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The twenty-one year freeze: Australia's relations with the
   Democratic Republic of Korea.

(by Adrian Buzo)


                
Introduction
  
   The stagnation of the relationship between Australia and the
   Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is striking in an era of
   rapid political and economic change in the Asia-Pacific region.
   Relations have been frozen since the expulsion of the staff of the
   Australian Embassy in Pyongyang on 8 November 1975. While the two
   countries have continued to recognise each other, for over twenty
   years they have not exchanged diplomatic representation. In recent
   years, Australia has limited official contact to talks between
   middle-level officials on an irregular basis with no fixed agenda, and
   has thus largely limited the scope of relations to the non-official
   sphere. There is little evidence of debate within Australia on whether
   the current state of affairs serves the national interest, and the
   purpose of this paper is, therefore, to outline the background to
   current Australian policy and look at some options for the future.
  
Background
  
   In November 1972, a significant change occurred in Australian politics
   when the Australian Labor Party was elected to office for the first
   time in twenty-three years. This was a period of considerable change
   in the region, marked by the steady withdrawal of the US and its
   allies, including Australia, from the Vietnam War, and by US-China
   rapprochement. The abatement of US--China hostility, soon to be
   followed by Japanese reconciliation with China, seemed to herald the
   dawning of a new era of intra-regional cooperation. In inter-Korean
   affairs the 4 July 1972 Joint Statement by the Republic of Korea and
   the DPRK had opened an avenue for substantive political talks between
   the two countries and seemed part of the general trend.
  
   The previous Liberal-Country Party Coalition government in Australia
   had followed a policy of refusing to extend recognition to the three
   communist countries in the Asia-Pacific region--the People's Republic
   of China (PRC), the then Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the
   DPRK. The incoming Labor government reversed this policy as a matter
   of priority and rapidly negotiated agreement on diplomatic recognition
   with the PRC and DRV. The case of the DPRK presented more of a
   challenge because it was difficult to fit the DPRK into the picture of
   emerging change in the region. The 4 July Agreement between the two
   Koreas had been a promising start, active DPRK diplomacy within the
   Non-Aligned Movement suggested a more outward-looking foreign policy
   than in previous years, and recent major DPRK purchases of Western
   plant and technology had given rise to expectations of an opening up
   of its economic system. Nevertheless, evidence of change from past
   policies of intransigence and confrontation seemed less clear-cut.
   Most important from Australia's point of view, there had been no
   movement in the DPRK's stance on reunification where, despite the 4
   July Agreement, the DPRK continued to deny the legitimacy of the
   Republic of Korea (ROK) government. The DPRK's allies, led by the
   Soviet Union and China, backed this up with a policy of continuing
   non-recognition of the ROK. Therefore, if Australia were to move
   toward recognition of the DPRK it would have to do so unilaterally.
   This would be against the wishes of the ROK, Japan and the US, and the
   benefit to Australia's national interest in this was far from clear.
  
   However, the case for extending recognition was a strong one. There
   was certainly no question that the DPRK government exercised effective
   authority in the northern part of the Korean peninsula, and the
   Whitlam government did not rule out diplomatic relations with
   countries on the grounds of ideological or political differences.
   Moreover, Australia felt that the continuing diplomatic isolation of
   the DPRK was anomalous and that wider acceptance Of the current
   reality of two Korean governments would contribute to the peace and
   stability of the peninsula without prejudicing future moves toward
   reunification. As Albinski has noted, Australian thinking on the DPRK
   embodied 'both pragmatic and idealistic connotations'.(n1)
   Accordingly, negotiations proceeded slowly and the two parties reached
   agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations on 31 July
   1974.(n2) The DPRK proceeded to establish a resident embassy in
   Canberra on 31 December 1974, and the Australian Embassy in Pyongyang
   opened on 30 April 1975. Six months later, however, the DPRK abruptly
   withdrew from Canberra and shortly afterwards expelled the Australian
   Embassy from Pyongyang.(n3) The DPRK did not break off relations but
   its actions left the two countries without accredited envoys.
  
   The DPRK accused the Australian authorities of adopting an unfriendly
   attitude toward the DPRK Embassy in Canberra and also made allegations
   against the staff of the Australian Embassy in Pyongyang, but has
   never offered a rational explanation for its actions. Beyond the
   stated reasons for the DPRK's action, it is probable that Australia's
   lobbying in favour of a pro-ROK resolution (and thus against a
   competing pro-DPRK resolution) on the Korean Question at the 30th
   session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 30), especially
   during the period August-October 1975,(n4) gave serious offence. The
   UNGA 30 debate seemed to bring home to the DPRK that Australia was not
   going to reduce significantly the level of its diplomatic support for
   the ROK and, in DPRK eyes, this was an unacceptable 'two Koreas'
   policy. There were clearly broad misunderstandings on the direction of
   each other's foreign policy, and differences in policy, not to mention
   diplomatic style, were simply too great to sustain relations at the
   resident embassy level.
  
   It is impossible to tell whether specific incidents involving the two
   countries' missions were a factor in the DPRK's move, but some further
   comment on the issue of diplomatic style is in order. The DPRK tended
   to interpret the mere establishment of diplomatic relations with
   Australia as a partisan act. It clearly expected the Australian
   government to be supportive of specific DPRK policies and activities,
   and anticipated a dividend in the form of a reduction in the level of
   Australian support for the ROK. It was no doubt disappointed at
   Australia's actual performance.
  
   In the case of the DPRK mission in Canberra, this writer was aware at
   the time of DPRK dissatisfaction at the travel restrictions imposed on
   its diplomats although, of course, far more stringent restrictions
   were placed upon Australian diplomats in Pyongyang. The DPRK also
   seemed to expect more assistance from the Australian government in its
   propaganda activities and probably resented occasional polite,
   official admonishments when these activities involved the slandering
   of the ROK. Meanwhile, in Pyongyang, the DPRK was openly surprised at
   Australia's stance at UNGA 30. it repeatedly stressed to Australian
   diplomats that it did not insist on support for the pro-DPRK
   resolution but it asked Australia not to oppose the DPRK position. As
   it became clear during September 1975 that Australia had fundamental
   problems with the pro-DPRK resolution, the DPRK openly stated that the
   Australian position would have a serious effect on bilateral
   relations. It is consistent with this stance that in early October the
   DPRK should have ordered its mission in Canberra to prepare for a
   quick exit.
  
Australian policy toward the DPRK 1975-95
  
   The expulsion of the Australian Embassy from Pyongyang coincided with
   the dismissal from office of the Labor government and the return to
   power of the Liberal--Country (now National) Party Coalition
   government (1975-83). Whether the DPRK assumed that the new government
   would be hostile to the DPRK or not, there was little contact between
   the two parties for a number of years.(n5) Gradually, however, and
   especially after the Australian Labor Party returned to power in March
   1983, the DPRK made a number of low level official approaches to the
   Australian government aimed at resuming relations. It is not clear why
   the DPRK sought to resume relations since its foreign policy had
   undergone little or no modification in the years since 1975.
   Certainly, however, the DPRK had ceased to attach much importance to
   United Nations-based diplomacy after UNGA 30 and this reduced the
   possibility for conflict. Moreover, the DPRK may have had in mind a
   more measured, circumspect relationship involving non-resident
   embassies and regular visits to Australia by officers from the DPRK
   Embassy in Jakarta.
  
   The incoming Labor government did not assign a high priority to the
   matter and, in any case, the Rangoon bombing which occurred seven
   months later in October 1983, effectively precluded any positive
   Australian response for some time afterward.(n6) In the wake of the
   bombing Australia joined a broad cross-section of countries in
   applying sanctions to the DPRK which included placing a series of
   restrictions on official contacts. For the next five years Australia
   limited contact to the non-official sphere, allowing visits to
   Australia by DPRK citizens only for the purpose of business or
   cultural activities, or else to attend multilateral meetings. The
   Australian government did not interfere with private commercial
   activities involving the DPRK but in any case these were of little
   significance during this period.
  
   Australia now proceeded to develop three interrelated conditions for
   resuming official relations with the DPRK. They were that the DPRK
   should renounce hostile actions against the ROK and engage in
   negotiation to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula, that the DPRK
   should demonstrate a willingness to abide by accepted norms of
   international behaviour, and that Australia would need to be convinced
   that there was scope for a constructive bilateral relationship. On 16
   October 1984, the then Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, described
   government policy as follows:
  
   It is the Australian Government's view that, in the long term, the
   DPRK must be brought into a more cooperative relationship with the
   region. But DPRK cooperation can only mean something if it starts with
   the ROK. In the meantime, Australia is not prepared to examine the
   question of restoring diplomatic relations with Pyongyang until it
   renounces hostile action against Seoul and abides by internationally
   accepted norms of behaviour. We consider that dialogue between the two
   Koreas should be encouraged as a means of reducing the problems of a
   very tense peninsula. We have supported Seoul's proposals for direct
   contacts with the DPRK and would like to see implementation of
   confidence-building measures which have been proposed within the
   framework of the Military Armistice Commission and elsewhere.(n7)
  
   This approach and the hierarchy of inter-Korean, international, and
   bilateral interests that it contained set the tone for the years that
   followed. Since Australia's bilateral interest in the DPRK was (and
   still is) negligible, the question of a resumption of ties was closely
   linked to developments on the Korean peninsula itself, with the
   possibility of increased contact very consciously linked to the DPRK
   playing a positive role in the reduction of tensions between the two
   Koreas. The general international behaviour of the DPRK was a further
   significant issue because, apart from the Rangoon bombing, over a
   period of years the DPRK had acquired a dubious record. It was a
   delinquent debtor, a supporter and practitioner of international
   terrorism, and the behaviour of its diplomats had given rise to a
   series of incidents in a number of countries involving the smuggling
   of drugs, currency and arms.
  
   The diplomatic effect of the Rangoon bombing was prolonged. By the
   second half of 1988, however, there were signs of marginal improvement
   in the situation on the Korean peninsula. In July 1988, ROK President
   Roh Tae-woo's Nordpolitik made clear the ROK's interest in having its
   allies develop contact with the DPRK in order to complement the ROK's
   own push toward ties with the Soviet Union and China. The ROK was able
   to stage the 1988 Olympic Games without incident and the favourable
   publicity that it generated underlined the advancing international
   status of the ROK. Accordingly, Mikhaii Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk
   declaration in September 1988 reversed long-established Soviet policy
   on Korea and foreshadowed formal trade relations with Seoul. There
   were also signs that China was reassessing its Korea policy, and the
   US had opened non-official talks with the DPRK in Beijing on 31
   October 1988.
  
   At the same time, however, there were no signs of change to basic DPRK
   political and diplomatic strategies. Traditional ideological
   parameters guided relations with its principal adversaries, there were
   no significant changes in the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) politburo,
   no stirring of ideological debate within the country, foreign trade
   initiatives of 1984 had not been followed up, and the Third Seven Year
   Plan (1987-93) was premised on continued application of traditional
   remedies to its economic problems. In inter-Korea relations, signs of
   change were limited to the inauguration of small-scale, indirect
   inter-Korea trade and a short and inconclusive period of negotiation
   on inter-parliamentary talks, which began in November 1988.(n8)
  
   The sense of positive movement among the allies of the two Koreas was
   sufficient for Australia to make a more positive response to what had
   been periodic DPRK overtures. Accordingly, in January 1989, two
   Australian diplomatic officers from the Australian Embassy in Beijing
   took up a recent DPRK invitation to visit Pyongyang where they met
   with their counterparts in a move that Foreign Minister Senator Gareth
   Evans described at the time as 'testing the water'.(n9) Senator Evans
   went on:
  
   Our basic position is--as we have told them--that our attitude to
   North Korea will depend (a) on overall developments in the Korean
   Peninsula and the state of the developing relationship with the South
   Koreans; second, it will depend on their international behaviour ....
   and thirdly, it will depend on our level of confidence that there's
   something in it for Australia, that there's a basis for a constructive
   relationship. And that's not unimportant given their record for debt
   repayment and so on in the past if you are contemplating the
   restoration of an economic or trade relationship. So there are a lot
   of caveats, there's a lot of 'ifs' and 'buts'..It's essentially
   exploratory but it's aimed at reducing the level of tension and again
   opening up dialogue.(n10)
  
   In talks with their Australian counterparts, the DPRK representatives
   revealed a considerable interest in moving rapidly toward a resumption
   of full diplomatic ties. They made a number of proposals covering
   diplomatic and trade activities, most notably the re-establishment of
   resident embassies in each other's capitals, the opening of a
   non-diplomatic DPRK trade office in Australia, the conclusion of a
   trade agreement, the provision of a $10m trade credit to finance
   imports from Australia, continuing visits by Australian diplomats
   stationed in Beijing to Pyongyang and an upgrading of the official
   bilateral dialogue channel, which was being conducted at the
   Counsellor level.
  
   The Australian government assessed these proposals and also undertook
   a general review of its DPRK policy in February 1989. This review
   reaffirmed the basic principles for conducting relations with the
   DPRK, and found that the thrust of the DPRK proposals were too
   sweeping to accord with Australia's interests which did not favour
   early movement on upgrading relations. In the economic sphere the
   small-scale, sporadic nature of Australia DPRK trade, the fact that
   the DPRK was in default on loans totalling over $1 billion to
   international banking consortia of which Australian banks were
   members, plus the DPRK's generally dubious record as an international
   trader provided little impetus for responding positively to the DPRK's
   trade proposals. In the diplomatic sphere the government saw the main
   benefits of closer contact with the DPRK in terms of the general
   reflection this would have on Australia's international standing as a
   country interested in monitoring closely events in Korea, and was also
   concerned to contribute where it could to reduce tensions. It noted
   that Australia seemed to be seen by the DPRK in a different, more
   conciliatory light than other Western nations such as the UK and
   Germany, both of whom had been rebuffed in recent efforts to improve
   ties with the DPRK. The review attributed this to several factors: the
   DPRK did not see Australia as a major player on the Korean peninsula;
   it felt less threatened by Australia; it saw Australia as having a
   relatively independent foreign policy stance; and there were no major,
   intractable issues in bilateral relations. The sum was an assessment
   that the DPRK might well see. Australia as a relatively undemanding
   entry point for developing ties with the West.(n11)
  
   However, the government's view of its balance of interest was that
   Australia should not get too far out in front of the US and Japan. It
   should pursue contact that was constructive for both parties and not
   unilaterally offer what might be seen as diplomatic encouragement to
   the DPRK in advance of any clear sign of change to its basic policies.
   Accordingly, the Australian government encouraged the DPRK to continue
   Counsellor-level diplomatic dialogue on an exchange of information
   basis, but advised that a resumption of a full diplomatic relationship
   was not yet appropriate. The DPRK's trade-related proposals were not
   rejected outright but were turned back into this dialogue.(n12)
  
   The cautious Australian response to. DPRK overtures enabled official
   contacts to proceed, but Canberra avoided making any specific
   commitments to normalising relations. These official contacts gained
   some press attention in November 1990, when Michael Costello, then
   Deputy Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
   Trade (DFAT) took advantage of a visit to Pyongyang for discussion
   with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, to meet with
   his--Costello's--counterpart in the DPRK Foreign Ministry.(n13) As a
   result of this meeting, Australia subsequently agreed to receive a KWP
   delegation, headed by a Party Secretary and Candidate Politburo member
   Kim Yong Sun, for party-to-party talks with the Australian Labor
   Party. In addition, there was further contact with Australian
   politicians and officials at the Interparliamentary Union Conference,
   held in Pyongyang 29 April-5 May 1991, where again the DPRK put
   forward some specific proposals to upgrade ties. The Australian
   government again responded in accordance with the February 1989
   review.
  
   There had been no sign of change to the Australian position by mid
   1991 when the nuclear issue began to emerge as a crucial determinant
   of Australia's DPRK policy.(n14) The US and its allies had begun to
   voice concern about the DPRK's nuclear facility at Yongbyon in 1989 on
   a number of grounds, especially the failure of the DPRK to conclude
   its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
   (IAEA) despite having a clear obligation to do so under the terms of
   its membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In April
   1991, Japan announced at the IAEA that the signature by the DPRK of
   the safeguards agreement would be a precondition for the normalisation
   of bilateral relations, and Australia now took the same view.
  
   In addition, representations to the Australian government at this time
   by the Australian banks owed some $55m in long-standing defaulted debt
   by the DPRK, resulted in the debt issue now being articulated as a
   specific bilateral problem which would need to be resolved before
   steps could be taken to upgrade relations. By October 1991, press
   reporting on the now imminent visit by Kim Yong Sun identified the
   safeguards issue and the DPRK's $55m debt to Australian banks as major
   difficulties in the relationship.(n15) When Kim called on Senator
   Evans in early November 1991, the Minister told him that Australia was
   unlikely to agree to renew diplomatic ties `until Pyongyang signed
   nuclear safeguard agreements and began repaying a $55 million debt to
   Australian banks'.(n16)
  
   Although Kim Yong Sun had been by far the most senior DPRK official to
   visit Australia since 1975, the nuclear issue now overshadowed all
   else and so this visit did not generate any momentum for further
   contact or discussion. While the situation appeared to improve when
   the DPRK signed its IAEA safeguards agreement on 31 January 1992, the
   level of disagreement with IAEA inspection teams over access to
   disputed sites grew steadily and, on 12 March 1993, the DPRK announced
   its withdrawal from the NPT. Australia reacted strongly to the DPRK
   move, with Senator Evans commenting:
  
   I think it's crucial that the international community put its full
   weight behind redressing the situation because it's a very dangerous
   one in terms of the long-term stability, not only of the region but of
   the world at large... This is probably the biggest, most difficult,
   most sensitive, most important arms control issue now on the
   international agenda, and for that reason the North Korean situation
   simply has to be addressed head on.(n17)
  
   Australia took a leading role in the IAEA response, drafting the
   subsequent resolution noting the DPRK's non-compliance with the NPT
   and referring the matter to the United Nations for further action. Yet
   despite DPRK awareness of Australia's activist role in the IAEA,
   diplomatic overtures continued, and by the end of 1993, DPRK
   ambassadors in Bangkok and Jakarta had approached Australian
   representatives to discuss improvement of bilateral relations,
   including a proposal to receive a DPRK government delegation in
   Australia. In December 1993, Canberra again conducted a policy review,
   and agreed to receive a delegation at no higher than Vice Foreign
   Minister level to discuss regional, nuclear, and bilateral issues,
   provided that discussions would constitute an advance on each side's
   established position. Canberra also reaffirmed three preconditions to
   upgrading ties improvement in the DPRK's relations with the ROK; a
   satisfactory resolution of the nuclear issue; and evidence that the
   DPRK was addressing the problem of its debt to international and
   Australian banks. It also reserved the right to reschedule the visit
   depending on developments in the ongoing DPRK-US and DPRK-ROK
   negotiating processes.(n18)
  
   Reports of these contacts surfaced in the Australian press in January
   1994, and an idea of the level of interest generated by the issue of
   Australia-DPRK ties can be gained from this coverage. In a page one
   banner headline story titled `North Korea in secret talks to restore
   ties' on 20 January 1994, the Australian reported the substance of the
   DPRK approaches and Canberra's response, including the preconditions.
   The newspaper observed:
  
   ... it is understood that if North Korea could meet these conditions,
   there would be considerable sympathy within the Department of Foreign
   Affair's for a restoration of diplomatic relations. Such a move would
   fit with Canberra's long-standing desire to entice North Korea out of
   its self-imposed isolation and back into the mainstream of
   international economic and political affairs.(n19)
  
   In an editorial `Time to draw in Pyongyang' on 24 January, the Sydney
   Morning Herald likewise commented: `The possibility that Australia
   might play a role in the induction of North Korea into the
   international community is to be welcomed'. It went on to endorse the
   preconditions laid down by Canberra, noting that, `in the light of the
   other momentous changes in the international landscape in recent
   years, these conditions are not as unrealistic as they would once have
   seemed'.(n20) But overall, the signs were that the two countries were
   heading for an impasse. The dialogue had become a reiteration of fixed
   positions, while the Australian preconditions, however practical,
   called for what was tantamount to a basic revision of the DPRK's
   foreign policy.
  
   There had been no further opportunity for dialogue with the DPRK
   before the nuclear crisis of May-June 1994 effectively ended any
   prospect of receiving the proposed Vice Ministerial delegation.(n21)
   This crisis was triggered by the DPRK's unilateral downloading of
   spent fuel from its Yongbyon reactor without full inspection by the
   IAEA. The US responded to the DPRK action by seeking support for
   international economic sanctions on the DPRK, and the DPRK in turn
   announced that it would regard sanctions as equivalent to an act of
   war. The Australian response, through Senator Evans, was to express
   doubt that `the kind of graduated sanction strategy that is being
   talked about would achieve anything practical or simply be an
   expression of displeasure'.(n22) In the event, the visit of Jimmy
   Carter to Pyongyang on 16-17 June removed the immediate cause of the
   crisis by securing the DPRK's agreement to further negotiation with
   the US.(n23)
  
   But the June 1994 crisis did not pass before it had revealed
   differences of emphasis in the Australian and US preferred strategies
   for dealing with the DPRK. Senator Evans's reservations about the
   implementation of sanctions followed previous public reservations
   expressed by the Australian Ambassador to Washington, Don Russell, and
   reflected Australian concerns that declaration of sanctions would
   significantly escalate tensions but, given doubts about Chinese
   compliance, were unlikely to achieve their objective of containment.
   In addition, as one US commentator noted, the Australian agenda in the
   region contained different points of emphasis to that of the US. In
   its hierarchy of interests Australia was more focused on the regional
   implications of a US-DPRK stand-off than was the US, and more
   attentive to the cautious approach of Japan, the ROK and especially
   China to containing the DPRK threat. The US, on the other hand, was
   impelled to a harder line for domestic considerations, and also
   because it attached greater significance to the global issue of
   non-proliferation--especially the doomsday scenario of the DPRK
   supplying missiles and nuclear warheads to states such as Iran and
   Libya.(n24)
  
Future relations
  
   In 1995 and 1996, Australia-DPRK diplomatic relations remained
   confined to occasional informal contact at the middle-level official
   level. A full resumption of ties is no more in prospect now than at
   any time in the past twenty years and this state of affairs seems
   destined to continue for the foreseeable future. With the steady
   growth of Australian political and economic interests in the region,
   and in particular in the ROK, regional considerations loom ever larger
   in Australian calculations, and these interests are likely to dictate
   the course of action. Moreover, as long as the DPRK declines to meet
   internationally acceptable standards of behaviour over issues such as
   nuclear non-proliferation, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism,
   human rights and the resolution of trade and commercial disputes,
   Australia sees pressing ahead with bilateral relations as not only
   hazardous in itself but also contrary to its international commitments
   on these issues.
  
   For the present, the combined weight of these regional and
   international levels of interest more than counterbalances any new
   bilateral objectives. The conventional wisdom of the carrot-and-stick
   approach of rewarding what are assessed as positive DPRK moves and
   standing firm in the face of what is viewed as continuing
   intransigence will almost certainly continue to prevail.(n25) In fact,
   time is against the DPRK here, for as the years pass it loses more and
   more economic and political ground to its neighbours, and therefore
   also loses effective advocacy within Australia. The scope for
   improvement of relations under these circumstances is limited. It
   seems likely, therefore, that the sporadic dialogue will go on,
   occasional DPRK visitors will continue to come to Australia on trade,
   cultural and academic business, but that Australia-DPRK relations will
   remain in a holding pattern.
  
   Clearly, this pattern could only be broken by the DPRK. Most external
   observers assess that the DPRK cannot continue to maintain its present
   system and sooner or later this must undergo fundamental change. A
   positive scenario would see the country's leadership opting for such
   change without much further ado. This would entail, for example, the
   effective implementation of the Geneva Framework Agreement,(n26)
   productive negotiations with the ROK, other confidence-building
   measures in the region such as dialogue with Japan, and wide-ranging
   measures aimed at the reform of the DPRK economy. From Australia's
   point of view any reasonable combination of these moves would go a
   considerable way toward relieving the regional and international
   impediments to a resumption of ties. On the other hand, a more
   negative scenario would see change coming only after continuing
   decline, and perhaps even after some form of full-blown systemic
   crisis within the DPRK. In that case, if the DPRK became increasingly
   unable to adequately feed, clothe and house its citizens, then this
   would pose a humanitarian dimension to the problem of dealing with the
   DPRK. This concern is far from academic, for the provision of
   humanitarian aid to the DPRK in the wake of the disastrous August 1995
   floods has already become the subject of political debate and
   difference between the ROK, Japan and the US, and there may be far
   more serious aid issues to address in the years ahead.(n27)
  
   The DPRK's regional neighbours (or at least most of them) obviously
   hope for the reform-without-crisis scenario, but we should not
   overlook the fact that signs of significant movement toward reform
   would still pose challenges to Australian diplomacy. The history of
   inter-Korea talks is littered with agreements that were hailed as
   breakthroughs at the time but which rapidly became dead letters the 4
   July 1972 Joint Communique, the 1985 exchange of home visits, the
   December 1991 Joint Agreement, have all proven to be examples of the
   `talk' phase of a fight-talk-fight pattern that makes evaluation of
   the significance of any one passage of negotiation a difficult
   task.(n28) This observation also applies to the much-vaunted, but so
   far sterile, DPRK-Japan and DPRK-US talks in recent years. The
   challenge to Australia is therefore one of accurate assessment of
   potential for real change within the DPRK, for while it would be
   incumbent upon Australia to contribute where it could to any momentum
   for positive change on the Korean peninsula, the record suggests that
   one cannot rely on the fact of negotiation alone for evidence of
   fundamental change to DPRK objectives. In assessing the potential for
   genuine reform in the DPRK Australia requires a broader definition,
   capable of transcending the level of negotiation tactics. This
   involves assessment of DPRK policy across a range of domestic and
   foreign policy issues. Leadership and Politburo changes in particular
   are important indicators, for past assessments of the potential for
   reform in the DPRK have generally contained the flawed expectation
   that significant reform could issue out of traditional ideological
   parameters and an unchanged leadership configuration.
  
   But it is the reform-through-crisis, or else crisis pure and simple,
   scenario that would pose the greater challenge, for it is still
   possible to envisage the country degenerating into conditions of
   widespread destitution under a continuation of current
   policies--whether from ideological conviction or political paralysis.
   At some point in this decline Australia would reach the stage where it
   could only continue to apply the current carrot-and-stick approach at
   the cost of pointlessly contributing further to the misery of the DPRK
   population. If the regime will not relent, then must not the outside
   world perforce relent on humanitarian grounds at some stage? Despite
   the obvious risks of diversion to military use, and hence the
   possibility of objections from the DPRK's major adversaries, the
   provision of substantial humanitarian aid would then constitute an
   appropriate response.
  
   In fact, either scenario would almost certainly bring the humanitarian
   aid question to the fore, for the economic situation in the DPRK will
   remain serious for the foreseeable future. Not only is its basic
   economic structure far more distorted than in any other former command
   economy,'(n29) but also practically all governmental functions are so
   firmly tied to the present political order that serious questions must
   be asked about the ability of coherent governmental authority to
   survive rapid change. Moreover, although we can still only guess at
   the effects of isolation and intense indoctrination on DPRK society,
   it is clear that twenty-two million DPRK citizens have been
   aggressively indoctrinated into a harsh, predatory view of the outside
   world and instilled with a deep fear and contempt for capitalism in
   general, and for the US, Japanese and ROK capitalist states in
   particular. They are also without any experience of a market economy
   system, and have largely been deprived of training in the use of
   advanced technologies.
  
   Ironically, having demonised capitalism for decades, the DPRK is now
   on the verge of self-fulfilling prophecy, for when the DPRK comes to
   disavow its rigid isolationism and adopt market economy measures, its
   citizens will be exposed to the full rigours of capitalism in an
   international economy which they will have little to offer except
   cheap labour. In any scenario for opening up the DPRK economy the bulk
   of the population will begin near the bottom of the Asia-Pacific
   economic hierarchy. The spectre of large numbers of people with little
   or no training of relevance to a modern market economy, operating in a
   climate of desperation or privation, will constitute a potential
   burden of some magnitude on the conscience as well as the economies
   and administrations of the DPRK's neighbours.
  
Conclusion
  
   The unspoken assumption behind the diplomacy of the DPRK's major
   adversaries, a diplomacy that Australia strongly supports, is that
   strong countervailing pressure to a range of unacceptable DPRK
   policies may help to contain their effect and eventually channel
   Pyongyang in more productive directions. The preconditions currently
   advanced by Australia for resuming relations reflect this outlook and
   at the same time serve fundamental foreign policy interests, most
   notably strong support for measures likely to reduce tension on the
   Korean peninsula, and support for nuclear non-proliferation, it
   accords with the current situation where Australia has practically no
   bilateral economic interests in the DPRK, apart from securing recovery
   of debts owed to Australian banks, and few political or consular
   interests involved that might counterbalance its other interests in
   the region. It also reflects the Australian assessment that the
   initiative for progress toward these goals lies with the DPRK and,
   despite the many unknowns surrounding the current leadership
   configuration in the DPRK, there is no sign that any interest in such
   progress exists in Pyongyang.
  
   Meanwhile, change to the current terms of the Australia-DPRK
   relationship must await significant developments in the DPRK. For the
   present we are left with the core dilemma of dealing with a regime
   whose basic foreign policies are unacceptable to the broad
   international community and whose current international commercial
   behaviour all but precludes economic, trade and investment links. This
   leaves the potential for developing ties confined almost entirely to
   initiatives in fields such as education, academic exchanges, culture
   and sport, all of which rely substantially on non-government
   initiative and support.
  
   The stakes in Korea remain high. The Korean War is still far from
   over--literally, because there is only a ceasefire in operation, and
   psychologically, because although the DPRK can no longer achieve its
   objective of reunification under the leadership of the KWP, its very
   identity as a state is inextricably bound up in the struggle against
   the South. It seems psychologically and ideologically incapable of
   accepting that there could be life beyond this struggle.
  
   But the increasingly dysfunctional nature of the DPRK state has
   produced a situation where the DPRK is no longer an adversary pure and
   simple, for while it continues to pose a serious military threat to
   its neighbours it also poses a major humanitarian challenge. The issue
   for the ROK, Japan, the US and their allies is, therefore, no longer
   simply to withstand the DPRK challenge but to both withstand it and
   comprehend the dimensions of the human disaster that has already
   occurred in the DPRK. Should the Korean peninsula manage to avoid a
   military catastrophe, and should the DPRK somehow manage to shed its
   identity as a war-making state, the future will still bring
   overwhelming humanitarian and social problems within the DPRK. It
   would be prudent policy for the governments in the region to give
   thought in the present to the intricate question of how to effect a
   soft landing for the people of the DPRK.
  
   (*) Swinburne University of Technology and Monash University,
   Melbourne. The author wishes to thank Moira Smythe and Jeff Robinson
   of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for their cooperation
   and assistance.
  
   (n1) Henry S. Albinski, Australian External Policy under Labor.'
   Content, Process and the National Debate (St Lucia: University of
   Queensland Press, 1977) p. 148.
  
   (n2) For the Australian government announcement and the joint
   communique of the two parties see, Australian Foreign Affairs Record
   45, 7 (July 1.974) pp.491-2.
  
   (n3) For the detailed response of the Australian Minister for Foreign
   Affairs, Senator D.R. Willesee, to the expulsion see, Australian
   Foreign Affairs Record 46, 11 (November 1975) pp.658-9. The embassy
   staff left Canberra without warning, sending a diplomatic note
   accusing the Australian government of unspecified unfriendly actions
   towards the DPRK mission via commercial mail, presumably en route to
   Canberra Airport. However, according to the then Maltese High
   Commissioner to Australia, Joseph Forace, they had planned their
   departure some time in advance. Forace was a neighbour of the DPRK
   charge d'affaires, he was accredited to Pyongyang from Australia, and
   in various ways also acted as mentor and friend to the DPRK mission.
   In a subsequent conversation Forace told this writer that the charge
   had advised Forace of the mission's impending departure some three
   weeks prior to the actual date.
  
   Forace's account is significant in the light of speculation that a
   somewhat bizarre sequence of events involving the DPRK embassy in the
   last week of its sojourn in Australia influenced the decision to
   leave. Since these events have entered into Canberra diplomatic
   folklore, we may note them briefly here, following an account
   subsequently given to this writer by the then ROK Ambassador to
   Australia. A few days before the DPRK departure, a DPRK Embassy driver
   was involved in a single car accident near the residence of the ROK
   Ambassador. The first person on the scene happened to be the ROK
   Ambassador. The driver, who was unhurt, immediately recognised the
   Ambassador and fled on foot. The following day, a DPRK diplomat
   visited the local Mercedes Benz dealer and sought to purchase a
   replacement off the showroom floor for cash. The dealer advised that
   he would have to order one from Sydney since the particular car the
   diplomat wished to purchase had already been sold--to the ROK Embassy.
  
   Why, then, did the DPRK leave the way it did? The DPRK has never
   offered any explanation, but to this writer it: seems plausible that
   DPRK diplomats were under orders to effect a sudden evacuation in
   countries where relations turned unfriendly. The DPRK's record clearly
   indicates a belief in the predatory nature of international
   transactions, whether diplomatic or commercial, and it may have
   believed that its diplomats could have been held against their will
   had they sought to leave in a regular fashion. Moreover, the DPRK may
   have seen this manner of departure as a deliberate expression of
   displeasure with Australia. In this connection, it is worth noting
   that shortly afterwards, the DPRK mission in Buenos Aires effected a
   similar departure after a bilateral dispute between the DPRK and
   Argentina.
  
   (n4) On the Korean Question at UNGA 30 see, B.C. Koh, `The Battle
   Without Victors: The Korean Question in the UN General Assembly',
   Journal of Korean Affairs V, 4 (January 1976) pp.43-63.
  
   (n5) The DPRK's uncomplicated view of competing party politics emerged
   during official talks between Senator Willesee and then DPRK Foreign
   Minister Ho Dam in May-June 1975, in which this writer participated.
   When the Australian side suggested that its mission in Canberra should
   endeavour to establish contact with the Liberal Party, then in
   opposition, in order to ensure that bilateral relations proceeded
   smoothly should there be a change of government, Ho expressed surprise
   that the Australian government would wish it to have dealings with its
   'enemies'.
  
   (n6) On 9 October 1983, seventeen senior ROK officials, including four
   Cabinet ministers, and four Burmese were killed when a bomb was
   detonated at the beginning of an official ceremony at the Martyrs
   Mausoleum in Rangoon. The officials were accompanying President Chun
   Doo Hwan on the first leg of a tour of Southeast Asian nations and
   Australia. Chun, the intended victim of the bomb, escaped injury,
   evidently because the bomb was detonated prematurely. After an
   official investigation, on 4 November the Burmese authorities
   pronounced themselves satisfied that DPRK commandos were responsible
   for the 9 October bombing. The Burmese government then proceeded to
   expel the DPRK Rangoon mission and withdraw diplomatic recognition of
   the DPRK.
  
   (n7) Speech delivered to the Sir Hermann Black Contemporary Asian
   Affairs Forum at the University of Sydney. It should also be noted
   that the speech was delivered in the context of a particularly active
   and encouraging phase of inter-Korean negotiations.
  
   (n8) On the course of the parliamentary talks see, Dong-Bok Lee,
   'North-South Korean Parliamentary Talks: Positions of Two Sides and
   Prospects', Korea and World Affairs 12, 4 (Winter 1988) pp.782-808.
  
   (n9) Interview with ABC/Radio Australia Beijing correspondent Trevor
   Watson in Beijing, 30 January 1989 (CRS A9737; 92/060089 DFAT),
  
   (n10) Watson interview.
  
   (n11) Ministerial Submission 890133, 13 February 1989 (CRS A9737;
   92/060089, DFAT).
  
   (n12) Ministerial Submission 890133.
  
   (n13) See Hanguk Ilbo (8 November 1990); and Canberra Times (7
   November 1990) for reports on Costello's 'secret talks' with the DPRK.
  
   (n14) For background to the DPRK's nuclear program see, Andrew Mack,
   `North Korea and the Bomb', Foreign Policy 83 (Summer 1991) pp.
   87-104; James Cotton, `North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions', Adelphi Paper
   275 (March 1993) pp. 94-106; and Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig,
   `North Korea's Nuclear Program' in Young Whan Kihl (ed.), Korea and
   the World Beyond the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).
  
   (n15) Australian (24 October 1991).
  
   (n16) Australian Financial Review (6 November 1991). Also see,
   Australian (6 November 1991). While the visit was a non-government
   visit Evans received a courtesy call from Kim. Concerning the debt
   issue, the ANZ bank had acquired an exposure of approximately A$50
   million and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia an exposure of
   approximately A$5 million as a result of participation in bank
   consortium loans originally made in the 1970s. In September 1991, the
   ANZ, as the leader of one of the bank syndicates, instituted legal
   proceedings in the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to force
   the DPRK government to resume interest payments (suspended in 1984)
   and commence principle repayments. ANZ officers assessed that the DPRK
   banking officials with whom they were dealing understood the issues
   involved but that their political masters did not. It therefore sought
   DFAT's assistance in communicating the serious ramifications of a
   successful ICC action to the DPRK at the highest possible level. It
   was under these conditions that Senator Evans raised the issue with
   Kim Yong Sun. in more recent public statements of Australia's position
   the debt issue has again tended to recede to the background.
  
   (n17) Interview with ABC Radio New York correspondent Matt Peacock,
   broadcast on the ABC program AM on 2 April 1993. Cable from Canberra
   to Foreign Min Abroad, 2 April 1993 (CRS A9737; 92/060089, DFAT).
  
   (n18) Ministerial Submission 931815, 22 December 1993 (CRS A9737;
   92/060089, DFAT).
  
   (n19) Australian (20 January 1994).
  
   (n20) Sydney Morning Herald (24 January 1994).
  
   (n21) Passing mention should be made of a visit by the DPRK Committee
   for the Promotion of External Economic Cooperation 1-4 February 1994.
   The purpose of the visit was to attract Australian investment to the
   Rajin-Sunbong Free Economic and Trade Zone, which had been proclaimed
   in December 1991. However, at the time of writing no Australian
   companies had invested in the Zone.
  
   (n22) `Australia Keeps Check on Korea Crisis', Australian Financial
   Review (24 June 1994).
  
   (n23) The visit eventually led to a US-DPRK Framework Agreement,
   signed in October 1994, which to date has essentially contained the
   crisis within an ongoing negotiation process. For an account of this
   crisis and its outcome see, James Cotton, `The North Korea/United
   States Nuclear Accord: Background and Consequences', Korea Observer
   XXVI, 3 (Autumn 1995) pp. 321-44.
  
   (n24) `Australia Keeps Check on Korea Crisis'.
  
   (n25) `Carrot-and-stick' may overstate Australia's options since the
   only real stick that Australia possesses is, of course, support for
   US-initiated moves against the DPRK. Perhaps a more accurate
   description of the Australian option would be the old classroom maxim
   of `praise-and-ignore'.
  
   (n26) See footnote 23.
  
   (n27) Australia, too, has already become active. On 18 September 1995,
   it announced a contribution of A$100 000 in emergency relief
   assistance to the DPRK and, following revelations that flood damage
   had been more serious than at first assessed, announced a further
   contribution of A$500 000 on 17 January 1996.
  
   (n28) On the pattern of DPRK negotiation see, Jong-Hwan Song, `How the
   North Korean Communists Negotiate: A Case Study of the South-North
   Korean Dialogue of the Early 1970s', Korea and World Affairs 8, 3
   (Fall 1984) pp. 610-64.
  
   (n29) Beginning with the size of the military-industrial sector,
   estimated to be four times larger in proportional terms to that of the
   former Soviet Union at its height. See, Marina Trigubenko, `Industry
   of the DPRK: Specific Features of the Industrial Policy, Sectoral
   Structure and Prospects', in Pukhan kyongje ui hyonhwang gwa chonmang
   (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1991). 

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