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THE SOVIET FACTION IN THE DPRK, 1945-1955
by Dr Andrei N. Lankov, The Australian National University
A very important role in the formation of the North Korean state and its early development was played by numerous Soviet Koreans -- Soviet citizens of Korean extraction. They were sent to North Korea by the Soviet authorities and occupied various leading positions during the period 1945-60. This paper will consider the circumstances of their arrival in North Korea, their activities in 1945-50, and the emergence of the so-called Soviet faction in the North Korean leadership. The present study is based on some materials which the author discovered in the Soviet archives (above all, the former Central Committee archive), as well interviews with several key Soviet Koreans themselves.
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The Soviet Koreans were one of the forces which helped Kim Il Song take power in the 1940s. They also made a major contribution toward the crystallization of the Stalinist regime in North Korea. During the first decade after the official establishment of the DPRK in 1948, Soviet Koreans had played an important role in the country's administration and had formed a so called Soviet faction - one of the four main political groupings in the North Korean leadership.
Russia is a multinational state which has had a Korean community for almost 130 years. The immigration of the Koreans to the Russian Far East began in the late 1860s, and by the 1890s it had became a significant phenomena. By the Communist Revolution of 1917, there were about 100 thousands ethnic Koreans residing in the Russian Far East.
After the Second World War, when the Soviet authorities launched a policy of the "communisation" of the Soviet-occupied countries of Eastern Europe, many people of suitable ethnic background were sent to the lands of their (or their ancestors') origin to facilitate the establishment of Communist regimes and ensure better Soviet control over them. However, in no other "communised" country did the Soviet nationals play such a critical role as in Korea.
The specifics of this role was determined first of all by the unique political situation in North Korea after its occupation by the Soviet Army. In Eastern Europe, the occupying Soviet authorities could rely on local Communists whose influence was sometimes quite considerable. In North Korea, the Communist movement had been weak, and thus the Soviet authorities had to create a foundation for the regime they wanted to see in North Korea. Hence, the special role of the Soviet faction, as well as other Koreans who came from abroad.
Depending on time and the circumstances of their arrival in Korea, the Soviet Koreans can be generally divided into four 'waves'. The first wave consisted of those who had been sent to Korea by the Soviet intelligence agencies and/or the Comintern before Liberation, in the 1920s, 30s and early 40s. The second 'wave' included those who came to Korea after Liberation, in 1945-1946, as Soviet Army personnel. The third wave was consisted of those who were sent to Korea in 1946-1948 as teachers and civilian advisers. The second and the third waves were by far the most numerous and important. Irrespective of the circumstances of their arrival and their initial plans, these Soviet Koreans soon found themselves working in North Korean institutions. The final fourth 'wave' was politically the least important: it consisted of the Soviet citizens of Korean origin who came to North Korea mainly for personal reasons during and after the Korean war { *1}.
The first group - Soviet Koreans who had come to the country before Liberation - was not numerous. Since the mid-1920s, the Soviet intelligence services and Comintern agencies began to dispatch Soviet Koreans to instigate underground operations in Korea. It was not difficult to find suitable operatives. The vast majority of Russian Koreans supported the 1917 Communist revolution, and during the Civil War many ethnic Koreans had joined the Red Army and Communist guerrilla units. Among Koreans living in the Far East, in the 1920s there were many party and Communist youth (komsomol) activists who dreamed of the 'romance' of underground activity in the land of their ancestors.
Since the mid-1920s, sending Soviet Koreans to do underground work in Korea and Manchuria became a common practice of the Comintern. Their tasks were to propagate Communist ideas and to establish connections with the local Communist underground. Although the details of their activities will be known only after the archives of the Comintern, as well as that of the intelligence and security services are opened, it is clear that during more than two decades quite a considerable number of people were sent to Korea by Moscow. Most of these died or were killed with only a handful surviving until 1945.
Among these survivors, one must mention Pak Cho:ng-ae and Kim Yong-bo:m, the best known members of this 'first wave'. The couple played an important role in the post-war developments in the DPRK. Pak Cho:ng-ae (Vera Tsoi) graduated from a teachers' 'tehnikum' (a sort of junior college in the USSR) in Voroshilov (now Ussuriisk) in the Soviet Far East and went to Moscow to continue her education {*2}. There she was admitted into one of the Comintern's schools and after some training was sent to Korea together with Kim Yong-bo:m (probably, in 1931) {*3}. It is also probable, Pak Ch'ang-ok, the future leader of the Soviet faction, had also been sent to Korea just before Liberation {*4}.
In 1937, all Soviet Koreans were forcibly deported from the lands in the Far East where they had lived since the 1870s and moved to Central Asia. The official explanation for this action was that Koreans were unreliable, being ethnic siblings of the Japanese subjects in Korean Peninsula and, hence, were not to be allowed to live near the border with Japanese-controlled Manchuria. On their new place of residence, they were subjected to various restrictions, including, for example, on their freedom of movement. It was the first case in Soviet history when an entire ethnic group was subjected to punishment for alleged (or potential) collaboration with the enemy, and when ethnicity was seen as a sufficient reason for persecution. At the same time, the Soviet Korean intellectual and political elite was subjected to purges -- quite severe even by the brutal Soviet standards of 1937. Around the same time, Comintern agents ceased being sent to Korea. Instead, the training of Soviet Koreans for the purposes of underground work became the prerogative of Soviet intelligence services and the tasks of the agents also had obviously shifted from igniting local Communist movement to more 'conventional' spying.
In 1940, a military intelligence school near Moscow established a special year-long course exclusively for training officers from among Soviet Koreans. In 1942, the graduates of this course numbered six (there is no data as to how many graduated in 1941). These graduates were sent on secret missions to Korea and Manchuria. The most famous of these graduates, Yu So:ng-ch'o:l, later served as the head of operations of the North Korean General Staff {*5}.
When in August 1945 Soviet troops entered the territory of North Korea, they found there only a few former Soviet Koreans, among whom ambitious and energetic Pak Cho:ng-ae was most notable. Later, some other Soviet Koreans, who had earlier worked illegally in the South, also moved to the North, but even then the number of former Soviet agents and Comintern cadres in the DPRK elite remained very small.
The second, and most numerous, wave of the Soviet Koreans in the DPRK consisted of those who came to North Korea during the first year after Liberation as servicemen in the Soviet Army.
After their deportation to Central Asia Soviet Koreans were not normally allowed to serve in the army and were enlisted only in exceptional circumstances. However, these restrictions did not apply to Koreans who in 1937 had lived in regions other than the Soviet Far East, and therefore had avoided deportation.
A few officers of Korean origin served in the Far East in the so-called "7th sections" of the political departments. The 7th sections (or departments) were responsible for propaganda among the soldiers and civilians of the enemy, as well as in Soviet-occupied foreign territory.
The command of the 25th army, which defeated the Japanese forces in North Korea in August 1945, had been preparing to fight in Korea but not to rule the occupied country. Paradoxically, even Soviet officers of Korean origin who were fluent in Korean participated in the war as "ordinary" servicemen, commanding military units, like Cho:ng Sang-jin, a marine captain. In interviews, all participants in the August battles pointed out that there were no interpreters, which at the beginning seriously hampered communication with the local population, particularly with ordinary Koreans who had not mastered Japanese { *6}. The only way to fix this problem was to get Korean speakers from the Soviet Union.
In late August, a first group of Soviet Koreans, around 12 people, was sent to Pyongyang and out at the disposal of the 25th army's political administration. By August 1945, all members of this first group had already served in the Soviet Army, at the Far Eastern Front headquarters. The group was led by major Mikhail Kang and captain O Ki-ch'an. Their main goals were to facilitate the communication between the Soviet military and the locals, to undertake all kinds of translating and interpreting, and, first and foremost, to conduct propaganda activities. Kang and his group launched a Korean language newspaper, the Choson sinmun published by the Soviet military. Among its editors and authors were several Korean men of letters, including Cho Ki-ch'o:n and Cho:n Tong-hyo:k {*7}.
'Kang's group', often called "The Soviet Army press company", consisted of personnel from the 7th (special propaganda = psychological warfare) department, and in theory was responsible only for translating and publishing propaganda materials. However, in a situation when the majority of Soviet officers and generals did not know much about Korea, ethnic Korean servicemen seldom limited themselves to psychological operations and propaganda. They also acted as consultants who exercised a significant influence over decision making. Not surprisingly, the first years of the DPRK's existence were later called by Ho: Un-bae the "rule of the Soviet interpreters" {*8}.
Soon, in September and October, the first group was joined by other Soviet Koreans, who also had served in the army as officers: Cho:ng Hak-jun, Ch'oe Chong-hak, Ch'oe Hu:ng-guk, Cho:ng Sang-jin, and Valentin Ch'oe (Tsoi) {*9}. In September 1945, it became clear that the needs of the Soviet military required many more Korean-speaking interpreters and consultants than were at the time available in the entire Soviet armed forces. Thus the military undertook a rational step: it was decided to tap into a natural reservoir of linguistic and other Korea-related expertise which was to be found in the large Korean community in Soviet Central Asia. In autumn, 1945 the military started to enlist into the army some of these Koreans from Central Asia.
In September-October 1945, groups were selected in Central Asia by officers from Moscow and the representatives of the 25th army. Particular attention was paid to those ethnic Koreans who had a good education and were considered "politically and morally reliable" - teachers and other professionals, as well as party and state cadres of middle and low rank who had managed somehow to survive 1937. Most of those enlisted were rank-and-file, while few, A.I. Hegai and Kang Sang-ho among them, had been reserve officers and got appropriate ranks once drafted {*10}.
A contemporary document (a memo sent by a Soviet officer from Korea to the Central Committee in 1946) states that the Soviet Koreans who arrived in North Korea in September-November, 1945, numbered 128 {*11}. It is not clear, however, if the Koreans who had arrived earlier, together with Major Kang, are included into this number -- probably not, since the memo refer to "a group of Soviet Koreans who had been sent to North Korea from Central Asia in September-November 1945", and all those whom it mentions by name had been drafted into the Army after August. Thus we can estimate that in North Korea by early 1946 there probably were already some 140-150 Soviet Koreans.
In the spring of 1946 the DPRK power structure was gradually emerging. However, the lack of qualified cadres was quite palpable. The Soviet authorities badly needed people who had organisational skills and a good education, who could explain to Koreans the Soviet political idiom and implement the Soviet models, while being at the same time "politically reliable" and loyal to the USSR. This need was felt by the North Korean Communists themselves: in April 1946 Kim Il Song himself began to petition the Soviet authorities to send more Soviet Koreans to North Korea {*12}. Starting in 1946, Soviet Koreans were transferred from the Soviet Army to local administrative organs. Thus, the Soviet authorities began to "import" into North Korea cadres to service the emerging regime. These Soviet Koreans retained Soviet citizenship and until 1948 were also technically considered servicemen of the Soviet Army {*13}.
Thus, from the spring and the summer of 1946, the enlistment of Soviet Koreans was increasingly dictated not by the needs of the Soviet Army but that of the emerging North Korean institutions. In addition, an important shift in recruiting happenned around summer, 1946. Prior to this date, the Soviet Koreans wer sent to the North as military personnel, after being drafted to the army. Since then Soviet civilian bodies (as usual, supervised by the party) became increasingly involved in the recruitment which had previously been before conducted exclusively by the military. From late 1946 onwards the decisions to send more Soviet Koreans to Pyongyang were made by the Party Central Committee, although the requests of the military authorities were taken into consideration (it is also possible that for a while the military kept recruiting Soviet Koreans independently, alongside with civilian bodies). In late 1946, the civilian 'third wave' of Soviet Koreans began to arrive in the North. These latest arrivals were mostly teachers and other civilian specialists, who had been recruited by party institutions, rather than through enlistment in the army. In reality the difference between those who arrived as servicemen and their civilian colleagues was not too great, since both performed basically the same tasks.
Initially the Soviet government considered that the primary mission of the new groups would be to teach Russian to the Koreans. On 11 December 1946, the Soviet Politburo made a decision to organise, from 1 January 1947, the 6-month courses at the pedagogical institutes in Alma-Ata and Tashkent for 100 students (50 in each institute). The purpose was to train teachers of Russian for the schools and colleges of North Korea. Students were supposed to be college-educated Koreans living in the Kazakh and Uzbek Soviet Republics {*14}.
This decision had important consequences. Future teachers were selected from Central Asia in late 1946 and sent to the "special teachers' courses" and, after their training, to North Korea. According to Pak Pyo:ng-yul, who had been a student of one of these courses, the instruction was conducted under the dual control of party and military bodies. Thus we can surmise that the military still was much involved in the process {*15}. On 10 October 1946, the Soviet Politburo sent 37 Soviet Koreans to Korea (it was the so called 'group of 37'). On 27 October 1947, the Soviet Politburo passed a decision to send to the DPRK 34 teachers of Russian (together with their with families -- 107 persons). On 2 March 1948, a similar decision was made by the Politburo, and 22 people (63, including family members) went to North Korea. {*16}. There is reason to believe that the Politburo did not make any other decisions on this matter, so we can roughly estimate that the number of civilians dispatched to North Korea to be about 100, excluding family members.
In the first months after their arrival, these people indeed worked in North Korean schools and, more often, colleges. However, the acute shortage of qualified personnel and educated people in general was so desperate that a majority of them were soon transferred to North Korean party and state agencies. Thus, Nam Il, formerly the dean of Samarkand pedagogical institute in Uzbekistan, who came to Korea with the "group of 37", became the deputy head of the Education Bureau of the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea (that is, in fact, the deputy minister for education). During the Korean war he was the chief of the General Staff and eventually replaced disgraced Pak Ho:n-yo:ng as the DPRK's Foreign Minister. Pak Pyo:ng-yul, who also came to Korea in 1947 as a teacher, soon found himself as the head of the Kangdong political school, the main training centre for South Korean guerrillas and underground activists {*17}. Likewise their military predecessors, the civilians of the 'third wave' had technically remained Soviet citizens until the mid-1950s.
In late December 1948, the last Soviet troops were withdrawn from North Korea. The Korean government compiled a list of those Soviet Koreans from the Soviet military who had been offered the opportunity to remain in the state, party, or military structures of North Korea. Shortly before the Soviet troops left the country, colonel A.M. Ignatiev, who was one of the key figures in implementing Soviet policy in North Korea, had assembled ethnic Korean military personnel and offered those whose names were included on this list the choice of whether to remain in North Korea or return to the USSR. Although some returned with the Soviet Army, the majority preferred to stay {*18}. It is not known if the civilians had been ever offered this same choice.
Only after the relevant archival documents become available will it be possible to establish just how many Soviet Koreans were sent to work in the DPRK. Ho: Un-bae (writing under the pseudonym Lim Un), reports that in January 1949 there were 428 Soviet Koreans in Pyongyang. He does not disclose his sources which is understandable since the book was written in the Soviet Union in the 1970s, when such a research often amounted to a virtual covert act {*19}. Obviously, Lim Un's figure can be checked only when new documents become available, but, in the interim, it looks very plausible. If we combine the four basic available figures, three of which have been mentioned above: 140 Soviet servicemen of Korean origin, 100 civilian teachers and advisers, 110 family members of the latter and an unknown number of the servicemen's families -- presumably around 100-150, and also take into consideration that some Koreans left with the Soviet troops in 1948 or were recalled by Moscow, we arrive at roughly same figure � 400-450. However, less than half of this number were active politicians and specialists, while a majority consisted of their children and/or spouses.
After 1948, the Soviet government did not send Soviet Koreans to North Korea or, at least, this practice was no longer common.
It is also necessary to mention that the 'cadre traffic' between the USSR and North Korea was not one-directional. Some Soviet Koreans were recalled to the USSR. In most cases, the recall was the punishment for 'indecent behaviour' which back at the time could include anything from corruption to critical remarks about Stalin to illicit love affairs. For example, on 16 May, 1951 the Soviet Politburo made a special decision to recall to the USSR nine Soviet Koreans, seven of whom had 'misbehaved in Korea' (a further investigation was deemed necessary), and two of whom were simply 'of no use' -- while not particularly complimentary, nevertheless a less menacing wording {*20}. Similar incidents had occurred earlier as well (for example, V.V. Kovyzhenko casually mentioned this fact in his 1948 memorandum) {*21}. These recalls were not always necessarily a result of some misconduct. In some cases the Soviet Koreans themselves petitioned for permission to leave. After 1956, the number of people who opted to leave was to increase greatly under mounting pressure, but even earlier, in 1953-1955 some people already asked for a permission to leave and were granted it. Personally, the author is aware of two such cases (Ch'oe Pyo-do:k and Kim Ch'an, who both left after the death of A.I.Hegai), but there undoubtedly may have been more examples.
The last or 'fourth wave' of Soviet Koreans did not leave any significant impact on the country's history. This 'wave' included few people who arrived during or after the Korean war. Among the Soviet technical specialists who participated in the post-war reconstruction of the North Korean economy in the mid-1950s, there were some ethnic Koreans, but most of them remained there only a few years and left when their contracts expired. These specialists by-and-large did not take any part in the political life of the country. Even if they wished to stay permanently in Korea, they were not welcomed any more: after the Korean War the Soviet Koreans were increasingly a nuisance to Kim Il Song. A few female Soviet Koreans married North Korean students who had studied in the USSR. They accompanied their husbands to the DPRK. However, these women did not take an active part in Korean public life. In the late 1950s, almost all of them were forced out of North Korea as the Soviet-North Korean relations worsened.
Prior to their arrival to the DPRK, most Soviet Koreans had worked as school teachers or education officials. Besides teachers, the Soviet faction also included some party and state cadres, mostly from the Posiiet region, all lucky survivors of the 1937 purge -- such as Ho: Ka-i (A.I.Hegai), Kang Sang-ho, and Kim Ch'an. There were also former military officers, spies and Comintern agents, such as Ch'oe P'yo-do:k, O Ki-ch'an, Yu So:ng-ch'o:l, Pak Cho:ng-ae, and Pak Ch'ang-ok. On the whole, teachers prevailed, particularly at the low and middle levels. It is noteworthy that among the Soviet Koreans in the DPRK there were almost no engineers and scientists. Among those who came from Central Asia, there were also former workers from collective farms, mainly tractor drivers (the best educated of peasantry) and low-ranking farm managers. Thus, An Tong-su, a tank officer whose unit was first to enter Seoul during the Korean war, had earlier been a tractor driver in the Chirchik district near Tashkent.
Many, if not most, members of the Soviet faction had known each other well before their arrival in North Korea: some of them had worked together in the Soviet, party, or komsomol (Communist youth) structures in the Far East before 1937, some occasionally met at various conferences of teachers often conducted in the USSR. However, on the whole, the Soviet faction was not as cohesive as the Yanan or Guerrilla factions since the Soviet Koreans did not have the common experience of working or fighting together for many years as a team.
The most influential leader of the Soviet grouping was Ho: Ka-i (A.I. Hegai, 1908-1953), who prior to 1937 had been one of the most notable party cadres of Korean origin in the Far East. His house was a meeting place for more prominent Soviet Koreans {*22}. After his removal and death, the role of the leader of the Soviet Koreans was assumed, or rather claimed, by Pak Ch'ang-ok, a former middle-level Soviet party cadre. In Korea, Pak Ch'ang-ok consolidated a substantial career as well: in 1946-56, he had been a member of the Standing Committee (the Politburo) of the Korean Workers' Party, and was even appointed a deputy prime minister for a short time after 1954. However, his authority among the Soviet Koreans as well as his general political influence was much weaker than that of Ho: Ka-i. Pak obviously considered Ho: a rival, and their relations were quite hostile. {*23}. In 1953, virtually on the following day after Ho:'s alleged suicide (or murder?), Pak Ch'ang-ok in a conversation with a Soviet diplomat referred to the recently deceased leader of the Soviet Koreans very negatively {*24}.
Those Soviet Koreans who had experience in administrative work were, soon after their arrival in North Korea, sent to work in the party and state institutions. Often Soviet Koreans were heads of the organisational departments of the party committees or secretaries of the provincial committees. The organisational departments were responsible for promotions and appointments, hence the control over these vital agencies meant a control over the entire Party bureaucratic machine. In August 1946, when the North Korean Workers' Party was officially established, three out of five provincial party organisations were led by Soviet Koreans: South Pyongan province (by Kim Chae-uk), Kangwon province - (by Han Il), and South Hamgyong province (by Kim Yo:l) {*25}. In the first NKWP Central Committee (1946), Soviet Koreans headed three out of 8 departments: the organisational, labour, and youth departments {*26}.
In 1948, when the Soviet faction's influence was at its height, its members accounted for one-fourth of the NKWP Central Committee members and one-third of Standing Committee (the Politburo) members. The Standing Committee at that time included Ho: Ka-i, the head of the tremendously important Central Committee organisational department, Pak Ch'ang-ok, the head of the propaganda department, Kim Chae-uk, the chairman of the South P'yongan provincial committee of the NKWP {*27}, and Ki So:k-pok, the editor of the official party newspaper, Nodong sinmun. The political prevalence of the Soviet faction was emphasised by the fact that soon after the unification of the Workers parties of the South and the North, A.I. Hegai, the leader of the Soviet Koreans, became the first secretary of the united KWP while Kim Il Song himself was Party's chairman.
By contrast, the role of the Soviet Koreans in the establishment of the North Korean armed forces was modest at best. The main reason was the lack of high-ranking military officers of Korean origin in the Soviet Army: most of such officers had perished in the purge of 1937-38. Hence those Soviet Koreans who survived to serve in the North Korean army were usually engaged in political indoctrination or some technical or administrative work. One of the few exceptions was Ch'oe P'yo-do:k, a Soviet colonel and former commander of the Saratov armour officers school, who first came to North Korea as a Soviet military adviser, but soon, under the influence of his friend and son-in-law Ho: Ka-i (A.I.Hegai), transferred into the Korean army {*28}. Many former staff members of the Soviet military intelligence, including Yu So:ng-ch'o:l, Pak Kil-nam, and Kim Pong-yul, also joined the North Korean military. On the other hand, Soviet Koreans were numerous among political officers (commissars). At different times, the political administration of the North Korean army was headed by Kim Chae-uk and Ch'oe Chong-hak, while many others worked as political officers at the division, corps, and army levels. With the beginning of the war, the situation changed and many Soviet Koreans were enlisted in the army. However, even during the war, a majority of the Soviet Koreans was still engaged in political indoctrination and technical work.
By contrast to the military, the Soviet Korean contribution towards the establishment of the North Korean police and security institutions was quite substantial. From the beginning, the North Korean political police was run by Pang Hak-se who arrived in North Korea in 1947. {*29} Under the guidance of Soviet advisers, Pang created North Korean repressive and security machine virtually from scratch. Many Soviet Koreans occupied positions as officials in the Ministry of the Interior, which combined the tasks of criminal police, intelligence agency and a counter-intelligence service.
A rough, but interesting and reliable picture of the Soviet Koreans' "distribution" between various branches of state and party organisation can be deduced from a contemporary document, compiled for the Soviet Politburo in 1951. In summer 1951 the North Korean authorities decided to decorate a large number of civilian officials and army officers who had made significant contributions toward the country's military efforts. From the available documents it is not really clear whether the orders were to bestowed only on former Soviet Koreans, or it was part of an even broader decoration campaign. Nevertheless, 128 Soviet Koreans were chosen to receive awards. Since they all were still Soviet citizens, a bureaucratic procedure of the period required a special clearance from Moscow, so a list of all candidates was compiled and duly delivered to the Kremlin. On the event, the permission was forthcoming (generally this was a largely formal exercise). The 128 names on the list is likely to form a majority of the Soviet Koreans who were then active in the DPRK, and, most likely, the most prominent majority. Hence, this list may be useful in forming a general picture of the 'employment' of the Soviet Koreans in 1951. {*30}
As one would suspect, most of them were in the military -- forty eight out of 128. After all, it was a time of war. It is remarkable, however, that only one Soviet Korean was actually commanding a battle unit (Cho:ng Ch'o:l-u, Alexei Ten, commander of the 17 mechanical division), Some 19, or about one third of the total number, were 'political officers', commissars, while others were either headquarter or technical and administrative personnel. A sort of uncertain case was Han Il-mu, commander-in-chief of the (almost non-existent) North Korean Navy, Ch'oe P'yo-do:k, commander of the armour troops, and Nam Il, the chief of General staff. The second most important field was education, press and culture (or, rather, cultural management) where thirty out of the 128 Soviet Koreans were employed. Their positions varied from vice-ministers to humble professors at second-rate universities to newspaper editors. Twenty four Soviet Koreans were engaged in industrial management. This number included nine deputy ministers and one minister. The number of Soviet Koreans in the security service, police and judiciary also was predictably high: sixteen out 128 candidates, including Pang Hak-se, the much-feared Minister of Public Security, his deputy and a deputy minister of Interior. Five Soviet Koreans mentioned in the list were professional party functionaries, and five were state officials (including two diplomats).
Usually, the Soviet Koreans were not appointed as the leading persons in their respective institutions: such a situation would have provoked a gossip of a "Soviet domination". Most often they were second in command. Thus, in 1951, according to the list (which, we must remember, might be incomplete) the Cabinet included only two Soviet Korean ministers, but 14 deputy ministers. Out of the 18 ministries, 12 contained deputies from among the Soviet Koreans, while the remaining ministries were mostly of secondary importance.
Obviously, the activities of the Soviet Koreans in the DPRK must not be depicted only in rosy or only in black. Quite often the Soviet Koreans looked down on the local population and local officials with obvious arrogance as they felt themselves superior in terms of education and experience. It is also worth remembering that for most of them the move to Korea had meant a promotion of such magnitude that they hardly would dare to dream of under ordinary circumstances. Former school teachers became professors, village Party secretaries instantly found themselves Central Committee members, petty officials received vice-ministerial positions. It meant not only power, but also a great deal of material benefits. Nevertheless, on the whole, the integrity of most Soviet Koreans, as well as their sincere intention to contribute to Korea's economic and social development, is beyond doubt.
Soviet Koreans who arrived in Pyongyang first, in 1945 and 1946, initially lived in Korea alone, separated from their families, but in the autumn of 1946, their families, about a hundred persons, arrived from Tashkent {*31}. Subsequently, the families were included in the groups of Soviet Koreans sent to work in the North. During the Korean war, the families moved to Manchuria, to Harbin, from where they returned only after the armistice agreement had been signed in the summer of 1953. Though data is lacking, one can surmise that most Soviet Koreans were already married when they moved to the North: the Soviet authorities normally avoided sending abroad anybody who was single, and there were no reasons to believe that Korea was an exception to this general rule. However, there were also at least a few cases of 'inter-marriage' with local North Korean women.
The children of Soviet Koreans seldom shared their parents' enthusiasm for Korea. The younger generation, brought up in the Russian traditions and much less connected to Korean culture, were often not fluent in Korean (at least, initially) and perceived the life around them as poor, backward, alien or, at best, exotic. Most of them were unable and/or unwilling to assimilate, although some did try hard to become "true Koreans". In many families children spoke at home largely or exclusively in Russian. {*32} Finally, most of them left Korea to study in Moscow and Leningrad, and with very few exceptions, never returned.
In Pyongyang, most children of Soviet Koreans studied in the so-called "6th high school" (Kor. Yuk ko jung), established chiefly for the children of Soviet diplomats and specialists. Its graduates were groomed for further education in the Soviet Union. The school was technically considered a Korean institution, but the language of tuition was chiefly Russian and the school's curriculum followed the curriculum of Soviet schools with only minor adjustments to the local conditions (e.g. some brief courses in Korean and KWP history, as well as intensive military training). In 1957, the school was closed down and this act was rightly perceived as sign of the widening gap between Moscow and Pyongyang. {*33}.
Like other representatives of the North Korean elite, the Soviet Koreans enjoyed a very agreeable life. They came to North Korea from the Soviet Union at the end of Stalinist period, when a system of privilege for the nomenklatura was fully developed and the egalitarian experiments of the early Communist years had became an almost forgotten history. This system of privilege was copied in North Korea. As part of the ruling elite, Soviet Koreans lived in houses formerly belonging to Japanese officials and officers, received good rations, enjoyed the comfort of chauffeured cars and many other things which were seen as luxuries in impoverished post-colonial North Korea.
One of the most important aspects related to the activities of the Soviet Koreans in North Korea was their relationship with the Soviet embassy. There are few doubts that Moscow meant to use them as the instruments of Soviet control, though it would be an oversimplification to believe that this was the principal goal of their dispatch to Pyongyang (lack of reliable and experienced officials was at least equally important). However, these plans were fulfilled only partially. On the course of time, many Soviet Koreans lost their contacts with the Soviet embassy. According to materials from the Soviet Foreign Ministry Archives, some Soviet Koreans, such as Pak Ch'ang-ok (first deputy Prime Minister, then Party Secretary), Pak U:i-wan (deputy Prime Minister), and Pak Kil-yong (deputy Foreign Minister), continued to maintain close contacts with the Soviet embassy until the late 1950s, but they were exceptions rather than rule. It also looks as if most Soviet diplomats were not, to put it mildly, very aggressive in seeking information, and did not try too hard to use the opportunities Soviet Koreans might have been able to provide.
In the mid-1950s, when Kim Il Song started to distance himself from the Soviets, the Soviet embassy continued to act cautiously, and avoided the use of Soviet Koreans as an instrument for soliciting information, not to mention applying pressure. At least, no participants in the events revealed to the author any such attempts, although some additional information could be contained in the still-closed archives. The Soviet Koreans did occasionally try to exploit their links with the Embassy, but obviously, did not gain much from it, since all their warnings fell on deaf ears.
The history of the Soviet faction was very short -- it lasted only about 15 years. In late 1955, Kim Il Song undertook his first attack, though still quite restricted, on Soviet Koreans. August 1956 was a major turning point. Pak Ch'ang-ok, then leader of the Soviet faction, took part in an ill-fated conspiracy against Kim Il Song. Although on the whole the participation of the Soviet Koreans in this event was modest, they became the target of the purges in the late 1950s and soon faced a hard choice: whether to leave Korea or risk arrest and, perhaps, even eventual execution or death in prison.
By the late 1950s, the Soviet Koreans were no longer beyond Kim's reach. The Soviet influence in North Korea had already significantly waned during the Korean war, while the Sino-Soviet conflict made a direct Soviet intervention on behalf of the Soviet Koreans unlikely.
In the autumn of 1958, the first arrests of Soviet Koreans took place. Among the victims were Kim Ch'il-so:ng, the former chief of staff in the North Korean Navy, and Pak U:i-wan, an outspoken deputy Prime minister of the DPRK. The year 1959 was one which witnessed arrests and "ideological examination" of the Soviet Koreans. People were disappearing. According to the estimates of their former comrades, at least 45 prominent Soviet Koreans (roughly a quarter of their total) were purged and perished in the North in the late 1950s and 1960s. {*35} Although in the North Korean situation it was often impossible to learn much about the prisoners' fate, not to mention the accusations against them, it was common knowledge that Soviet Koreans were usually accused of "factionalist anti-party activities". {*36}
The deterioration of the Soviet-Korean relationship and ongoing purges meant that contacts with the Soviet Union ceased to be a basis of the Soviet Koreans' privileged status. On the contrary, these connections soon became a source of danger. Some Soviet Koreans tried to adapt to this situation. A few of them even took an active part in purges, obviously in hope to secure Kim Il Song's trust. Such was, for instance, the cases of Pang Hak-se, Nam Il, and Pak Cho:ng-ae. However, the vast majority of former Soviet citizens did their best to leave Korea and return to the USSR. Since 1958, after the initial arrests, a mass exodus of Soviet Koreans from the DPRK to the USSR began. It lasted until late 1961. {*37}
In December 1957 the DPRK and the USSR signed an official agreement which made dual citizenship impossible. For Kim Il Song, the Agreement was a major diplomatic success, since it hindered one of the possible avenues for Soviet influence over North Korean politics. According to the Agreement, all Soviet citizens who had been working in Korea (i.e., a majority of the Soviet Koreans) had to choose either of the two citizenships. Those who chose the Soviet Union were officially considered "foreigners" and, as such, could not normally occupy official positions any more. Hence it is understandable that most of the Soviet Koreans preferred North Korean citizenship. They did so in order to keep their posts, but at the same time this made them even more vulnerable to ongoing purges. Nevertheless, the legal status of a great many of them remained uncertain through 1958 and 1959, thus enabling many of them to still apply for permission to return to the USSR as Soviet citizens.
Fearing that attempts to rescue Soviet Koreans would be considered as an "intervention in the internal matters" of the DPRK, and thus would damage the delicate balance of intrigue in the Moscow-Peking-Pyongyang triangle, the Soviet embassy abstained from any decisive measures and often failed to act on behalf any of the Soviet Koreans. On 10 February 1956, when the purges of the Soviet Koreans were still very limited in scale, A.M. Petrov, then the Soviet charge d'affaires, remarked to Kim Il Song (as recorded in an official diary): "In the opinion of the Soviet Union, people from among the Soviet Koreans who committed offenses should not escape punishment by returning to the USSR. Hence, everybody who committed an offense has to answer for it here and should be appointed to a lesser post than [they] previously held". {*38} Nor this approach change much subsequently , when the purges began to escalate after the failure of the opposition attempts at the August Plenum. Alas, this was only too typical of Soviet (and Russian) politics: disdain for its own citizens and a tendency to sacrifice everything and everybody for what the government in power rightly or wrongly considers the "national interests".
While this cautious Soviet approach might be somehow justified, even worse, in some cases when the Korean side had allowed somebody to leave Korea, the Soviet authorities would usually subject the application to return to the USSR to a bureaucratic procedure which took several months. This delay cost some people their lives, since in a few months time the North Korean authorities often changed their mind, and the would-be escapee was apprehended to disappear forever . {*39} It would be unfair though not to mention that some staff members of the Soviet consulate did a lot to help Soviet Koreans return to the USSR, as did for instance Vadim P. Tkachenko, later the head of the Korean department in the Soviet Central Committee. {*40} However, these were exceptions which confirmed the rule.
Perhaps, the only major exception was the case of Nikolai Pak (Pak Kil-nam), the former head of the Engineering Department in the Korean People's Army Headquarters. In the late 1950s, N. Pak was arrested and for 40 days was subjected to "ideological inspection". After his release, he immediately hid in the Soviet embassy, in the quarters of General Malchevsky, then Soviet military attache. After long negotiations, the Soviet embassy obtained from the Korean authorities permission for Pak Kil-nam to return to the USSR. Such happy outcome was said to be determined by the good contacts of Pak Kil-nam's wife who since her youth had been known to the Soviet elite: rumours had it that she knew Marshal K.Voroshilov and some other top Soviet leaders well and managed to use these lifelong connections to save her husband from almost certain death. However, Pak's case was by no means typical. {*41}
The main goal of Kim Il Song was not so much the physical as political elimination of the Soviet faction, and the best way to do this was by pushing these people out of politics and, preferably, outside the country. Both "ideological inspections" and the arrests of some well-known Soviet Koreans were part of the intimidation campaign. In the late 1950s, Soviet Koreans were not usually prevented from leaving the country if they wished to do so. On the contrary, in many cases, the Korean authorities themselves encouraged Soviet Koreans to leave. In 1959, for instance, the chief of the North Korean General Staff called a special meeting of all Soviet Korean senior officers and said that all who wished to return to the USSR could do so. {*42} Often such offers were made individually. Thus, Yu So:ng-hun, the former rector of Kim Il Song university was advised by his superiors to go to the USSR "to have a rest and to improve his health" (and it was made clear that he'd better postpone his return indefinitely). {*43}
* * *
More than half a century has passed since the emergence of the Soviet faction in North Korea. The events of the first years of the DPRK had long become history, so now we can try to assess objectively the activities of Soviet Koreans in North Korea in 1945-60.
The personal honesty of these people is beyond doubt. They went to Korea in order to help the country of their ancestors, with a belief that Stalinist socialism which they strove to build was the best social order in the world. The Soviet faction played an important role in the establishment of the North Korean state. Without its efforts the economic success of the 1950s would not have been possible. The mass exodus of Soviet Koreans in the late 1950s and the early 1960s became one of the factors leading to the sharp decline of the speed of the country's economic development.
On the other hand, the activities of Soviet Koreans helped to establish the dictatorship of Kim Il Song in the northern part of the Korean peninsula. They did much to help the development of the police and the army of North Korea. The history of the Soviet faction is inseparable from the history of the policy of "Communisation" of the Korean peninsula, conducted by the Soviet authorities in the 1940s. The Soviet faction was one of the most powerful instruments of this policy and as such shares the responsibility for its consequences.
Footnotes:
1. This picture of four 'waves' might look a bit too general, since every 'wave' encompasses many separate arrivals of small groups and individuals. This is especially true in regard to the 'first wave' which by definition consisted of individual arrivals (one can hardly imagine spies arriving in big and well organised groups). So far, in the literature there have been two attempts to sort out the information on individual and small group arrivals (in both cases the data was obtained through personal interviews conducted in the USSR in the 1970s and early 1990s). The first was undertaken by Ho: Un-bae (nickname Lim Un: Lim Un. The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea. Tokyo: Jiyu-sa, 1982) and another by a group of the South Korean journalists who conducted their research in the USSR in the early 1990s (Mirok Choson minjuju:i inmin konghwaguk. Seoul: Chungan ilbo sa, 1992). However, there are numerous contradictions between the data of these two books, as well as between these and data collected by this author. These discrepancies are mostly of minor, even trivial, nature, but they are quite numerous, thus sorting them out or even listing them in this chapter would require more space than is available. Hence I have decided to limit myself to a more general picture and not to dwell unduly on details. These things will be sorted out in due time, when all relevant sources are available.
2. The fact that Pak Cho:ng-ae studied at the Voroshilov teachers' tehnikum is confirmed by a 1946 document (Memo: Biographical data and personal characteristics of leaders of parties and social groups in North Korea. Sent by T.F. Shtykov to Suslov, CPSU Central Committee. RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis' 128, delo 61). In the same document it is said that Kim Yong-bo:m was sent to Korea in 1931. Pak Cho:ng-ae's authentic surname was Ch'oe, traditionally transcribed in Russian as Tsoi, but only her Russian given name Vera is known (she must have also had a Korean given name, as it was a norm among the Koreans at the time).
3. Interview with Kang Sang-ho, Leningrad, 7 March 1990. In 1945-59, Kang Sang-ho, a Soviet teacher, journalist and party cadre, worked in the DPRK, in particular, as the director of the High Party School and the deputy minister of the Interior.
4. According to Lim Un, in August 1945, Pak Ch'ang-ok was already in Korea where he was running a covert mission: Lim Un. The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea... p. 143. The same information was given to the author by Yu So:ng-ch'o:l, a former staff member of the Soviet military intelligence: Interview with Yu So:ng-ch'o:l, 29 January 1991, Tashkent.
5. Interview with Yu So:ng-ch'o:l, 18 and 29 January 1991, Tashkent.
6. Interview with N.G. Lebedev, 13 November 1989, Moscow. Lebedev was a Soviet general, in 1945 a member of the Military Council (political commissar) of the 25th army, later the head of the Soviet Civil Administration in North Korea.
7. On the role of Cho Ki-ch'o:n in North Korean literary circles see an interesting study by Brian Myers: Brian Myers. Han Sol-ya and North Korean Literature: The Failure of Socialist Realism in the DPRK. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994, pp. 40, 50-51.
8. These days, there is a lot of material on the activities of this group. See, for instance:
Lim Un. The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea... P. 143-144. Mirok Choson minjuju:i inmin konghwaguk. Seoul: Chungan ilbo sa, 1992. P. 178-181.
9. Lim Un. The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea...
10. Mirok Choson minjuju:i inmin konghwaguk... P. 178. Interview with Kang Sang-ho, Leningrad, 31 October 1990.
11. Memorandum to Suslov, CPSU Central Committee. RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis 128, delo 55, list 5.
12. One such letter, sent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and eventually forwarded to the CPSU Central Committee, see: A copy of letter by Kim Il Song to General Romanenko. RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis 128, delo 205, page 5.
13. Interview with Kang Sang-ho, Leningrad, 30 November 1990.
14. A copy of the Politburo decision in author's personal archive.
15. The author was told about these courses in detail by Pak Pyo:ng-yul, a former students of the program. Interview with Pak Pyo:ng-yul, 25 January 1990.
16. Copies of the Politburo decisions in the author's personal archive.
17. Interview with Pak Pyo:ng-yul, Moscow, 25 January 1990.
18. Interview with Kang Sang-ho, Leningrad, 30 November 1990.
19. Lim Un. The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea... P. 146.
20. A copy of the Politburo decision in author's personal archive.
21. Letter of V.V. Kovyzhenko to L.S. Baranov, CPSU Central Committee, 20 April 1948. Archive of the author.
22. Interview with Maia Hegai, Tashkent, 15 January 1991. Interview with Lira Hegai, Tashkent, 26 January 1991.
23. Little is known about the life of Pak Ch'ang-ok prior to 1945. Apparently, he was sent to North Korea as an intelligence agent before Liberation. In 1956, he mentioned that in the USSR he had occupied a "small post" (A conversation of S.N. Filatov, the councilor of the Soviet embassy in the DPRK, with Pak Ch'ang-ok, the deputy prime minister of the DPRK and a member of the KWP Central Committee, 12 March 1956. Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive (hence AVPRF), fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68.
24. The diary of S.P. Suzdalev, Soviet charge d'affaires in the DPRK, 2 July 1953. AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 9, delo 9, papka 44.
25. Pukhan hyo:ndae sa. Vol. 1. Seoul: Kongdongch'e, 1989, Pp.114-116.
26. Ibid. P.29
27. The North Korean capital Pyongyang is located in the province of South P'yongan. The ranks are given as valid in 1948.
28. Interview with Liudmila Tsoi, Moscow, 26 January 1990. Liudmila Tsoi (Russian transcription of Ch'oe) is a daughter of Ch'oe Pyo-do:k.
29. Not much is known about Pang Hak-se's pre-Korean past. Kang Sang-ho once mentioned that Pang had been working in the local attorney administration somewhere in Central Asia, possibly in Kzyl-orda. The date of his arrival in the North is uncertain, since the pre-1950 Soviet official papers tend to use Russian (not Korean) names of the Soviet Koreans, while post-1950 documents normally mention only their Korean names. Identification of two sets of such names is always a difficult task. If our tentative identification of Pang Hak-se as Nikolai Ignatieevich Pan is correct, he was sent to Korea by a Politburo decision of 10 September 1946 (his actual arrival could have occurred later).
30. List of Soviet citizens of Korean origin, currently on Korean service, to be awarded with Korean decorations. RTsHIDNI, fond 17, opis 3, delo 1090.
31. Interview with Maia Hegai, Tashkent, 15 January 1991.
32. My teacher, professor Anantolii G. Vasiliev, who was studying in the DPRK in the mid-1950s, once recalled that at the time one could often see in downtown Pyongyang groups of well-dressed Korean youngsters who spoke only Russian between themselves. They were second-generation Soviet Koreans.
33. The author was told about the life of Soviet Koreans' children by Kim Mil-ya, a daughter of Kim Chae-uk. Interview with Kim Mil-ya, 27 January 1991.
35. Mirok Choso:n minjujuu:i inmin konghwaguk..., pp. 371-372.
36. Interview with Pak Z.P. Tashkent, 1 February 1991.
37. Emigration to the USSR did not necessarily mean that a defector had belonged to the Soviet faction earlier. Thus, Yi Sang-jo, the DPRK ambassador to the USSR, who refused to come back to Pyongyang and wrote Kim Il Song a very critical letter, had been a prominent member of the Yanan faction. Together with Yi, several other minor Yanan figures remained in the USSR. Among those postgraduate students who did not return to Korea from the USSR in the late 1950s there were some members of the Domestic faction.
38. The diary of A.M. Petrov, Soviet temporary charg� d'affaires, 9-15 February 1956, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 12, delo 6, papka 68.
39. Interview with Kang Sang-ho. Leningrad, 30 November 1990.
40. Interview with Yu So:ng-go:l. Tashkent, 22 January 1991.
41. Interview with Kang Sang-ho. Leningrad, 7 March 1990. Interview with G.K. Plotnikov. Moscow, 1 February 1990.
42. Interview with Sim Su-ch'o:l, 17 January 1991.
43. Interview with S.P. Yugai. Moscow, January 1990.
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