Every early civilization had a pervasive set of religious beliefs and philosophies that reached out to every corner of society. Such ideologies shaped society and ensured the conformity of its members¸ but to study intangibles is a formidable task. Ideologies come down to us in distinctive art styles. Like those of the Egyptians¸ or the Moche art style of the Andes. Such styles are visual reminders of a state's ideology¸ reinforcing the power of supreme rulers and their special relationships to the gods and the spiritual world. In societies where only minorities¸ those with power¸ are literate (or have scribes in their employ)¸ art and public architecture have powerful roles to play in shaping society and reinforcing ideology.
The Maya lived in cities like Copan and Tikal, which were depictions in stone, wood and stucco of a symbolic landscape of sacred hills¸ caves¸ and forests. Here great lords appeared before the people atop high pyramids in elaborate public ceremonies. Through ritual bloodletting and shamanistic trance¸ they entered the realm of the Otherworld¸ the world of the deities and ancestors. These sacred rituals validated the world of the Maya¸ and linked noble and commoner¸ ruler and humble village farmer in a complex social contract. The leaders were the intermediaries¸ the people who interceded with the gods to guarantee plentiful crops and ensure the continued existence of human life. The ceremonial centers, with the pyramids¸ plazas¸ and temples¸ were reassuring settings where the drama of life and death¸ of planting and harvest were played out against a backdrop of ever–changing seasons. These ceremonies justified social inequality¸ the great distinctions between the ruler and the ruled.
Ancient ideologies were as complex as our own¸ and they defy ready archaeological analysis by their very complexity and nonmaterial nature. The recent decipherment of Maya script has shown just how important and pervasive ideologies were in ancient civilizations. Until decipherment¸ most authorities assumed Maya rulers were peaceful priest–kings, who used their power as astronomers to preside over small city–states. However¸ Maya glyphs reveal an intricate and complex pantheon of deities¸ and religious beliefs that often defy modern analysis. Each day in the Maya calendar possessed a combination of qualities; every compass direction had colors and characteristics; each deity had many roles and moods. Nothing in Maya society occurred without acquiring symbolic and often ideological meaning. In Egypt¸ too¸the ancient precedents of the pharaohs´ rule and the teaching of the gods permeated all society and governed even the collection of taxes and the distribution of rations.
With ideology comes factionalism. As we have seen¸ancient societies were as diverse as modern ones¸especially when their rulers traded with neighbors near and far. The state functioned for the benefit of a minority–privileged rulers and nobles to whom all wealth and power flowed. A ruler governed his domains by deputing governance to relatives and loyal followers who became provincial governors. However¸inevitably some individuals were more ambitious than others¸ rebelling against authority¸ plotting to gain supreme social power. Competing factions within local groups and in different regions triggered further social inequality and changing patterns of leadership, increased specialization¸ and the royal successions¸ even trigger civil war when a ruler was perceived as weak or indecisive. Competition and emerging factionalism were powerful catalysts in the development of many early states.
In an era when archaeological research has become increasingly specialized¸it is probably futile to search for a theory of state formation that can be applied to all civilizations. There are some common questions¸ however¸ that revolve around the implications of ecological variables in societies about to become states. How is ecological opportunity or necessity translated into political change? What were the larger goals of the political actors who were pursuing their goals while states were coming into being? Which ecological variables were obstacles? Which were opportunities? The answer to these questions will come from sophisticated researches that combine systems-ecological approaches with careful research into what British archaeologist Colin Renfew has called “the archaeology of mind” the elusive intangibles behind the material record of the past.
People as Agents of Change
For all our talk of “cultural process¸” we must never forget that it is people-individuals and groups–who are the agents of political and other cultural change. Peoples make history with individuals of exceptional ability and leadership qualities. No question¸ such people also came to positions of great power in the early civilizations¸ but many of them remain anonymous because written records are very incomplete. In some cases, for example Egypt¸ we know the names of seminal rulers like the early pharaoh Narmer¸ but they are little more that shadowy personages on the stage of history. More modern examples include the Zulu King Shaka¸ who set up the Zulu state in South Africa in the early nineteenth century¸ King Kamehameha of Hawaii¸ and others. All of them, whether ancient or more modern, were individuals who were products of their times¸ whose personal abilities made the most of unusual circumstances¸ accidental situations¸ and other more moments where they could further their political and military goals. The result was¸ invariably¸ a process of historical change.
Distinctive qualities make Shaka and other modern agents of change that were shared by the chiefs ability who created the first civilizations. They were members of an elite people with aggressive and authoritarian personalities, with outstanding military abilities that gave them upward social mobility. They usurped the position of chief by fair means or foul¸ then conquered their immediate neighbors¸ while seeking a competitive advantage over more distant rivals (this could be technological¸ a matter of military strategy¸ and so on) They used this advantage to expand into more distant lands¸ while using forced labor to intensify agricultural production, as a means of keeping one´s subjects content and of provisioning armies. If they could not intensify their food production, they acquired additional resources by raiding. Finally, they solidified their position by power–sharing, even if it was nothing more than a nominal gesture. This was definitely not democracy¸ for the earliest states were ruled by a strong¸ able rulers who governed autocratically¸ even if they had nominal councils of advisors.
Much depends on ideology¸ too¸ for invariably the pre–industrial states were held together by a powerful and distinctive ideology. The famous Epic of Gilgameshgives us a flavor of Mesopotamian ideology. The pharaohs ruled as living personification of the sun god. Maya lords were shamans and intermediaries between the people and the ancestors. These ideologies were reflected in scared places¸ where lavish ceremonies and public appearances by the ruler were important symbols of continuity and stability, where the ruler's subjects directed their loyalty into central figure at the pinnacle of the state. Ideology never caused states to come into being, but were an invariable and important part of their fabric once they were established.
Both process and individual agents played vital roles in the formation of states. Aggressive individuals of great ambition have been members of human societies since the beginning¸ but¸ until about 6¸000 years ago¸ they never lived at a time when conditions of social inequality and chiefly competition were endemic in areas like Mesopotamia and the Nile Valley¸ or later in Mesoamerica and the Andes. Then¸ competitive advantage¸ military prowess¸ and other circumstances turned a very few of them from powerful chiefs into authoritarian kings, soon supported by compelling new ideologies developed from earlier and less complex world views.
The Collapse of Civilizations
Many historians have written about cycles of history¸ the rise of civilizations¸ their brilliant apogees¸ and their sudden declines. Eventually one civilization falls and another rises to task its place¸ which in turn goes through the same cycle of rise and fall. The record of early civilizations could easily be written in cyclical terms¸ for states have risen and the collapsed with bewildering rapidity in all parts of the world within the past 5¸000 years. In the Mexican highlands¸ for example¸ the great city of Teotihuacán flourished between about 200 B.C.E. and 700 A.C.E. In 600 A.C.E.¸ it had a population of more than 125,000 people. For 600 years¸ more than 85% of the population of the Valley of Mexico lived in or close to Teotihuacán. Then the city collapsed in the eighth century A.C.E. Within a half century¸ the population shrank to a quarter of its former size.
When a complex society collapses¸ it suddenly becomes smaller¸ simpler¸ and much more egalitarian. Population densities fall¸ trade and economic activity dries¸ information flow declines¸ and the known world shrinks for the survivors. Joseph Tainter¸ one of the few archaeologists to have made a comparative study of collapse¸ points out that an initial investment by a society in growing complexity is a rational way of trying to solve the needs of the moment. At first the strategy works¸ agricultural production increases through more intensive farming methods; an emerging bureaucracy works well; expanding trade networks bring wealth to a new elite, who use their authority and economic clout to undertake great public works¸ such as pyramids and temples¸ which validate their spiritual authority and divine associations.
As the most costly solutions to society´s needs are exhausted¸ so does it become imperative that new organizations and economic answers be found¸ which may have much lower yields and cost a great deal more. As these stresses develop, argues Tainter, a complex society such as that of the Maya is increasingly vulnerable to collapse. These are few reserves to carry ensures¸ especially when segments of society perceive that centralization and social complexity simply do not work any more that they are better off on their own. The trend toward decentralization¸ toward collapse¸ becomes compelling. Collapse is not a catastrophe but a rational process that occurs when increasing stress requires some organizational change. The population decline and other catastrophic effects that just preceded, accompanied¸ or followed collapse may have been traumatic at the time¸ but they can be looked at as past of what one might call an economic process.
There is¸ of course, more to collapse than merely an economizing process. Complete collapse can occur only under circumstances in which there is a power vacuum. In many cases¸ there may be a powerful neighbor waiting in the wings. In earlier times¸ numerous city–states traded and completed with one another within a small area. Sumerian cities¸ Minoan¸ and Mycenaean palace–kingdoms in Greece and Aegean¸ the Maya in Mesoamerican—all lived in close interdependence within their culture areas¸ in a state of constant “peer–polity interaction.” They traded¸ fought¸ and engaged in constant diplomacy. Under these circumstances¸ to collapse is an invitation to be dominated by one´s competitors. There is only loss of complexity when every polity in the interacting cluster collapses at the same time.
The collapse of early civilizations may¸ them, be closely connected to declining returns from social complexity, and to the normal political process of factionalism¸ social unrest¸ succession disputes¸ even civil war.
Summary
This chapter contrasts the historical and anthropological approaches to the origins of states and summarizes the main theories developed by archaeologists¸ and Gordon Childe´s “Urban Revolution” theory centered on the developed of the city. Another group of theories involved the intensification of agriculture and irrigation. Exchange networks and warfare have also been espoused as potential causes of civilization. Many modern theories revolve around systems–evolutionary hypotheses and explanations involving environmental change. A new generation of social approaches¸ on the other hand¸ argues that religious and informational factors¸ epitomized by centralized authority¸ have been key elements in the regulation of environmental and economic variables in early civilization. Such theories also stress that the social structure of a society focus on ecological variables and the opportunities they present to individuals pursuing political goals in different societies–individual agent of change. In other words¸ how is ecological opportunity or necessity translated into political change? Recent researches are now focusing on factionalism¸ ideology¸ and gender as promising areas of inquiry.
Many historians have written about cycles of history¸ the rise of civilizations¸ their brilliant apogees¸ and their sudden declines. Eventually one civilization falls and another rises to task its place¸ which in turn goes through the same cycle of rise and fall. The record of early civilizations could easily be written in cyclical terms¸ for states have risen and the collapsed with bewildering rapidity in all parts of the world within the past 5¸000 years. In the Mexican highlands¸ for example¸ the great city of Teotihuacán flourished between about 200 B.C.E. and 700 A.C.E. In 600 A.C.E.¸ it had a population of more than 125,000 people. For 600 years¸ more than 85% of the population of the Valley of Mexico lived in or close to Teotihuacán. Then the city collapsed in the eighth century A.C.E. Within a half century¸ the population shrank to a quarter of its former size.
When a complex society collapses¸ it suddenly becomes smaller¸ simpler¸ and much more egalitarian. Population densities fall¸ trade and economic activity dries¸ information flow declines¸ and the known world shrinks for the survivors. Joseph Tainter¸ one of the few archaeologists to have made a comparative study of collapse¸ points out that an initial investment by a society in growing complexity is a rational way of trying to solve the needs of the moment. At first the strategy works¸ agricultural production increases through more intensive farming methods; an emerging bureaucracy works well; expanding trade networks bring wealth to a new elite, who use their authority and economic clout to undertake great public works¸ such as pyramids and temples¸ which validate their spiritual authority and divine associations.
As the most costly solutions to society´s needs are exhausted¸ so does it become imperative that new organizations and economic answers be found¸ which may have much lower yields and cost a great deal more. As these stresses develop, argues Tainter, a complex society such as that of the Maya is increasingly vulnerable to collapse. These are few reserves to carry ensures¸ especially when segments of society perceive that centralization and social complexity simply do not work any more that they are better off on their own. The trend toward decentralization¸ toward collapse¸ becomes compelling. Collapse is not a catastrophe but a rational process that occurs when increasing stress requires some organizational change. The population decline and other catastrophic effects that just preceded, accompanied¸ or followed collapse may have been traumatic at the time¸ but they can be looked at as past of what one might call an economic process.
There is¸ of course, more to collapse than merely an economizing process. Complete collapse can occur only under circumstances in which there is a power vacuum. In many cases¸ there may be a powerful neighbor waiting in the wings. In earlier times¸ numerous city–states traded and completed with one another within a small area. Sumerian cities¸ Minoan¸ and Mycenaean palace–kingdoms in Greece and Aegean¸ the Maya in Mesoamerican—all lived in close interdependence within their culture areas¸ in a state of constant “peer–polity interaction.” They traded¸ fought¸ and engaged in constant diplomacy. Under these circumstances¸ to collapse is an invitation to be dominated by one´s competitors. There is only loss of complexity when every polity in the interacting cluster collapses at the same time.
The collapse of early civilizations may¸ them, be closely connected to declining returns from social complexity, and to the normal political process of factionalism¸ social unrest¸ succession disputes¸ even civil war.
Summary