NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK
     ***** SPECIAL REPORT *****

The following "DPRK Report" is the product of a joint project between the
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of
International Studies (Monterey, California, USA) and the Institute for
Contemporary International Problems (ICIP) (Moscow, Russia).   It is
written by Russian analysts associated with the ICIP and edited by the
CNS.

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1.  North Korean Views of the Significance of the Upcoming DPRK-ROK Summit

North Korean representatives stress that the summit being held in Pyongyang "will demonstrate the superiority of the DPRK in the eyes of all Koreans living in the South and abroad."  Kim Dae-jung had insisted
on a neutral venue for the summit (Beijing, Vladivostok, the 38th Parallel on the Korean Peninsula, or some other site), but was "categorically rebuffed."  As North Korean officials stress, "The side that is morally weaker and that committed so many crimes against its own nation must kowtow before the real and only leader of all Koreans."

The summit in Pyongyang, as North Korean officials admit, should also boost the morale of the DPRK population.  "The country is undergoing serious difficulties," a high-ranking diplomat admitted, "and it will be
very encouraging for our citizens to see that Seoul's leaders are coming to pay respect to the DPRK."

North Koreans believe as well that the summit will "greatly promote" the prestige of the DPRK and personally Kim Jong-il throughout the world and will attract new countries to cooperate with Pyongyang.

Of special significance for the North Korean leadership will be the U.S. reaction to the inter-Korean summit.  Pyongyang, as can be construed from private remarks by its representatives, expects "major economic and
strategic concessions from Washington."  As one official emphasizes, "The summit is in fact a concession to the United States, so we are entitled to reciprocal moves by the U.S."  The DPRK leadership wants Washington to
provide "a full green light" to U.S. economic cooperation with North Korea and to drop its plans for theater missile defenses (TMD) in the Asian-Pacific region.  The development of improved economic ties with
Japan is also envisaged.

Some North Koreans express the hope that the June summit will pave the way to expanded economic exchanges with the South, though others dismiss this perspective as "not important."  One official stated, "We don't need their money."

2.  Russia's Reaction to the Planned Inter-Korean Summit

Russian authorities consider the Korean situation to be the most dangerous hot spot in the Asian-Pacific region and one that directly concerns Russia.  Moscow has all along supported a direct political dialogue and rapprochement between the North and the South.  It has criticized both Korean sides for not having improved their relations long after the great powers put an end to the Cold War. 

The agreement between Pyongyang and Seoul finally to hold a summit is being hailed in Russia as a breakthrough and is sincerely welcomed. However, Russian analysts express caution about the likely results of the June meeting in Pyongyang.  They feel that Kim Jong-il will not risk the future of his regime by undertaking a significant opening of the DPRK to the rest of the world.  Such an opening would first require preliminary
steps in the domestic ideological, political, and economic spheres.  None of these steps can be observed at present in the North.

Pyongyang, as Russian experts argue, "will use the summit to wrest concessions from the United States and its allies without altering its traditional external and internal strategies."  Some specialists don't exclude that the summit itself might be canceled under some as yet uncertain pretext.

3.  New Soviet-Era Archival Materials on the Korean War

Materials found in the Russian archives reveal the reasons why Stalin changed his views in 1950 and decided to support Kim Il-sung's desire "to liberate" the South.

In conversations with Kim Il-sung in April 1950 in the Kremlin, Stalin gave four reasons to support his conclusion that the international environment had "changed sufficiently to permit a more active stance on
the unification of Korea."

The first reason was "the significant strengthening of the socialist camp in the East: the victory of the Chinese revolution, the signing of an alliance between the USSR and the PRC, and the USSR's acquisition of an
atomic bomb."

The second reason concerned "the obvious weakness of the reactionary camp [as seen in]: the shameful defeat of America's intervention into Chinese affairs, Western troubles in Southeast Asia, and the inability of the
South Korean regime and its American masters to improve the social, economic, and political situation in South Korea."

Stalin listed as the third factor contributing to the Soviet Union's new stance "the dishonest, perfidious, and arrogant behaviour of the United States in Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, and especially its
decision to form NATO."  According to Stalin, "America was no longer a partner, but [instead] an adversary, and the Soviet Union could not bind itself any longer to agreements with [such] an adversary."

The fourth reason was the "aggressive designs of the South Korean junta." As Stalin concluded, "the South was determined to launch an attack on the North sooner or later and it was important to forestall this aggression."

This information could change the way outside analysts understand the Korean War and may add useful details toward a future resolution of this still-unsettled conflict.