

(After8th, version 13 Jan 95)

0.   Some questions, some history, some answers.

Regarding the STEEL PANTHERS Scenarios about the Italian battles
against the Germans, in Greece, Albania and elsewhere, that took 
place after the 8th September 1943.

(Cefalonia/Leros/Eubea/Larissa/Corf/Kruja/Verat/Filottrano...)

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1- Why, after the 8th september, did the italian army collapse
in Italy but fought with determination in Greece and elsewhere?

     In Italy, the sweeping chaos that followed the 8th
September, embroiled the army too, with the overpowering lure,
for all the Italian soldiers, of the possibility to return
immediatly home, listening to the strong call of the family ties
and without having to give their life for a evidently lost and -
as appeared with ever increasing evidence- evil cause.
     Abroad, on the contrary, everyone was compelled to act and
decide alone, and if the call of the fern away lying country was
strong (albeit Italy seemed sometime so fern that she appeared
unattainable) indeed even more strong must have been the desire,
to solve "immediately" the own situation, taking the weapons and
choosing -once for all- the side "that had had right" in the War,
redeeming at once in this simple way many humiliations and shames
suiffered because of the incapacity and disorganisation of the
Italian fascists.
     But there was not (there could not have been) an immediate
encounter between the Italian soldiers and the oppressed people
of the Balkans: the first moves in this direction were -of
course- very difficult: too many recent wounds, too damaging and
poisoning the memories. But there was, and this was immediate,
at hand reach, the possibility to recover the respect for
oneself, to rescue the soiled dignity of the name of Italian.
     To describe in one word the Resistance of the "Forze Armate"
abroad would force to characterize it as a rebellion against the
Germans, and -at the same time- against the faul orders coming
from the Italian High Command. A rebellion that had had many
precedents, i.e. in the attitude of the "Julia" division before
the invasion of Greece or in the well-known "fraternizing" of the
"Sassari" brigade with the strikers, in Turin, in the years just
before the advent of Fascism. 
     Now, after the collapse of the 8th of September, there 
appears something new: an encounter between the aspirations of
the "rebel" officers, jealous of their own stained "military
honour" and the mighty "freedom call" coming from below. These
two elements unite in a robust blow against the Germans, culpable
of blocking the passage.
    In Italy, anyway, the partisans of the CNL (Comitato Nazionale
di liberazione) and the italian soldiers of the CIL (Corpo Italiano
di Liberazione) fought the Germans valiantly: the CNL in upper Italy 
(divided in "Brigate Garibaldi", the stronger units, communists, 
Brigate "Giustizia e Libert", liberals, Brigate "Matteotti", Socialists,
and Brigate "Osoppo", conservatives), and the CIL with the allies, in
southern italy.

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2.   Did the Allies understand what was going on in the Italian
Army in those days?

     Let's take the example of Lero: the Italian Dodecanneso, a
series of small, beautiful isles that Italy had conquered in the
War against Turkey, had a big strategycal importance for the
anglo-americans. The allied Command of the Middle East began
landing in Coo and in Lero on the 13th September, immediatly
after the German victory at Rodi, as Ammiraglio Campioni was
compelled to surrender there. 
     But the ideas of the allied Command of the Middle East were
rebuked by Eisenhower, worried for the consequences of the
Salerno landing (until the date of the 14th September the
positions of the anglo-americans could have indeed been
defeated). Eisenhower said that the "Italian garrisons (there)
would not have been able to fight against nobody") and organised
a conference in Tunisi with all the Middle East commanders: "the
simplest and less discussed conference of the whole war".
     Eisenhower was maybe right in his valuation of the
importance of the main trust in Italy, and in his refusing to
distract any force from the main theatre of war... but his
distrust of the italian fighters was by all means unmotivated,
as the facts demonstrated in the course of the next months.

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3.   What happened in Leros and why (SCENARIO: LEROS.ZIP)

The Presidium of Lero, under the orders of Ammiraglio Mascherpa,
fought at the side of the british that were still on the isle for
over 50 days against the siege of the nazi. The Germans organized
187 aerial bombings of the Isle. The italian sailors and soldiers
of the "Regina" drove back the first German landing, on the 12th
November, but had to give up the struggle on the 16th November:
they had no more ammonitions. Out of 12000 Italians there were
only 1500 survivors, but the Germans lost 200 planes under the
blows of the old 76-AA of the Forze Armate and there were at
least 3000 German casualties.
     This obstinate resistance was at the same time a result of
good leading (Admiral Mascherpa and Commander Re were able to
keep up the morale and the military efficiency of the troops
until the last moment) and a consequence of the growing hate
against the Fascists that had flourished among the Italians after
1940, which especially in the troops stationed in Greece and in
the Dodecanneso had already before emerged as a diffused
discontent.


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What happened elsewhere
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4.   GREECE

4.1. CRETA     
     In Creta many italian soldiers took the path of the
mountains and constituted an efficient group of snipers inside
the "nazi fortress of Creta".

4.2. EUBEA     
     In Eubea, on the 12th September, Bersaglieri and Infantry
attacked the Germans, took many weapons, and then took refuge in
the northern part of the isle, remaining there until the end of
the nazi-occupation of Eubea, fighting guerrilla together with
the greek partisans and some british commandos.

4.3. CORFU'         
     In Corf, colonel Lusignani refused to accept the order for
disarming the XI Italian Army, fought boldly against the Germans
together with his soldiers and the greek partisans until the
bombing destroyed the town of Corf and all the Italians were
shooted as "rebels" by the nazi.

4.4. CEFALONIA      (SCENARIO: CEFALONI.ZIP)      
     In Cefalonia the rebellion comes from "below": Commander in
chef of the "Acqui" Division, General Gardin, had already begone
the negotiations with the German for the surrending of the
weapons and the return home of the Division (as a matter of fact
the Germans brought the Italians that did elsewhere surrender
directly in the German labour camps in northern Europa and not
home as promised). But in the course of these negotiations a
German detachment seized two italian batteries on the peninsula
of Liscuri, so that Captain Apollonio decided autonomously to
open fire with the coast batteries, in the morning of the 13th
September, against the German landing at the harbour of
Argostoli. The compromise  clime is broken, the soldiers rally
around Captain Apollonio, take contact with the greek partisans
and begin a determinate struggle against the Germans. In the
afternoon of the 15th September the German Stukas begin the
bombing of Argostoli. For seven days the Italian with very few
AA-weapons, held the German at bay. They finally succumbed and
on the 22th the German landing forces begin the slaughtering of
8400 Italians, left unburied on the isle as "Rebels"

4.5. LARISSA    (Three SCENARIOS: LARISSA1/LARISSA2/LARISSA3.ZIP)   
     In Tessaglia the Germans try to conquer on surprise, in the
night between the 8th and the 9th September 1943, the airport of
Larissa, on the greek mainland, in the region of Tessaglia. The
Division "Pinerolo" drives the German commandos back and destroys
the paratroopers (Scenario: LARISSA1.ZIP). General Infante decided 
to leave Larissa in direction of Trekkala, the "Pinerolo" attained 
this town after a very difficult march, with the German attacker 
behind and on the sides. The Lancers of the "6 Lancieri Aosta" kept 
the German at bay until the whole Division reached Trekkala. General 
Infante concluded in the meantime a pact with the greek partisans of 
the ELAS and with the british High Command, the first time in  
history where Italian troops are recognized as "Allies of the United 
Nations"... a month (!) before Badoglio's government declared war on 
Germany. General Infante repaired (with british help) the 90-AA 
semoventi he had used in the defence of the Larissa airport 10 days
before and organised a clever counterattack, that succeded in destroying
8 German aircraft, but eventually failed against a very well leaded 
German Lynx platoon.


5.      EASTERN MACEDONIA               (Not yet implemented)

6.      ALBANIA                 
6.1.    (Devoli: 13th September)        (Not yet implemented)
6.2.    (Verat: 15th September)         (Not yet implemented)
6.3.    Kruja: Divisione "Firenze", General Azzi, 21-22th September
        Scenario: KRUJA.ZIP
At Kruja, general Azzi and the Firenze Division attacked the
German garrison after having destroyed the Iron mines (strategically
very important for the Germans) with the last tanks and semoventi the 
Italians could gather together. The attack at the mines encountered
very fierce German resistence and represented a very difficoult 
operation.

7.      JUGOSLAVIA                      (Not yet implemented)

8.      ITALY
The Maneuver of Filottrano 8/7/1944 (FILOTTRA.ZIP)
At the end of June, as the Allied took Cherbourg, in Normandy,
on the Italian front, in the Adria sector, the CIL (Corpo
italiano di liberazione) fighting against the Germans, took the
town of Macerata (30 June). The italians arrived on the road to
Filottrano at the beginning of July. At Filottrano the italians
fought a very hard battle. The small town was defended by the I
and II battalion of the 994 German regiment (this belonged,
together with the 992 and 993 to the 278 German Division, which
had 12000 men in May). During the battle of Filottrano the
Germans of the 278th Division received support from some units
of the 71th German Division.
The Germans had 3 tanks and 5 armoured cars, plus some 75/AT
guns.
Filottrano was strategically very important: it represented the
stronghold of the "Line Albert": a defence that the Germans had
set up to delay as long as possible the allied and italian
progress. The conquest of Filottrano was unequivocally imperative
and the italian General Umberto Utili had a smart plan for the
5 battalions of the "Nembo" CIL-Division, supported by the
artillery and the 5 tanks from the 6th polish brigade and the
"Kresowa" Division.
The main force (Nembo II) had to engage the Germans from south,
while the two groups I and III attacked Filottrano from west and
east respectively.
At 7.30 of the 8th of July the italian paratroopers of the
"Nembo" began the attack. The struggle went on in the narrow
valleys around Filottrano and then in the small town, house after
house. At 15.00 the german counterattacked, the more exposed
units had to retire, but one company could fortify inside the
city hospital. After a lot of attacks and counterattacks two
italian companies, with the help of the polish tanks, rejoined
it at 19.00. At dusk the italians made a final, desperate central
attack and achieved it: the Germans had to retire to the nearby
village of Scuffolo. The important crossroad on the Line Albert
was taken, the slow allied italian offensive could now proceed.

9.   BIBLIOGRAPHY:
-    E.Scala, "La riscossa dell'esercito", Ministero italiano
     della Difesa, Stato maggiore, Ufficio storico, pp.151-178.,
     Roma 1953
-    "Cefalonia", Ministero della Difesa, Stato maggiore
     esercito, Ufficio storico, Roma 1947
-    V. Spigai, "Lero", Tirrenia, Livorno 1949
-    Bollettino Comitato nazionale ANPI, Supplemento al N 23,
     "La resistenza italiana all'estero", Roma 1952
-    Marco Picone Chiodo, "In nome della resa", L'Italia nella
     seconda guerra mondiale, Mursia, Milano 1990. A very good
     book for small-scale battles.
-    Luigi Marchesi, "1939-1945, dall'impreparazione alla resa
     incondizionata, Memorie di un ufficiale del Comando supremo",
     Mursia, Milano 1993
-    Roberto Battaglia, "Storia della resistenza italiana", Einaudi,
     Torino 1979.

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-- Francesco Vianello
-- 100114.453@compuserve.com
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