClellan was able to swiftly move them up the peninsula until he was blocked by Confederate Generals Joseph Johnston and Robert E. Lee near Yorktown. After being entrenched at Yorktown, Lincoln became impatient. McClellan had little choice but to make a frontal assault.

At this point in the campaign, Johnston made a brilliant tactical decision. Fearing he would be turned at Yorktown, he retreated past Williamsburg, back to the Richmond defenses. This movement left little room for McClellan to perform maneuvers to avoid a large conflict. McClellan never realized that the heavily wooded Virginia terrain that became the battlefield was much different than the wide open battlefields of Europe. It became difficult for his army to maintain an efficient supply line. Jominian tactics do not advocate being cut off from one’s supply lines and being forced to live off the land. These two problems would cause the largest obstacles for McClellan.

At this point McClellan believed his best option was to move his army to a position that would expedite the receipt of supplies and at the same time make an attack on Richmond more plausible for his troops to perform. The Peninsula Campaign became bloody and more fatal as Lee’s plans for flanking attacks failed and he was forced into frontal assaults into McClellan’s entrenched positions. This is the precursor to the fighting that would become common in World War I. The Civil War was the first modern war in many respects including the wide use of entrenched defensive positions.

The Confederates began to incur heavy losses of lives. According to the author Edward Hagerman, "These statistics and Confederate tactical failure seemed to justify McClellan’s [tactics]...[t]hey tended to support Mahan’s reservations about open frontal assaults." McClellan is often blamed for his strategy during this campaign. Many revisionist historians believe that the war could have been won in 1862 during the Peninsula campaign, with a decisive defeat of the Confederate Army and a Union march to Richmond.

The campaign ended after severe supply problems began to hamper further attempts to move on Richmond. Prior to marching towards Richmond, McClellan asked for reinforcements while camped near the Chickahominy River. He expected to receive 50,000 troops from Washington, but the Union government felt it was risky to leave Washington undefended. Heavy losses began to accumulate on both sides after battles at Gaines Mills, Glendale and Malvern Hill. McClellan hoped that with reinforcements he could lay siege on Richmond and wait for capitulation from the Confederates. Without the extra manpower, McClellan was forced to retreat, or he risked being routed by Confederates defending Richmond.

McClellan believed that the army with the most reserves, supplies and soldiers left at the end of a campaign was the victor. This thought was fashioned after the wars of the European continent when it was expensive to replace lost manpower. This war was different, each side was fighting for a higher moral belief and way of life. This war would not be over until the opponent was completely demoralized.

McClellan’s tactics were out of place and out of time. The Civil War was the first war fought by American troops in the Industrial era. "Total War," is the military strategy that prevailed in this conflict. The war had to be won with decisive battles and large losses for enemy armies as well as inflicting damage on civilian resources. Grant, Sherman, and Philip Sheridan realized what type of actions winning the war would necessitate. It is ironic that the war began with a common goal and belief on both sides: work to capture the opposing government’s capital city and victory would follow through capitulation. The irony lies in the fact that the capture of a capital city is Jominian in principle, but the war ended via the effects and consequences of the total war concept.

The author T. Henry Williams, comments that McClellan fought the war as if was playing an, "immense chess game...pursuing empty objects such as cities and territories," rather than fighting the enemy’s army and inflicting damage upon their ability to fight. McClellan seemed bound to fight by the book, and even under harsh criticism was unable to adopt more offensive and decisive tactics.

McClellan has also been the target of criticism for his love of his troops. While Grant routinely sent troops out en masse to be slaughtered, only to gain little strategic advantage, McClellan was cautious with the lives of each and every soldier under his command. Part of this tendency not to put troops in harms way, lied in the fact that McClellan understood that his troops were not trained or prepared to conduct full frontal assaults or attacks that required timing and skill. McClellan acted as if he was constantly afraid of making a crucial mistake. The great Civil War author Bruce Catton denotes that the Northern Generals, "could afford mistakes," they had the men and resources on their side. It was common for McClellan to overestimate the enemies forces. This occurrence is one gleaming mark against McClellan, and can go a long way to prove he was just overcautious in many instances rather than adhering to Jominian tactics.

It is important to view this topic in relationship to the shift in war technology and strategy. The Civil War is a combination of the last war to be fought with the old tactics of line formations and open field battles, while it is also the first to be fought with new tactics of bringing the war home to the populace and the addition of railroads as a means of transporting supplies. This does not mean that Jominian tactics are not applicable to today’s military world. While the idea of "total war," rules, the strategy of capturing place and defensive maneuvers are still very much part of modern warfare.

The lesson that should be learned by today’s military leaders is that the times change and the face of warfare changes at a rapid pace. One can not fight yesterday’s war in tomorrow’s conflict. It is important to adapt strategy and tactics to fit a particular situation. A military commander must take all circumstances and details into account.

McClellan was taught and observed that Jominian tactics were proper and successful. He was taught these tactics at West Point, and later witnesses these strategies put to application in the Mexican War and in Europe. His actions were those of an intelligent and prudent military officer. Grant and Sherman became the beneficiaries of McClellan’s failures as a Union Commander. They had the opportunity to learn from his failures and adapt their strategies to suit a war that had changed the face of military conflict.