(greece1, vesion 30/11/95)

0.   Some questions, some history, some answers.

Regarding the STEEL PANTHERS Scenarios about the Italian battles
against the Germans, in Greece and Albania, that took place after
the 8th September 1943.

(Cefalonia/Leros/Eubea/Larissa/Corf/Kruja/Verat...)

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1- Why, after the 8th of september, did the Italian army collapse
in Italy but fought with determination in Greece and elsewhere?

     In Italy, the sweeping chaos that followed the 8th of
September, embroiled the army too, with the overpowering lure,
for all the Italian soldiers, of the possibility to return home
immediatly, responding to the strong call of the family ties
and without having to give their life for a evidently lost and -
as appeared with ever increasing evidence- evil cause.
     Abroad, on the contrary, everyone was compelled to act and
decide alone, and if the call of the far away country was
strong (albeit Italy seemed sometime so far that she appeared
unattainable) indeed even stronger must have been the desire
to solve "immediately" ones own situation, taking the weapons and
choosing -once for all- the side "that was right" in the War,
redeeming at once in this simple way many humiliations and shames
suiffered because of the incapacity and disorganisation of the
Italian fascists.
     But there was not (there could not have been) an immediate
encounter between the Italian soldiers and the oppressed people
of the Balkans: the first moves in this direction were -of
course- very difficult: too many recent wounds, too damaging and
poisoning the memories. But there was, and this was immediate,
at hand reach, the possibility to recover the respect for
oneself, to rescue the soiled dignity of the name "Italian".
     To describe in one word the Resistance of the "Forze Armate"
abroad would force to characterize it as a rebellion against the
Germans, and -at the same time- against the flawed orders coming
from the Italian High Command. A rebellion that had had many
precedents, i.e. the attitude of the "Julia" division before
the invasion of Greece or the well-known "fraternizing" of the
"Sassari" brigade with the strikers, in Turin, in the years just
before the advent of Fascism. 
     Now, after the collapse of the 8th of September, there appears
something new: an encounter between the aspirations of
the "rebel" officers, jealous of their own stained "military
honour" and the mighty "freedom call" coming from below. These
two elements unite in a robust blow against the Germans, culpable
of blocking the passage.

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2.   Did the Allies understand what was going on in the Italian
Army abroad in those days?

     Let's take the example of Lero: the Italian Dodecanneso, a
series of small, beautiful isles that Italy had conquered in the
War against Turkey, had a big strategical importance for the
Anglo-americans. The allied Command of the Middle East began
landing in Coo and in Lero on the 13th of September, immediatly
after the German victory at Rodi, as Ammiraglio Campioni surrended 
there. 
     But the ideas of the allied Command of the Middle East were
rebuked by Eisenhower, worried for the consequences of the
Salerno landing (until the 14th of September the Anglo-americans 
could have indeed been defeated). 
Eisenhower said that the "Italian garrisons (of the Dodecanneso)
would not have been able to fight against anybody") and organised
a conference in Tunisi with all the Middle East commanders: "the
simplest and less discussed conference of the whole war".
     Eisenhower was maybe right in his evaluation of the
importance of the main thrust in Italy, and in his refusal to
distract any force from the main theatre of war... but his
distrust of the italian fighters was by all means unmotivated,
as the facts demonstrated in the course of the next months.

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3.   What happened in Leros and why (SCENARIO: LEROS.ZIP)

The Presidium of Lero, under the orders of Ammiraglio Mascherpa,
fought at the side of the British for more than 50 days against 
the siege of the nazi. The Germans organized 187 aerial 
bombings of the Isle. The Italian sailors and soldiers
of the "Regina" drove back the first German landing, on the 12th
November, but had to give up the struggle on the 16th November:
they had no more ammunitions. Out of 12000 Italians there were
only 1500 survivors, but the Germans lost 200 planes under the
blows of the old 76-AA of the Forze Armate and there were at
least 3000 German casualties.
     This obstinate resistance was at the same time a result of
good leading (Admiral Mascherpa and Commander Re were able to
keep up the morale and the military efficiency of the troops
until the last moment) and a consequence of the growing hate
against the Fascists that had flourished among the Italians after
1940, which especially in the troops stationed in Greece and in
the Dodecanneso had already before emerged as a diffused
discontent.


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4.   What happened elsewhere

4.1. CRETA     
     In Creta many Italian soldiers took the path of the
mountains and constituted an efficient group of snipers inside
the "Nazi fortress of Creta".

4.2. EUBEA     
     In Eubea, on the 12th of September, Bersaglieri and Infantry
attacked the Germans, took many weapons, and then took refuge in
the northern part of the isle, remaining there until the end of
the nazi-occupation of Eubea, fighting guerrilla together with
the Greek partisans and Some british commandos.

4.3. CORFU'         
     In Corf, colonel Lusignani refused to accept the order for
disarming the XI Italian Army, fought boldly against the Germans
together with his soldiers and the greek partisans until the
bombing destroyed the town of Corf and all the Italians were
shooted as "rebels" by the nazi.

4.4. CEFALONIA      (SCENARIO: CEFALONI.ZIP)      
     In Cefalonia the rebellion comes from "below": Commander in
chef of the "Acqui" Division, General Gardin, had already begone
the negotiations with the German for the surrending of the
weapons and the return home of the Division (as a matter of fact
the Germans brought the Italians that did -elsewhere- surrender
directly in the German labour camps in northern Europa and not
home as promised). But in the course of these negotiations a
German detachment seized two italian batteries on the peninsula
of Liscuri, so that Captain Apollonio decided autonomously to
open fire with this coast batteries, in the morning of the 13th
September, against the German landing attempt in the harbour of
Argostoli. The compromise  clime was broken, the soldiers rallied
around Captain Apollonio, took contact with the Greek partisans
and began a determinate struggle against the German. In the
afternoon of the 15th September the German Stukas began
bombing Argostoli. For seven days the Italians, with very few
AA-weapons, held the German at bay. They finally succumbed and
on the 22th the German landing forces begin the slaughtering of
8400 Italians, left unburied on the isle as "Rebels"

4.5. LARISSA    (Three SCENARIOS: LARISSA1/LARISSA2/LARISSA3.ZIP)   
     In Tessaglia the German try to conquer on surprise, in the
night between the 8th and the 9th September 1943, the airport of
Larissa, on the greek mainland, in the region of Tessaglia. The
Division "Pinerolo" drives the German commandos back and destroys
the paratroopers (Scenario: LARISSA1.ZIP). General Infante decided 
to leave Larissa in direction of Trekkala, the "Pinerolo" attained 
this town after a very difficult march, with the German attacker 
behind and on the sides. The Lancers of the "6 Lancieri Aosta" kept 
the German at bay until the whole Division reached Trekkala. General 
Infante concluded in the meantime a pact with the greek partisans of 
the ELAS and with the british High Command, the first time in  
history where Italian troops are recognized as "Allies of the United 
Nations"... a month (!) before Badoglio's government declared war on 
Germany. General Infante repaired (with british help) the 90-AA 
semoventi he had used in the defence of the Larissa airport 10 days
before and organised a clever counterattack, that succeded in destroying
8 German aircraft, but eventually failed against a very well leaded 
German Lynx platoon.


4.6. EASTERN MACEDONIA   (Not yet implemented)

4.7. ALBANIA             (Not yet implemented)    
     (Devoli: 13th September)
     (Verat: 15th September)
     (Kruja: Divisione "Firenze", General Azzi, 21-22th
     September)


5.   BIBLIOGRAPHY:
-    E.Scala, "La riscossa dell'esercito", Ministero italiano
     della Difesa, Stato maggiore, Ufficio storico, pp.151-178.,
     Roma 1953
-    "Cefalonia", Ministero della Difesa, Stato maggiore
     esercito, Ufficio storico, Roma 1947
-    V. Spigai, "Lero", Tirrenia, Livorno 1949
-    Bollettino Comitato nazionale ANPI, Supplemento al N 23,
     "La resistenza italiana all'estero", Roma 1952

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-- Francesco Vianello
-- 100114.453@compuserve.com
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