Uranium Purchase 1AC

1.) Inherency: 

A.) No U.S. policy to stop nuclear weapons from entering. 

William C. Potter, LA Times, "'The Peacemaker' is a warning to all", September 29, 1997 

The U.S. has in place only bits and pieces of an effective policy to prevent the introduction or use of nuclear weapons within its borders. These existing programs are under funded, poorly coordinated, and do not cover the full spectrum of this immediate threat to U.S. national security. 

B.) Current programs more of a threat than an answer. 

Rich Kelly, independent defense analyst, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 39, The Nunn-Lugar Act: A Wasteful and Dangerous Illusion, March 18, 1996. 

That program, which began in response to a pressing national security challenge, has evolved into a Pentagon bureaucracy. The urgent need for aid has waned, and its central purpose--to destroy nuclear weapons- remains unfulfilled. To date, the CTR program has done relatively little. The few projects it has funded--ranging from defense conversion to providing housing for former Soviet military officers--do little, if anything, to advance Washington's key objective of curbing nuclear proliferation. In fact, the evidence suggests that CTR may in the long run threaten, rather than enhance, American security. CTR funds have eased the Russian military's budgetary woes, freeing resources for such initiatives as the war in Chechnya and defense modernization. Congress should eliminate CTR funding so that it does not finance additional, perhaps more threatening programs in the former Soviet Union. 

C.) Support to clean up Russian uranium fading. 

William C. Potter, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project, February 12-13, 1996, p. http://ceip.org/npconf4.htm 

Historically, the issue of nuclear non-proliferation was the one item on the U.S. and Soviet arms control agenda on which the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union were not too far apart. Indeed, U.S. and Russian cooperation for non-proliferation has continued on a bilateral and multilateral basis, across both Republican and Democratic administrations for over three decades. There are signs, however, that this cooperation is waning and may deteriorate further if pressures intensify in the former Soviet Union and the United States to elevate international commercial considerations in the conduct of foreign policy. These indications include U.S. opposition to Russia's recent nuclear export initiatives toward Iran, China and India, and Russian charges that Western accusations regarding illicit nuclear exports from the former Soviet Union are in fact designed to undermine legitimate Russian nuclear commerce. 

2.) Harms: 

A.) Nuclear weapons missing from Russia. 

William C. Potter, L.A. Times, "'The Peacemaker' is a warning to all", September 29, 1997, p. on-line, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/latimes.html 

Until recently, most experts downplayed the risk of the theft or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons from Russia's vast arsenal. Earlier this month, however, Gen. Alexander T. Lebed claimed that more than 100 nuclear "suitcase bombs" were unaccounted for. In January 1996, I received a similar report from a senior advisor to President Boris Yeltsin. According to this individual, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the KGB acquired an unspecified number of small nuclear weapons (under 75 pounds) that never were included in any inventory. 

B.) Ethics say we must find lost weapons. 

Molly Young Brown, "Nuclear Contamination and the Cousteau Society's Proposed Bill of Rights", Nuclear Guardianship Forum, #1, spring 1992. 

It is therefore the paramount responsibility of each generation to maintain a constantly vigilant and prudential assessment of technological disturbances and modifications adversely affecting life on Earth, the balance of nature and the evolution of [humankind] in order to protect the rights of future generations." The phrase "vigilant and prudential assessment of technological disturbances and modifications" calls us to task in our use of radioactive materials, from the moment uranium is mined from the earth (a clear "disturbance"), the oppressive effect of the threat of nuclear weapons, and throughout the cycles of processing, transportation, and storage. We have not made a "prudent assessment" of the effects of our nuclear technology on future generations. 


Plan: 

PLANK 1: Fiat 
PLANK 2: We mandate that the United States purchase 500 tons of surplus uranium from Russia every year in order to relinquish the problem these nuclear suitcases have. 
PLANK 3: Funding through normal means. 
PLANK 4: Enforcement is through the United States Federal Government. 
PLANK 5: We reserve the right to define terms and clarify intent. 

3.) Solvency: 

A.) U.S. can solve for a good portion of uncontrolled uranium. 

William C. Potter, L.A. Times, "'The Peacemaker' is a warning to all", September 29, 1997, p. on-line, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/latimes.html 

A useful step that the United States should take is to accelerate the implementation of the 1992 agreement to purchase 500 tons of surplus uranium from Russia. Washington also should attempt to buy all of the highly enriched uranium known to reside in the non-Russian successor states. Given the relatively small but militarily significant amount of material involved, this effort would be a low-cost, high-return nonproliferation strategy. 

B.) Harvard believes U.S. can solve also. 

William C. Potter, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project, February 12-13, 1996, p. on-line - http://ceip.org/npconf4.htm 

I think the Harvard group recently has noted some creative steps that the United States might take in forging a greater shared sense of mission with MINATOM, including such things as restructuring and expanding the highly enriched uranium (HEU) deal, earmarking a portion of additional fissile material purchases for material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) improvements, and facilitating private sector investment and involvement in converting Russia's nuclear enterprises, and especially its three "plutonium cities," something, I suspect, Frank Von Hippel may talk more about."
