

# THREE DAYS IN JUNE

## Bijlandt's Brigade and the Campaign of 1815. By David Meyler

That the British commanders were paranoid about their Dutch allies in 1815 is, perhaps, understandable. Having been under French domination since 1795, and direct rule from 1810, the army of the newly constituted Kingdom of the Netherlands inspired little confidence in those who had fought Napoleon through that same period. It was a logical conclusion that politically unreliable troops were also militarily unreliable. This impression has been reinforced in Captain W. Siborne's seminal account of the Hundred Days campaign, which appeared in 1844, and which has been uncritically carried over by later historians. But what does the result of the battlefield actually show? This article, looking in detail at Bijlandt's Brigade at Quatre Bras and Waterloo, will attempt to show the Netherlands Army of 1815 in a new light.

The great irony of this is that throughout the Napoleonic Wars, it was the French who had the most right to suspect their Dutch allies. Relations between the French and the Dutch were never easy. The Dutch revolutionaries, the "Patriots," were not just carbon-copies of their French counterparts. They owed more to the humanist tradition of Erasmus than to the theoretical meanderings of Rousseau. To the growing frustration of succeeding French administrations, the Dutch never proved to be a mere proxy for French policy.

During Napoleon's rule, various Dutch governments had to tread a very careful path. Aside from the Emperor's frustration with Dutch party politics, there were three main irritants for him: the Dutch refused to implement national conscription (political suicide for the party in power); they refused to repudiate their national debt (economic suicide as the Amsterdam money market remained one of the few underpinnings of the Dutch economy); and, most serious, the Dutch refused to actively participate in the Continental System.

In 1806, Napoleon made his younger brother Louis monarch of the newly-crafted Kingdom of Holland, expecting that this would give him a pliant puppet state. Instead, true to Bonaparte character, Louis took his role seriously and, to the surprise of almost everyone, provided an able administration and protected Dutch interests more than the Dutch themselves could have done. But, by 1809, the end of Dutch independence was in sight. Napoleon's demands for troops and money for his wars could not be put off indefinitely. Finally, in 1810, after 15 years of staving off what was inevitable. The independence of the Netherlands was snuffed out. Louis was "asked" to abdicate, and direct French rule was imposed. Conscription was instituted and the ban on trade with England rigorously enforced. Sporadic rioting broke out, some of it on a serious scale. Low-level guerrilla activity began. By 1812, it was not safe for the French customs officers and troops to be out after dark. The French debacle in Russia removed any lingering confidence in the Napoleonic regime. When the allied armies approached the Netherlands in 1813, French rule collapsed like a house of cards. Radical democrat and conservative alike could finally agree on one thing: Napoleon had to go. The French occupation of four years had created a single national will, something the previous 30 years of internal politics had failed to achieve. In 1813, William, Prince of Orange (son of the William exiled in 1795, and deceased in 1806), returned and became King William I of a newly reconstituted kingdom, including the former Austrian province (Belgium) as well as the northern provinces. He attempted to

rebuild an army along the British model. but in the emergency of 1815 had to resort to conscription. Only about one-fifth of his troops had seen previous military action, but his officer corps was both experienced and competent. While those who had lost positions of privilege with the fall of Napoleon may have welcomed news of the Emperor's return, most Dutch-Belgians were cynical. Their growing nationalism was hardly compatible with a renewed French empire on the continent. Dutch troops in 1815 generally evidenced a strong patriotic spirit, viewing the French as hostile invaders; the Belgian troops can best be characterized as politically indifferent (having now served a succession of foreign administrations over the previous three decades, his was hardly surprising). In spite of Wellington's misgivings about his allies, Dutch units were the first that made contact with the advancing enemy. While Wellington expected Napoleon to attack his right flank, and thus had concentrated his forces to the west, the French in fact struck at what amounted to the British left flank. Here, on the road to Brussels, near Quatre Bras was Perponcher's division, composed of Goedecke's Nassau brigade (Saxe-Weimar took command on 16 June) and Bijlandt's brigade of Dutch and Belgians. The force had been ordered to move west to Nivelles but Perponcher ignored the order as forward elements of his command had already contacted the French vanguard on 15 June. This turned out to be the entire French II Corps under General Reille, and an early disaster for the allies had been narrowly averted. It was Napoleon's intent to split the Anglo-Allied and Prussian armies apart; a move to Nivelles by Perponcher at this point would have accomplished that very neatly without any lighting at all.

The situation for Perponcher was far from secure, though. It would take some hours for reinforcements to reach his solitary division (even this was not yet at full strength), and for the time being he was on his own. Nassau outposts at Frasnes were driven off on 15 June, but resistance (notably from Stevenart's Belgian foot battery) had been strong enough to make the French cautious. Only by late evening on 16 June was II Corps ready to attack; the controversial battle of Quatre Bras was about to begin. Traditionally, British accounts of the battle, based on Siborne, begin around three o'clock when Wellington arrived on the field of battle (Precise times during this action are impossible to determine.) As the first British reinforcements were moved up at this point, all they saw were Dutch and Nassau units falling back some in disorder. The battle, however, had already been under way for perhaps 90 minutes, possibly as long as two hours. Perponcher had concentrated his forces in and along the woods of Bossu and the adjacent high ground on the right of his position. The five Nassau battalions were placed in dispersed order. In Bossu itself of Bijlandt's brigade, the 5th Militia battalion-tough farm lads from the Dutch province of Gelderland-occupied the key position of Gemioncourt farm, which covered the road to Brussels. The 7th Line battalion (Belgian) and 8th Militia (Dutch) were in reserve in Quatre Bras itself, while the 7th Militia was still enroute to the battlefield (and would not arrive in time to take part). To cover the left flank, the Dutch 27th Jaeger battalion (a strong unit with 800 men) was placed in a very dispersed line over 1,500 yards long, supported in place by the guns of Stevenart's battery and Bijlefeld's horse artillery battery.

Unfortunately for Perponcher, the French put the weight of their attack on this flank. The thin line of jaegers was soon forced back by the clouds of French skirmishers preceding the cautious but steady advance of Foy's and Bachelu's divisions. Bijlefeld successfully evacuated his guns back to Gemioncourt, while Stevenart attempted to move back to Bossu Wood. Stevenart, however, was killed and the men panicked and fled all the way back to Quatre Bras. The 5th Militia now moved past Gemioncourt in line, but French fire soon forced it to move back behind the farm. As the Dutch battalion moved back, the 5th and 6th Lancer Regiments of Pire's Light Cavalry Division saw their chance to carry the field and charged. The 27th Jaegers was scattered, and several dozen men were ridden down or speared. But the 5th Militia formed square smartly and beat off several attacks, although taking heavy losses from the French artillery. Sheltering in the woods, Bijlefeld's battery opened fire in support. Meanwhile, the 7th Line had moved down to cover the gap between the farm and the woods. William of Orange, 22-year-old son of King William and commander of the I Corps, much liked by his troops, led the 5th in a spirited charge. Retaking the farm and once again moving south, Stevenart's had by now been rallied, and they moved up in support. Pire's French cavalry charged again and took the Dutch in the flank. The militiamen were this time disrupted and driven back, William himself narrowly escaping. But the timely intervention of the 7th Line, which moved out of the shelter of the woods and drove off the lancers with some volleys of musket fire, salvaged the situation. But again, Gemioncourt was lost and the Dutch-Belgian line pushed back towards Quatre Bras. Meanwhile, in Bossu woods a confused fight had been raging between the Nassau battalions and the regiments of Jerome's division. Although some British accounts claim the Nassau troops were routed, no reports from first-hand participants are extant. Suffice to say, the three battalions of the 2nd Nassau bore the brunt of the fight outnumbered four-to-one and were slowly pushed back through the heavy growth. At this point now about three o'clock, Wellington arrived. Van Merlen's (or Merlin in the game) 2nd Light Cavalry Brigade also arrived, but exhausted after its nine-hour trot. The allied line was under severe pressure still. Pire's lancers charged the battered 5th Militia yet again but still could not break them. While the 7th Line moved back into the woods for protection, Van Merlen sent in his 6th Hussar Regiment, a recently raised Dutch formation, despite their obvious fatigue. The lancers counter-charged and the hussars were scattered, fleeing all the way back to Quatre Bras. (And almost trampling down Wellington in the process!) Stevenart's unlucky battery was overrun by the lancers during this action yet again (by the end of the battle, the unit would have lost 100 of its 119 men). The gunners of Gey's section of horse artillery, riding in support of van Merlen, made an impromptu charge against some of the French lancers attempting to make off with the guns and recaptured them—a most unusual "cavalry" action. With the hussars scattered, van Merlen himself charged with the 5th Light Dragoons, a veteran Belgian unit. These men had fought under the French, but in 1814 had voted to join the Austrian army as part of the anti-French Belgian Legion. Although his former comrades called on him to desert, Van Merlen refused and a bitter hand-to-hand fight resulted in the middle of the field.

Political considerations aside, one should not discount military pride; to desert was hardly honorable and regimental loyalty was certainly not limited to the English. (The only major desertion to occur during the campaign was the defection of the commander and staff of the French 14<sup>th</sup> Division to the Prussians.) The Belgian dragoons were forced to fall back, but the lancers had been distracted for the moment. Moving back towards Quatre Bras, the Belgian horse were then mistakenly fired upon by recently-arrived English infantry, killing 40 men including the regimental commander Mercx (first of several cases of mistaken identity between the allies with tragic consequences).

Now, with the steady arrival of British units, the situation was stabilized. Most of Perponcher's units were pulled back in reserve, although the 7<sup>th</sup> Line was committed with the British Guards in the counterattack on Jerome's division in Bossu. Thus, the opening phase of the battle was concluded. The rest of the action is well recounted in a number of sources, and a very brief summary will suffice here. The advance of Foy's and Bachelu's regiments was stopped by some precise volleys from the six British battalions now in place. A charge led by the 79<sup>th</sup> Highlanders drove the French infantry back along the entire line. There now followed a series of cavalry charges, both by Pire's light cavalry and the 8<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> Cuirassier regiments. The British line held firm, but late in the afternoon the last French charge caused a near disaster. The 69<sup>th</sup> Foot had not formed square properly, and it was ridden down by French cuirassiers. Two other nearby battalions, the 33<sup>rd</sup> and 73<sup>rd</sup> Foot, panicked and bled into the woods (both these battalions contained many new recruits). Ney, however, had not supported this cavalry with an infantry advance and could not now follow up this sudden success. At six o'clock, with 5000 fresh reinforcements, Wellington led a general counterattack which everywhere drove the French back and recaptured all the positions originally held by Perponcher's men. Bijlandt's brigade had taken heavy losses at ward slope at 11 AM with the 100-yard retreat at Quatre Bras. The 5<sup>th</sup> Militia especially. Out of 482 men and officers. 306 had been killed, wounded or were missing (for a total loss of 62.9% yet incredibly the unit had maintained its order through-out the long day. The 27<sup>th</sup> Jaegers lost 263 men, or 32.5% of its original strength. The 7<sup>th</sup> Line lost 94 men out of 701 and the 8<sup>th</sup> Militia 25 out of 566. In spite of these losses and a shortage of ammunition Bijlandt's force was next posted in front of the Anglo-Allied position which Wellington laid out on a shallow ridge near Waterloo on 17 June. Here the units served picket duty during the night of 17/18 June, getting little rest. The next morning the men received some thin soup and a limited resupply of ammunition. but were left on the exposed forward slope of the ridge. At about 11:00 AM, Perponcher noted concentrations of French artillery; according to his official report on 11 July 1815 (see Otto von Pivka, *Dutch-belgian Troops of the Napoleonic Wars*), Bijlandt's brigade was pulled back, coming into line with Pack's and Kempt's brigades of Picton's division, at around noon. Here a somewhat dispersed firing line was formed (denser than a skirmish line but thinner than the usual three-rank line) with a reserve line 100 yards behind based on the 5<sup>th</sup> Militia, which was obviously too battered for front-line duties.

Quite contrary to Siborne's account, Bijlandt's brigade was well out of the way of the French artillery bombardment and had been moved up the ridge some two hours before the major assault of D'Erlon's I Corps. Bijlandt was faced against the bulk of Donzelot's division (Bourgeois' brigade). Both Pack and Kempt formed battalion squares due to the presence of supporting French cavalry. Bijlandt remained in line buttressed on each flank by the British squares. But his first line was not

strong enough to hold the furious French assault and was pushed back onto the reserve. The Dutch seemed to disappear through the smoke and were assumed to be gone for good. Here however at least the 7<sup>th</sup> Line rallied with some of the militia, formed a square, and held. Later British reports of deserters are not pure fancy, and numbers of the militia no doubt fled the battlefield. Yet this is hardly the mass flight that Siborne recorded some 30 years after the fact. The smoke of battle, mixed with faded memories, had confused the calculated withdrawal from the forward slope at 11AM with the 100-yard retreat at 2PM and has thus created the story of the ignominious rout of Bijlandt's battalions. In fact the 7<sup>th</sup> Line again supported by the bulk of the militia, participated in Picton's counterattack against D'Erlon. The brigade remained in the line until the time of Ney's major assault on La Haye Saint in the late afternoon, when the whole brigade was pulled back into reserve due to lack of ammunition. The 7<sup>th</sup> Line at a military review in Paris in July, received a special commendation from Wellington for its actions at Waterloo (and the commander-in-chief was not known to be liberal with praise) Losses at Waterloo were heavy 85 men in the 27<sup>th</sup> Jaegers, 148 in the 7<sup>th</sup> line 286 in the 7<sup>th</sup> Militia and 162 in the 8<sup>th</sup> Militia Only the 7<sup>th</sup> Militia shows a suspiciously high number of "missing" on its rolls, and if significant desertion did occur on the battlefield It was probably from this unit The 7<sup>th</sup> Militia had not arrived at Quatre Bras in time to take part in the battle. Thus 18 June was its baptism of fire always a critical test for an untried unit Thus, it would appear that this failing of one green battalion has resulted in the general condemnation of all Dutch-Belgian troops for over a century. While the role of Bijlandt's brigade has been the focus here a summary of other Dutch units is enlightening. The much maligned cavalry division of General Collaert saw extensive action through-out the long afternoon De Ghigny's 1<sup>st</sup> Light Brigade (the 4<sup>th</sup> Dutch Light Dragoon and the 8<sup>th</sup> Belgian Lancers) charged the French 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Lancers east of La Haye Saint which were supporting D'Erlon's first assault The brigade was then moved west and charged the cuirassiers during the massed cavalry charges. A third charge was made against the Grenadiers a Cheval, which never reached the target in the face of massed French artillery fire. Meanwhile, van Merlen's regiments supported the British heavy cavalry in their charge against D'Erlon's forces, and were also engaged against the 1<sup>st</sup> Cuirassiers during the series of French charges in mid-afternoon. Van Merlen himself was Killed during this action (Collaert also suffered a fatal wound during the afternoon-the courage of the Dutch commanders was never at question.) The two regiments became separated, the 5<sup>th</sup> Light Dragoons joining de Ghigny while the 6<sup>th</sup> Hussars were moved to the far right flank in support of the British 1<sup>st</sup> Guards. Here they made good on their poor performance at Quatre Bras, making two charges against the Chasseurs a Cheval and the Lancers of the Guard during the climactic assault of the Imperial Guard. Tripp's heavy brigade of cavalry (1<sup>st</sup> Dutch, 2<sup>nd</sup> Belgian and 3<sup>rd</sup> Dutch Karabinier regiments) made two charges against the 7<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> Cuirassiers during the battle. All three Dutch-Belgian brigades participated in the general pursuit that night. Casualties among the cavalry were 1265 (out of a total strength of about 4100). Chasse's 3<sup>rd</sup> division (Detmer's and D'Aubreme's brigades) was not engaged for most of the day, being posted on the far right flank. Late in the afternoon it was moved east to shore up the allied line. During the march it was exposed to French artillery and so suffered considerable loss. In the Imperial Guard's final assault, Chasse was engaged by the eastmost column (1st Battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers). The British 30<sup>th</sup> and 73<sup>rd</sup> Foot (Halkett's brigade) broke after having been battered

the whole afternoon. Moving his artillery up, Chasse blasted the French at point-blank range Detmer's brigade then charged from the night flank, routing the guards back down the slope The 4<sup>th</sup> Grenadiers had meanwhile pushed back Halkett's other two battalions, the 69<sup>th</sup> and 33<sup>rd</sup> Foot (which had also suffered heavy losses), but following the rout of the 3rd Grenadiers fell back, in good order. Meanwhile the British 1<sup>st</sup> Guards and 52nd Foot were heavily engaged with the second column (composed of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> battalions of the 3rd Chasseurs) and routed it (in perhaps the most famous episode of the entire famous fight) Halkett's men had now rallied, and a general allied counterattack was launched. With this, the battle was over The aim of the above has been to show that the Dutch-Belgian troops in 1815 were not quite the hopeless rabble that Siborne described. Some of then actions can be considered heroic, such as the 5<sup>th</sup> Militia at Gemioncourt, others were less so, just as in all other national armies. Overall, the Dutch and Belgian formations were competent and this, as events proved, was good enough. On the accompanying chart arc some suggested revisions for the Dutch and Dutch Belgian forces for the entire period covered by *NAPOLÉON'S BATTLES* (which can be used with the accompanying Quatre Bras scenario) Hopefully, this article will also encourage other players to delve into the game system; what the designers have presented is only the beginning

### Dutch Units in French Service:

The actions of the Dutch army during the Napoleonic Wars are generally not well known, even to wargamers. Similar to Denmark, Sweden, Spain and Turkey, the Netherlands was a former "great power" now in decline. Nevertheless, while their fleets and armies posed no real threat, these nations could not simply be ignored. They might not make effective allies, but no ruler could afford to have them as friends of his enemies. The army of the Batavian Republic saw its first large actions against the joint Anglo-Russian invasion of 1799 in north Holland (the major battles at Bergen and Castricum) In 1809, the British alone attempted an invasion on an even larger scale along the Scheldt estuary, but Dutch forces were only lightly engaged as the bulk of their army was stationed abroad in support of the French. Batavian expeditionary corps served in the Germanies during 1796; during 1800-01 along the River Main under General Augereau's command; in June 1803 in Hanover under General Bessoles; during the summer of 1805 as part of Marmont's corps; and later that same year, in December, as part of Louis Napoleon's Army of the North. As the "Royal Dutch Army", three divisions formed part of Marmont's corps during 1806 campaigning in Germany; and in 1807 two Dutch divisions saw action at Friedland as part of Mortier's corps. Two brigades, with supporting elements, served with Jerome's corps in 1809, destroying von Schill's rebel Prussian force. A Dutch brigade served in Spain from 1808-10, seeing combat at Durango (1808), Mesa de Ibor, Ciudad Real, Merida, Talavera, Almonacid, Daymiel, Dos Barrios and Ocano (all 1809). In 1801, the Dutch army was disbanded. Some units were simply broken up; others were adapted as is into the French army and given new uniforms (some even kept then old uniforms). These latter units included the 2<sup>nd</sup> Grenadiers (later 3<sup>rd</sup>) of the Imperial Guard, the 123<sup>rd</sup>, 12<sup>th</sup>, 125<sup>th</sup> and 126<sup>th</sup> Line plus the Walcheren Legion (later renamed the 131<sup>st</sup> Regiment), the 33<sup>rd</sup> Light Infantry, the 9<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Foot and 7<sup>th</sup> Regiment of Horse artillery, the 11<sup>th</sup> Husaars, 14<sup>th</sup> Cuirassiers and the famous 2<sup>nd</sup> (or Red) Lancers of the Imperial Guard.

The Dutch contingent in Russia, aside from the guards units, served with Victor's IX Corps, divided between Daendel's and Partouneaux's

divisions. These were left as a reserve in Smolensk during the invasion, and were virtually the only fresh force left Napoleon after the retreat from Moscow. Victor's corps bore the brunt of the fighting at the crossing of the Berezina while covering the retreat. The bulk of his force was cut off on the wrong side of the river, and only a few of the rearguard escaped.

Typical of the losses, the 126<sup>th</sup> Regiment, of a strength of 1887 men, it had been reduced to just 206 skeletal survivors when it finally surrendered to the Russians. Those units that survived the debacle declared for the Prince of Orange in 1814. The French never made any great effort to raise a Belgian army as such, although some ethnic Belgian units did seemingly exist.

### Dutch Personalities in 1815:

**William of Orange (1792-1849):** Although only 22-years old at the time of Waterloo, William (son of King William I) had served for a number of years under Wellington in Spain not a bad schooling in the ways of war. His tactical handling of his forces at Quatre Bras cannot be faulted, but he had a tendency to be over-aggressive and was seriously wounded on the field at Waterloo. William was later much maligned due to his desperate but futile efforts to save La Haye Saint late in the day, resulting in the loss of a KGL battalion ridden down by French cavalry; but it is unfair to judge his reputation on this incident alone. (It might be noted that the commander of the KGL brigade himself made a similar move to reinforce the farm earlier in the day, also missed seeing the same mass of cavalry, leaving one battalion badly cut up before a square could be formed.) What William can be criticized for is not the tactical move but his failure to heed a subordinate who warned him about the location of the enemy cavalry.

**Jean- Victor de Constant Rebecque (1773- 1850):** He had a long record of service in opposition to the French revolution. He served in the armies of the Swiss Republic (his homeland), the Dutch Republic, Prussia, and Great Britain. This able staff officer was the key military advisor to young William (forming a team not unlike Blucher and Gneisenau).

**Hendrik de Perponcher-Sedlnitzky ( 1771 - 1856)** : He served first in the army of the Dutch Republic, as adjutant to Prince Frederick. From 1800-1813 he was in British service. After Leipzig, he rejoined the Dutch army and so came to command the 2nd Dutch-Belgian Division at Quatre Bras and Waterloo.

**David Hendrik Chasse (1765-1849):** Chasse served

as a cadet in the army of the Dutch Republic, but joined the "Patriot" movement. After 1795, he served first with the Batavian and then with the Royal Dutch army. For the French, he saw action in Spain and Austria, and in France in 1814. He commanded the 3rd Dutch-Belgian Division at Waterloo, playing a key role at the close of the battle.

**Jean-Antoine Collaert (1761-1816):** He had served with the Austrians in 1778, and then went to the army of the Dutch Republic. After 1795, he was an officer in the Batavian and Royal Dutch armies, and entered French service in 1810. He too rejoined the Dutch army in 1814 and commanded the cavalry division at Waterloo. In 1816, he at last succumbed to wounds suffered on that field.

*There follows a new scenario for NAPOLEON'S BATTLES, originally researched and submitted by Mr. Meyler. Some of the information and data included as explained in his article above varies from the values in a standard version of this action. Since Craig Taylor had already researched the same battle during the design effort of the*

*NAPOLEON'S BATTLES Module (containing nine new scenarios and new optional rules), he took the opportunity to collate and combine the information, plus making a few corrections. So, here we present the Quatre Bras scenario using both the standard version and information and, where different the changes espoused by Mr Meyler. This permits readers to try the scenario either way and draw their own conclusions.*

MEYLER'S REVISED LOW COUNTRIES INFORMATION CHART																				
UNIT TYPE		COMBAT MODS				DRD	RSP	FIRE	MOVEMENT c			MOVE MODS			POINTS					
		COL or LIM	LIN or ULM	SQ VS CV	a VS OT	/ RTr NO	/ DSP b	/ MODS 1	COL or LIM	LIN or ULM	MCH COL	RGH or SQ	BCK or SID	CG FM d						
HOLLAND	GHC Guard Heavy Cav. (06-10)	+2g	+3g	—	+6	2/4	6/B	—	13"	12"	21"	4/1	3/1	5"	12	16	20	—	—	
	GLC Guard Light Cav. (06-10)	−1g	+1g	—	+4	2/3	6/C	—	15"	14"	24"	3/1	2/1	6"	11	15	18	—	—	
	HC Heavy Cavalry (92-10)	+1g	+2g	—	+5	2/4	5/C	—	13"	12"	20"	4/1	3/1	6"	11	15	19	—	—	
	LC Light Cavalry (92-10) h	−2g	0g	—	+3	2/3	5/C	—	15"	14"	24"	3/1	3/1	7"	10	13	16	—	—	
	GD/GN Guard/Gren. Inf. (06-10) j3	0	+3	+8	−3	3/5	5/B	4"/0	11"	4"	18"	2/1	3/2	1"	—	21	27	32	37	
	LN Line Infantry (92-95) y	−5	+1	+5	−6	2/3	4/D	2"/−3	5"	2"	15"	3/1	3/1	2"	—	7	8	10	12	
	* LN Line Infantry (96-05)	−2	+1	+6	−5	2/3	4/C	4"/−1	10"	2"	15"	2/1	2/1	2"	—	11	13	16	19	
	* LN Line Infantry (06-10)	−1	+2	+7	−4	2/4	5/C	4"/0	10"	3"	16"	2/1	2/1	2"	—	13	17	20	24	
	* LEG Legion Infantry (94-95)	−2	+1	+6	−5	2/4	5/C	4"/0	10"	1"	18"	3/1	3/1	1"	—	12	15	17	20	
	* LEG Legion Infantry (96-10)	−2	+1	+6	−5	2/3	4/D	4"/−1	10"	2"	15"	2/1	2/1	2"	—	10	13	15	18	
* LT/JG Lt./Jager Inf. (95-10)	0	+3	+8	−4	2/4	5/C	5"/+1	12"	3"	18"	3/2	3/2	1"	—	15	19	23	26		
	4# 4# Horse Artillery (92-10) p	−5g	−3g	f	f	k	5/-	8"/0	11"	4"	21"	4/1	1/1	3"	—	9	—	—	—	
DUTCH-BELGIAN	* HC Heavy Cavalry (14-15)	+1g	+2g	—	+5	2/4	5/C	—	13"	12"	20"	4/1	3/1	6"	11	15	19	—	—	
	* LC Light Cavalry (14-15) h	−2g	0g	—	+3	2/3	4/D	—	15"	14"	24"	3/1	3/1	7"	9	12	16	—	—	
	* LEG/LN Line Infantry (14-15)	−2	+1	+6	−5	2/4	5/C	4"/0	10"	2"	16"	2/1	2/1	2"	—	12	15	18	21	
	* JG Jager Infantry (14-15) s	−2	+1	+6	−5	2/4	5/C	5"/+1	12"	3"	18"	3/2	3/2	1"	—	13	16	20	23	
	* GSN/MI Militia Inf. (14-15)	−3	−2	+4	−5	1/3	3/E	3"/−1	8"	1"	15"	4/1	3/1	1"	—	6	8	9	11	
	* 6# 6# Horse Artillery p	−5g	−3g	f	f				9"/0	11"	4"	21"	4/1	1/1	3"	—	9	—	—	—
* New or re-rated units.																				