THE DPRK REPORT, No. 20 (September-October 1999)

The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Center for Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Moscow, Russia).  It is written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the CNS.

1.  Differing U.S./Russian Views about the DPRK

U.S. and Russian political circles and the general public share a common concern about peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.  They also share some of the same worries in regards to Pyongyang's nuclear,
missile, and conventional weapons programs.   Nevertheless, there are considerable differences in the perceptions of U.S. and Russian elites, as well as of their general publics, regarding North Korea and its
domestic and foreign policies.

According to a recent poll conducted by a prestigious Russian research organization, none of the respondents across the Russian Federation identified North Korea as a threat to Russian security.  Instead, 82
percent named Islamic extremists, 40 percent named the United States, and 26 percent China.  Not surprisingly, the attempts of some U.S. leaders to solicit Russian cooperation in tackling the "North Korean threat" are simply not understood by the majority of Russian citizens.

Russians also do not support the idea that the DPRK is, in general, an "aggressive" state capable of threatening others, such as South Korea, Japan, or certainly the United States.  In fact, most Russians find it
absurd to talk about the "dangers" posed by North Korean missiles to the United States.  As both Russian experts and ordinary people observe, judging by the comparative number of missiles at the disposal of
Washington and Pyongyang, the former is much more dangerous to the latter than visa versa.

A common belief in Russia is that the DPRK is a militarily weak state that faces overwhelmingly powerful opponents and must fear for own survival.  All its efforts are viewed as defensive in nature and not
adequate to the threats it faces.  Indeed, some Russians hold the view that Washington and its allies pose a real threat to the DPRK and that "it is only a matter of time before they attack North Korea as they
attacked Yugoslavia earlier this year."

In any event, Russians argue, Kim Jong Il's regime should not be pushed into a corner, because such policies will leave it with no other choice but to resort to extreme measures (such as resuming its development of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles).

Among certain Russian nationalist and communist political circles, it is also common to find the opinion that the stronger the DPRK is, the better it will be for Russia.  Some of these politicians go as far as welcoming
a nuclear North Korea as a potential Russian ally in the 21st century against the threat of "American domination."  A growing sympathy towards North Korea's rejection of Washington's "hegemonic policies" can be detected even among mainstream Russian elites today.

At the same time, the Russian government realizes that North Korean missiles are serving as an impetus for U.S. plans to construct a national missile defense, which is strongly opposed by Moscow.  The Russian
government is equally aware that North Korea's nuclear ambitions could provoke an arms race in Northeast Asia and severely destabilize the region.  For these reasons, Moscow's concerns regarding North Korean
military preparations are in certain respects comparable to U.S. concerns.  Russia is trying to discourage Pyongyang from pursuing its nuclear and missile ambitions.

2.  Russian Appraisals of the Perry Report

Russian government officials and experts have responded positively to former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry's review of U.S. policy towards the DPRK.  However, Russians doubt that the new policy will be implemented successfully.  A number of reasons are advanced in support of such pessimism:

* The distrust of U.S. leaders towards the DPRK runs too deep to allow for a fundamental redirection of U.S. policies vis-à-vis Pyongyang.

* The forthcoming U.S. presidential elections will further complicate the process of opening up to the DPRK to the outside.  Republicans will attack the "softness" of the Democratic administration, while Democrats
will try to avoid losing election points for their alleged failure to "tame" the North.

* The collapse of the new initiative is almost inevitable, in the view of many Russians, since Pyongyang, in all probability, will continue its missile program and maybe even its nuclear program in one form or
another.   Russian analysts believe that-from Pyongyang's perspective-it is simply too risky for such a desperately weak regime to lose the few deterrents it has against a range of more powerful opponents, whose
ultimate goal remains unchanged: the dismantlement of the North Korean communist regime.

* There will also be continuing clashes between the North and the United States concerning human rights issues and inevitable attempts by outsiders to encourage democratic and market reforms in the DPRK.

* Finally, the totalitarian regime, faced with grave domestic constraints, will be inclined to preserve tensions with the outside world as a lighting rod for the local populace and as an effective method for keeping its people under control.

3.  The Mood in the North Korean Armed Forces

Conversations by Russian analysts with representatives of the North Korean armed forces reveal a very complicated state of mind.  The officers remain unquestionably loyal to Kim Jong Il, considering him to
be the only leader capable of governing the nation in these difficult times.  Not surprisingly, the soldiers express very negative views about the United States, firmly believing that sooner or later the Americans
will try to take over the DPRK.  In this connection, the North Korean military considers it necessary to keep its ballistic missile development program alive.  Its representatives also favor continuation of at least
laboratory-level research in the nuclear field.  Reforms and opening of the country to the outside world, especially to South Korean and U.S. influence, are not popular within the DPRK's armed forces.

At the same time, North Korean officers complain bitterly about the dismal economic and social conditions in the country, including the shortage of weapons and ammunition in the armed forces.  Some of them
admit that the country has never been in such a desperate situation. According to their analysis, these conditions have been caused by incompetent economic policies followed by the top leadership, a lack of
discipline in society, and the laziness of the workforce.  The way out, they argue, is a combination of simultaneously "tightening the screws" and relaxing living and labor regulations, while also increasing the
supply of weapons.

The above-mentioned conversations lead to an obvious conclusion: the North Korean military is deeply confused and lacks a clear understanding of what needs to be done both domestically and externally to overcome the DPRK's chronic and deepening economic crisis.   Whether North Korea's political leaders have a better understanding of the nature of the country's problems and a clearer approach regarding the way out, remains to be seen.  Alternatively, they may try to follow the contradictory advice of the military and suffer the likely consequences.