Return to *North Korean Studies*
February 13, 2002. The following report was posted on the Center for Strategic and International Studies website on February 2, 2002. The entire report is entitled "The Global Nuclear Balance: A Quantitative and Arms Control Analysis." Excerpted is part VI entitled, "North Korean Force Trends." The report is broken down into US Department of Defense estimates of DPRK actions and intentions involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and CIA estimates of DPRK missile force trends.
A web version of this report can be found at: ftp://ftp.nautilus.org/napsnet/special_reports/globalnuclearbalanceDPRK.txt
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(excerpted from: The Global Nuclear Balance A Quantitative and Arms Control Analysis by Anthony H. Cordesman)
The Global Nuclear Balance A Quantitative and Arms Control Analysis Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy With the Assistance of Eric E. Fillinger. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270
Revised January 22, 2002 Part VI: NORTH KOREAN FORCE TRENDS
Objectives, Strategies, and Resources
Despite the June 2000 summit meeting and meetings between high level U.S. and North Korean officials on the one hand, and economic turmoil and continued food shortages on the other, we believe North Korea remains committed to maintaining strong military forces. These forces continue to be deployed close to the border with South Korea in an offensively oriented posture, and North Korea's NBC and missile programs likely remain key components of its overall security strategy. The most likely large-scale regional war scenario over the near term, which would involve the United States, would be on the Korean peninsula. In recent years, North Korea has continued to pose a
complex security challenge to the United States and its allies. Prior to the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea is believed to have produced and diverted sufficient plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. In addition, although North Korea froze the production of plutonium in 1994, there are concerns that North Korea is continuing with some elements of a nuclear weapons program. North Korea also possesses stockpiles of chemical weapons, which could be used in the event of renewed hostilities on the peninsula. Research and development into biological agents and toxins suggest North Korea may have a biological weapons capability. North Korea has
hundreds of ballistic missiles available for use against targets on the peninsula, some of which are capable of reaching tar-gets in Japan. Its missile capabilities are increasing at a steady pace, and it has progressed to producing medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). North Korea also has continued development of even longer-range missiles that would be able to threaten areas well beyond the region, including portions of the continental United States. As a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts, however, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has maintained a moratorium on launches of long-range missiles for over one year.
Lastly, North Korea's willingness to sell its ballistic missiles and related missile technologies and, potentially, share its NBC expertise are major proliferation concerns. North Korea's centrally planned economic system has been crippled over the past decade and is unable to meet the most basic needs of its people, although there is limited evidence that the economic decline may have slowed. Certainly, international food aid administered through the United Nations World Food Program has played a significant role in alleviating the food crisis. North Korea likely will continue to require inter-national food assistance for the foreseeable future. The regime continues with
its decades old policy to fund its military programs, including NBC and missile forces, at the expense of its civil economy.
Nuclear Program
The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea froze nuclear weapons material production at the Yongbyon and Taechon facilities. However, the United States believes North Korea pro-duced and diverted sufficient plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon prior to the agreement. (In any event, North Korea will have to satisfy the Interna-tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as to its exact plutonium holdings before key nuclear components can be delivered for the two light-water reactors that are to be provided under the Agreed Framework.) North Korea removed spent fuel from the Yongbyon reactor in 1994. Had Pyongyang reprocessed the spent fuel from the
Yongbyon reactor, it could have pro-duced enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons. As part of the Agreed Framework, the IAEA has main-tained a continuous presence at Yongbyon, and IAEA personnel have monitored canning of the spent fuel from the reactor. The canning of all accessible spent fuel rods and rod fragments, which was carried out by a team from the United States, under the auspices of the Department of Energy (DOE), was completed in April 2000. The U.S. team maintains a presence at the site to continue maintenance activities. In 1998, the United States became concerned about an underground construction project at Kumchang- ni, in northern North Korea. The
site was believed to be large enough to house a plutonium production facility and possibly a reprocessing plant. Through successful negotiations, U.S. officials were permitted to visit the facility at Kumchang-ni in May 1999. Based on the 1999 team's findings, it was concluded that the facility as then concurrently configured, was not suited to house graphite-moderated reactors or reprocessing operations. A second visit to Kumchang-ni was conducted in May 2000, during which the team found no evidence to contradict the 1999 conclusions. In the summer of 1999, the United States dispatched former Secretary of Defense William Perry to consult with North Korea on key U.S.
security concerns such as its nuclear and missile programs. In the North Korea Policy Review, Dr. Perry concluded that the nuclear freeze instituted at
Yongbyon's facilities remained in effect, although the U.S. remains concerned about possible continuing North Korean interest in a nuclear weapons program. Moreover, there is some evidence that North Korea has tried to procure technology that could have applications in its nuclear program. North Korea has ratified the NPT. It has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Dr. Perry recommended that the U.S. should seek the complete and verifiable cessation of testing, production, and deployment of missiles exceeding the parameters of the MTCR, and the complete cessation of export sales of such missiles and the equipment and technology associated with them.
Biological Program
North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), but nonetheless has pursued biological warfare capabilities since the 1960s.Pyongyang's resources include a rudimentary (by Western standards) biotechnical infrastructure that could support the production of infectious biological warfare agents and toxins such as anthrax, cholera, and plague. North Korea is believed to possess a munitions-production infrastructure that would allow it to weaponize biological warfare agents and may have biological weapons available for use.
Chemical Program
Like its biological warfare effort, we believe North Korea has had a long- standing chemical warfare program. North Korea's chemical warfare capabilities include the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents, using its sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. We believe it possesses a sizeable stockpile of these agents and weapons, which it could employ should there be renewed fighting on the Korean peninsula.
North Korea is believed to be capable of weaponizing such stocks for a variety of delivery means. These would include not only ballistic missiles, but also artillery and aircraft, and possibly unconventional means.
In fact, the United States believes that North Korea has some long-range artillery deployed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and ballistic missiles, some of which could deliver chemical warfare agents against forward- based U.S. and allied forces, as well as against rear-area targets.
North Korean forces are prepared to operate in a contaminated environment; they train regularly in chemical defense operations and are taught that South Korean and U.S. forces will employ chemical munitions. North Korea has not signed CWC, nor it is expected to do so in the near future.
Ballistic Missiles
During the last several years, North Korea has made substantial progress with its ballistic missile forces in the areas of research and development, testing, deployment, and, most worrisome, exports. Despite efforts on the part of the United States and its East Asian allies to constrain North Korea's missile development, Pyongyang continues to move ahead.
North Korea produces SCUD B and SCUD C short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) as well as the No Dong MRBM. North Korea has over 500 SCUD missiles of various types in its inventory, and enough No Dong missiles for its own use as well as for export. In any attack on the South Korea, Pyongyang could use its missiles in an attempt to isolate the peninsula from strategic reinforcement. In addition, North Korea's No Dong missiles, with their 1,300 kilometer range, are capable of striking targets throughout the peninsula as well as in nearly all of Japan.
In August 1998, North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 system, which it characterized as a space launch vehicle (SLV) attempting to orbit a small satellite. The launch demonstrated several of the key technologies required to develop an ICBM, including stage separation. The existence of a third stage itself was an unanticipated development in the North Korean ballistic missile program. With the Taepo Dong 1, North Korea has now demonstrated the capability to reach the entire territory of South Korea and Japan, as well as large portions of China and Russia. Potentially, a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 SLV could deliver a light payload to the United States, although with
very poor accuracy.
North Korea also has moved forward with the development of other longer- range missiles, which has become a matter of growing international concern. North Korea is developing the Taepo Dong 2 (ICBM), which could deliver a several- hundred kilogram pay-load to Alaska or Hawaii, and a lighter payload to the western half of the United States. A three stage Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a several-hundred kilogram pay-load anywhere in the United States. North Korea is much more likely to weaponize the more capable Taepo Dong 2 than the three-stage Taepo Dong 1 as an ICBM. During 1999, there were indications that North Korea would test the Taepo Dong 2, but Pyongyang in September
1999, announced it would refrain from testing long-range missiles while high-level talks to improve bilateral relations with the U.S. are ongoing. The DPRK subsequently reaffirmed the moratorium in June 2000, and again, in writing, in the October 2000 Joint Communique issue at the conclusion of Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok's visit to Washington. During Secretary Albright's historic trip to Pyongyang 23-25 October, she discussed with DPRK Chairman Kim Jong II a range of missile-related issues, including Kim's idea of trading long-range missile restraint for launches, outside DPRK borders, of DPRK civil satellites on non-DPRK boosters. However, significant issues remain to be
resolved.
Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery
North Korea has several types of short-range land-, air- and sea-launched anti- ship cruise missiles, which are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. In the past, North Korea has produced two versions of anti-ship cruise missiles based on Soviet and Chinese designs; these have ranges of about 100 kilometers. In the future, North Korea may try to modify some of these anti-ship missiles to extend their range or acquire the technology to do so. Moreover, it may try to develop or purchase land attack cruise missiles. North Korea also has a variety of fighters, bombers, helicopters, artillery, rockets, mortars, and sprayers available as potential means of delivery for
NBC weapons.
Role as Supplier
During the last several years, North Korea has been a major proliferator of ballistic missiles and related technologies. The sale of No Dong missile technology to Iran has created an immediate, serious and growing capability to target U.S. forces, and our allies in the Middle East. North Korea also has provided missile technology to Pakistan. Further, these sales have had an impact on the strategic balance in the Middle East and in South Asia. In addition, these exports could lead to additional proliferation. For example, were states like Iran or Pakistan to become missile producers, they in turn could sell the missiles to other states of concern, further upsetting
regional balances of power. In the past, North Korea also has brokered deals for missle- related technologies and components produced by third parties for customers in the Middle East. Pyongyang attaches a high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology, as these exports are one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued
missile development and production.
Source: Department of Defense, Proliferation and Response,
January 2001, North Korea section.
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* There is no debate within the US intelligence community over the fact that North Korea has long had large stocks of chemical and biological weapons, and has deployed them in warheads that can be used in its Scud and extended range Scud missiles. There is more debate over whether North Korean has nuclear weapons and is continuing its nuclear weapons development and production program.
* The first major reports of North Korea's nuclear program began in 1993, when analysts found satellite reconnaissance evidence that a North Korean nuclear reprocessing center at Yongbyon had gone had begun to process plutonium. This led to a diplomatic confrontation and talks where the Clinton administration obtained a North Korean pledge to freeze plutonium production at the site. In exchange, the United States, South Korea and Japan agreed to give the North oil and technical assistance to build a peaceful nuclear power program. The agreement called for international monitoring of the Yongbyon site, and Energy Department experts were allowed to encase the spent fuel
rods at the center to ensure that they could not be used for warheads. Before this production freeze, however, North Korea was able to produce about 26 pounds of weapons- grade plutonium. As a result, a consensus developed that North Korea could produce one or two bombs.
* The current debate focuses on what North Korean has done since that time. The Clinton Administration initially declared that North Korea had agreed to freeze its entire nuclear program. It later became clear, however, that the agreement covered only Yongbyon and did not preclude nuclear activity at other sites. North Korea then dumped radioactive nuclear fuel out of the heavy water reactor into a cooling pool in order to replace it with fresh fuel rods. The US intelligence community estimated that the spent fuel rods contained enough plutonium for 10 nuclear warheads, and this raised serious questions as to whether North Koreans was covertly going on with its nuclear
program.
* A report in the New York Times, which has been informally confirmed by several US experts, indicates that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) began to report that it had detected a series of other secret sites, many of them underground, that analysts suspected were related to an ongoing nuclear program. By the late- 1990's, DIA and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, compiled a list of at least 10 potential sites which raised questions about their function without providing clear evidence of any weapons activity.
* One installation, at Kumchangri, was believed to house an underground nuclear reactor and plutonium reprocessing operation. In May 1999, this led the US to pressure North Korea to allow an inspection of the installation which had the same visual signatures as if North Korea was installing an underground a reactor, including the water supplies for water cooling. When North Korea did allow inspection, however, the US only found a series of empty tunnels with no large underground chamber able to hold a nuclear reactor. Another inspection in May 2000 had the same result.
* The Times reported that some intelligence experts feel the US gave North Korea too much warning before inspecting the site, making it possible for the North Koreans to hide its purpose. However, State Department officials became leary of the DIA estimates, another installation DIA suspected proved to be nothing more that an underground storage site for the memorabilia of the North Korean leadership.
* This eventually led Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Lt. Gen. Patrick Hughes, director of the DIA, to clash over intelligence report suggesting that North Korea had built a storage installation that housed components for nuclear warheads. State Department officials indicated that DIA was reporting an over-pessimistic picture. DIA indicated in turn that the State Department was too willing to overlook reports of suspicious activity. In their view, the failure of a single inspection does not mean the United States should stop pressing the North Koreans about suspect installations, including the building suspected of housing warhead components. Some of the
debate focused on an installation DIA suspected of being a storage building for components of nuclear warheads. The identity and exact location of this center, whose existence has not been released, but the Times reports that intelligence on the storage center was obtained at least three years ago, and was based not only on spy satellite photographs and intercepted communications, but also on
"human intelligence" -- spies -- reporting to DIA.iii
* What is clear is that North Korea is steadily acquiring more advanced missile forces in spite of major economic problems, its rapproachment talks with South Korea in June 2000, and its agreements to suspend the test firing of long-range missiles in September 1999 and June 2000. It has tested a booster that could
allow it to develop missiles that could strike the US, and it has had a serious nuclear weapons development effort in the past. As Table III.5 shows, North Korea also has a wide range of missile programs. It also has already deployed large numbers of shorter-range missiles with chemical and probably biological warheads.
These include extended range Scud-type missiles with ranges over 1,300 kilometers. The US intelligence community also reported in June 2000 that North Korea did not suspend any other aspects of development and production after it agreed to suspend missile tests in September 1999.
* North Korea launched a multistage Taepo Dong-1 missile across Japan on August 31, 1998 -- in an effort to place a satellite in orbit. The mission failed, but the United States and its allies were surprised and shocked by the missile's 2,000-kilometer range. David J. Osias, an officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated that "The third stage concerns us. Nobody knew they had it," during a national media update April 26-27, 1998 at the Army Space and Missile Defense Command headquarters.
* North Korea has limits. The Tapeo Dong 1 test was a failure, and the missile was anything but an advanced design. The first stage was modified from a liquid- fueled Scud and the second from the No Dong. Both are 1960s technology. The third stage was a small, solid-fueled rocket designed to put a small satellite into space. It was too small to carry a nuclear weapon or an effective biological payload and dispersal system, and the system was so inherently inaccurate that it was unclear it had growth potential to hit a city- sized target. US experts feel that North Korea has since abandoned work on the Taepo Dong-1 missile, and is now developing the Taepo Dong-2. This
missile is a two- stage system that uses a cluster of No Dong engines in the first stage and a single No Dong in the second stage. It has never been tested.
* Furthermore, North Korea agreed to suspend further tests of long-range missiles in September 1999 -- largely as a result of the negotiating efforts of former Secretary of Defense William Perry. This agreement was reached after the NIC report was written, and was renewed in June 2000.. However, US intelligence community also reported in June 2000 that North Korea did not suspend any other aspects of development and production after it agreed to suspend missile tests in September 1999. ?A CIA report in August 2000 also summarized the state of proliferation in North Korea as follows.
* Pyongyang continues to acquire raw materials from out-of-country entities to produce WMD and ballistic missiles. During the reporting period, there were increased reflections of North Korean procurement of raw materials and components for its ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources, especially through firms in China. North Korea produces and is capable of using a wide variety of chemical and possibly biological agents, as well as their delivery means.
* During the second half of 1999, Pyongyang sought to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its nuclear program, but we do not know of any procurement directly linked to the nuclear weapons program. We assess that North Korea has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. The United States and North Korea are nearing completion on the joint project of canning spent fuel from the Yongbyon complex for long-term storage and ultimate shipment out of the North in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework. That reactor fuel contains enough plutonium for several more weapons.
* Pyongyang continues to seek conventional weapons via the grey market. In 1999, for example, North Korea acquired MiG-21 fighter aircraft from Kazakhstan.
* Throughout the second half of 1999, North Korea continued to export significant ballistic missile-related equipment and missile components, materials, and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. Pyongyang attaches a high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology are one of the North's
major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued missile development and production.
* These factors help explain why the report of the National Intelligence Council has seen North Korea as presenting the most serious near term threat to the US, and why this threat has been used as the rationale for setting early deadlines for the deployment of a US NMD system.
* "After Russia and China, North Korea is the most likely to develop ICBMs capable of threatening the United States during the next 15 years.
* North Korea attempted to orbit a small satellite using the Taepo Dong- 1 SLV in August 1998, but the third stage failed during powered flight; other aspects of the flight, including stage separation, appear to have been successful.
* If it had an operable third stage and a reentry vehicle capable of surviving ICBM flight, a converted Taepo Dong-1 SLV could deliver a light payload to the United States. In these cases, about two-thirds of the payload mass would be required for the reentry vehicle structure. The remaining mass is probably too light for an early generation nuclear weapon but could deliver biological or chemical (BW/CW) warfare agent.
* Most analysts believe that North Korea probably will test a Taepo Dong-2 this year, unless delayed for political reasons. A two-stage Taepo Dong-2 could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii, and a lighter payload to the western half of the United States. A three-stage Taepo Dong-2 could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload anywhere in the United States.
* North Korea is much more likely to weaponize the more capable Taepo Dong-2 than the three-stage Taepo Dong-1 as an ICBM."
* These comments are particularly striking in view of the fact North Korea launched a multistage Taepo Dong-1 missile across Japan on August 31, 1998 -- in an effort to place a satellite in orbit. The mission failed, but the United States and its allies were surprised and shocked by the missile's 2,000- kilometer range. David J. Osias, an officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated that "The third stage concerns us. Nobody knew they had it," during a national media update April 26-27, 1998 at the Army Space and Missile Defense Command headquarters.
* The fact remains, however, that the Korean test was a failure, and that the missile was anything but an advanced design. The first stage was modified from a liquid-fueled Scud and the second from the No Dong. Both are 1960s technology. The third stage was a small, solid-fueled rocket designed to put a small satellite
into space. It was too small to carry a nuclear weapon or an effective biological payload and dispersal system, and the system was so inherently inaccurate that it was unclear it had growth potential to hit a city- sized target. US experts feel that North Korea has since abandoned work on the Taepo Dong-1 missile, and is now developing the Taepo Dong-2. This missile is a two- stage system that uses a cluster of No Dong engines in the first stage and a single No Dong in the second stage. It has never been tested.
* Furthermore, North Korea agreed to suspend further tests of long-range missiles in September 1999 -- largely as a result of the negotiating efforts of former Secretary of Defense William Perry. This agreement was reached after the NIC report was written, and was renewed in June 2000.
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North Korea has hundreds of Scuds and No Dong missiles and continues to develop the longer range Taepo Dong-2, which will enable the North to target the United States. In May 2001, however, Kim Chong-il unilaterally extended the North's voluntary flight-test moratorium-in effect since 1999-until 2003, provided negotiations with the United States proceeded.
North Korea has extended until 2003 the missile launch moratorium it announced late in 1999, although the North continues to work on the Taepo Dong-2 program. The Taepo Dong-2-capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload-may be ready for flight-testing. The initial test likely would be conducted in a space launch configuration. Iran also is pursuing a longer range missile capability.
North Korea has assumed the role as the missile and manufacturing technology source for many programs. North Korean willingness to sell complete systems and components has enabled other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than otherwise would have been possible-notably the sale of the No Dong MRBM to
Pakistan. The North also has helped countries to acquire technologies to serve as the basis for domestic development efforts- as with Iran's reverse- engineering of the No Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile, Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile technology.
Ballistic Missile Programs
Taepo Dong-2. The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2-capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload may be ready for flight- testing. The North probably also is working on improvements to its current design.
The Taepo Dong-2 in a two-stage ballistic missile configuration could deliver a several-hundred-kg payload up to 10,000 km sufficient to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of the continental United States. If the North uses a third stage similar to the one used on the Taepo Dong-1 in 1998 in a ballistic missile configuration, then the Taepo Dong-2 could deliver a several-hundred-kg payload up to 15,000 km-sufficient to strike all of
North America. A Taepo Dong- 2 flight test probably would be conducted as an SLV with a third stage to place a small payload into the same orbit the North Koreans tried to achieve in 1998.
No Dong. The 1,300-km-range No Dong remains the longest-range ballistic missile North Korea has deployed.
WMD Payload Options: The Intelligence Community judged in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons, although the North has frozen plutonium production activities at Yongbyon in accordance with the Agreed Framework of 1994. North Korea also has chemical and biological weapons programs.
Foreign Assistance: North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in developing and producing ballistic missiles and has demonstrated a willingness to sell complete systems and components that have enabled other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than would otherwise have been possible and to acquire the basis for domestic development efforts.
(Charts and tables can be found at: http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/global_Nuc_bal020122.pdf )