More articles by Leonid A.Petrov
NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK
***** SPECIAL REPORT *****
The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between
the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of
International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for
Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Moscow, Russia). It is written
by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the CNS.
THE DPRK REPORT, No. 21 (November-December 1999)
1. The Russian General Staff's View of the North Korean Missile Program
The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces is paying serious attention
to North Korean efforts to develop its nuclear and missile potential.
These attempts are viewed in Moscow as "one of the most important
problems directly affecting ... Russia's national security, as well as
regional and global stability." Preventing this "serious
threat" to
Russia's security is identified as one of the main tasks facing Moscow.
Russian military officials believe that North Korean, as well as Indian,
Pakistani, and Israeli nuclear-missile ambitions, should be checked
through a number of approaches.
First of all, Russian officials argue that it is necessary "to strengthen
mechanisms within the relevant international agreements," including the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970). Other measures
are needed as well, including possibly the creation of new nuclear-
weapon-free zones and full implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. The Russian General Staff considers the rejection by the U.S.
Senate of the 1996 CTBT agreement as "a tremendous blow" to the cause
of
nuclear-missile nonproliferation. Officials note that because of the
Senate's action, Russia "finds it now much more difficult to talk with
India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea about nonproliferation issues."
A related venue of actions is solidifying international regimes regarding
controls on nuclear and missile exports. And here, as Russian generals
argue: "No double standards are admissible."
A third approach is to strengthen anti-nuclear and anti-missile efforts
by corresponding work to ban chemical and biological weapons.
Unfortunately, there are signs that the DPRK possesses both types of
weapons.
Finally, Russian officials believe that is also important to prevent
illegal transfers of conventional weapons.
The Russian General Staff insists on taking into consideration regional
military and political factors which "push various countries, including
North Korea, to the nuclear-missile road." Officials argue that the
United States "should, in practice, adjust its policies vis-a-vis the
DPRK to alleviate North Korean fears." The Russian military favors a
low-key, bilateral approach for influencing the DPRK and others, rather
than exerting international pressure on seekers of missile and nuclear
arms.
2. DPRK Views of U.S. Missile Defences
North Korean diplomats explain, in "off-the-record" discussions with
Russian experts, that the decision of their government to refrain from
missile launches is a tactical move, but it may evolve into a long-term
strategy, depending on U.S. behaviour. As one DPRK diplomat states:
"If
Washington agrees to shelve its National Missile Defence (NMD) plan and
adopts a constructive attitude towards our country, then we will not have
any reason to build long-range missiles." Otherwise, according to
this
and other North Korean diplomats, Pyongyang "will keep its powder
dry,"
resuming the missile tests and even reconsidering its cooperation with
the Agreed Framework.
3. Pyongyang's Appraisals of ROK President Kim Dae-jung's Policies
While North Korean propaganda continues to lash out at Seoul's policies,
privately, DPRK officials admit that Kim Dae-jung "has already done a lot
to dismantle the hostile anti-Northern policies of his predecessors."
The most valuable thing for Pyongyang, it seems, is the ROK's
encouragement of foreign governments to promote dialogue and ties with
the DPRK. As a scholar from the North points out, "With the help of
present South Korean administration, we've significantly expanded our
relations with a number of countries." Another North Korean national
said, "Seoul influences Washington favourably, helping moderates in the
U.S. government to push for the unfreezing of ties with the DPRK."
The North Koreans explain, however, that Pyongyang will not acknowledge
its satisfaction with South Korean government publicly "since that would
have a negative impact inside the DPRK and would be used by the enemies
of the DPRK abroad."
4. DPRK Hopes to Overcome Its Food Shortage
North Korean officials express hope that the expected normalization of
DPRK-U.S. relations will help to improve the food situation in their
country. The easing of economic sanctions is expected to lead to the
influx of foreign goods, capital, and expertise. Normalization of DPRK-
U.S. relations will also be conducive to the acquisition of more aid from
other possible donors.
As one high-ranking North Korean economist predicts, his country's
economy will start showing growth in two to three years after the opening
of ties with the United States. As can be judged by private
conversations, the North Korean leadership feels that the American threat
has been reduced lately and that Washington can be expected to make some
practical moves to improve relations with the DPRK.
5. The DPRK Military
According to Russian estimates, the DPRK government has been forced to
cut its military expenditures due to the lack of funds. In 1999 their
level will be 2 percent lower than in the previous year. The relative
proportions within the military budget have also changed, with a
comparatively larger amount now being spent on missiles and other "high
impact" arms, since their effectiveness per money spent is much greater
than that of conventional weapons.