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North and South Korea:Cooperation and Conflicts
Intercultural Institute of
California (IIC)
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Return to *North Korean Studies*
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Joongang Ilbo, by Kang Ju-an
December 30, 2004 ㅡ North Korea is undertaking small experiments with free market economy principles that would have been unthinkable a couple of years ago, the Unification Ministry said in a new report released yesterday.
The report said that there are now 24-hour stores operating in Pyeongyang and six to seven places providing computer access as well. One of the stores has 100 personal computers, the report said.
Some stores are selling hamburgers. The report said that hamburgers first started to appear at colleges inside North Korea where foreign culture is spreading faster than other places.
According to the report, about 150 bars and 350 restaurants are operating in the capital
Pyeongyang. Restaurants, cafes, karaoke and pool halls are running late into the night as long as there are customers. Lighters embossed with a restaurant's name are given as small presents to potential customers.
Unification Ministry officials said that such trends in North Korean society are against standard policy.North Korea generally views too much leisure time as a threat to the ruling system. It publicly preaches that "the more free time people have makes room for individualism which leads to freedom of consciousness," the report said.
Pyeongyang citizens are reportedly trying to barter with store owners when buying goods and services. The bargaining has giving birth to a vocabulary only found in societies where a free market economies exist, read the report.
The ministry report said that such changes are being conducted while the North Korean regime is trying to strengthen its ideological education of citizens.
"In order to make up for the shortage of goods and provide some flexibility in distribution, North Korea has introduced free market influenced economic measures," said a ministry official, who added that North Korea might briefly try to control the level of reform but that eventually it would be hard to change its overall direction. "The North Korean people have tasted what it's like to live in a free economy. Their minds already have started to adopt to such a change."
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Pyongyang, December 27 (KCNA) -- Papers here dedicate editorials to the 32nd
anniversary of President Kim Il Sung's promulgation of the "Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" that is December 27,
Juche 61 (1972). This marked a historic event of great significance in the political life of the
Korean people and their efforts to accomplish the cause of the revolution. Rodong Sinmun Monday says the first session of the 10th Supreme People's
Assembly held in September Juche 87 (1998) marked a momentous occasion in further consolidating and developing the state and social system to meet the new
requirements of the Songun revolution.
It goes on: The session reorganized the state machinery in order to enable it to carry out the cause of Songun, renamed the Socialist Constitution Kim Il Sung Constitution, thus, providing a sure legal guarantee for firmly upholding the President's idea of building the state and his exploits performed in it and accomplishing the revolutionary cause of Juche in all fields under the Songun leadership of Kim Jong Il. We do all work including not only the work in the fields of politics, military affairs, economy and culture but the work of bringing the masses into action and the anti-imperialist struggle as intended and instructed by the President and as required by Juche under any circumstances. We are building a great prosperous powerful nation our own way in conformity with the actual conditions of our country and in line with the desire and wishes of the people.
We have frustrated the brigandish U.S. imperialists' vicious moves to stifle Korean-style socialism with the Juche-oriented strategy and tactics. The invincible military power built by Kim Jong Il under the uplifted banner of independence, the banner of great Songun, provides a sure guarantee for resolutely foiling any pressure and attempt to hurt the socialist system, a precious gain of the Korean revolution, and pushing ahead with everything in accordance with our faith and pluck. The unity of the Korean revolutionary ranks in mind has grown stronger as the days go by thanks to the Songun leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea and its policy of loving servicepersons and people. This serves as the most powerful weapon to smash the U.S. imperialists' moves to isolate and stifle the DPRK and gives a strong impetus to the drive for building a great prosperous powerful socialist nation.
We should hold Kim Jong Il, a great brilliant commander pursuing the Songun policy, in higher esteem and wage a vigorous struggle to devotedly defend the Korean-style socialist system and further glorify it, under his leadership. It is necessary to increase the function and role of the socialist law as a weapon of the working class struggle and thoroughly establish the legal order as required by the present situation where the confrontation with the U.S. is getting extremely acute in order to prevent capitalist elements from infiltrating into our society. Minju Joson Sunday called for accelerating the building of a great prosperous powerful nation by thoroughly applying the Socialist Constitution under the banner of Songun.
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Jonathan Watts, East Asia correspondent, Guardian, Thursday December 23, 2004
European policymakers have been advised to prepare for 'sudden change' in North Korea amid growing speculation among diplomats and observers that Kim Jong-il is losing his grip on power.
A EU delegation to Pyongyang recommended a review of the union's policy towards the peninsula, including proposals for closer engagement with North Korea and contingency plans for a possible collapse of the reclusive state, the Guardian has learned.
The sense of urgency was prompted by reports of divisions within the North Korean leadership and expectations that the second Bush administration will intensify pressure on a country the US president labelled part of an 'axis of evil'.
Despite boasting about its nuclear deterrent, North Korea has been left on the diplomatic backburner for the past 12 months.
Six-country talks aimed at resolving one of the world's last cold war conflicts have been postponed largely because the two main protagonists - Washington and Pyongyang - were awaiting the results of the US presidential election.
In the past month, however, the North Korean rumour mill has been working overtime. While no one is ever quite sure what is going on in one of the world's most closed countries, diplomats, intelligence agents, academics and defectors across the political spectrum and from several different countries are reporting signs of potentially destabilising change.
There are strong indications of a power struggle centring on the successor to Kim
Jong-il.
Last weekend South Korean news agencies reported an assassination attempt on Kim
Jong-nam, a son of the 'Great Leader', while he was on a trip to Europe. The plan, which was foiled by Austrian police, is believed to have been hatched by supporters of a rival son.
Another possible successor, Kim Jong-il's brother-in-law, Chang Sung-taek, has been purged from government and possibly placed under house arrest, according to a South Korean intelligence official who testified to a parliamentary committee late last month. Mr Chang, who had close connections to the military, was often cited as Mr Kim's second-in-command, but he has not been seen in official leadership line-ups for more than a year.
Mr Kim has also been out of the public eye long enough to prompt rumours that he has been killed or struck down by disease. Such speculation is not unusual, but it coincides with reports that his portraits have been removed from several public places.
Since the summer Pyongyang residents have reported a security crackdown, with extra checkpoints and ID inspections. Even Chinese academics - usually cautious in criticising North Korea - say there have been a large number of high-level defections because of growing dissatisfaction with the political system.
Veteran North Korea watchers say government officials are contradicting one another and being forced to wear military uniforms instead of their usual civilian clothes. 'I've never seen or heard so many signs of division within the leadership,' said a western observer who has been travelling in and out of Pyongyang for more than five years. 'Kim Jong-il seems to be losing control.'
'There is a great deal of pressure coming from somewhere,' a North Korea-based diplomat said. 'We don't know whether it is internal or external, but something is going on.'
In typically pugnacious style, North Korea denounced such speculation as part of a psychological warfare campaign by the US and its allies. 'The system in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is politically stable and is as firm as a rock,' the state-run Korean Central News Agency said. 'No matter how noisily the US may cry out, we will take it as no more than a dog's barking at a moon.'
Even if the reports are part of a new whispering campaign, it would be a sign of heightened pressure. Colin Powell, the main advocate of a cautious approach to North Korea, is leaving the White House next month. This will strengthen the position of hawks who favour a more combative policy, including taking the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN security council, which could lead to sanctions.
Japan is also taking a tougher stance. This week the foreign minister, Nobutaka
Machimura, said time was running out for Pyongyang. 'The international community as a whole, the United Nations, will have to implement stricter policies, including sanctions,' he said.
Alarmed at the prospect of instability in north-east Asia - an increasingly important centre of economic growth - European diplomats are urging EU policymakers to draw up contingency plans. The delegation to Pyongyang has called for a report, which is expected to be completed by early March.
'There is a lot of discussion now about how the EU should react in the event of a sudden change taking place in North Korea,' a diplomat said. 'The idea is to pull opinions together so we are prepared.'
Among matters under consideration are an emergency fund to support refugees and rebuild the country in the event of a collapse, and the response of EU members to a US call for sanctions.
A sharpening of policy could cause another transatlantic rift. Most European countries have maintained links with North Korea, while the US has tried to isolate it. 'One of the options is to intensify our engagement as a way of persuading them to shift their position in the six-party talks,' said Glynn Ford, a European MP who has visited North Korea on several occasions.
'I'm in favour. The best way to persuade them is to use carrots rather than sticks.'
Tuesday, December 21, 2004, Special to World Tribune.com EAST-ASIA-INTEL.COM
North Korea has expelled 27 foreigners it said tested positive for HIV and claimed the country remains free of AIDS.
North Korea is "the only country on the earth that has no AIDS-related patients," South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported quoting North Korea's Pyongyang Time. Yonhap reported the magazine in Pyongyang carried an interview with Han
Kyong-Ho, director of Pyongyang's Central Hygienic and Anti-Epizootic Center in its Dec. 4 issue.
In the interview, Han said that more than 400,000 people have been tested for AIDS since 1989, and that none other than the 27 foreigners was found to have the disease.
"Those 27 foreigners were sent home at their request," Han said. He did not elaborate on the period of time in which the disease was allegedly discovered and when the foreigners were expelled or to which nations they went.
Han attributed the non-existence of AIDS patients in North Korea to the "sound and moral lifestyle" of North Korean people.
Many North Korean statements are impossible to confirm independently and objectively, to health officials in South Korea say. "WHO [World Health Organization] reports every year that there is no AIDS patient reported from North Korea, but the international health organization has no way to confirm the report," said Koh
Eun-A, an official at the AIDS & Tuberculosis Section of the National Institute of Health in Seoul.
25 December 2004 1621 hrs (SST) - AFP
TOKYO : North Korea's nascent economic reforms have widened the wealth gap in the Stalinist state and there are signs of instability in its totalitarian system, Japan's national intelligence agency said.
An increasing flow of information from abroad has also helped divide the state's 20 million people into 'winners and losers,' making it possible for a 'rift to emerge in the foundations of power,' it added.
The warning was contained in an annual report by the Public Security Intelligence Agency.
The report also pointed to the possiblity of a 'feud or confrontation' arising in the course of selecting an heir to leader Kim Jong-Il, the eldest son of the country's late founding father Kim Il-Sung.
It has been reported that Kim Jong-Il's latest wife Ko Yong-Hui, 51, died this year after a long battle with cancer.
Ko had reportedly campaigned to have one of her two sons groomed as heir apparent rather than Jong-Nam, the leader's eldest son from a previous marriage.
Ko was the mother of Kim Jong-Il's second son Jong-Chul, 23, and third son Jong-Woon, 18.
South Korea's intelligence agency said last month that Jang Song-Taek, a brother-in-law of Kim Jong-Il, was stripped of power early this year after he was accused of creating his own faction within the military.
In a desperate drive to revive its moribund economy, North Korea launched economic reform in July 2002, allowing individuals and corporations to run for-profit operations.
The move has spawned markets handling a broad range of commodities and helped revitalise the economy to a certain extent, the Japanese agency said.
'As a result, public discontent against the establishment may possibly grow while confrontation develops between winners and losers in the ruling class such as military and government leaders.'
The report warned that if the economy further deteriorates it could accelerate the country's efforts to earn foreign currency through trafficking in narcotics, forging money and spreading weapons of mass destruction.
By Donald Kirk, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, from the December 15, 2004 edition
SEOUL - In a country where nearly every facet of society is controlled, North Korean authorities are encountering a new foe: the cellphone.
Mobile phones, which are ubiquitous in China and South Korea, are now infiltrating North Korea and are allowing information into - and out of - the 'hermit kingdom.'
Douglas Shin, a Korean-American minister who has been campaigning for human rights in North Korea, sees the emerging cellphone 'revolution' as paralleling, if not abetting, budding dissent against the government.
'At first cellphones worked on a narrow band of land along the Chinese border,' says Mr. Shin. 'Now they can penetrate a great distance.'
Often, he says, cellphone users must climb a hill or mountain to use them, but still he says it's possible to convey messages that previously would never have penetrated the barriers of a state that bars normal international mail and ordinary telephone calls for all but a privileged few.
Many observers say the fact that anyone can hold such long-distance conversations in North Korea could spell trouble for the country's leader, Kim Jong Il.
Can you hear me now?
Shin predicts the US government may even use the spread of cellphones to help bring about regime transformation, if not change in North Korea. He predicts that the US in the next two or three years will begin sending cellphones into North Korea, just as it now plans to penetrate the North by smuggling in small radios capable of receiving Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, both official US stations.
It was shortly after the rail disaster last April in the town of Ryongchon, just 10 miles south of the Yalu River border with China, that the government imposed a ban on all cellphones. North Korean officials have suggested that the ban was intended to stop saboteurs from plotting against the North Korean regime. Kim - whose train had sped through Ryongchon shortly before two trains collided and blew up, killing several hundred people - is widely believed to have been the target.
'If possible, Kim wants mobile phones to disappear in North Korea,' says Nishioka Tsutomu, a professor of modern Korean studies at Tokyo Christian University. 'But North Korean people do not have enough food. To trade on the black market in China, it is essential to have a mobile phone.'
Despite the ban, North Koreans have been using cellphones more than ever, according to visitors to the region. Whether crossing the border legally on official business or illegally to procure food and other vital supplies, they routinely rent or purchase phones on the Chinese side, then turn them off and hide them from border guards as they return.
Cellphones by now are in common use in Sinuiju, the North Korean city across the Yalu River from Dandong, the major Chinese center through which China does much of its trade with the North. They're also widely used along the Tumen River border in the east, and advances in technology now mean callers can occasionally reach contacts as far south as the capital, Pyongyang.
On again, off again
It was only last year that North Korea legalized cellphones, at least among the elite in the capital, after they had been in use illegally for several years. Now that they are illegal again, the only people who can use them legally are high-level officials and the political police.
'People make calls mostly for business,' says Kim Kwang Tae, a South Korean journalist who recently visited Dandong, 'but some use them for reunions of family members.' Indeed, he says, those who have cellphones lend them, for a fee, to North Koreans eager to call relatives who have fled to China - or made it to South Korea at the time of the Korean War more than half a century ago.
'I've called North Koreans on cellphones from Japan,' says Professor Tsutomu. 'We talked about 10 minutes each time.' The conversations 'were secret,' says Tsutomu, a critic of North Korea's regime. 'I cannot say what we discussed.'
Although most cellphone calls would probably not compromise security, some cellphone callers are voicing the kind of dissent that could land them in a North Korean prison. 'Some people spread some negative news to outside people,' says Kim. 'One Chinese businessman who was living in Pyongyang said reform will not make much difference unless the leadership changes.'
Dissemination of such views - not to mention actual coordination among factions plotting against the government - could pose a threat to a regime already roiled by recent high-level defections and purges, say South Korean analysts.
Kim Jong Il himself has been absent from public view for three months - prompting speculation that he's feeling insecure as he resists pressure for another round of six-party talks (with the US, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea) on the North's nuclear program.
Kim Moon Soo, a conservative member of South Korea's National Assembly, is quick to make a connection between the cellphone revolution and a real one.
'I'm aware many defectors and refugees are using cellphones,' he says. 'North Korea has banned the use of cellphones, but since you can hide them easily, and many Chinese use them, it's not easy to detect them.'
Clearly, 'something strange is going on in North Korea,' says the legislator. 'A lot of North Koreans are not happy under dictatorship and are not well off, so loyalty for Kim Jong Il's regime has lessened, and they are beginning to yearn for the outside world. The leadership is having a hard time controlling people through food distributions, prison camps, and executions.'
Under the circumstances, he says, 'cellphones are a threat for the leadership.'
By Andrei Lankov, Asia Times On-line
SEOUL, 14 Dec. 2004. - A creeping revolution, both social and economic, is under way in North Korea and it seems there's no turning back. For decades, the country served as the closest possible approximation of an ideal Stalinist state. But the changes in its economy that have taken place after 1990 have transformed the country completely and, perhaps, irreversibly.
For decades, Pyongyang propaganda presented North Korea as an embodiment of economic self-sufficiency, completely independent from any other country. This image sold well, especially in the more credulous part of the Third World and among the ever-credulous leftist academics. The secret of its supposed self-sufficiency was simple: the country received large amounts of direct and indirect aid from the Soviet Union and China, but never admitted this in public. Though frequently annoyed by such "ingratitude", neither Moscow nor Beijing made much noise since both communist giants wanted to maintain, at least superficially, friendly relations with their small, capricious ally.
But collapse of the Soviet Union made clear that claims of self-sufficiency were unfounded. From 1991, the North Korean economy went into free fall. Throughout 1991-99, the gross national product (GNP) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) nearly halved. The situation became unbearable in 1996, when the country was struck by a famine that took, by the best available estimates, about 600,000 lives. The famine could have been prevented by a Chinese-style agricultural reform, but this option was politically impossible: such a reform would undermine the government's ability to control the populace.
The control on daily lives was lost anyway. What we have seen in North Korea over the past 10 years can be best described as collapse of what used to be rigid Stalinism from below. In the Soviet Union of the late 1950s and in China of the late 1970s, Stalinism-Maoism was dismantled from above, through a chain of deliberate reforms planned and implemented by the government. In North Korea the same thing happened, but the system disintegrated from below, despite weak and ineffectual attempts to keep it intact.
In the 1960s, North Korea was unique in being the only nation in the world where markets were outlawed. The retail trade in a strict sense almost ceased to exist since virtually everything, from socks to apples, was distributed through an elaborate public distribution system with money payments being rather symbolic. The rations depended on a person's position in the intricate social hierarchy, which eventually became semi-hereditary. In Kim
Il-sung's North Korea, there was almost nothing that could be sold on market since production outside the state economy was almost non-existent.
Unlike governments of other communist countries, until the late 1980s the North Korean government did not even allow its farmers to cultivate kitchen gardens - the individual plot was limited to merely 20-30 square meters, hardly enough to grow enough chili pepper. This was done on purpose. In many other communist countries, farmers had bigger plots and made their living from them, ignoring their work obligations to the state-run cooperative farms. Without their own plots, farmers would work more for the state - or so believed the North Korean government. In the utopia constructed by Kim Il-sung, every single man or woman was supposed to work for the state, and was rewarded for his and her efforts with officially approved rations and salaries.
In 1969, Kim himself admitted that the anti-market policy had been a failure. Thus private markets were gradually legalized, but remained small and strictly controlled. However, as late as late 1980s, markets were still considered inappropriate for a "socialist paradise". They were something to be ashamed of, so they were pushed to the margins of the city. Until the early 1990s, most markets were in places more or less hidden from view, inside residential blocks and behind high concrete walls. In Pyongyang, the main city market was set up under a huge viaduct at the easternmost part of the North Korean capital, as far from the city center as possible.
However, the economic disaster of 1991-95, and especially the subsequent famine, changed the situation. Markets began to spread across the country with amazing speed. From 1995-97, nearly all plants and factories ceased to operate. The rations were not issued anymore: in most areas people still received ration coupons but these could not be exchanged for food or other rationed goods. Only in Pyongyang and some other politically important areas did food continue to be distributed. But even there, the norms were dramatically watered down. In such a situation, the ability and willingness to engage in some private business became the major guarantee of physical survival.
The government also relaxed the restrictions on domestic travel. Since around 1960, every North Korean who ventured outside his native county was required to have a special "travel permit" (an exception was made for one-day travel to neighboring counties). However, in the mid-1990s, the authorities began to turn a blind eye to unauthorized travel. It is not clear whether it was a deliberate relaxation or just inability to enforce regulations when the state bureaucracy was demoralized. After all, a bribe of some US$5 would buy such a permit from a police officer.
The tidal wave of small trade flooded the country, which once came very close to creating a non-money-based economy. People left their native places in huge numbers. Many sought places where food was more available while others enthusiastically took up the barter trade, including smuggling of goods to and from China. Women were especially prominent in the new small businesses. Many North Korean women were housewives or held less-demanding jobs than men. Their husbands continued to go to their factories, which had come to a standstill. The males received rationing coupons that were hardly worth the paper on which they were printed. But North Korean men still saw the situation as temporary and were afraid to lose the trappings of a proper state-sponsored job that for decades had been a condition for survival in their society. While men were waiting for resumption of "normal life", whiling away their time in idle plants, the women embarked on frenetic business activity. Soon some of these women began to make sums that far exceeded their husbands' wages.
The booming markets are not the only place for retail trade. A new service industry has risen from the ashes: private canteens, food stalls and inns operate near the markets. Even prostitution, completely eradicated around 1950, made a powerful comeback as desperate women were eager to sell sexual services to the newly rich merchants. Since no banking institution would serve private commercial operations, illegal money lenders appeared. In the late 1990s they would charge their borrowers monthly interests of 30-40%. This reflected very high risks: these lenders had virtually no protection against the state, criminals and, above all, bad debtors.
In North Korea, which for decades was so different, this meant a revolution. The new situation undermined the government's ability to control the populace. People involved in the new market activities are independent from (or inured to) subtle government pressures that had ensured compliance for decades. One cannot promote or demote a vendor, transfer him or her to a better or worse job, nor determine his or her type of residence (though admittedly, most people still live in the houses they received when the old system was still operating).
The growth of new markets also undermined some pillars of old North Korean hierarchy. Of course, many people who became affluent in the new system came from the old hierarchy - as was the case in most post-communist countries. Officials or managers of state-run enterprises found manifold ways to make an extra won. These managers often sold their factories' products on the market. But many hitherto discriminated-against groups managed to rise to prominence during this decade. The access to foreign currency was very important, and in North Korea there were three major groups who had access to some investment capital: the Japanese-Koreans, Chinese-Koreans and Korean-Chinese.
The Japanese-Koreans moved into the country in the 1960s (there were some 95,000 of them - with family members, children and grandchildren, their current number can be estimated at 200,000-250,000). These people have relatives in Japan who are willing to send them money. Traditionally, the authorities looked at Japanese-Koreans with suspicion. At the same time, since money transfers from Japan have been a major source of hard currency for Pyongyang, their activities were often tolerated. This particular group even enjoyed some special rights, being privileged and discriminated against at the same time. When the old system of state control and distribution collapsed, Japanese-Koreans began to invest their money into a multitude of trade adventures. It did not hurt that many of them still had the first-hand experience of living in a capitalist society.
Another group were people with relatives in China. The economic growth of China meant that the relatives could also help their poor relatives in North Korea. In most cases, this was not in the form of money transfers, but assistance in business and trade. The local ethnic Chinese were in an even better position to exploit the new opportunities. For decades, they have constituted the only group of the country's inhabitants who could travel overseas as private citizens more or less at their will. Even in earlier times, the ethnic Chinese used this unique position to earn extra money by small-scale and part-time smuggling. In the 1990s, they switched to large operations. There is an irony in the sudden economic advance of these groups. For decades, their overseas connections have made them suspect and led to systematic discrimination against them. In the 1990s, however, the same connections became the source of their prosperity.
Until recently, the government did not try to lead, but simply followed the events. The much-trumpeted reforms of 2002 by and large were hardly anything more than the admission of the situation that had been existing for a few years by then. The official abolition (or near-abolition) of the public distribution system did not count for much, since this system ceased to operate outside Pyongyang around 1995.
But the North Korean economy has indeed come a long way from its Stalinist ways. Now the government has neither money nor support nor the political will to revive the Stalinist-style central economy. There is no way back, only forward. Stalinism is dead. Welcome to capitalism, comrades!
12/11/2004 The People's Korea.
Key Policy to Develop Economy: Strengthening Government’s Unified Guidance and Transferring Decision-making Authority to Lower Units.
The People’s Korea interviewed Kim Yong Sul, Vice Minister of Trade of the DPRK on Pyongyang’s incentive policy on external trade investment.
The following is a summary of the interview.
Q: A series of changes seems to have taken place in the DPRK’s economy since the DPRK took measures to reform its economic management. Following these changes, favorable conditions have been created in trade investment.
A: Lower organizations have been authorized to independently handle economic problems in many fields, while unified guidance by the government was strengthened after the economic management reform was taken.
Vice Trade Minister Kim Yong Sul
The State Planning Commission sets production quotas for strategic materials and other important goods to each factory and production unit, but it gives only money quota to factories and enterprises which are not engaged in producing goods. Lots of lower units are carrying out production plans, using their originality to the full.
There are detailed regulations concerning how money is spent, but enterprises can use money except payment to the government at their discretion. Enterprises can deal in necessary materials each other at prices of mutual consent.
Meanwhile, they have to get materials independently in case they require materials necessary for production or repair of facilities. Officials and workers of each enterprise do their duties and are playing their role at their post.
The DPRK government also invested authority to lower units regarding the payment of wages to workers and of costs for the management of
labor.
Formerly, workers received fixed rewards for their labor regardless of their work load. The amounts of money paid were decided by the government uniformly. After the reform of economic management went into effect, workers came to be able to receive rewards according to their work and earning. Regarding ways to pay wages, daily or weekly payment is permitted as well as monthly payment.
Lower units are given authority to make a decision on abolishing or merging and consolidating their affiliated sections in case such a decision is reasonable.
General Secretary Kim Jong Il said that the important point of reforming socialist economic management was to establish a method of economic management which can produce the highest possible profit while maintaining the principles of socialism. His instructions mean that the points to be improved should be examined attaching importance to “actual benefit,” in accordance with fast changing reality, even though the points were advantageous in the past age.
We aim at establishing a method of “our style” economic management, not a Chinese style.
Q: What new measures have been taken recently?
A: The “field management system” was introduced on a trial basis for cooperative farms.
Since 2002, a co-op farm has been permitted to use all the money except expenses needed to run a farm, such as land fees, fertilizers, diesel oil, agricultural chemicals and seeds.
In the past, a farmland had “workteams” which were formed by several sub-workteams, and each workteam had an authority to adjust the distribution of money. Recently, a
sub-workteam has been in charge of this work.
A co-op farm came to be authorized to divide sub-workteams into smaller units. So, we have started a “field management system” in which each small unit can manage a certain field of the farm.
We are testing several means to increase production, holding fast to the principles of making “actual profit.”
We are also making efforts to reform our economic management. We take measures to stabilize market prices.
Q: On Pyongyang’s efforts to activate trade.
A: The government has given authority to large enterprises, ministries, autonomous cities and counties to engage in foreign trade. Because of the government’s decision to allow foreign trade, trading companies have been established one after another recently. I think that the authorities should support and strengthen trading companies without hesitation, if they can produce products in large quantities.
To help develop person’s ability is important to activate trading. The government has been making effective measures to train trade officials and examine them.
We have recently established a system of qualification certificates for persons in charge of trade. The certificate of qualification is given only to those who have passed a certification examination. Only certified persons are allowed to engage in commerce. It can be said that this system is one of the measures to enhance the ability of trade officials.
The qualification deliberation committee has been holding examinations in four subjects since the second half of this year and confers a certificate to a successful candidate. Examinations will be held until the end of first half of the next year. The subjects of examination include trade policy of the Workers’ Party of Korea, practical business in trade deals, foreign languages concerning trade terms and computer skill.
The changing situation requires lots of capable trade officials.
The Ministry of Trade is now making every effort to train able officials in charge of trade.
Q: How was regulations changed to encourage trade investments from the outside world?
A: The authorities have lowered a minimum wage to 30 euros. This is a global standard of a legal minimum wage. In the past, we set a minimum wage at 100-120 U.S. dollars for foreign companies, and 80 U.S. dollars for companies run by Koreans living in Japan.
We also have lowered all kinds of fees.
We set an electricity bill at 53 euros per 1000kw, though the electricity situation in the DPRK is still bad. Our tax water rate is lowered to 33 euros per 1000 cubic meters from 90 U.S. dollars. This rate is the same as that for domestic companies.
Formerly, factories were allowed to sell 30% of their products in domestic markets, and the remaining 70% were exported. Now, factories can sell their products in domestic markets without approval of the authorities.
The DPRK does not impose a tax on productive facilities and raw materials, because we think that imported equipment and materials are exported in the form of products. It can be said that the absence of taxes is a kind of the preferential treatment.
Automobile insurance is the only thing to buy in starting a business in the DPRK. Other insurance is not compulsory. We have reduced an automobile insurance premiums.
Q: What is the preferential treatments enjoyed only by overseas Koreans?
A: The first special treatment is that a Korean businessman living overseas can establish an independent enterprise, not a joint venture, outside the special economic zones. The second is the rights of independent mining development and establishing a bank. Tax reduction is the third preferential treatment for overseas Koreans.
As a matter of course, such preferential treatment can be applied to the Korean businessmen living in Japan who were pioneers in joint venture with the
DPRK.
Digital Choson Ilbo, 8 Dec.2004
North Korea revised its criminal law back in April to reinforce provisions related to "anti-state and anti-nation offenses" in an attempt to strengthen its legal system for the purpose of maintaining the system, it was confirmed Tuesday.
According to a revised version of the North's criminal law, obtained by the authorities concerned including the National Intelligence Service, "participants in a coup, riot, demonstration and attack" were added to those who are subject to the crime of subversive conspiracy. Subject to this crime were only "participants in a conspiracy" under the previous version.
Among anti-state and anti-nation crimes, the penalty of "hard labor for more than 5 years and less than 10 years" for one found guilty of participating in an armed riot has been amended to the penalty of "hard labor for more than 5 years" with the upper ceiling omitted. The penalties of hard labor for more than 10 years and death for armed riot ring leaders were changed into "lifelong hard labor or death" with the bottom line heightened substantially. The penalties for "those who have escaped to other countries betraying the Fatherland" were revised from "hard labor for more than 5 years and less than 10 years" to "hard labor for more than 5 years," with the bottom line eliminated.
The amended criminal law has newly stipulated "crimes infringing upon the order of national defense control," created a new chapter on "crimes violating socialist culture" plus a provision providing for the principle of legality.
Also newly created was the crime of obscenity, judging obscene culture as a poison of capitalism. One who is found to "have listened to obscene music, performed an obscene dance or watched an obscene video or compact disk" is liable for punishment under the new criminal law. Those who are found to have listened to anti-state broadcasting or have possessed an anti-state leaflet are given prison terms of not more than 5 years.
At the same time, the North has reinforced provisions protecting the right to private property. The penalty for "illegally seizing another's property" was reinforced from "hard labor for less than 10 years" to "hard labor for more than 10 years."
The North's criminal law, legislated by the Supreme People's Council (the North Korean legislature) in March 1950, was amended for a fifth time this year. Its previous revisions came in 1974, 1987, 1995 and 1999.
Digital Choson Ilbo, 8 Dec.2004
North Korea amended its Criminal Law in April by reinforcing penalties for acts that threaten to undermine the regime and incorporating a horde of new articles to regulate new crimes, hinting at immense change that the regime is struggling to control.
The state increased the number of articles included in its criminal code from 161 to 303, widening the scope of the law to account for recent social change. It was last amended in 1999.
The revision reflects greater change in the reclusive state than was previously imagined, suggesting that people's lifestyles, ways of thinking and the speed with which information is circulated are all transforming rapidly.
The changes are so vast they threaten to unsettle the rigid power structure, with one official at the North's State Security Agency even attempting to extort money from a defector residing in the South after establishing contact using a Chinese-made cell phone.
With no sign of improvement in the North's escalating financial and food crises, the populace has to find extra-judicial ways of surviving. A collapsing system of food rationing has led to the rampant spread of illegal money-making enterprises, with 80-90 percent of the population making forays into the black market to support themselves. As a result, the new Criminal Law attempts to impose greater state control of the populace.
The fate of the North Korean system may well hinge on how well the regime copes with the expansive changes rippling through its social fabric from the lowest stratum. If the North pursues its policy of fending off any attempts at transparency and invites international isolation over the current nuclear standoff, the chances of its survival in the face of internal and external pressure will be plunged into greater uncertainty.
Establishing a strong system to supplant the sole leadership of Kim Jong-il also places the government in a tenuous position. Reports of the Workers' Party having been realigned and strengthened to bolster support based on members' loyalty to the North's Dear Leader suggest internal power plays and instability in the wake of the downgrading of Jang Sung-taek from his position as second on the ladder in the political hierarchy.
Believing the North fully capable of surmounting its current crises and tensions borders on being overly positive and sidesteps current realities. The level of uncertainty facing the regime demands that we develop a
multi-faceted response in preparation for any eventuality.
by Erich Weingartner, CanKor, 5 December 2004,
Reflections on a visit to the DPRK by a delegation of the Canada-DPR Korea Association,
18 to 27 September 2004
Visitors to the DPRK inevitably look for signs of reforms -- particularly
economic reforms -- as well as signs of ideological adjustments to accommodate the reforms. The reason this question has taken on so much importance is an
argument that proponents of engagement advance. The safest course to take with regard to the
DPRK, they say, is to induce and encourage gradual reform towards
more openness, which will reduce tensions on the peninsula, leading ultimately to a more benign regime, a “soft landing,” a new peace and security structure,
and eventually to reunification of the Korean peninsula. Opponents of engagement argue that the Kim Jong Il regime is
unreformable, because those in power know that reform inevitably leads to regime
instability. Encouraging reforms will only harden the reflex of regime preservation, leading to an increase in tensions and risk of war. According to
this argument, if surrounding powers can be persuaded to agree on a new regional
security structure, a policy of coercive diplomacy can speed the process of regime change while at the same time limiting the risk of war.
So did the Canada-DPR Korea delegation visiting Pyongyang, Nampo, Kaesong and Panmunjom form 18 to 27 September see signs of reform? The problem is that
information on the DPRK continues to be frustratingly opaque and incomplete, even when it is staring you in the face during a visit such as ours. What we
think we see is influenced by what we think we know. What visitors believe they are seeing in North Korea depends largely on the signs they are looking
for. Kenneth Quinones, visiting Pyongyang at the beginning of August, put it
this way: “What one sees is less important than how one looks at what one sees.”
My
own perspective on what we saw was certainly influenced by my history of repeated visits since 1985, and my two-and-a-half year residence in the late
1990s. Much was familiar ground: the continued parading through all the usual tourist sites and showcase institutions. Many, like the maternity hospital, are
now sadly out of date, both in equipment and in therapeutic philosophy.
Ideologically, a harder line was projected. More references were made to the songun (“military first”) policy, and the nuclear “deterrence” policy.
Posters and slogans were more militarized than only two years ago. Defectors were roundly denounced as criminals. Passage of the human rights act in the US
Congress and the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur on human rights were denounced as psychological warfare against the
DPRK. People seemed genuinely
afraid that a US attack is imminent. There continues to be a striking difference between talking to guardians
of ideology on the one hand, and practitioners and businessmen on the other. Although most of our wishes were eventually granted, there seemed to be a
reluctance to show us evidence of economic reforms, like the Tong-il market, or the Kaesong Industrial Park. It was almost as if the task of those assigned to
us was to deny the significance of what we saw with our own eyes.
What we saw were signs of lively commerce, new shops, new restaurants, street markets in back allies, construction and renovation. Economic “improvement” measures have forced businesses to become profitable. Organizations seem to be competing for the attention of foreigners, as we were introduced to several commercial business proposals. The two of us who returned by train could see brand new villages, new subdivisions, and a massive apartment housing project rising up from empty fields on the approach to Sinuiju.
Despite the current freeze on inter-Korean talks, we heard no negative reference to South Korea. There seemed to be confidence that the ROK will continue its policy of assisting in North Korea’s development. Officials of the Ministry of Land and Environmental Protection spoke to us with enthusiasm of plans to formulate environmental policies as follow-up to the Report on the Status of the DPRK Environment, published with the assistance of UNPD and UNEP last August.
Everyone we met seemed to exude a desire to be connected with the outside world. A British teacher working at Kim Il Sung University told us that 90% of
the students in his English class want to study market economics abroad. The young seem to sense which way the wind is blowing.
These “changes” hardly qualify as “reforms”, nor would it be prudent to suggest that the DPRK has embarked on a long march toward capitalism. On the
other hand, I do believe that the changes we are witnessing are quite robust, and not necessarily related to the efforts or the wishes of the central
government. Nor can we claim that the changes have been driven by international pressures, or by humanitarian engagement, or the policies of the US
administration.
Because of our lack of access and hard information, we tend to underestimate the DPRK’s own internal dynamics. Chief among these has been the government’s inability to supply the means necessary for continued centralized control over the economy. The failure of food supply is only one of the stresses to the system. In some respects, even more important is the failure to supply energy needs and the raw materials necessary to keep industries operating at even minimal levels.
To
adjust to these conditions, Pyongyang already ten years ago began to give outlying regions more economic autonomy. Provinces bordering China were
encouraged to use cross-border trade as a coping mechanism. This led to numerous
innovations, both legal and illegal, giving rise to a black market and a thriving “second economy”.
Inviting international humanitarian assistance in 1995 was the first attempt to “catch up” to this second economy and regain authority over the food
distribution system. The same is likely the case with the 2002 “economy management” adjustment, which restructured wage and price controls and foreign
exchange rates. Even these changes were not enough, as inflationary pressures continue to drive up the price of European Euros, now the currency of choice.
What I felt during this visit is that the DPRK regime is barely able to keep the lid on changes that are apparent everywhere. The regime has to find a
way to stay ahead of the game, to reassert its authority over the economy, and thereby over the society. It appears to be doing so in the usual heavy-handed
way, aided, paradoxically, by the hard-line policy of the Bush Administration. Those who support the confrontational line towards North Korea -- as one
prominent foreign resident in Pyongyang’s diplomatic community told me -- are the “best friend” of the status quo in the
DPRK. It provides an external
justification for a harder internal discipline. Nonetheless, it seems clear even to Kim Jong Il that if he wishes to
remain in power, economic reform is a necessary evil.
By Hideko Takayama and Christian Caryl, Newsweek International
Dec. 6 issue - You have to give credit to Kim Jong Il for one thing—he knows the score. The North Korean leader's subjects may be largely ignorant of the bleak situation in their country, owing to the country's all-encompassing propaganda machine, but Kim himself clearly has no illusions. Shortly after the revolutions that toppled half-a-dozen communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe back in 1989, according to Japanese journalist and North Korea watcher Ryo Hagiwara, Kim informed members of his ruling circle that he and they could easily end up like deposed Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu if they didn't watch their step. For a full week in early 1990, Kim forced North Korean officials to watch multiple video showings of Ceausescu's bloody death at the hands of an angry mob and warned his colleagues of the dangers of losing control. One defector told Hagiwara that he recalled Kim obsessively repeating, "We will be killed by the people."
The North Korean dictator remains isolated and obsessive, by all accounts, but he may be more concerned nowadays about gathering international pressure, led by a hawkish U.S. government, than an uprising by his mistreated people. For one thing, the incoming U.S. secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, is apt to take a sharper line with Pyongyang than her predecessor. Kim may be sensing that. In one account related to NEWSWEEK, a recent visitor to Pyongyang got a candid take from the North Korean leader himself. Kim confessed that the North could not give up its nuclear weapons because his conventional weapons were hopelessly outmoded and ineffective—leaving him at the mercy of the U.S. military.
For Kim, the next few months could be critical. Domestically, he must deal with the short-term fallout from the limited economic reforms he introduced two years ago. A recent report by the World Food Program states that they've caused even more problems for North Korea's people. By cutting state subsidies and freeing prices, Kim has sent inflation through the roof—making basic foodstuffs catastrophically expensive. Says one recent North Korean defector: "One third of the population can eat rice and meat soup. One third can manage to eat corn. And one third is waiting to die with water-thin porridge."
Perhaps as a result, the flow of refugees and defectors out of the country continues unabated—and so do the inevitable rumors of internal dissension. Remedies might be found on the international front—but it's precisely there that Kim faces some of his biggest challenges. In the coming weeks Kim will come under intense pressure to return to the negotiating table for six-party talks aimed at dismantling his nuclear arsenal. If he continues to stonewall, he could find himself jettisoned by putative friends like Russia and China.
Some conservatives in Washington argue that the Bush administration should be pushing China and South Korea to ratchet up the pressure on Pyongyang. "I think we need a stronger coalition," says Nicholas
Eberstadt, a researcher at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington. "We will not get a less dangerous North Korea without more outside pressure." He says that China's North Korea policy has been, effectively, to "kick the can down the road," while South Korea's government is "implacably anti-American and reflexively pro-appeasement toward Pyongyang."
But giving in on negotiations could spell trouble for Kim, too. He'll have to deal with Americans and Japanese who are being less understanding of Pyongyang's demands than ever before. "I think Kim doesn't know which way to move now," says Lee Young
Hwa, a North Korea analyst at Japan's Kansai University. "His options are getting narrow."
Questions about Kim's hold on power have been spreading in recent weeks—fueled by mysterious details about symbolic changes leaking out of the North. Official portraits of Kim have been disappearing from walls. Badges bearing his image have begun to vanish from the lapels of party members. Signs of a creeping coup? Not likely—but in a closed society, no one knows. South Korean intelligence analysts opine that the portrait removals are merely a sign of the son's Confucian respect for his father, whose portraits have remained firmly in place. (Kim Il Sung died 10 years ago.) Other experts speculate that some of the much-ballyhooed changes may have been underway for months or even years—part of a calculated campaign on Kim's part to soften his international image. "No matter where Kim looks, there is no bright prospect," says Katsumi Sato, director of the Modern Korea Institute in Tokyo. "The recent effort is one example of how hard he is trying to change his image to the rest of the world."
If so, he's got lots of work to do. Case in point: the new scepticism in Japan. Anger toward the North has intensified there since the failure, earlier this month, of Tokyo's most recent effort to solve the festering issue of Japanese citizens abducted by Kim Jong Il's minions during the cold war. A Japanese delegation dispatched to Pyongyang to clarify the fates of some of those still missing returned home with very little conclusive information. Public opinion plummeted. In one poll taken shortly after the trip, 73 percent of those queried favored "the possibility of imposing economic sanctions"—up from 45 percent in May of last year.
Japanese politicians have jumped on the get-tough bandwagon. A cross-party group of lawmakers has called publicly for economic sanctions. And a leading member of the prime minister's team, hard-line Liberal Democratic Party Acting Secretary-General Shinzo Abe, spoke aloud what many leading politicians in Tokyo have been thinking in private: "I think we should consider the possibility that a regime change will occur, and we need to start simulations of what we should do at that time."
The threat for the North is real. Japan is North Korea's third largest trading partner. "What Kim fears is that Japan might restrict the exports of software and hardware that can be used as vital parts of the weapons of mass destruction like missiles and nuke facilities," says Sato. "I estimate that 65 percent of car parts used by the North Korean Army is Japan-made. Or wireless radios for use by ships. If these things are banned, the North will be in serious trouble." Not long ago, Japanese officials were letting it be known that the North could expect a huge economic sweetener if the two sides could normalize relations; the talk was of sums ranging up to $10 billion. Now there is far less enthusiasm for buying peace.
Things are dire for Kim on other fronts. The re-election of George W. Bush is surely the last thing he wanted. The U.S. Congress recently passed the North Korea Human Rights Act, which, among other things, offers support to defectors and allocates funds for mass drops of portable radios on the North—an attempt to break through the information blockade. In addition, trade between the two Koreas is still minimal, and Seoul's capacity to offer aid is being curtailed by the South's own sluggish economy. The conservative South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo recently cited intelligence sources who confirm that an erstwhile pretender to the throne, Kim Jong Il's brother-in-law Jang Song
Taek, was "purged" from the senior leadership earlier this year along with a coterie of high-ranking generals. That may sound surprising. But given the parlous state of the North's economy, the Great Leader Kim may be running out ways to keep his house of cards from falling.
By Andrei Lankov (Australian National University)
Few doubt that in the long run the present North Korean system is
unsustainable, and the last decade has been marked by intense speculations on how and when it will crash. As a result of these
attempts at crystal ball gazing, the Pyongyang watchers have come up with two possible scenarios for its eventual collapse--the "soft
landing" and "hard landing" options. By the late 1990s a general consensus was reached: almost everybody
agreed that a "soft landing" was much more preferable than its alternative, the "hard landing".
The idea of a "soft landing" as it is normally understood implies the gradual evolution of a regime accompanied by large-scale social
and economic reforms, more or less similar to that undertaken in China or Vietnam. The perceived need to promote such an option was
the major factor behind the Sunshine policy of unilateral concessions launched by Kim Dae Jung's administration in 1997 and
still continued by the present South Korean administration. An important part of the underlying assumptions in this policy is a
belief that reform would prolong the existence of the North Korean state and make possible a gradual elimination of the huge economic
and social gap between the two Koreas. As A. Foster-Carter noted, "Despite the rhetoric of unification, the immediate aim [of the
soft-landing policy] was to retain two states, but encourage them to get on better."(1)
The alternative to the soft landing is a "hard" or ("crash") landing. This scenario implies economic and political collapse, followed by
unification with the South. Over the past decade this has been seen as a nightmarish
scenario since the expected financial and social costs are truly astronomical.
However, there are reasons to believe that the so-called contradiction between the "soft" and "hard" landings may be an
illusion. A "soft landing" might be "desirable" but it is hardly "feasible", and is likely to turn "hard" very quickly. The political
behaviour of the North Korean elite appears to testify to the fact that such is their assessment of the situation as well.
At first glance, the behaviour of the North Korean elite appears to be quite irrational. Unlike their counterparts in China or Vietnam,
they had not initiated any serious reform agenda-- even though the examples of their
neighbours vividly demonstrate the efficiency and speed of the economic recovery which can be induced by such reforms.
For a time, it appeared that Pyongyang was indeed seriously considering the reform option. However, it has by now become clear
that the "July measures" of 2002 were badly planned and that their only palpable result has
been the escalating inflation. The "July measures" are better described not as reforms per se but rather as a
final recognition of the grim economic reality.
This stubbornness of the North Korean elite is sometimes described as "paranoid". However, this expression
begs the intelligence of the Pyongyang rulers. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines paranoia as
"a tendency on the part of an individual or group toward excessive or irrational suspiciousness and distrustfulness of others". However,
one cannot describe as "irrational" the distrustfulness with which the North Korean leadership views the apparently beneficial reform
proposals and their proponents. This distrust and suspicion is, alas, very rational and reflects a deep understanding of their country's
problems and their own political situation.
Assumptions based on the Chinese, East European or post-Soviet experiences are not applicable to the North.
The "market" or capitalist reforms in those countries were indeed beneficial to the
former Communist elite or at least for more flexible and better-educated parts. Even a cursory look at the biographies of post-Soviet tycoons and top politicians confirms that the so-called
"anti-communist revolutions" of the early 1990s often boosted the standing of those who were prominent apparatchiks in the 1980s. The
first two presidents of the supposedly anti-Communist Russia were Yeltsin, the former Politburo member and Putin, the former KGB
colonel. The same is true of other post-Soviet states and China.
However, North Korea is dramatically different from other former members of the Communist bloc. Its major problems are created by the
existence of a democratic and prosperous "alternate Korea" just across the border, a mere few hundred kilometres away from even the
remotest North Korean village.
The economic gap between the two Koreas and the corresponding difference in living standards is huge, far exceeding the difference
which once existed between East and West Germany. The per capita GDP of the South is approximately 10,000 USD, while in the North it is
estimated to be between 500 and 1,000 USD. Obesity is a serious health problem in the South while in the North the ability to eat
rice every day is a sign of unusual affluence. South Korea, the world's fifth largest automobile manufacturer, has one car for every
four persons, while in the North a private car less accessible to the average citizen than a private jet would be to the average
American. South Korea is the world's leader in broadband Internet access while in the North only major cities have automatic telephone
exchanges and a private residential phone is still a privilege reserved solely for cadres.
The survival strategy of the North Korean political system has been based on the combination of three important
strategies: intense police surveillance, harsh suppression of even the slightest dissent
and maintaining a strict information blockade.
The last factor is especially important. All Communist regimes have attempted to cut their populace from
unauthorized overseas information but few if any have done so with Pyongyang's thoroughness or efficiency. For decades all North Korean radio sets
have been made to receive the few official broadcast channels only. No tuning was allowed. All foreign periodicals and books are sent to
special departments of libraries where they can only be accessed by persons with security clearance. A prolonged unauthorized
conversation with a foreigner on a Pyongyang street has frequently led to serious trouble for the persons involved.
Recently these measures have been relaxed somewhat--not least because maintaining such an exhaustive
self-isolation is expensive and the government does not have the money to support it any more.
The large-scale illegal migration of North Koreans to China also caused serious breaches in the system since the refugees invariably
return with a wealth of unauthorized information about the outside world. Nonetheless, the degree of isolation remains very high. Many
North Koreans are beginning to suspect that the South is not really a land of hunger, as Pyongyang's propaganda has been telling them
for decades. Still, few of them imagine how affluent their South Korean brethren really are.
Economic reforms are unthinkable without large-scale foreign investment and other types of exchange with overseas countries (what
is known in China as "openness"). However such "openness" would mean a decisive break with this system of self-imposed isolation. Under
the present circumstances both investment capital and expertise are likely to come largely from South Korea.
The influx of foreigners, especially South Koreans, will however undermine one of the pillars of the regime's political stability,
namely the system of information isolation. Even if these visitors carefully avoid everything which could upset their minders, the
sheer presence of strangers will be disruptive. This was not such an issue in China or Vietnam where the visitors came from alien
countries whose prosperity was seen as generally irrelevant to the local situation. It is likely to be a problem in the North, however,
where a large proportion of foreign investors and experts will come from another half of the same country and will speak the same
language.
Thus, any wide-scale cooperation with the outside world remains a dangerous option. Its obvious economic
benefits do not count for much, since the associated political risks are prohibitively huge
and the Pyongyang elite will not take chances. So far the North Korean leaders have tried to have their cake and eat it too, with a
measure of success. They have largely promoted those joint projects where interactions between outsiders and Koreans
can be kept at a minimum. The much-trumpeted Kumgang Tourist Project is a good example of such an
undertaking. South Korean visitors are allowed to travel under constant supervision of carefully selected security
personnel, within an area which has been purged of any local inhabitants and fenced off from the rest of the country. Another
popular idea is the creation of special economic zones where capitalism and subversive
information would be kept virtually behind high walls. However, the possible scale of such "politically secure"
projects is quite small, and they will not be very beneficial to the technological development of this hopelessly backward country.
In spite of the heavy use of nationalist, even racist, rhetoric, the regime cannot rely on nationalism alone as a source of its
legitimacy. The inhabitants of the South, after all, belong to the same nation, as North Korean media itself has never tired of
repeating. Nor can it cite the sacral sources of its legitimacy: in spite of the numerous
quasi-religious features of chuch'e, the regime still exhibits strong vestiges of the rationalist Marxist
tradition and has construed its propaganda discourse around its supposed ability to deliver a "happy and prosperous life" to its
subjects. The present government which includes a large number of Kim's clansmen and their confidants simply cannot recognize that the
country's economy has been following an erroneous path for decades. It will be suicidal for the people who hold power, first and
foremost, as heirs to the late Great Leader, Eternal President.
If the populace learned how dreadful their position was compared to that of the South Koreans, and if the still-functioning system of
police surveillance and repression ceased to work with its usual efficiency, then the chance of violent revolution or at very least,
mass unrest would be highly likely. The proponents of a "soft landing" believe that the collapse of the regime (be it violent or
otherwise) would not mean an end to a separate North Korean state. However, it is difficult to see how the North Koreans could possibly
be persuaded to remain quiet if they knew the truth and were not afraid of immediate and swift retribution for their dissent. The
proponents of the "soft landing", obviously influenced by the Chinese experience, imply that rising living
standards will be seen by the populace as an adequate trade-off for their political
docility--either under Kim Jong Il or under some force which eventually replaced him. Indeed such has been the case in China or
Vietnam, but then the populace of these two countries were not exposed to the effect of democratic freedoms and capitalist
prosperity enjoyed just across the border by people who speak the same language and belong to a similar culture.
In a North Korea
with freer information flows, the existence of the South is bound to create the illusion that the North Korean economic problems would
find a simple and fast solution by immediate unification with the South. Such an option is not conceivable at the moment, when the
masses are kept under control and information about South Korea is scarce. However, the easing of political restrictions and access to
relevant information is bound to lead to a development not much different from that of Germany in 1989-1990.
In other words, the attempts to promote reform and liberalization are likely to lead to the exact opposite--to
political instability, regime collapse and a subsequent "hard landing."
The Pyongyang elite is understandably terrified of such an outcome. For them the regime's collapse would mean the loss of considerable
privileges. While not exactly "filthy rich", the North Korean top families enjoy very
agreeable standards of living, with a generous supply of delicacies, occasional theme parties and an unlimited use
of luxury cars. Many of them are afraid that they would be persecuted by the victors. They know only too
well how they would treat the Seoul "reactionary puppets" had Pyongyang emerged victorious from the
inter-Korean rivalry and they do not see any reason why they would be treated differently.
Nonetheless, the major stumbling bloc to serious reform is not the stubborn resistance of the top leadership. The political position of
the lower elites, the mid-level party cadres and military officers, is probably more
important for the fate of the country. Under different circumstances these people would be able to press the
government into reforming the economy or simply remove it, as occurred in Romania, the closest East European analogy to North
Korea. However in North Korea these people--say, Central Committee members or Major Generals--also have nothing to gain and everything
to lose from a possible regime change.
In Eastern Europe and the former USSR it was the second and third tiers of apparatchiks who reaped the greatest benefits from the
dismantling of state socialism. Their skills, training and expertise, as well as their connections allowed them to appropriate sizeable
chunks of the former state assets. They then used this property to secure dominant positions in the new system and quickly re-modelled
themselves as prominent businessmen or even "democratic politicians". The North Korean mid-level elite does not have access to such an
attractive option. Once again such a scenario is rendered unlikely by the existence of South Korea with its highly developed
economy, large pools of capital and managerial skills. If the collapse of Kim's regime spells an end to the independent North Korean state
which is a very likely option, the local elite would stand no chance of competing with the South Korean companies and their
representatives.
Capitalism in post-Kim North Korea would be
constructed not by former apparatchiks who some day declare themselves the born-again enemies of the evil Communism, but by
resident managers of Samsung and LG. At best, the current elite might hope to gain some subaltern positions, but even this outcome
is far from certain. Something analogous to the "lustration policy", the formal prohibitions of former Party cadres and security
officials from occupying important positions in the bureaucracy of post-Communist regimes, is at least equally likely.(2) Some ex-apparatchiks might even face persecution for their deeds under the
Kims' rule. Facing such dangers, the lower strata of the ruling elite is showing no signs of dissent and prefers to loyally follow
Kim Jong Il's entourage.
In the unusual North Korean situation both the top government leaders and the lower-level bureaucrats are
deprived of decent exit options. Therefore they cannot be expected to risk the stability of
the country by engaging in dubious experiments and work towards the supposed wonders of a "soft landing". After all they do not suffer
from famine themselves and their privileges remain impressive even amidst the current chaos and disruption.
These bureaucrats obviously believe that reform is likely to hasten the end of the regime and
undermine their own privileged position. Unfortunately they appear to be correct in this opinion.
This does not mean that the regime will last forever. However, its transformation is unlikely to occur according to the "soft landing"
scenario. If the elite resists change for too long an implosion will be unavoidable and if it initiates reform now, the result is likely
to be the same or perhaps, only marginally less dramatic.
Thus if a "soft landing" does not appear to be a realistic option, should a policy of political and/or military pressure be suggested
as an alternative? This too is unlikely, even if we put aside the very serious dangers associated with such a policy. Western pressure
is probably counter-productive. Threats from Washington only remind the Pyongyang leaders once again how precarious their position is
and how terrible a fate is awaiting them in the event of a disaster. These pressures also reinforce the perception of the West as a
basically hostile and ruthless force, cause the elite to stick closer together, and justify even harsher treatment of the populace
(For the sake of "national salvation" the threats from the surrounding perfidious enemies must be resisted at all
costs!). This pressure will also help to mobilize the nationalist feelings of the
common North Koreans and make them to side with the government.
Then how long will it last? It is difficult to say. After all, Pyongyang has already confounded the predictions of many an expert
who forecast its imminent collapse in the early 1990s. Obviously if the elite refrains from
tampering with the system and continues to ignore the overtures of the proponents of reform, then the North
Korean state might survive for years to come. Wily diplomacy, including the usual nuclear and missile brinkmanship, will also be
helpful if it results in a modicum of foreign aid. However in the long run the system appears doomed. Sooner or later the gradual
disintegration of the police and security apparatus, increasing
access to unauthorized information along with manifold social changes will bring it down, probably, in a chain of dramatic, even
cataclysmic events.
___________________________________
(1) Aidan Foster-Carter. Towards the endgame. The World Today. London: Vol. 58, Iss. 12 (Dec 2002.); p. 23.
(2) As of 2003, lustration laws have been enacted in Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania and Poland. The most thorough
of these is the Czech Lustration Act which requires every applicant for senior or middle-level positions in the armed forces, bureaucracy,
judiciary, academic management and media to provide a certificate confirming that under Communism the candidate was not an officer of
or informer for the secret police, a medium or high-level Party cadre, a member of party militia and so on. In other words, it has made it
impossible for a former Communist apparatchik to reach any position of authority or influence in the new system and also greatly
restricts his or her ability to engage in economic activity. See: Roman David. Lustration laws in action: The motives and evaluation of
lustration policy in the Czech Republic and Poland (1989-2001). Law & Social Inquiry. Chicago: Spring 2003. Vol. 28, Iss. 2; pg. 387.
NOVEMBER 28, 2004, by Ho-Gab Lee, Dong-A Ilbo
The Tokyo Shimbun in Japan reported November 27 while citing North Korea’s internal documents that North Korea has decided to actively foster the establishment of markets and lengthen business hours until late in the evening.
This measure was put into effect after an order by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il according to a confidential document that the Chunichi Shimbun obtained. The document, Cabinet Decision No. 27, which deals with adopting regulations to administer markets, was published on May 5, 2003.
The document said, “There was an order from our leader, Kim Jong Il, to foster markets in order to facilitate the socialist economy and to help make the life of the people efficient.”
The number of markets that are to be established is not revealed, but the establishment and the shutdown of a market is administered by the Commerce Ministry, and the management of markets is handled by the Council of People`s Commissars in each province, city, and county.
Also, it has been laid down that business hours should be expanded so that laborers can shop after they leave work, and agricultural products, food, and life’s necessities except those manufactured by the state can be sold in shops. In addition, there should be a limit on prices so that sales are made within certain price range, and merchants should pay rental fees according to the size and the location of their stores.
In case of violations of rules, people will be indicted with penal and administrative responsibilities.
It is reported that there are about 40 markets in Pyongyang, and about 300 markets in areas outside of Pyongyang.
BBC, 16 November 2004
Some portraits of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il have reportedly been taken down in Pyongyang, news agencies quoted diplomats as saying on Tuesday.
The portraits were removed from some public buildings, the diplomats said. North Korea is one of the world's most secretive states, and it is difficult to know if the reports are significant.
 |
But South Korea's Yonhap news agency reported that Mr Kim ordered the move himself, amid worries he had been "lifted too high".
Yonhap did not name its source, who was said to have good contacts in the North.
Such an explanation, if true, would square with other recent reports that the North Korean leader was scaling back on the cult of personality that surrounds him.
Portraits of Mr Kim and his father, Kim Il-sung, are ubiquitous in North Korea, where they symbolise the ruling party's grip over every aspect of peoples' lives. |
|
An unnamed diplomat told the Russian news agency Itar-Tass that at receptions hosted by the North Korean foreign ministry, guests had recently only seen pictures of Kim Jong-il's father, Kim Il-sung, and a mark on the wall where a portrait of the North Korean leader used to hang.
"Only a light rectangular spot on the yellow whitewashed wall and a nail have remained in the place where the second portrait used to be," the diplomat said.
The French news agency AFP quoted a diplomat as saying that one place where pictures of Mr Kim had certainly disappeared from was the Grand People's Cultural Palace.
"In Pyongyang there is always a lot of speculation and on this question too, there is a lot of speculation," the source said.
The diplomat who spoke to Itar-Tass said that he understood that a secret edict had been issued to remove portraits of Mr Kim, but that no explanation has been given.
However, a Canadian tourist interviewed by Reuters on Tuesday said that he had seen plenty of portraits or Mr Kim around the city.
"Just yesterday, actually, I was in an office and saw the pictures on the wall," he said.
An official at the North Korean embassy in Moscow denied the reports about the portraits being taken down. "This is false information, lies. Can the sun be removed from the sky? It is not possible," he told Itar-Tass...
РБК. 26.11.2004, Тайюань 07:46:25. Большая часть питьевой воды в КНДР опасна для здоровья. Такого мнения придерживаются эксперты ООН. По их данным, водопроводная вода Северной Кореи практически на всей территории страны значительно загрязнена нечистотами. Эксперты отмечают, что причиной подобной ситуации стало неудовлетворительное состояние канализации в этой стране. Как было заявлено на конференции ООН по проблемам питьевой воды в китайском г.Тайюань, необходимо принятие скорейших мер по обеспечению населения КНДР качественной питьевой водой, иначе в стране могут начаться эпидемии, передает Kyodo News.
Tue 16 November, 2004, Reuters
|
BEIJING (Reuters) - Portraits of Kim Jong-il have been removed from some public meeting halls in North Korea, a Pyongyang-based diplomat says, but others say the leader's picture remain prominently displayed. It was not immediately clear on Tuesday what the removal of some portraits meant about the political fortunes of the North Korean dictator, but the diplomat said the pictures had been down for some time. Portraits of Kim were ubiquitous in homes, offices and public buildings across North Korea, where they have hung prominently for years beside a picture of his late father, the reclusive communist state's founder Kim Il-sung. "In some meeting places where they used to be placed side by side the one portrait has been removed," the diplomat told Reuters by telephone from Pyongyang. "In some places they have been replaced with portraits of Kim Il-sung," he said. |
 |
 |
Kim has poked fun at the cult of personality pervasive in North Korea, and analysts said the removal of some portraits could be an indication he wanted to tone it down in line with incremental economic reforms. Russian news agency Itar-Tass quoted an unidentified foreign diplomat as saying guests invited to official receptions in the North Korean capital Pyongyang had seen only portraits of state founder Kim Il-sung. "Only a light rectangular spot on the yellow whitewashed wall and a nail have remained in the place where the second portrait used to be," the source said. |
FAMILIAR FACE
But a Canadian tourist who landed in Beijing from Pyongyang on Tuesday said he saw Kim's portrait beside his father's frequently, including in office buildings and on subway cars as usual.
"Just yesterday, actually, I was in an office and saw the pictures on the wall," he said, adding they were also up in the subway.
Portraits of the younger Kim were also hanging as usual outside the North Korean embassy in Beijing.
North Korea has been embroiled in a two-year-old crisis over its nuclear arms programmes and the United States, Japan, South Korea, China and Russia have teamed up to try to persuade the North to scrap the weapons programmes.
An analyst at Radiopress, a Japanese news agency that monitors North Korean media from Tokyo, said there were no signs of anything unusual in the broadcasts it monitored.
"Nothing seems different," he added.
The diplomat quoted by Tass said officials in the hardline communist state had offered no explanation for the change.
He added that, according to his information, a secret directive had been issued to remove portraits of Kim Jong-il.
KCNA reported on Monday that Kim sent a wreath to the Palestinian embassy in Pyongyang for the late leader Yasser Arafat and North Korean television programmes were being broadcast as normal.
East-Asia-Intel.com, November 19, 2004
 |
A portrait of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il has been taken down in the
People's Cultural Palace, a major public building in Pyongyang. South Korean
intelligence sources said the action was a public relations initiative
undertaken by Kim aimed both at his own people and the outside world.
A photo in the October edition of the North Korean magazine, Chosun (Korea), acquired by South Korea's Joong-Ang Ilbo newspaper, shows that Kim's portrait, which had hung side by side with that of his father Kim Il-Sung, had been removed from the massive hall in the building. The photos provide the first confirmation of rumors that Kim's portraits have been taken down in public buildings in North Korea. |  |
Only a portrait of the senior Kim appeared in the very center of the wall, dismissing speculation that the removal of Kim Jong-Il' portrait may have been temporary before being replaced by a new one. Some defectors from North Korea had said in response to news reports about removed portraits, that they would be replaced by new ones in more ornate frames. The North Korean magazine showed in its July edition that Kim Jong-Il's portrait remained on the wall, alongside his father's. The picture was taken in May. A European diplomat in Seoul, who said he witnessed the sole picture of the senior Kim at the People's Cultural
Palace during his visit to Pyongyang in early September, said the removal took place on or about July 8 which marked the 10th anniversary of the death of Kim Il-sung. He said portraits of the junior Kim were quietly taken down in several other public buildings.
A South Korean intelligence source also said that portraits of Kim Jong-Il had been taken down in several public buildings and hotels in Pyongyang, which were open to foreign visitors. "But as far as we know, North Koreans are not removing Kim's portraits in other places, such as factories, companies and home," he said.
"The removal of portraits are not happening across the country, but just at several public buildings foreigners are allowed to visit, as part of efforts to ease the cult worship image of him," a government official said.
The North Korean Foreign Ministry denied news reports of the removal of Kim's portraits from public offices, according to China's Xinhua news agency on Nov. 19. The Chinese official news agency quoted a ministry official as denying the reports as a "groundless fabrication."
The removal was a direct order from Kim Jong-Il, the intelligence official said. It is essentially a public relations initiative to demonstrate to North Koreans his filial duty to his deceased father as well as to improve his external image to a world which considers the deification of leaders bizarre, he said.
The issue of the portraits demonstrates the country's decades-long cult worship. When a massive explosion killed hundreds of North Koreans in a border city with China in April, Pyongyang's official media praised the "heroic deaths" of the people who rushed into collapsing or burning buildings to save "treasured" portraits of Kim Jong-Il.
Portraits of Kim and his deceased father are mandatory fixtures in every home, office, public buildings and factory in the country. All adults are required to wear lapel pins bearing images of one or both Kims.
Koh Yu-Hwan, a North Korea specialist at Dongguk University in Seoul, said the removal of his portraits seemed aimed at easing burdens on policy failures that led to economic troubles. "Mr. Kim is probably trying to re-establish an image as a down-to-earth leader, no longer with demi-god status like his father," he said.
The intelligence source and other government officials downplayed Japanese reports that North Korea's state media had dropped the honorific title — "Dear Leader" — to refer to Kim Jong-Il.Tokyo-based Radio Press Inc. which monitors North Korea's state-run media, said on Nov. 18 that the North's official Central News Agency dropped the "Dear Leader" from its report of Kim's visit to an army unit, sparking speculation that he may be involved in a power struggle or his status was challenged.
But Seoul officials said there were no "unusual signs at all" in North Korea's power structure. There are no notable signs that Kim is in poor health, they said. Kim has been given some 1,200 titles, they said, and the North's media for the most part continue to use the honorific title of "Dear Leader."
By ANDREAS LORENZ, Der Spiegel.
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan, Published: November 8, 2004
The people of North Korea are not as submissive as they appear to be.
Unnoticed by the outside world, strong opposition to the regime of dictator Kim Jong
Il is beginning to appear. On April 22, two trains loaded with chemicals exploded in the city of
Ryongchon. Although 169 people died or were horribly disfigured, including a large number of children from a nearby school, no functionaries appeared
in the city to comfort the injured and the relatives of the victims. President Kim Jong Il did not even condescend to issuing a telegram offering his
condolences.
The state-owned news agency barely managed to devote a few lines to the catastrophe. Instead, the military in the capital celebrated the 72nd
anniversary of the founding of the army and "Dear Leader" Kim with "joyful dancing"
(the government's term). No pity and no compassion for the suffering victims. The regime showed its
true face - once again. A few hours prior to the tragedy, Kim's special train passed through the Ryongchon train station, returning from a trip to China.
Is it possible that this was not an accident, but instead an attempt by opponents
of the regime to blow up the dictator and his entourage? Until now, the world has been under the impression that the North Koreans,
shielded from information about the outside world, weakened by hunger and subject to the
tyranny of a foolproof monitoring system, are incapable of rebelling.
After all, didn't they succumb to collective hysteria in 1994 when, after living through decades of his cult of personality, they were suddenly faced with the death of Kim's father, the founder of the state, "Great Leader" Kim Il Sung? But the 22.5 million people of this country are not as submissive as they appear to be. In the bitter years of the mid-1990s, when the regime allowed up to three million people to die from malnutrition and weakness, demonstrations repeatedly flared up against the country's bizarre ruler who, with his blow-dried hair and eccentric uniforms, is partial to preaching to his exhausted citizens in so-called spontaneous lectures.
Slogans
against the dictator ("Down with Kim Jong Il") appeared on railroad cars, overpasses
and factory walls. Flyers condemning the dynasty's unbelievable ostentation were
even posted outside the Kumsusan Mausoleum in Pyongyang, where the elder Kim's embalmed body lies in state. In a new, soon-to-be-published book about
North Korea, Jasper Becker, 48, a British author and journalist living in Beijing,
writes that factories, military units, and even entire towns revolted against the leadership in Pyongyang. In conversations with North Korean
refugees, members of the South Korean intelligence service and scientists, Becker
offers a deep, virtually unprecedented look into the secretive country. For example,
Becker obtained details about the biggest labor demonstrations in North Korea's history, which took place in 1998 in the industrial city of
Songrim. The protests began on a cold February morning after the public execution
of eight men, all managers at the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Works. Their crime? In
an effort to provide food for the workers and their families, they sold parts of the factory to Chinese businessmen.
Even though many of Songrim's inhabitants were starving at the time, the attempt to circumvent the defunct public
supply system to obtain food was considered sabotage and treason. The deal with wealthy comrades from the
other side of the border was quickly exposed when Chinese grain freighters were seen
openly unloading cargo designated for Songrim at the port of Nampo. When the bodies of the eight functionaries, including two Central
Committee members, fell into the dust, a woman in the crowd yelled: "They did not try to
enrich themselves, but to help the workers. Shooting them is brutal." The courageous
woman was one of the town's most respected citizens. As a nurse working in an elite hospital in Pyongyang, she had even taken care of the country's
leaders. But that didn't protect her. Three soldiers grabbed the woman and shot her
on the spot. The crowd, deeply fearful and horrified, quickly dispersed. A few hours later, however, the factory's employees stopped working. The
peaceful protest was short-lived. The next morning, tanks broke through the factory
gates and mowed down the demonstrators. According to eyewitness reports, hundreds lost their lives. Several days later, dozens of
suspected agitators were shot, and countless so-called counter-revolutionaries and their
families were taken away to labor camps. (See Wolgan
Choson (March 2001) 1998년 8월 중순 北韓
황해제철소 학살 전말 (1/4)
for a detailed account of the incident in Korean)
This was apparently not an isolated incident.
Resentment against Kim is deeply entrenched in the population. Even a few of Kim's 450 hand-picked bodyguards, referred to as the "2-16 Unit," in honor
of the dictator's birthday, apparently attempted to shoot their boss in the mid-1990s. Generals pushing for economic reforms planned a coup in 1992. Their leaders included the vice-commander of an army unit in Hamhung and deputy general staff commander An
Jong Ho. Both were exposed and executed; their cohorts managed to escape to Russia. In the bleak northern
industrial city of Chongjin, several officers attempted to take control of the port
and rocket bases in 1995, as well as to convince other military units to join them
and march on Pyongyang. Other members of the military plotted to fire a shell at Kim's platform during a military parade in the capital. A military
resistance group calling itself "The Supreme Council of National Salvation" threw flyers from trains and trucks, reading: "We
appeal to the soldiers of the People's Army and to the people to join us in our fight." The
omnipresent state security service exposed the plots. Kim himself has now constructed
a protective wall around himself. He constantly moves from one residence to another, and his houses in Pyongyang are connected by a system of
tunnels. An elite unit of 100,000 soldiers dedicated to Kim exists solely to protect
him against conspiracies.
The uprisings happened at a time when even the privileged military was suffering and soldiers were starving in
their barracks. During the 1990s, soldiers maraudered throughout the country, looking for food. Most factories
were shut down, the power was only on for a few hours each day, if at all, and water no longer flowed from
faucets. The situation was not solely attributable to droughts, as the government
attempted to convince its subjects. The Kim dynasty had taken the country to the brink of ruin, because it refused to loosen the reins on its calcified
planned economy and allow the people to farm small private lots. It was not until 1994, when the elite began to
feel the effects of this mistake, that Kim asked for foreign aid. The famine did not begin in the early nineties, as
is commonly assumed, but much earlier. An agricultural expert who fled the country began discovering the first
signs of famine in 1987. But in a North Korea dominated by the cult of personality, no one dared inform old Kim
Il Sung about the situation. By the time the "Great Leader" became aware of the problem, it was already too late.
As Becker discovered, a serious
disagreement between father and son must have occurred during this period. The patriarch
was furious because his son had kept the economy crisis concealed from him for so long. Kim
junior apparently opposed his father's plan to reform the economy based on the Chinese model, and to seek
reconciliation with his South Korean compatriots. When Kim Il Sung died of heart failure in his villa on July
8, 1994, things may not have entirely above-board. Apparently, his son forbade doctors from entering his father's
room for a long period of time. Two of the five helicopters that were to take the corpse and the dead man's
entourage to Pyongyang crashed, killing the doctors and bodyguards on board. Other
functionaries later disappeared without a trace.
While the North Koreans starved and the country descended ever more deeply into poverty, the younger Kim
built at least ten palaces, complete with golf courses, stables and movie theatres. His garages are filled with
luxury cars. The CIA estimates the family's wealth at four billion dollars, part of
which is deposited in Swiss bank accounts.
Astonishing details about the lifestyle of the current president have now come to light. In the 1980s, he launched
the "Project to Guarantee the Longevity of the Great and the Dear Leader." What this means, specifically, is that
about 2,000 young women serve the leadership in "satisfaction teams" (sexual service) and "happiness teams"
(massage). Kim himself selected Ko Yong Hi, a dancer, as his life partner, even though
he was already married at the time and also had a mistress. Ko bore him two sons
and was given the honorary titles "Great Wife" and "Beloved Mother." She has long since died, supposedly of cancer. One of her sons may carry on the
dynasty.
by Erich Weingartner, Senior Editor, CanKor, 22 October 2004
The
1993 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report argued
that traditional notions of security are inadequate to address modern realities:
“The
concept of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to
a much greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to
security through human development, from territorial security to food,
employment and environmental security.” [Human
Development Report 1993: People’s Participation, New York, United
Nations Development Programme.]
The
1994 Human Development Report, which launched the term “human security” as a
major international issue, subdivided the concept into seven categories:
economic security, food security, health security, environmental security,
personal security, common security, and political security. [Human
Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security, New York,
United Nations Development Programme.]
One
problem with the term human security is that the way it has come to be used –
at least in Europe and North America – concentrates too much on the personal
security of the individual. And this individual security can sometimes be at
odds with the wellbeing of groups or of society at large.
Another
problem with human security is the difficulty experienced in operationalizing
the concept, especially when it comes to international diplomacy, where national
security concerns usually overshadow human security concerns.
The
third difficulty is with the concept of security itself. Is it really possible
for us to achieve security? Does striving for security not inevitably lead to
disappointment? Helen Keller has been quoted as saying that “security is
mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature, nor do the children of men
as a whole experience it.”
The
topic that has been assigned to me is “Common Wellbeing through
Cooperation”. Common wellbeing may be seen as a more inclusive concept than
human security, taking into account the various needs that individuals, groups
and societies as a whole experience. We may never achieve security, but we can
strive to increase the wellbeing of all. The biblical term “shalom” may best
describe such a state. Shalom means “peace,” not merely in the sense of the
absence of war, but in the sense of living within an atmosphere of justice and
wellbeing, thereby giving human communities the opportunity collectively to
reduce insecurities to tolerable, liveable, even enjoyable levels.
In
addition to being inclusive, common wellbeing is also communal. Common wellbeing
is interactive. When we look to the Korean peninsula, for example, six decades
of division have surely taught us that neither side can feel secure as long as
the other side feels insecure. As long as either side feels threatened, it will
seek to secure itself through the force of arms. And that will be enough to make
the other side feel threatened. And since any conflict on the Korean peninsula
immediately affects Korea’s neighbours, the entire region becomes insecure.
That
is exactly the condition in which we find ourselves today, and why the topic of
this conference is so relevant. The Korean Peninsula has been the pivot of
conflict in this region for more than a century. What has been lacking is
common, inclusive wellbeing. And yet, if peace could be achieved on the Korean
Peninsula, it has the potential of becoming a pivot for peace in the entire
region. This is possible only through the achievement of common wellbeing.
Most
people believe that regional insecurity in North East Asia is the result of an
aggressive North Korea. But that is reversing cause and effect. It is North
Korea’s perception of insecurity that lies at the heart of today’s dangerous
conflict. As long as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea feels under
threat of survival, the entire region will remain unsafe.
The
DPRK regime’s perception that possession of nuclear weapons can guarantee
security is fundamentally flawed. Yet in the absence of a regional security
framework, the surrounding states
[South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the USA] are unable or unwilling to
provide the DPRK with security guarantees.
Insecurity
is a symptom of the lack of wellbeing. And since individual wellbeing depends on
common wellbeing, since the wellbeing of one side depends on the wellbeing of
the other side, the denial of the benefits of wellbeing to either side of the
divide becomes a major source of conflict.
The
lack of wellbeing in the DPRK stems from a persistent fear of attack by external
enemies, a fear of infiltration and corruption, the fear aroused by economic
sanctions and embargoes, the fear that social solidarity may be undermined by
contact with the outside world, and, among the elite, an unspoken yet genuine
fear of regime collapse. These fears are reinforced by a history of isolation
and a lifelong diet of propaganda.
For
ordinary North Koreans, lack of wellbeing also results from a political and
social system that excludes individual liberties and metes out harsh punishments
for anti-social behaviour or disloyalty to the party and leader. In recent
years, economic hardships have led to a large-scale famine and a steady stream
of migrants, refugees and defectors crossing from North Korea into China and
Russia.
A
long-range vision of common wellbeing would dictate solutions that provide
maximum security and maximum development, with minimum disruption to daily lives
and the least possible personal and social harm.
A redesigned regional security structure incorporating the interests of all
would go a long way to providing an environment conducive to common wellbeing.
But such an arrangement seems only a distant possibility under current
circumstances.
The
possibility of economic development seems to hinge on our assessment of whether
the DPRK is capable of reform. Optimists see a window of opportunity in economic
rapprochement between the two Koreas, and in the DPRK’s first tentative
economic reforms that have gathered momentum during the last two years. Pessimists
see little evidence of serious commitment to reform in North Korea.
The
dilemma for DPRK leader Kim Jong Il is that economic reforms are indispensable
for regime survival, but reforms usually result in unpredictable changes, often
leading to regime instability. This has the consequence that when outside powers
(e.g. USA and Japan) threaten the DPRK with regime instability, they inevitably
frustrate the very reforms that they say they wish to achieve.
Common
wellbeing depends on common commitment to common action for common ends. What we
often fail to appreciate is that common wellbeing always depends on cooperative
rather than adversarial relationships.
How
do we build cooperative relationships? To begin with, we need to realize that
common wellbeing is much too important to be left exclusively to governments.
That is because governments are always constrained by domestic political
realities that are often inimical to international cooperation. Civil society,
especially faith-based organizations, can lead the way in showing how
cooperation helps to build and maintain common wellbeing.
Of
course, that presupposes that civil society organizations practice what they
preach and learn to cooperate with each other – which is unfortunately not
always the case. In recent years we have witnessed a quite acrimonious division
among NGOs between pro-engagement and anti-engagement groups, especially with
regard to the question of how to promote and achieve common wellbeing in the
DPRK. That is precisely why a conference such as this one is so important.
Both
the pro-engagement and the anti-engagement groups claim to have the interests of
the North Korean people at heart. Given this context, the most appropriate
question to ask is which course of action will enhance the common wellbeing of
all the people in the Korean Peninsula? The answer must surely be those
activities with the greatest potential for achieving good, and the lowest risk
of inflicting harm.
I
would like to propose some ideas for cooperative attitudes and actions that
would serve to enhance the common wellbeing of the people of North Korea. None
of the ideas are new, but they will hopefully stimulate our thinking.
1.
Having
just come from a conference that commemorated the 20th anniversary of the
so-called “Tozanso Process,” I have been strongly reminded that it was
churches and civil society groups that gave the stimulus for inter-Korean
cooperation, long before any official rapprochement
took place on the Korean Peninsula. The key to the success of the Tozanso
conference 20 years ago was the recognition that it is Koreans themselves who
must achieve peace and reunification in Korea. Outsiders, no matter how
benevolent, cannot enforce reconciliation. Under the Tozanso Process, churches
and other organizations committed themselves to pursue activities in cooperation
with both North and South Koreans. At a time when South Koreans were forbidden
to be in touch with North Koreans, this meant, for example, that visitors to
North Korea were encouraged to visit South Korea as well, in order to report on
the results of their encounters in the DPRK.
2.
There is a need for much more cooperation among the various sectors that
have engaged with the DPRK in recent years. At the national level here in Korea,
the Korea Peace Forum already serves that function, engaging in dialogue with
governments, humanitarian agencies, academics, NGOs, and the business community.
Perhaps it is necessary to create an international advisory group representing
these same sectors, who could share information, initiate research, maintain
contact with the six-party frontline states, and with other countries that have
diplomatic relations with the DPRK, especially those with representatives on the
ground in Pyongyang.
3.
It is a mistake to believe that problems in North Korea can be solved
without reference to cooperation on the Korean Peninsula as a whole. When
engaging in peace, humanitarian and development efforts for North Korea,
religious communities and civil society groups often seek cooperation with each
other, viewing the DPRK as the object of their activities. However, in order to
build a truly common wellbeing, it is necessary to continue to seek cooperation
with North Koreans themselves, despite the difficulties this entails.
4.
Since reliable information on the DPRK is so difficult to find, yet so
crucial in efforts for peace, there is a need for increased capacity of
information gathering and information sharing. The Korea Peace Forum has begun
an excellent information service that I hope everyone here is subscribed to. In
Canada we have been producing the weekly CanKor information service for the last
four years. Originally meant only for Canadian institutions, CanKor is now read
worldwide, with a web site (www.CanKor.ca) containing additional documentation,
information, and intelligence from various sources, as well as links to other
DPRK-related sites. Both the KPF and CanKor are involved in a new internet-based
“Global Collaborative,” initiated by the Nautilus Institute. We are also in
the process of creating a “virtual think-tank on peace and security in
Korea” (VTK), which will draw on the expertise of academics, civil servants
and practitioners the world over to generate ideas for effective engagement, and
to advise government, business and civil society on dangers and opportunities in
the unfolding drama on the Korean Peninsula.
5.
Humanitarian assistance continues to be vitally important, but should be
delivered with the larger perspective of improving food security, in order to
move from short-term emergency assistance to long-term development assistance.
Significant changes need to be made in the way agriculture is managed in the
DPRK, for example sustainable cropping systems and crop rotations, the planting
of green manure crops, supplemental irrigation, and the use of appropriate
technology such as portable, energy-efficient harvesting machinery.
6.
The current doctrine of Western countries has been that the withdrawal of
development assistance is a good way to press the DPRK into compliance on the
nuclear weapons issue. This is nonsense, serving only to increase the hardships
of ordinary Koreans. There is an urgent need to support environmental planning
and sustainable development in the DPRK. [As clearly documented in the “DPRK
State of the Environment Report,” assembled by DPR Korea officials from 20
different government and academic agencies, in cooperation with the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), and published 27 August 2004. See UNEP press release reprinted
in CanKor #177.] Reforestation is urgently needed, for example, to address the
need for fuel wood, windbreaks, and soil and water conservation. Religious
communities have continued to provide small-scale development assistance and
should increase efforts in that direction. As has been demonstrated by the
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), an organization that has worked on
just four farms over a sustained period of several years, small changes in a
limited number of farms can produce significant results, with a reach far beyond
the primary location.
7.
There is an urgent need to create a scholarship fund to allow DPRK
students to study abroad. The DPRK has expressed willingness to send students to
other countries for English language studies, as well as a variety of other
subjects, ranging from forestry to aquaculture, from mineralogy and mining to
economics and management, from engineering to medicine. There are many civil
society organizations in countries like Canada that would be willing to receive
these students, but lack the funds to finance them.
8.
We should encourage more education in the DPRK about life in other
countries. A delegation of the Canada-DPR Korea Association recently brought
films of the National Film Board of Canada for viewing in Pyongyang. The
Canadian embassy in Beijing has sent a shipment of Canadian books to the Grand
People’s Study House in Pyongyang. The Goethe Institute has opened a
multimedia library in Pyongyang and held a film festival featuring German films
in 2003.
9.
It is important to continue to challenge our North Korean colleagues to
broaden their experience, perspectives and imagination. This will require a more
effective transfer of ideas in a variety of fields. In fact, the topics that can
be approached are very wide-ranging, and may include sensitive issues, as long
as these are dealt with cooperatively, rather than aggressively. An example is
the issue of human rights. Up until this year, there has been the beginning of a
human rights dialogue with the DPRK. In June 2001, five DPRK officials attended
human rights education seminars in Sweden. [Five North Koreans attended a
seminar at the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
in Lund, Sweden, on 11-12 June 2001. They then traveled to Brussels, Belgium,
where they held discussions with EU officials. See “DPRK to Study Human Rights
In Europe,” The Associated Press, 29 May 2001, reprinted in CanKor #42.] This
was followed by other dialogues at the level of the European Union. All dialogue
on human rights was abruptly ended by the passing of a North Korean human rights
resolution at the UN Commission of Human Rights in 2003 and again earlier this
year, followed by the passing of a North Korean human rights act by the US
Congress, signed into law by US President George Bush several two days ago.
Human rights are now perceived by North Korea as yet another weapon in the
arsenal of aggression.
10.
As a Canadian (especially after the invasion by 44 North Korean asylum
seekers into the Canadian Embassy in Beijing at the end of September), I have a
particular interest in finding a more rational way of dealing with North Korean
migrants/refugees/defectors in China, mindful of the stresses already at play in
the China-DPRK relationship. A number of proposals have been put forward which
appropriate interlocutors may wish to discuss with Chinese authorities. These
include, for example: permission for reputable NGOs who provide social
assistance to North Koreans in China to operate more freely, provision of an
orderly means for Koreans to apply for emigration to embassies and consulates in
China, and the granting of assistance to transport eligible persons to third
countries. [This follows proposals put forward by Amnesty International. See
“Human Rights in North Korea, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Testimony by T. Kumar,
Advocacy Director for Asia and The Pacific,” Amnesty International USA, 4
November 2003, p. 6.]
11.
People-to-people contacts and exchanges are a valuable contribution to
the building of trust and confidence, and the creation of a favourable
atmosphere for dialogue. In 2001, Canadian women hosted a conference that
included women from both parts of Korea, as well as from China, Japan, and the
USA. The women's committee of the Canada-DPR Korea Association held a follow-up
conference in May 2004 on the theme "Canadian Women and Peace-building in
Korea." Unfortunately, North Korean women were prevented from attending the
latter conference because of the current international atmosphere.
12.
The ROK has engaged in a variety of cultural and sporting exchanges with
the DPRK. The DPRK has issued an open invitation for countries to send artists
and musicians to its annual Spring Arts Festival in Pyongyang. Promoting
cultural, academic, artistic, musical, sporting, and circus exchanges is an
excellent way to broaden and deepen cooperation with North Korea on a
non-political, emotionally satisfying level. [A North Korean circus troupe
composed of 125 artists toured Europe from October 2002 to January 2003.
Canadian artist Irwin Oostindie is currently touring Canada with an exhibition
“Axis to Grind: Inside North Korea,” with photographic, film and digital
artwork representations of DPRK.]
13.
The DPRK has expressed an interest in establishing tourism and trade
connections with other countries. The ROK is probably further advanced in this
respect than most countries. Unfortunately, considerable structural and legal
problems continue to hamper normal business relations. The basic point, however,
is that positive economic and trade relations are a powerful motivator for
tension reduction and stable, peaceful cooperation.
The purpose of all these activities is to open as many doors and windows into and out of the DPRK as possible—not just to expose North Koreans to the outside world, but to provide the basis of genuine cooperation in the pursuit of a common future of wellbeing on the Korean Peninsula and in the East Asian region as a whole. In time, mutually beneficial interactions may alter perceptions of threat, and leave room for the hope that common wellbeing is an achievable objective in the context of a durable, cooperative peace on the Korean Peninsula.
