Continente Indiano | home
National Security Study Memorandum 200
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 24, 1974
National Security Study Memorandum 200
--------------------------------------
TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Deputy Secretary of State
Administrator, Agency for International Development
SUBJECT: Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for U.S.
Security and Overseas Interests
The President has directed a study of the impact of world population
growth on U.S. security and overseas interests. The study should look
forward at least until the year 2000, and use several alternative
reasonable projections of population growth.
In terms of each projection, the study should assess:
- the corresponding pace of development, especially in poorer
countries;
- the demand for US exports, especially of food, and the trade
problems the US may face arising from competition for re-
sources; and
- the likelihood that population growth or imbalances will
produce disruptive foreign policies and international
instability.
The study should focus on the international political and economic
implications of population growth rather than its ecological, socio-
logical or other aspects.
The study would then offer possible courses of action for the United
States in dealing with population matters abroad, particularly in
developing countries, with special attention to these questions:
- What, if any, new initiatives by the United States are needed
to focus international attention on the population problem
- Can technological innovations or development reduce
growth or ameliorate its effects?
- Could the United States improve its assistance in the population
field and if so, in what form and through which agencies --
bilateral, multilateral, private?
The study should take into account the President's concern that
population policy is a human concern intimately related to the
dignity of the individual and the objective of the United States is to
work closely with others, rather than seek to impose our views on
others.
The President has directed that the study be accomplished by the
NSC Under Secretaries Committee. The Chairman, Under Secretaries
Committee, is requested to forward the study together with the
Committee's action recommendations no later than May 29,
1974 for consideration by the President.
HENRY A. KISSINGER
cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
NSSM 200:
IMPLICATIONS OF WORLDWIDE POPULATION GROWTH
FOR U.S. SECURITY AND OVERSEAS INTERESTS
December 10, 1974
CLASSIFIED BY Harry C. Blaney, III
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWN-
GRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED
ON DECEMBER 31, 1980.
This document can only be declassified by the White House.
----------------------------------------------------------
Declassified/Released on 7/3/89
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by F. Graboske, National Security Council
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
World Demographic Trends
1. World Population growth since World War II is quantitatively and
qualitatively different from any previous epoch in human history. The
rapid reduction in death rates, unmatched by corresponding birth rate
reductions, has brought total growth rates close to 2 percent a year,
compared with about 1 percent before World War II, under 0.5 percent in
1750-1900, and far lower rates before 1750. The effect is to double the
world's population in 35 years instead of 100 years. Almost 80 million are
now being added each year, compared with 10 million in 1900.
2. The second new feature of population trends is the sharp
differentiation between rich and poor countries. Since 1950, population in
the former group has been growing at 0 to 1.5 percent per year, and in the
latter at 2.0 to 3.5 percent (doubling in 20 to 35 years). Some of the
highest rates of increase are in areas already densely populated and with
a weak resource base.
3. Because of the momentum of population dynamics, reductions in birth
rates affect total numbers only slowly. High birth rates in the recent
past have resulted in a high proportion in the youngest age groups, so
that there will continue to be substantial population increases over many
years even if a two-child family should become the norm in the future.
Policies to reduce fertility will have their main effects on total numbers
only after several decades. However, if future numbers are to be kept
within reasonable bounds, it is urgent that measures to reduce fertility
be started and made effective in the 1970's and 1980's. Moreover, programs
started now to reduce birth rates will have short run advantages for
developing countries in lowered demands on food, health and educational
and other services and in enlarged capacity to contribute to productive
investments, thus accelerating development.
4. U.N. estimates use the 3.6 billion population of 1970 as a base
(there are nearly 4 billion now) and project from about 6 billion to 8
billion people for the year 2000 with the U.S. medium estimate at 6.4
billion. The U.S. medium projections show a world population of 12 billion
by 2075 which implies a five-fold increase in south and southeast Asia and
in Latin American and a seven-fold increase in Africa, compared with a
doubling in east Asia and a 40% increase in the presently developed
countries (see Table I). Most demographers, including the U.N. and the
U.S. Population Council, regard the range of 10 to 13 billion as the most
likely level for world population stability, even with intensive efforts
at fertility control. (These figures assume, that sufficient food could be
produced and distributed to avoid limitation through famines.)
Adequacy of World Food Supplies
5. Growing populations will have a serious impact on the need for food
especially in the poorest, fastest growing LDCs. While under normal
weather conditions and assuming food production growth in line with recent
trends, total world agricultural production could expand faster than
population, there will nevertheless be serious problems in food
distribution and financing, making shortages, even at today's poor
nutrition levels, probable in many of the larger more populous LDC
regions. Even today 10 to 20 million people die each year due, directly or
indirectly, to malnutrition. Even more serious is the consequence of major
crop failures which are likely to occur from time to time.
6. The most serious consequence for the short and middle term is the
possibility of massive famines in certain parts of the world, especially
the poorest regions. World needs for food rise by 2-1/2 percent or more
per year (making a modest allowance for improved diets and nutrition) at a
time when readily available fertilizer and well-watered land is already
largely being utilized. Therefore, additions to food production must come
mainly from higher yields. Countries with large population growth cannot
afford constantly growing imports, but for them to raise food output
steadily by 2 to 4 percent over the next generation or two is a formidable
challenge. Capital and foreign exchange requirements for intensive
agriculture are heavy, and are aggravated by energy cost increases and
fertilizer scarcities and price rises. The institutional, technical, and
economic problems of transforming traditional agriculture are also very
difficult to overcome.
7. In addition, in some overpopulated regions, rapid population growth
presses on a fragile environment in ways that threaten longer-term food
production: through cultivation of marginal lands, overgrazing,
desertification, deforestation, and soil erosion, with consequent
destruction of land and pollution of water, rapid siltation of reservoirs,
and impairment of inland and coastal fisheries.
Minerals and Fuel
8. Rapid population growth is not in itself a major factor in pressure
on depletable resources (fossil fuels and other minerals), since demand
for them depends more on levels of industrial output than on numbers of
people. On the other hand, the world is increasingly dependent on mineral
supplies from developing countries, and if rapid population frustrates
their prospects for economic development and social progress, the
resulting instability may undermine the conditions for expanded output and
sustained flows of such resources.
9. There will be serious problems for some of the poorest LDCs with
rapid population growth. They will increasingly find it difficult to pay
for needed raw materials and energy. Fertilizer, vital for their own
agricultural production, will be difficult to obtain for the next few
years. Imports for fuel and other materials will cause grave problems
which could impinge on the U.S., both through the need to supply greater
financial support and in LDC efforts to obtain better terms of trade
through higher prices for exports.
Economic Development and Population Growth
10. Rapid population growth creates a severe drag on rates of economic
development otherwise attainable, sometimes to the point of preventing any
increase in per capita incomes. In addition to the overall impact on per
capita incomes, rapid population growth seriously affects a vast range of
other aspects of the quality of life important to social and economic
progress in the LDCs.
11. Adverse economic factors which generally result from rapid
population growth include:
reduced family savings and domestic investment;
increased need for large amounts of foreign exchange for food imports;
intensification of severe unemployment and underemployment;
the need for large expenditures for services such as dependency support,
education, and health which would be used for more productive
investment;
the concentration of developmental resources on increasing food
production to ensure survival for a larger population, rather than on
improving living conditions for smaller total numbers.
12. While GNP increased per annum at an average rate of 5 percent in
LDCs over the last decade, the population increase of 2.5 percent reduced
the average annual per capita growth rate to only 2.5 percent. In many
heavily populated areas this rate was 2 percent or less. In the LDCs
hardest hit by the oil crisis, with an aggregate population of 800
million, GNP increases may be reduced to less than 1 percent per capita
per year for the remainder of the 1970's. For the poorest half of the
populations of these countries, with average incomes of less than $100,
the prospect is for no growth or retrogression for this period.
13. If significant progress can be made in slowing population growth,
the positive impact on growth of GNP and per capita income will be
significant. Moreover, economic and social progress will probably
contribute further to the decline in fertility rates.
14. High birth rates appear to stem primarily from:
a. inadequate information about and availability of means of fertility
control;
b. inadequate motivation for reduced numbers of children combined with
motivation for many children resulting from still high infant and child
mortality and need for support in old age; and
c. the slowness of change in family preferences in response to changes
in environment.
15. The universal objective of increasing the world's standard of
living dictates that economic growth outpace population growth. In many
high population growth areas of the world, the largest proportion of GNP
is consumed, with only a small amount saved. Thus, a small proportion of
GNP is available for investment -- the "engine" of economic growth. Most
experts agree that, with fairly constant costs per acceptor, expenditures
on effective family planning services are generally one of the most cost
effective investments for an LDC country seeking to improve overall
welfare and per capita economic growth. We cannot wait for overall
modernization and development to produce lower fertility rates naturally
since this will undoubtedly take many decades in most developing
countries, during which time rapid population growth will tend to slow
development and widen even more the gap between rich and poor.
16. The interrelationships between development and population growth
are complex and not wholly understood. Certain aspects of economic
development and modernization appear to be more directly related to lower
birth rates than others. Thus certain development programs may bring a
faster demographic transition to lower fertility rates than other aspects
of development. The World Population Plan of Action adopted at the World
Population Conference recommends that countries working to affect
fertility levels should give priority to development programs and health
and education strategies which have a decisive effect on fertility.
International cooperation should give priority to assisting such national
efforts. These programs include: (a) improved health care and nutrition to
reduce child mortality, (b) education and improved social status for
women; (c) increased female employment; (d) improved old-age security; and
(e) assistance for the rural poor, who generally have the highest
fertility, with actions to redistribute income and resources including
providing privately owned farms. However, one cannot proceed simply from
identification of relationships to specific large-scale operational
programs. For example, we do not yet know of cost-effective ways to
encourage increased female employment, particularly if we are concerned
about not adding to male unemployment. We do not yet know what specific
packages of programs will be most cost effective in many situations.
17. There is need for more information on cost effectiveness of
different approaches on both the "supply" and the "demand" side of the
picture. On the supply side, intense efforts are required to assure full
availability by 1980 of birth control information and means to all fertile
individuals, especially in rural areas. Improvement is also needed in
methods of birth control most acceptable and useable by the rural poor. On
the demand side, further experimentation and implementation action
projects and programs are needed. In particular, more research is needed
on the motivation of the poorest who often have the highest fertility
rates. Assistance programs must be more precisely targeted to this group
than in the past.
18. It may well be that desired family size will not decline to near
replacement levels until the lot of the LDC rural poor improves to the
extent that the benefits of reducing family size appear to them to
outweigh the costs. For urban people, a rapidly growing element in the
LDCs, the liabilities of having too many children are already becoming
apparent. Aid recipients and donors must also emphasize development and
improvements in the quality of life of the poor, if significant progress
is to be made in controlling population growth. Although it was adopted
primarily for other reasons, the new emphasis of AID's legislation on
problems of the poor (which is echoed in comparable changes in policy
emphasis by other donors and by an increasing number of LDC's) is directly
relevant to the conditions required for fertility reduction.
Political Effects of Population Factors
19. The political consequences of current population factors in the
LDCs -- rapid growth, internal migration, high percentages of young
people, slow improvement in living standards, urban concentrations, and
pressures for foreign migration -- are damaging to the internal stability
and international relations of countries in whose advancement the U.S. is
interested, thus creating political or even national security problems for
the U.S. In a broader sense, there is a major risk of severe damage to
world economic, political, and ecological systems and, as these systems
begin to fail, to our humanitarian values.
20. The pace of internal migration from countryside to over-swollen
cities is greatly intensified by rapid population growth. Enormous burdens
are placed on LDC governments for public administration, sanitation,
education, police, and other services, and urban slum dwellers (though
apparently not recent migrants) may serve as a volatile, violent force
which threatens political stability.
21. Adverse socio-economic conditions generated by these and related
factors may contribute to high and increasing levels of child abandonment,
juvenile delinquency, chronic and growing underemployment and
unemployment, petty thievery, organized brigandry, food riots, separatist
movements, communal massacres, revolutionary actions and
counter-revolutionary coups. Such conditions also detract from the
environment needed to attract the foreign capital vital to increasing
levels of economic growth in these areas. If these conditions result in
expropriation of foreign interests, such action, from an economic
viewpoint, is not in the best interests of either the investing country or
the host government.
22. In international relations, population factors are crucial in, and
often determinants of, violent conflicts in developing areas. Conflicts
that are regarded in primarily political terms often have demographic
roots. Recognition of these relationships appears crucial to any
understanding or prevention of such hostilities.
General Goals and Requirements for Dealing With Rapid Population Growth
23. The central question for world population policy in the year 1974,
is whether mankind is to remain on a track toward an ultimate population
of 12 to 15 billion -- implying a five to seven-fold increase in almost
all the underdeveloped world outside of China -- or whether (despite the
momentum of population growth) it can be switched over to the course of
earliest feasible population stability -- implying ultimate totals of 8 to
9 billions and not more than a three or four-fold increase in any major
region.
24. What are the stakes? We do not know whether technological
developments will make it possible to feed over 8 much less 12 billion
people in the 21st century. We cannot be entirely certain that climatic
changes in the coming decade will not create great difficulties in feeding
a growing population, especially people in the LDCs who live under
increasingly marginal and more vulnerable conditions. There exists at
least the possibility that present developments point toward Malthusian
conditions for many regions of the world.
25. But even if survival for these much larger numbers is possible, it
will in all likelihood be bare survival, with all efforts going in the
good years to provide minimum nutrition and utter dependence in the bad
years on emergency rescue efforts from the less populated and richer
countries of the world. In the shorter run -- between now and the year
2000 -- the difference between the two courses can be some perceptible
material gain in the crowded poor regions, and some improvement in the
relative distribution of intra-country per capita income between rich and
poor, as against permanent poverty and the widening of income gaps. A much
more vigorous effort to slow population growth can also mean a very great
difference between enormous tragedies of malnutrition and starvation as
against only serious chronic conditions.
Policy Recommendations
26. There is no single approach which will "solve" the population
problem. The complex social and economic factors involved call for a
comprehensive strategy with both bilateral and multilateral elements. At
the same time actions and programs must be tailored to specific countries
and groups. Above all, LDCs themselves must play the most important role
to achieve success.
27. Coordination among the bilateral donors and multilateral
organizations is vital to any effort to moderate population growth. Each
kind of effort will be needed for worldwide results.
28. World policy and programs in the population field should
incorporate two major objectives:
(a) actions to accommodate continued population growth up to 6 billions
by the mid-21st century without massive starvation or total frustration
of developmental hopes; and
(b) actions to keep the ultimate level as close as possible to 8
billions rather than permitting it to reach 10 billions, 13 billions, or
more.
29. While specific goals in this area are difficult to state, our aim
should be for the world to achieve a replacement level of fertility, (a
two-child family on the average), by about the year 2000. This will
require the present 2 percent growth rate to decline to 1.7 percent within
a decade and to 1.1 percent by 2000. Compared to the U.N medium
projection, this goal would result in 500 million fewer people in 2000 and
about 3 billion fewer in 2050. Attainment of this goal will require
greatly intensified population programs. A basis for developing national
population growth control targets to achieve this world target is
contained in the World Population Plan of Action.
30. The World Population Plan of Action is not self-enforcing and will
require vigorous efforts by interested countries, U.N. agencies and other
international bodies to make it effective. U.S. leadership is essential.
The strategy must include the following elements and actions:
(a) Concentration on key countries. Assistance for population moderation
should give primary emphasis to the largest and fastest growing
developing countries where there is special U.S. political and strategic
interest. Those countries are: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria,
Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, Turkey,
Ethiopia and Colombia. Together, they account for 47 percent of the
world's current population increase. (It should be recognized that at
present AID bilateral assistance to some of these countries may not be
acceptable.) Bilateral assistance, to the extent that funds are
available, will be given to other countries, considering such factors as
population growth, need for external assistance, long-term U.S.
interests and willingness to engage in self-help. Multilateral programs
must necessarily have a wider coverage and the bilateral programs of
other national donors will be shaped to their particular interests. At
the same time, the U.S. will look to the multilateral agencies --
especially the U.N. Fund for Population Activities which already has
projects in over 80 countries -- to increase population assistance on a
broader basis with increased U.S. contributions. This is desirable in
terms of U.S. interests and necessary in political terms in the United
Nations. But progress nevertheless, must be made in the key 13 and our
limited resources should give major emphasis to them. (b) Integration of
population factors and population programs into country development
planning. As called for by the world Population Plan of Action,
developing countries and those aiding them should specifically take
population factors into account in national planning and include
population programs in such plans. (c) Increased assistance for family
planning services, information and technology. This is a vital aspect of
any world population program. (1) Family planning information and
materials based on present technology should be made fully available as
rapidly as possible to the 85% of the populations in key LDCs not now
reached, essentially rural poor who have the highest fertility. (2)
Fundamental and developmental research should be expanded, aimed at
simple, low-cost, effective, safe, long-lasting and acceptable methods
of fertility control. Support by all federal agencies for biomedical
research in this field should be increased by $60 million annually. (d)
Creating conditions conducive to fertility decline. For its own merits
and consistent with the recommendations of the World Population Plan of
Action, priority should be given in the general aid program to selective
development policies in sectors offering the greatest promise of
increased motivation for smaller family size. In many cases pilot
programs and experimental research will be needed as guidance for later
efforts on a larger scale. The preferential sectors include:
Providing minimal levels of education, especially for women;
Reducing infant mortality, including through simple low-cost health
care networks;
Expanding wage employment, especially for women;
Developing alternatives to children as a source of old age security;
Increasing income of the poorest, especially in rural areas, including
providing privately owned farms;
Education of new generations on the desirability of smaller families.
While AID has information on the relative importance of the new major
socio-economic factors that lead to lower birth rates, much more
research and experimentation need to be done to determine what cost
effective programs and policy will lead to lower birth rates.
(e) Food and agricultural assistance is vital for any population
sensitive development strategy. The provision of adequate food stocks
for a growing population in times of shortage is crucial. Without such a
program for the LDCs there is considerable chance that such shortage
will lead to conflict and adversely affect population goals and
developmental efforts. Specific recommendations are included in Section
IV(c) of this study. (f) Development of a worldwide political and
popular commitment to population stabilization is fundamental to any
effective strategy. This requires the support and commitment of key LDC
leaders. This will only take place if they clearly see the negative
impact of unrestricted population growth and believe it is possible to
deal with this question through governmental action. The U.S. should
encourage LDC leaders to take the lead in advancing family planning and
population stabilization both within multilateral organizations and
through bilateral contacts with other LDCs. This will require that the
President and the Secretary of State treat the subject of population
growth control as a matter of paramount importance and address it
specifically in their regular contacts with leaders of other
governments, particularly LDCs.
31. The World Population Plan of Action and the resolutions adopted by
consensus by 137 nations at the August 1974 U.N. World Population
Conference, though not ideal, provide an excellent framework for
developing a worldwide system of population/family planning programs. We
should use them to generate U.N. agency and national leadership for an
all-out effort to lower growth rates. Constructive action by the U.S. will
further our objectives. To this end we should:
(a) Strongly support the World Population Plan of Action and the
adoption of its appropriate provisions in national and other programs.
(b) Urge the adoption by national programs of specific population goals
including replacement levels of fertility for DCs and LDCs by 2000. (c)
After suitable preparation in the U.S., announce a U.S. goal to maintain
our present national average fertility no higher than replacement level
and attain near stability by 2000. (d) Initiate an international
cooperative strategy of national research programs on human reproduction
and fertility control covering biomedical and socio-economic factors, as
proposed by the U.S. Delegation at Bucharest. (e) Act on our offer at
Bucharest to collaborate with other interested donors and U.N. agencies
to aid selected countries to develop low cost preventive health and
family planning services. (f) Work directly with donor countries and
through the U.N. Fund for Population Activities and the OECD/DAC to
increase bilateral and multilateral assistance for population programs.
32. As measures to increase understanding of population factors by LDC
leaders and to strengthen population planning in national development
plans, we should carry out the recommendations in Part II, Section VI,
including:
(a) Consideration of population factors and population policies in all
Country Assistance Strategy Papers (CASP) and Development Assistance
Program (DAP) multi-year strategy papers.
(b) Prepare projections of population growth individualized for
countries with analyses of development of each country and discuss them
with national leaders.
(c) Provide for greatly increased training programs for senior officials
of LDCs in the elements of demographic economics.
(d) Arrange for familiarization programs at U.N. Headquarters in New
York for ministers of governments, senior policy level officials and
comparably influential leaders from private life.
(e) Assure assistance to LDC leaders in integrating population factors
in national plans, particularly as they relate to health services,
education, agricultural resources and development, employment, equitable
distribution of income and social stability.
(f) Also assure assistance to LDC leaders in relating population
policies and family planning programs to major sectors of development:
health, nutrition, agriculture, education, social services, organized
labor, women's activities, and community development.
(g) Undertake initiatives to implement the Percy Amendment regarding
improvement in the status of women.
(h) Give emphasis in assistance to programs on development of rural
areas.
Beyond these activities which are essentially directed at national
interests, we must assure that a broader educational concept is developed
to convey an acute understanding to national leaders of the interrelation
of national interests and world population growth.
33. We must take care that our activities should not give the
appearance to the LDCs of an industrialized country policy directed
against the LDCs. Caution must be taken that in any approaches in this
field we support in the LDCs are ones we can support within this country.
"Third World" leaders should be in the forefront and obtain the credit for
successful programs. In this context it is important to demonstrate to LDC
leaders that such family planning programs have worked and can work within
a reasonable period of time.
34. To help assure others of our intentions we should indicate our
emphasis on the right of individuals and couples to determine freely and
responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have
information, education and means to do so, and our continued interest in
improving the overall general welfare. We should use the authority
provided by the World Population Plan of Action to advance the principles
that 1) responsibility in parenthood includes responsibility to the
children and the community and 2) that nations in exercising their
sovereignty to set population policies should take into account the
welfare of their neighbors and the world. To strengthen the worldwide
approach, family planning programs should be supported by multilateral
organizations wherever they can provide the most efficient means.
35. To support such family planning and related development assistance
efforts there is need to increase public and leadership information in
this field. We recommend increased emphasis on mass media, newer
communications technology and other population education and motivation
programs by the UN and USIA. Higher priority should be given to these
information programs in this field worldwide.
36. In order to provide the necessary resources and leadership,
support by the U.S. public and Congress will be necessary. A significant
amount of funds will be required for a number of years. High level
personal contact by the Secretary of State and other officials on the
subject at an early date with Congressional counterparts is needed. A
program for this purpose should be developed by OES with H and AID.
37. There is an alternate view which holds that a growing number of
experts believe that the population situation is already more serious and
less amenable to solution through voluntary measures than is generally
accepted. It holds that, to prevent even more widespread food shortage and
other demographic catastrophes than are generally anticipated, even
stronger measures are required and some fundamental, very difficult moral
issues need to be addressed. These include, for example, our own
consumption patterns, mandatory programs, tight control of our food
resources. In view of the seriousness of these issues, explicit
consideration of them should begin in the Executive Branch, the Congress
and the U.N. soon. (See the end of Section I for this viewpoint.)
38. Implementing the actions discussed above (in paragraphs 1-36),
will require a significant expansion in AID funds for population/family
planning. A number of major actions in the area of creating conditions for
fertility decline can be funded from resources available to the sectors in
question (e.g., education, agriculture). Other actions, including family
planning services, research and experimental activities on factors
affecting fertility, come under population funds. We recommend increases
in AID budget requests to the Congress on the order of $35-50 million
annually through FY 1980 (above the $137.5 million requested for FY 1975).
This funding would cover both bilateral programs and contributions to
multilateral organizations. However, the level of funds needed in the
future could change significantly, depending on such factors as major
breakthroughs in fertility control technologies and LDC receptivities to
population assistance. To help develop, monitor, and evaluate the expanded
actions discussed above, AID is likely to need additional direct hire
personnel in the population/family planning area. As a corollary to
expanded AID funding levels for population, efforts must be made to
encourage increased contributions by other donors and recipient countries
to help reduce rapid population growth.
Policy Follow-up and Coordination
39. This world wide population strategy involves very complex and
difficult questions. Its implementation will require very careful
coordination and specific application in individual circumstances. Further
work is greatly needed in examining the mix of our assistance strategy and
its most efficient application. A number of agencies are interested and
involved. Given this, there appears to be a need for a better and higher
level mechanism to refine and develop policy in this field and to
coordinate its implementation beyond this NSSM. The following options are
suggested for consideration: (a) That the NSC Under Secretaries Committee
be given responsibility for policy and executive review of this subject:
Pros:
Because of the major foreign policy implications of the recommended
population strategy a high level focus on policy is required for the
success of such a major effort.
With the very wide agency interests in this topic there is need for an
accepted and normal interagency process for effective analysis and
disinterested policy development and implementation within the N.S.C.
system.
Staffing support for implementation of the NSSM-200 follow-on exists
within the USC framework including utilization of the Office of
Population of the Department of State as well as other.
USC has provided coordination and follow-up in major foreign policy
areas involving a number of agencies as is the case in this study.
Cons:
The USC would not be within the normal policy-making framework for
development policy as would be in the case with the DCC.
The USC is further removed from the process of budget development and
review of the AID Population Assistance program.
(b) That when its establishment is authorized by the President, the
Development Coordination Committee, headed by the AID Administrator be
given overall responsibility:*
Pros: (Provided by AID)
It is precisely for coordination of this type of development issue
involving a variety of U.S. policies toward LDCs that the Congress
directed the establishment of the DCC.
The DCC is also the body best able to relate population issues to other
development issues, with which they are intimately related.
The DCC has the advantage of stressing technical and financial aspects
of U.S. population policies, thereby minimizing political complications
frequently inherent in population programs.
It is, in AID's view, the coordinating body best located to take an
overview of all the population activities now taking place under
bilateral and multilateral auspices.
Cons:
While the DCC will doubtless have substantial technical competence, the
entire range of political and other factors bearing on our global
population strategy might be more effectively considered by a group
having a broader focus than the DCC.
The DCC is not within the N.S.C. system which provides a more direct
access to both the President and the principal foreign policy
decision-making mechanism.
The DCC might overly emphasize purely developmental aspects of
population and under emphasize other important elements.
(c) That the NSC/CIEP be asked to lead an Interdepartmental Group for this
subject to insure follow-up interagency coordination, and further policy
development. (No participating Agency supports this option, therefore it
is only included to present a full range of possibilities). Option (a) is
supported by State, Treasury,
Defense (ISA and JCS), Agriculture, HEW,
Commerce NSC and CIA.**
Option (b) is supported by AID.
Under any of the above options, there should be an annual review of our
population policy to examine progress, insure our programs are in keeping
with the latest information in this field, identify possible deficiencies,
and recommend additional action at the appropriate level.***
* NOTE: AID expects the DCC will have the following composition: The
Administrator of AID as Chairman; the Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs; the Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs;
the Under Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture and Labor; an Associate
Director of OMB; the Executive Director of CIEP, STR; a representative of
the NSC; the Presidents of the EX-IM Bank and OPIC; and any other agency
when items of interest to them are under discussion.)
** Department of Commerce supports the option of placing the population
policy formulation mechanism under the auspices of the USC but believes
that any detailed economic questions resulting from proposed population
policies be explored through existing domestic and international economic
policy channels.
*** AID believes these reviews undertaken only periodically might look at
selected areas or at the entire range of population policy depending on
problems and needs which arise.
CHAPTER I - WORLD DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
Introduction
The present world population growth is unique. Rates of increase are
much higher than in earlier centuries, they are more widespread, and have
a greater effect on economic life, social justice, and -- quite likely --
on public order and political stability. The significance of population
growth is enhanced because it comes at a time when the absolute size and
rate of increase of the global economy, need for agricultural land, demand
for and consumption of resources including water, production of wastes and
pollution have also escalated to historically unique levels. Factors that
only a short time ago were considered separately now have interlocking
relationships, inter-dependence in a literal sense. The changes are not
only quantitatively greater than in the past but qualitatively different.
The growing burden is not only on resources but on administrative and
social institutions as well.
Population growth is, of course, only one of the important factors in
this new, highly integrated tangle of relationships. However, it differs
from the others because it is a determinant of the demand sector while
others relate to output and supply. (Population growth also contributes to
supply through provision of manpower; in most developing countries,
however, the problem is not a lack of but a surfeit of hands.) It is,
therefore, most pervasive, affecting what needs to be done in regard to
other factors. Whether other problems can be solved depends, in varying
degrees, on the extent to which rapid population growth and other
population variables can be brought under control. Highlights of Current
Demographic Trends Since 1950, world population has been undergoing
unprecedented growth. This growth has four prominent features:
1. It is unique, far more rapid than ever in history.
2. It is much more rapid in less developed than in developed regions.
3. Concentration in towns and cities is increasing much more rapidly
than overall population growth and is far more rapid in LDCs than in
developed countries. 4. It has a tremendous built-in momentum that
will inexorably double populations of most less developed countries by
2000 and will treble or quadruple their populations before leveling off --
unless far greater efforts at fertility control are made than are being
made.
Therefore, if a country wants to influence its total numbers through
population policy, it must act in the immediate future in order to make a
substantial difference in the long run.
For most of man's history, world population grew very slowly. At the
rate of growth estimated for the first 18 centuries A.D., it required more
than 1,000 years for world population to double in size. With the
beginnings of the industrial revolution and of modern medicine and
sanitation over two hundred years ago, population growth rates began to
accelerate. At the current growth rate (1.9 percent) world population will
double in 37 years.
By about 1830, world population reached 1 billion. The second billion
was added in about 100 years by 1930. The third billion in 30 years by
1960. The fourth will be reached in 1975.
Between 1750-1800 less than 4 million were being added, on the average,
to the earth's population each year. Between 1850-1900, it was close to
8 million. By 1950 it had grown to 40 million. By 1975 it will be about
80 million.
In the developed countries of Europe, growth rates in the last
century rarely exceeded 1.0-1.2 percent per year, almost never 1.5
percent. Death rates were much higher than in most LDCs today. In North
America where growth rates were higher, immigration made a significant
contribution. In nearly every country of Europe, growth rates are now
below 1 percent, in many below 0.5 percent. The natural growth rate
(births minus deaths) in the United States is less than 0.6 percent.
Including immigration (the world's highest) it is less than 0.7 percent.
In less developed countries growth rates average about 2.4 percent.
For the People's Republic of China, with a massive, enforced birth control
program, the growth rate is estimated at under 2 percent. India's is
variously estimated from 2.2 percent, Brazil at 2.8 percent, Mexico at 3.4
percent, and Latin America at about 2.9 percent. African countries, with
high birth as well as high death rates, average 2.6 percent; this growth
rate will increase as death rates go down.
The world's population is now about 3.9 billion; 1.1 billion in the
developed countries (30 percent) and 2.8 billion in the less developed
countries (70 percent).
In 1950, only 28 percent of the world's population or 692 million,
lived in urban localities. Between 1950 and 1970, urban population
expanded at a rate twice as rapid as the rate of growth of total
population. In 1970, urban population increased to 36 percent of world
total and numbered 1.3 billion. By 2000, according to the UN's medium
variant projection, 3.2 billion (about half of the total) of world
inhabitants will live in cities and towns.
In developed countries, the urban population varies from 45 to 85
percent; in LDCs, it varies from close to zero in some African states to
nearly 100 percent in Hong Kong and Singapore.
In LDCs, urban population is projected to more than triple in the
remainder of this century, from 622 million in 1970 to 2,087 in 2000. Its
proportion in total LDC population will thus increase from 25 percent in
1970 to 41 percent in 2000. This implies that by the end of this century
LDCs will reach half the level of urbanization projected for DCs (82
percent) (See Table I).
The enormous built-in momentum of population growth in the less
developed countries (and to a degree in the developed countries) is, if
possible, even more important and ominous than current population size and
rates of growth. Unlike a conventional explosion, population growth
provides a continuing chain reaction. This momentum springs from (1) high
fertility levels of LDC populations and (2) the very high percentage of
maturing young people in populations. The typical developed country,
Sweden for example, may have 25% of the population under 15 years of age.
The typical developing country has 41% to 45% or its population under 15.
This means that a tremendous number of future parents, compared to
existing parents, are already born. Even if they have fewer children per
family than their parents, the increase in population will be very great.
Three projections (not predictions), based on three different
assumptions concerning fertility, will illustrate the generative effect of
this building momentum.
a. Present fertility continued: If present fertility rates were to
remain constant, the 1974 population 3.9 billion would increase to 7.8
billion by the hear 2000 and rise to a theoretical 103 billion by 2075.
b. U.N. "Medium Variant": If present birth rates in the developing
countries, averaging about 38/1000 were further reduced to 29/1000 by
2000, the world's population in 2000 would be 6.4 billion, with over 100
million being added each year. At the time stability (non-growth) is
reached in about 2100, world population would exceed 12.0 billion.
c. Replacement Fertility by 2000: If replacement levels of fertility
were reached by 2000, the world's population in 2000 would be 5.9 billion
and at the time of stability, about 2075, would be 8.4 billion.
("Replacement level" of fertility is not zero population growth. It is the
level of fertility when couples are limiting their families to an average
of about two children. For most countries, where there are high
percentages of young people, even the attainment of replacement levels of
fertility means that the population will continue to grow for additional
50-60 years to much higher numbers before leveling off.)
It is reasonable to assume that projection (a) is unreal since
significant efforts are already being made to slow population growth and
because even the most extreme pro-natalists do not argue that the earth
could or should support 103 billion people. Famine, pestilence, war, or
birth control will stop population growth far short of this figure.
The U.N. medium variant (projection (b) has been described in a
publication of the U.N. Population Division as "a synthesis of the results
of efforts by demographers of the various countries and the U.N.
Secretariat to formulate realistic assumptions with regard to future
trends, in view of information about present conditions and past
experiences." Although by no means infallible, these projections provide
plausible working numbers and are used by U.N. agencies (e.g., FAO, ILO)
for their specialized analyses. One major shortcoming of most projections,
however, is that "information about present conditions" quoted above is
not quite up-to-date. Even in the United States, refined fertility and
mortality rates become available only after a delay of several years.
Thus, it is possible that the rate of world population growth has
actually fallen below (or for that matter increased from) that assumed
under the U.N. medium variant. A number of less developed countries with
rising living levels (particularly with increasing equality of income) and
efficient family planning programs have experienced marked declines in
fertility. Where access to family planning services has been restricted,
fertility levels can be expected to show little change.
It is certain that fertility rates have already fallen significantly
in Hong King, Singapore, Taiwan, Fiji, South Korea, Barbados, Chile, Costa
Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mauritius (See Table 1). Moderate declines
have also been registered in West Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Egypt. Steady
increases in the number of acceptors at family planning facilities
indicate a likelihood of some fertility reduction in Thailand, Indonesia,
the Philippines, Colombia, and other countries which have family planning
programs. On the other hand, there is little concrete evidence of
significant fertility reduction in the populous countries of India,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, etc.1
Projection (c) is attainable if countries recognize the gravity of
their population situation and make a serious effort to do something about
it.
The differences in the size of total population projected under the
three variants become substantial in a relatively short time.
By 1985, the medium variant projects some 342 million fewer people
than the constant fertility variant and the replacement variant is 75
million lower than the medium variant.
By the year 2000 the difference between constant and medium fertility
variants rises to 1.4 billion and between the medium and replacement
variants, close to 500 million. By the year 2000, the span between the
high and low series -- some 1.9 billion -- would amount to almost half the
present world population.
Most importantly, perhaps, by 2075 the constant variant would have
swamped the earth and the difference between the medium and replacement
variants would amount to 3.7 billion. (Table 2.) The significance of the
alternative variants is that they reflect the difference between a
manageable situation and potential chaos with widespread starvation,
disease, and disintegration for many countries.
Furthermore, after replacement level fertility is reached, family
size need not remain at an average of two children per family. Once this
level is attained, it is possible that fertility will continue to decline
below replacement level. This would hasten the time when a stationary
population is reached and would increase the difference between the
projection variants. The great momentum of population growth can be seen
even more clearly in the case of a single country -- for example, Mexico.
Its 1970 population was 50 million. If its 1965-1970 fertility were to
continue, Mexico's population in 2070 would theoretically number 2.2
billion. If its present average of 6.1 children per family could be
reduced to an average of about 2 (replacement level fertility) by 1980-85,
its population would continue to grow for about sixty years to 110
million. If the two-child average could be reached by 1990-95, the
population would stabilize in sixty more years at about 22 percent higher
-- 134 million. If the two-child average cannot be reached for 30 years
(by 2000-05), the population at stabilization would grow by an additional
24 percent to 167 million.
Similar illustrations for other countries are given below.
As Table 3. indicates, alternative rates of fertility decline would
have significant impact on the size of a country's population by 2000.
They would make enormous differences in the sizes of the stabilized
populations, attained some 60 to 70 years after replacement level
fertility is reached. Therefore, it is of the utmost urgency that
governments now recognize the facts and implications of population growth
determining the ultimate population sizes that make sense for their
countries and start vigorous programs at once to achieve their desired
goals.
FUTURE GROWTH IN MAJOR REGIONS AND COUNTRIES
Throughout the projected period 1970 to 2000, less developed regions
will grow more rapidly than developed regions. The rate of growth in LDCs
will primarily depend upon the rapidity with which family planning
practices are adopted.
Differences in the growth rates of DCs and LDCs will further
aggravate the striking demographic imbalances between developed and less
developed countries. Under the U.N. medium projection variant, by the year
2000 the population of less developed countries would double, rising from
2.5 billion in 1970 to 5.0 billion (Table 4). In contrast, the overall
growth of the population of the developed world during the same period
would amount to about 26 percent, increasing from 1.08 to 1.37 billion.
Thus, by the year 2000 almost 80 percent of world population would reside
in regions now considered less developed and over 90 percent of the annual
increment to world population would occur there.
The paucity of reliable information on all Asian communist countries
and the highly optimistic assumptions concerning China's fertility trends
implicit in U.N. medium projections2 argue for disaggregating the less
developed countries into centrally planned economies and countries with
market economies. Such disaggregation reflects more accurately the burden
of rapidly growing populations in most LDCs.
As Table 4. shows, the population of countries with centrally planned
economies, comprising about 1/3 of the 1970 LDC total, is projected to
grow between 1970 and 2000 at a rate well below the LDC average of 2.3
percent. Over the entire thirty-year period, their growth rate averages
1.4 percent, in comparison with 2.7 percent for other LDCs. Between 1970
and 1985, the annual rate of growth in Asian communist LDCs is expected to
average 1.6 percent and subsequently to decline to an average of 1.2
percent between 1985 and 2000. The growth rate of LDCs with market
economies, on the other hand, remains practically the same, at 2.7 and 2.6
percent, respectively. Thus, barring both large-scale birth control
efforts (greater than implied by the medium variant) or economic or
political upheavals, the next twenty-five years offer non-communist LDCs
little respite from the burdens of rapidly increasing humanity. Of course,
some LDCs will be able to accommodate this increase with less difficulty
than others.
Moreover, short of Draconian measures there is no possibility that
any LDC can stabilize its population at less than double its present size.
For many, stabilization will not be short of three times their present
size.
NATO and Eastern Europe. In the west, only France and Greece have a
policy of increasing population growth -- which the people are
successfully disregarding. (In a recent and significant change from
traditional positions, however, the French Assembly overwhelmingly
endorsed a law not only authorizing general availability of contraceptives
but also providing that their cost be borne by the social security
system.) Other western NATO members have no policies.3 Most provide some
or substantial family planning services. All appear headed toward lower
growth rates. In two NATO member countries (West Germany and Luxembourg),
annual numbers of deaths already exceed births, yielding a negative
natural growth rate.
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia have active policies
to increase their population growth rates -- despite the reluctance of
their people to have larger families. Within the USSR, fertility rates in
RSFSR and the republics of Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia are below
replacement level. This situation has prevailed at least since 1969-1970
and, if continued, will eventually lead to negative population growth in
these republics. In the United States, average fertility also fell below
replacement level in the past two years (1972 and 1973). There is a
striking difference, however, in the attitudes toward this demographic
development in the two countries. While in the United States the
possibility of a stabilized (non-growing) population is generally viewed
with favor, in the USSR there is perceptible concern over the low
fertility of Slavs and Balts (mostly by Slavs and Balts). The Soviet
government, by all indications, is studying the feasibility of increasing
their sagging birth rates. The entire matter of fertility-bolstering
policies is circumscribed by the relatively high costs of increasing
fertility (mainly through increased outlays for consumption goods and
services) and the need to avoid the appearance of ethnic discrimination
between rapidly and slowly growing nationalities.
U.N. medium projections to the year 2000 show no significant changes
in the relative demographic position of the western alliance countries as
against eastern Europe and the USSR. The population of the Warsaw Pact
countries will remain at 65 percent of the populations of NATO member
states. If Turkey is excluded, the Warsaw Pact proportion rises somewhat
from 70 percent in 1970 to 73 percent by 2000. This change is not of an
order of magnitude that in itself will have important implications for
east-west power relations. (Future growth of manpower in NATO and Warsaw
Pact nations has not been examined in this Memorandum.)
Of greater potential political and strategic significance are
prospective changes in the populations of less developed regions both
among themselves and in relation to developed countries.
Africa. Assessment of future demographic trends in Africa is severely
impeded by lack of reliable base data on the size, composition, fertility
and mortality, and migration of much of the continent's population. With
this important limitation in mind, the population of Africa is projected
to increase from 352 million in 1970 to 834 million in 2000, an increase
of almost 2.5 times. In most African countries, population growth rates
are likely to increase appreciably before they begin to decline. Rapid
population expansion may be particularly burdensome to the "least
developed" among Africa's LDCs including -- according to the U.N.
classification -- Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Upper Volta, Mali,
Malawi, Niger, Burundi, Guinea, Chad, Rwanda, Somalia, Dahomey, Lesotho,
and Botswana. As a group, they numbered 104 million in 1970 and are
projected to grow at an average rate of 3.0 percent a year, to some 250
million in 2000. This rate of growth is based on the assumption of
significant reductions in mortality. It is questionable, however, whether
economic and social conditions in the foreseeable future will permit
reductions in mortality required to produce a 3 percent growth rate.
Consequently, the population of the "least developed" of Africa's LDCs may
fall short of the 250 million figure in 2000.
African countries endowed with rich oil and other natural resources
may be in a better economic position to cope with population expansion.
Nigeria falls into this category. Already the most populous country on the
continent, with an estimated 55 million people in 1970 (see footnote to
Table 4), Nigeria's population by the end of this century is projected to
number 135 million. This suggests a growing political and strategic role
for Nigeria, at least in Africa south of the Sahara.
In North Africa, Egypt's population of 33 million in 1970 is
projected to double by 2000. The large and increasing size of Egypt's
population is, and will remain for many years, an important consideration
in the formulation of many foreign and domestic policies not only of Egypt
but also of neighboring countries.
Latin America. Rapid population growth is projected for tropical
South American which includes Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador
and Bolivia. Brazil, with a current population of over 100 million,
clearly dominates the continent demographically; by the end of this
century, its population is projected to reach the 1974 U.S. level of about
212 million people. Rapid economic growth prospects -- if they are not
diminished by demographic overgrowth -- portend a growing power status for
Brazil in Latin America and on the world scene over the next 25 years.
The Caribbean which includes a number of countries with promising
family planning programs (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Cuba, Barbados and
also Puerto Rico) is projected to grow at 2.2 percent a year between 1970
and 2000, a rate below the Latin American average of 2.8 percent.
Perhaps the most significant population trend from the viewpoint of
the United States is the prospect that Mexico's population will increase
from 50 million in 1970 to over 130 million by the year 2000. Even under
most optimistic conditions, in which the country's average fertility falls
to replacement level by 2000, Mexico's population is likely to exceed 100
million by the end of this century.
South Asia. Somewhat slower rates are expected for Eastern and Middle
South Asia whose combined population of 1.03 billion in 1970 is projected
to more than double by 2000 to 2.20 billion. In the face of continued
rapid population growth (2.5 percent), the prospects for the populous
Indian subregion, which already faces staggering economic problems, are
particularly bleak. South and Southeast Asia's population will
substantially increase relative to mainland China; it appears doubtful,
however, that this will do much to enhance their relative power position
and political influence in Asia. On the contrary, preoccupation with the
growing internal economic and social problems resulting from huge
population increases may progressively reduce the ability of the region,
especially India, to play an effective regional and world power role.
Western South Asia, demographically dominated by Turkey and seven
oil-rich states (including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait) is projected to
be one of the fastest growing LDC regions, with an annual average growth
rate of 2.9 percent between 1970 and 2000. Part of this growth will be due
to immigration, as for example, into Kuwait.
The relatively low growth rate of 1.8 percent projected for East
Asian LDCs with market economics reflects highly successful family
planning programs in Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong.
The People's Republic of China (PRC). The People's Republic of China
has by far the world's largest population and, potentially, severe
problems of population pressure, given its low standard of living and
quite intensive utilization of available farm land resources. Its last
census in 1953 recorded a population of 583 million, and PRC officials
have cited a figure as high as 830 million for 1970. The Commerce
Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis projects a slightly higher
population, reaching 920 million by 1974. The present population growth
rate is about two percent. Conclusion Rapid population growth in
less developed countries has been mounting in a social milieu of poverty,
unemployment and underemployment, low educational attainment, widespread
malnutrition, and increasing costs of food production. These countries
have accumulated a formidable "backlog" of unfinished tasks. They include
economic assimilation of some 40 percent of their people who are pressing
at, but largely remain outside the periphery of the developing economy;
the amelioration of generally low levels of living; and in addition,
accommodation of annually larger increments to the population. The
accomplishment of these tasks could be intolerably slow if the average
annual growth rate in the remainder of this century does not slow down to
well below the 2.7 percent projected, under the medium variant, for LDCs
with market economics. How rapid population growth impedes social and
economic progress is discussed in subsequent chapters.
CHAPTER II. POPULATION AND WORLD FOOD SUPPLIES
Rapid population growth and lagging food production in developing
countries, together with the sharp deterioration in the global food
situation in 1972 and 1973, have raised serious concerns about the ability
of the world to feed itself adequately over the next quarter century and
beyond.
As a result of population growth, and to some extent also of
increasing affluence, world food demand has been growing at unprecedented
rates. In 1900, the annual increase in world demand for cereals was about
4 million tons. By 1950, it had risen to about 12 million tons per year.
By 1970, the annual increase in demand was 30 million tons (on a base of
over 1,200 million tons). This is roughly equivalent to the annual wheat
crop of Canada, Australia, and Argentina combined. This annual increase in
food demand is made up of a 2% annual increase in population and a 0.5%
increased demand per capita. Part of the rising per capita demand reflects
improvement in diets of some of the peoples of the developing countries.
In the less developed countries about 400 pounds of grain is available per
person per year and is mostly eaten as cereal. The average North American,
however, uses nearly a ton of grain a year, only 200 pounds directly and
the rest in the form of meat, milk, and eggs for which several pounds of
cereal are required to produce one pound of the animal product (e.g., five
pounds of grain to produce one pound of beef).
During the past two decades, LDCs have been able to keep food
production ahead of population, notwithstanding the unprecedentedly high
rates of population growth. The basic figures are summarized in the
following table: [calculated from data in USDA, The World Agricultural
Situation, March 1974]:
INDICES OF WORLD POPULATION AND FOOD PRODUCTION
(excluding Peoples Republic of China)
1954=100
+--------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
| WORLD | DEVELOPED COUNTRIES|LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES|
| Food | Food | Food |
| production | production | production |
| | | |
| Popu- Per | Popu- Per | Popu- Per |
|lation Total Capita|lation Total Capita|lation Total Capita |
+------+--------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
| 1954 | 100 100 100 | 100 100 100 | 100 100 100 |
| 1973 | 144 170 119 | 124 170 138 | 159 171 107 |
| | |
| Compound Annual Increase (%): |
| | 1.9 2.8 0.9 | 1.1 2.8 1.7 | 2.5 2.9 0.4 |
+------+--------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
It will be noted that the relative gain in LDC total food production
was just as great as for advanced countries, but was far less on a per
capita basis because of the sharp difference in population growth rates.
Moreover, within the LDC group were 24 countries (including Indonesia,
Nigeria, the Philippines, Zaire, Algeria, Guyana, Iraq, and Chile) in
which the rate of increase of population growth exceeded the rate of
increase in food production; and a much more populous group (including
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) in which the rate of increase in
production barely exceeded population growth but did not keep up with the
increase in domestic demand. [World Food Conference, Preliminary
Assessment, 8 May 1974; U.N. Document E/CONF. 65/ PREP/6, p. 33.]
General requirements have been projected for the years 1985 and 2000,
based on the UN Medium Variant population estimates and allowing for a
very small improvement in diets in the LDCs.
A recent projection made by the Department of Agriculture indicates a
potential productive capacity more than adequate to meet world cereal
requirements (the staple food of the world) of a population of 6.4 billion
in the year 2000 (medium fertility variant) at roughly current relative
prices.
This overall picture offers little cause for complacency when broken
down by geographic regions. To support only a very modest improvement in
current cereal consumption levels (from 177 kilograms per capita in 1970
to 200-206 kilograms in 2000) the projections show an alarming increase in
LDC dependency on imports. Such imports are projected to rise from 21.4
million tons in 1970 to 102-122 million tons by the end of the century.
Cereal imports would increase to 13-15 percent of total developing country
consumption as against 8 percent in 1970. As a group, the advanced
countries cannot only meet their own needs but will also generate a
substantial surplus. For the LDCs, analyses of food production capacity
foresee the physical possibility of meeting their needs, provided that (a)
weather conditions are normal, (b) yields per unit of area continue to
improve at the rates of the last decade, bringing the average by 1985
close to present yields in the advanced countries, and (c) a substantially
larger annual transfer of grains can be arranged from the surplus
countries (mainly North America), either through commercial sales or
through continuous and growing food aid. The estimates of production
capacity do not rely on major new technical breakthroughs in food
production methods, but they do require the availability and application
of greatly increased quantities of fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation
water, and other inputs to modernized agriculture, together with continued
technological advances at past rates and the institutional and
administrative reforms (including vastly expanded research and extension
services) essential to the successful application of these inputs. They
also assume normal weather conditions. Substantial political will is
required in the LDCs to give the necessary priority to food production.
There is great uncertainty whether the conditions for achieving food
balance in the LDCs can in fact be realized. Climatic changes are poorly
understood, but a persistent atmospheric cooling trend since 1940 has been
established. One respectable body of scientific opinion believes that this
portends a period of much wider annual frosts, and possibly a long-term
lowering of rainfall in the monsoon areas of Asia and Africa. Nitrogen
fertilizer will be in world short supply into the late 1970s, at least;
because of higher energy prices, it may also be more costly in real terms
than in the 1960s. Capital investments for irrigation and infrastructure
and the organizational requirements for securing continuous improvements
in agricultural yields may well be beyond the financial and administrative
capacity of many LDCs. For some of the areas under heaviest population
pressure, there is little or no prospect for foreign exchange earnings to
cover constantly increasing imports of food.
While it is always unwise to project the recent past into the
long-term future, the experience of 1972-73 is very sobering. The
coincidence of adverse weather in many regions in 1972 brought per capita
production in the LDCs back to the level of the early 1960s. At the same
time, world food reserves (mainly American) were almost exhausted, and
they were not rebuilt during the high production year of 1973. A
repetition under these conditions of 1972 weather patterns would result in
large-scale famine of a kind not experienced for several decades -- a kind
the world thought had been permanently banished.
Even if massive famine can be averted, the most optimistic forecasts
of food production potential in the more populous LDCs show little
improvement in the presently inadequate levels and quality of nutrition.
As long as annual population growth continues at 2 to 3 percent or more,
LDCs must make expanded food production the top development priority, even
though it may absorb a large fraction of available capital and foreign
exchange.
Moderation of population growth rates in the LDCs could make some
difference to food requirements by 1985, a substantial difference by 2000,
and a vast difference in the early part of the next century. From the
viewpoint of U.S. interests, such reductions in LDC food needs would be
clearly advantageous. They would not reduce American commercial markets
for food since the reduction in LDC food requirements that would result
from slowing population growth would affect only requests for concessional
or grant food assistance, not commercial sales. They would improve the
prospects for maintaining adequate world food reserves against climatic
emergencies. They would reduce the likelihood of periodic famines in
region after region, accompanied by food riots and chronic social and
political instability. They would improve the possibilities for long-term
development and integration into a peaceful world order.
Even taking the most optimistic view of the theoretical possibilities
of producing enough foods in the developed countries to meet the
requirements of the developing countries, the problem of increased costs
to the LDCs is already extremely serious and in its future may be
insurmountable. At current prices the anticipated import requirements of
102-122 million tons by 2000 would raise the cost of developing countries'
imports of cereals to $16-204 billion by that year compared with $2.5
billion in 1970. Large as they may seem even these estimates of import
requirements could be on the low side if the developing countries are
unable to achieve the Department of Agriculture's assumed increase in the
rate of growth of production.
The FAO in its recent "Preliminary Assessment of the World Food
Situation Present and Future" has reached a similar conclusion:
What is certain is the enormity of the food import bill which might
face the developing countries . . . In addition [to cereals] the
developing countries . . . would be importing substantial amounts of other
foodstuffs. clearly the financing of international food trade on this
scale would raise very grave problems.
At least three-quarters of the projected increase in cereal imports
of developing countries would fall in the poorer countries of South Asia
and North and Central Africa. The situation in Latin America which is
projected to shift from a modest surplus to a modest deficit area is quite
different. Most of this deficit will be in Mexico and Central America,
with relatively high income and easily exploitable transportation links to
the U.S.
The problem in Latin America, therefore, appears relatively more
manageable.
It seems highly unlikely, however, that the poorer countries of Asia
and Africa will be able to finance nearly like the level of import
requirements projected by the USDA. Few of them have dynamic
export-oriented industrial sectors like Taiwan or South Korea or rich raw
material resources that will generate export earnings fast enough to keep
pace with food import needs. Accordingly, those countries where
large-scale hunger and malnutrition are already present face the bleak
prospect of little, if any, improvement in the food intake in the years
ahead barring a major foreign financial food aid program, more rapid
expansion of domestic food production, reduced population growth or some
combination of all three. Worse yet, a series of crop disasters could
transform some of them into classic Malthusian cases with famines
involving millions of people.
While foreign assistance probably will continue to be forthcoming to
meet short-term emergency situations like the threat of mass starvation,
it is more questionable whether aid donor countries will be prepared to
provide the sort of massive food aid called for by the import projections
on a long-term continuing basis.
Reduced population growth rates clearly could bring significant
relief over the longer term. Some analysts maintain that for the post-1985
period a rapid decline in fertility will be crucial to adequate diets
worldwide. If, as noted before, fertility in the developing countries
could be made to decline to the replacement level by the year 2000, the
world's population in that year would be 5.9 billion or 500 million below
the level that would be attained if the UN medium projection were
followed. Nearly all of the decline would be in the LDCs. With such a
reduction the projected import gap of 102-122 million tons per year could
be eliminated while still permitting a modest improvement in per capita
consumption. While such a rapid reduction in fertility rates in the next
30 years is an optimistic target, it is thought by some experts that it
could be obtained by intensified efforts if its necessity were understood
by world and national leaders. Even more modest reductions could have
significant implications by 2000 and even more over time.
Intensive programs to increase food production in developing
countries beyond the levels assumed in the U.S.D.A. projections probably
offer the best prospect for some reasonably early relief, although this
poses major technical and organizational difficulties and will involve
substantial costs. It must be realized, however, that this will be
difficult in all countries and probably impossible in some -- or many.
Even with the introduction of new inputs and techniques it has not been
possible to increase agricultural output by as much as 3 percent per annum
in many of the poorer developing countries. Population growth in a number
of these countries exceeds that rate.
Such a program of increased food production would require the
widespread use of improved seed varieties, increased applications of
chemical fertilizers and pesticides over vast areas and better farm
management along with bringing new land under cultivation. It has been
estimated, for example, that with better varieties, pest control, and the
application of fertilizer on the Japanese scale, Indian rice yields could
theoretically at least, be raised two and one-half times current levels.
Here again very substantial foreign assistance for imported materials may
be required for at least the early years before the program begins to take
hold.
The problem is clear. The solutions, or at least the directions we
must travel to reach them are also generally agreed. What will be required
is a genuine commitment to a set of policies that will lead the
international community, both developed and developing countries, to the
achievement of the objectives spelled out above.
CHAPTER III - MINERALS AND FUEL
Population growth per se is not likely to impose serious constraints
on the global physical availability of fuel and non-fuel minerals to the
end of the century and beyond.
This favorable outlook on reserves does not rule out shortage
situations for specific minerals at particular times and places. Careful
planning with continued scientific and technological progress (including
the development of substitutes) should keep the problems of physical
availability within manageable proportions.
The major factor influencing the demand for non-agricultural raw
materials is the level of industrial activity, regional and global. For
example, the U.S., with 6% of the world's population, consumes about a
third of its resources. The demand for raw materials, unlike food, is not
a direct function of population growth. The current scarcities and high
prices for most such materials result mainly from the boom conditions in
all industrialized regions in the years 1972-73.
The important potential linkage between rapid population growth and
minerals availability is indirect rather than direct. It flows from the
negative effects of excessive population growth in economic development
and social progress, and therefore on internal stability, in overcrowded
under-developed countries. The United States has become increasingly
dependent on mineral imports from developing countries in recent decades,
and this trend is likely to continue. The location of known reserves of
higher-grade ores of most minerals favors increasing dependence of all
industrialized regions on imports from less developed countries. The real
problems of mineral supplies lie, not in basic physical sufficiency, but
in the politico-economic issues of access, terms for exploration and
exploitation, and division of the benefits among producers, consumers, and
host country governments.
In the extreme cases where population pressures lead to endemic
famine, food riots, and breakdown of social order, those conditions are
scarcely conducive to systematic exploration for mineral deposits or the
long-term investments required for their exploitation. Short of famine,
unless some minimum of popular aspirations for material improvement can be
satisfied, and unless the terms of access and exploitation persuade
governments and peoples that this aspect of the international economic
order has "something in it for them," concessions to foreign companies are
likely to be expropriated or subjected to arbitrary intervention. Whether
through government action, labor conflicts, sabotage, or civil
disturbance, the smooth flow of needed materials will be jeopardized.
Although population pressure is obviously not the only factor involved,
these types of frustrations are much less likely under conditions of slow
or zero population growth.
Reserves.
Projections made by the Department of Interior through the year 2000
for those fuel and non-fuel minerals on which the U.S. depends heavily for
imports5 support these conclusions on physical resources (see Annex).
Proven reserves of many of these minerals appear to be more than adequate
to meet the estimated accumulated world demand at 1972 relative prices at
least to the end of the century. While petroleum (including natural gas),
copper, zinc, and tin are probable exceptions, the extension of
economically exploitable reserves as a result of higher prices, as well as
substitution and secondary recovery for metals, should avoid long-term
supply restrictions. In many cases, the price increases that have taken
place since 1972 should be more than sufficient to bring about the
necessary extension of reserves.
These conclusions are consistent with a much more extensive study
made in 1972 for the Commission on Population Growth and the American
Future.6
As regards fossil fuels, that study foresees adequate world reserves
for at least the next quarter to half century even without major
technological breakthroughs. U.S. reserves of coal and oil shale are
adequate well into the next century, although their full exploitation may
be limited by environmental and water supply factors. Estimates of the
U.S. Geological Survey suggest recoverable oil and gas reserves (assuming
sufficiently high prices) to meet domestic demand for another two or three
decades, but there is also respectable expert opinion supporting much
lower estimates; present oil production is below the peak of 1970 and
meets only 70 percent of current demands.7 Nevertheless, the U.S. is in a
relatively strong position on fossil fuels compared with the rest of the
industrialized world, provided that it takes the time and makes the heavy
investments needed to develop domestic alternatives to foreign sources.
In the case of the 19 non-fuel minerals studied by the Commission it
was concluded there were sufficient proven reserves of nine to meet
cumulative world needs at current relative prices through the year 2020.8
For the ten others9 world proven reserves were considered inadequate.
However, it was judged that moderate price increases, recycling and
substitution could bridge the estimated gap between supply and
requirements.
The above projections probably understate the estimates of global
resources. "Proved Reserves," that is known supplies that will be
available at present or slightly higher relative costs 10 to 25 years from
now, rarely exceed 25 years' cumulative requirements, because industry
generally is reluctant to undertake costly exploration to meet demands
which may or may not materialize in the more distant future. Experience
has shown that additional reserves are discovered as required, at least in
the case of non-fuel minerals, and "proved reserves" have generally
remained constant in relation to consumption.
The adequacy of reserves does not of course assure that supplies will
be forthcoming in a steady stream as required. Intermediate problems may
develop as a result of business miscalculations regarding the timing of
expansion to meet requirements. With the considerable lead time required
for expanding capacity, this can result in periods of serious shortage for
certain materials and rising prices as in the recent past. Similarly, from
time to time there will be periods of overcapacity and falling prices.
Necessary technical adjustments required for the shift to substitutes or
increased recycling also may be delayed by the required lead time or by
lack of information.
An early warning system designed to flag impending surpluses and
shortages, could be very helpful in anticipating these problems. Such a
mechanism might take the form of groups of experts working with the UN
Division of Resources. Alternatively, intergovernmental commodity study
groups might be set up for the purpose of monitoring those commodities
identified as potential problem areas.
Adequate global availability of fuel and non-fuel minerals is not of
much benefit to countries who cannot afford to pay for them. Oil supplies
currently are adequate to cover world needs, but the quadrupling of prices
in the past year has created grave financial and payment problems for
developed and developing countries alike. If similar action to raise
prices were undertaken by supplies of other important minerals, an already
bad situation would be intensified. Success in such efforts is
questionable, however; there is no case in which the quantities involved
are remotely comparable to the cases of energy; and the scope for
successful price-gouging or cartel tactics is much smaller.
Although the U.S. is relatively well off in this regard, it
nonetheless depends heavily on mineral imports from a number of sources
which are not completely safe or stable. It may therefore be necessary,
especially in the light of our recent oil experience, to keep this
dependence within bounds, in some cases by developing additional domestic
resources and more generally by acquiring stock-piles for economic as well
as national defense emergencies. There are also possible dangers of
unreasonable prices promoted by producer cartels and broader policy
questions of U.S. support for commodity agreements involving both
producers and consumers. Such matters, however, are in the domain of
commodity policy rather than population policy.
At least through the end of this century, changes in population
growth trends will make little difference to total levels of requirements
for fuel and other minerals. Those requirements are related much more
closely to levels of income and industrial output, leaving the demand for
minerals substantially unaffected. In the longer run, a lower ultimate
world population (say 8 to 9 billion rather than 12 to 16 billion) would
require a lower annual input of depletable resources directly affected by
population size as well as a much lower volume of food, forest products,
textiles, and other renewable resources.
Whatever may be done to guard against interruptions of supply and to
develop domestic alternatives, the U.S. economy will require large and
increasing amounts of minerals from abroad, especially from less developed
countries.10 That fact gives the U.S. enhanced interest in the political,
economic, and social stability of the supplying countries. Wherever a
lessening of population pressures through reduced birth rates can increase
the prospects for such stability, population policy becomes relevant to
resource supplies and to the economic interests of the United States.
ANNEX
OUTLOOK FOR RAW MATERIALS
I. Factors Affecting Raw Material Demand and Supply
Some of the key factors that must be considered in evaluating the
future raw materials situation are the stage of a country's economic
development and the responsiveness of the market to changes in the
relative prices of the raw materials.
Economic theory indicates that the pattern of consumption of raw
materials varies with the level of economic activity. Examination of the
intensity-of-use of raw materials (incremental quantity of raw material
needed to support an additional unit of GNP) show that after a particular
level of GNP is reached, the intensity of use of raw materials starts to
decline. Possible explanations for this decline are:
1. In industrialized countries, the services component of GNP expands
relative to the non-services components as economic growth occurs.
2. Technological progress, on the whole, tends to lower the
intensity-of-use through greater efficiency in the use of raw materials
and development of alloys.
3. Economic growth continues to be characterized by substitution of
one material by another and substitution of synthetics for natural
materials.11
Most developed countries have reached this point of declining
intensity-of-use.12 For other countries that have not reached this stage
of economic development, their population usually goes through a stage of
rapid growth prior to industrialization. This is due to the relative ease
in the application of improved health care policies and the resulting
decline in their death rates, while birth rates remain high. Then the
country's economy does begin to industrialize and grow more rapidly, the
initial rapid rise in industrial production results in an increasing
intensity-of-use of raw materials, until industrial production reached the
level where the intensity-of-use begins to decline.
As was discussed above, changes in the relative prices of raw
materials change the amount of economically recoverable reserves. Thus,
the relative price level, smoothness of the adjustment process, and
availability of capital for needed investment can also be expected to
significantly influence raw materials' market conditions. In addition,
technological improvement in mining and metallurgy permits lower grade
ores to be exploited without corresponding increases in costs.
The following table presents the 1972 net imports and the ratio of
imports to total demand for nine commodities. The net imports of these
nine commodities represented 99 percent of the total trade deficit in
minerals.
+--------------------------+--------------+------------------+
| | 1972 | Ratio of Imports |
| Commodity | Net Imports | to Total Demand |
| | ($Millions)* | |
+--------------------------+--------------+------------------+
| Aluminum | 48.38 | .286 |
| Copper | 206.4 | .160 |
| Iron | 424.5 | .049 |
| Lead | 102.9 | .239 |
| Nickel | 477.1 | .704 |
| Tin | 220.2 | .943 |
| Titanium | 256.5 | .469 |
| Zinc | 294.8 | .517 |
| Petroleum | 5,494.5 | .246 |
| (including natural gas) | | |
+--------------------------+--------------+------------------+
The primary sources of these US imports during the period 1969-1972 were:
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Commodity Source & % |
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aluminum - Canada 76% |
| Copper - Canada 31%, Peru 27%, Chile 22% |
| Iron - Canada 50%, Venezuela 31% |
| Lead - Canada 29%, Peru 21%, Australia 21% |
| Nickel - Canada 82%, Norway 8% |
| Tin - Malaysia 64%, Thailand 27% |
| Titanium - Japan 73%, USSR 19% |
| Zinc (Ore) - Canada 60%, Mexico 24% |
| Zinc (Metal) - Canada 48%, Australia 10% |
| Petroleum (crude) - Canada 42% |
| Petroleum (crude) - Venezuela 17% |
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
II. World Reserves
The following table shows estimates of the world reserve position for
these commodities. As mentioned earlier, the quantity of economically
recoverable reserves increases with higher prices. The following tables,
based on Bureau of Mines information, provide estimates of reserves at
various prices. (All prices are in constant 1972 dollars.)
Aluminum (Bauxite)
Price (per pound primary aluminum)
Price A Price B Price C Price D
.23 .29 .33 .36
Reserves (billion short tons, aluminum content)
World 3.58 3.76 4.15 5.21
U.S. .01 .02 .04 .09
Copper
Price (per pound refined copper)
.51 .60 .75
Reserves (million short tons)
World 370 418 507
U.S. 83 93 115
Gold
Price (per troy ounce)
58.60 90 100 150
Reserves (million troy ounce)
World 1,000 1,221 1,588 1,850
U.S. 82 120 200 240
Iron
Price (per short ton of primary iron contained in ore)
17.80 20.80 23.80
Reserves (billion short tons iron content)
World 96.7 129.0 206.0
U.S. 2.0 2.7 18.0
Lead
Price (per pound primary lead metal)
.15 .18 .20
Reserves (million short tons, lead content)
World 96.0 129.0 144.0
U.S. 36.0 51.0 56.0
Nickel
Price (per pound of primary metal)
1.53 1.75 2.00 2.25
Reserves (millions short tons)
World 46.2 60.5 78.0 99.5
U.S. .2 .2 .5 .5
Tin
Price (per pound primary tin metal)
1.77 2.00 2.50 3.00
Reserves (thousands of long tons - tin content)
World 4,180 5,500 7,530 9,290
U.S. 5 9 100 200
Titanium
Price (per pound titanium in pigment)
.45 .55 .60
Reserves (thousands short tons titanium content)
World 158,000 222,000 327,000
U.S. 32,400 45,000 60,000
Zinc
Price (per pound, prime western zinc delivered)
.18 .25 .30
Reserves (million short tons, zinc content)
World 131 193 260
U.S. 30 40 50
Petroleum:
Data necessary to quantify reserve-price relationships are not available.
For planning purposes, however, the Bureau of Mines used the rough
assumption that a 100% increase in price would increase reserves by 10%.
The average 1972 U.S. price was $3.39/bbl. with proven world reserves of
666.9 billion bbls. and U.S. reserves of 36.3 billion barrels. Using the
Bureau of Mines assumption, therefore, a doubling in world price (a U.S.
price of $6.78/bbl.) would imply world reserves of 733.5 billion bbls. and
U.S. reserves of 39.9 billion barrels.
Natural Gas:
Price (wellhead price per thousand cubic feet)
.186 .34 .44 .5
Reserves (trillion cubic feet)
World 1,156 6,130 10,240 15,599
U.S. 266 580 900 2,349
It should be noted that these statistics represent a shift in 1972
relative prices and assume constant 1972 technology. The development of
new technology or a more dramatic shift in relative prices can have a
significant impact on the supply of economically recoverable reserves.
Aluminum is a case in point. It is the most abundant metallic element in
the earth's crust and the supply of this resource is almost entirely
determined by the price. Current demand and technology limit economically
recoverable reserves to bauxite sources. Alternate sources of aluminum
exist (e.g., alunite) and if improved technology is developed making these
alternate sources commercially viable, supply constraints will not likely
be encountered.
The above estimated reserve figures, while representing approximate orders
of magnitude, are adequate to meet projected accumulated world demand
(also very rough orders of magnitude) through the year 2000. In some
cases, modest price increases above the 1972 level may be required to
attract the necessary capital investment.
Chapter IV - Economic Development and Population Growth
Rapid population growth adversely affects every aspect of economic
and social progress in developing countries. It absorbs large amounts of
resources needed for more productive investment in development. It
requires greater expenditures for health, education and other social
services, particularly in urban areas. It increases the dependency load
per worker so that a high fraction of the output of the productive age
group is needed to support dependents. It reduces family savings and
domestic investment. It increases existing severe pressures on limited
agricultural land in countries where the world's "poverty problem" is
concentrated. It creates a need for use of large amounts of scarce foreign
exchange for food imports (or the loss of food surpluses for export).
Finally, it intensifies the already severe unemployment and
underemployment problems of many developing countries where not enough
productive jobs are created to absorb the annual increments to the labor
force.
Even in countries with good resource/population ratios, rapid
population growth causes problems for several reasons: First, large
capital investments generally are required to exploit unused resources.
Second, some countries already have high and growing unemployment and lack
the means to train new entrants to their labor force. Third, there are
long delays between starting effective family planning programs and
reducing fertility, and even longer delays between reductions in fertility
and population stabilization. Hence there is substantial danger of vastly
overshooting population targets if population growth is not moderated in
the near future.
During the past decade, the developing countries have raised their
GNP at a rate of 5 percent per annum as against 4.8 percent in developed
countries. But at the same time the LDCs experienced an average annual
population growth rate of 2.5 percent. Thus their per capita income growth
rate was only 2.5 percent and in some of the more highly populated areas
the increase in per capita incomes was less than 2 percent. This stands in
stark contrast to 3.6 percent in the rich countries. Moreover, the low
rate means that there is very little change in those countries whose per
capita incomes are $200 or less per annum. The problem has been further
exacerbated in recent months by the dramatic increases in oil and
fertilizer prices. The World Bank has estimated that the incomes of the
800 million inhabitants of the countries hardest hit by the oil crisis
will grow at less than 1% per capita per year of the remainder of the
1970s. Taking account of inequalities in income distribution, there will
be well over 500 million people, with average incomes of less than $100
per capita, who will experience either no growth or negative growth in
that period.
Moderation of population growth offers benefits in terms of resources
saved for investment and/or higher per capita consumption. If resource
requirements to support fewer children are reduced and the funds now
allocated for construction of schools, houses, hospitals and other
essential facilities are invested in productive activities, the impact on
the growth of GNP and per capita income may be significant. In addition,
economic and social progress resulting from population control will
further contribute to the decline in fertility rates. The relationship is
reciprocal, and can take the form of either a vicious or a virtuous
circle.
This raises the question of how much more efficient expenditures for
population control might be than in raising production through direct
investments in additional irrigation and power projects and factories.
While most economists today do not agree with the assumptions that went
into early overly optimistic estimates of returns to population
expenditures, there is general agreement that up to the point when cost
per acceptor rises rapidly, family planning expenditures are generally
considered the best investment a country can make in its own future.
II. Impact of Population Growth on Economic Development
In most, if not all, developing countries high fertility rates impose
substantial economic costs and restrain economic growth. The main adverse
macroeconomic effects may be analyzed in three general categories: (1) the
saving effect, (2) "child quality" versus "child quantity", and (3)
"capital deepening" versus "capital widening." These three categories are
not mutually exclusive, but they highlight different familial and social
perspectives. In addition, there are often longer-run adverse effects on
agricultural output and the balance of payments.
(1) The saving effect. A high fertility economy has perforce a larger
"burden of dependency" than a low fertility economy, because a larger
proportion of the population consists of children too young to work. There
are more non-working people to feed, house and rear, and there is a
smaller surplus above minimum consumption available for savings and
investment. It follows that a lower fertility rate can free resources from
consumption; if saved and invested, these resources could contribute to
economic growth. (There is much controversy on this; empirical studies of
the savings effect have produced varying results.)
(2) Child quality versus quantity. Parents make investment decisions,
in a sense, about their children. Healthier and better-educated children
tend to be economically more productive, both as children and later as
adults. In addition to the more-or-less conscious trade-offs parents can
make about more education and better health per child, there are certain
biologic adverse effects suffered by high birth order children such as
higher mortality and limited brain growth due to higher incidence of
malnutrition. It must be emphasized, however, that discussion of
trade-offs between child quality and child quantity will probably remain
academic with regard to countries where child mortality remains high. When
parents cannot expect most children to survive to old age, they probably
will continue to "over-compensate", using high fertility as a form of
hedge to insure that they will have some living offspring able to support
the parents in the distant future.
(3) Capital deepening versus widening. From the family's viewpoint
high fertility is likely to reduce welfare per child; for the economy one
may view high fertility as too rapid a growth in labor force relative to
capital stock. Society's capital stock includes facilities such as schools
and other educational inputs in addition to capital investments that raise
workers' outputs in agriculture and manufacturing. For any given rate of
capital accumulation, a lower population growth rate can help increase the
amount of capital and education per worker, helping thereby to increase
output and income per capita. The problem of migration to cities and the
derived demand for urban infrastructure can also be analyzed as problems
of capital widening, which draw resources away from growth-generating
investments.
In a number of the more populous countries a fourth aspect of rapid
growth in numbers has emerged in recent years which has profound long-run
consequences. Agricultural output was able to keep pace or exceed
population growth over the many decades of population rise prior to the
middle of this century, primarily through steady expansion of acreage
under cultivation. More recently, only marginal unused land has been
available in India, Thailand, Java, Bangladesh, and other areas. As a
result (a) land holdings have declined in size, and (b) land shortage has
led to deforestation and overgrazing, with consequent soil erosion and
severe water pollution and increased urban migration. Areas that once
earned foreign exchange through the export of food surpluses are now in
deficit or face early transition to dependence on food imports. Although
the scope for raising agricultural productivity is very great in many of
these areas, the available technologies for doing so require much higher
capital costs per acre and much larger foreign exchange outlays for
"modern" inputs (chemical fertilizer, pesticides, petroleum fuels, etc.)
than was the case with the traditional technologies. Thus the population
growth problem can be seen as an important long-run, or structural,
contributor to current LDC balance of payments problems and to
deterioration of their basic ecological infrastructure.
Finally, high fertility appears to exacerbate the maldistribution of
income which is a fundamental economic and social problem in much of the
developing world. Higher income families tend to have fewer children,
spend more on the health and education of these children, have more wealth
to pass on to these children in contrast to the several disadvantages that
face the children of the poor. The latter tend to be more numerous,
receiving less of an investment per child in their "human capital",
leaving the children with economic, educational and social constraints
similar to those which restrict the opportunities of the parents. In
short, high fertility contributes to the intergenerational continuity of
maldistributions of income and related social and political problems.
III. The Effect of Development on Population Growth
The determinants of population growth are not well understood,
especially for low income societies. Historical data show that declining
fertility in Europe and North America has been associated with declining
mortality and increasing urbanization, and generally with "modernization."
Fertility declined substantially in the West without the benefit of
sophisticated contraceptives. This movement from high fertility and high
mortality to low fertility and low mortality is known as the "demographic
transition". In many low income countries mortality has declined markedly
since World War II (in large part from reduction in epidemic illness and
famine), but fertility has remained high. Apart from a few pockets of low
fertility in East Asia and the Caribbean, a significant demographic
transition has not occurred in the third world. (The Chinese, however,
make remarkable claims about their success in reducing birth rates, and
qualified observers are persuaded that they have had unusual success even
though specific demographic information is lacking.)
There is considerable, incontestable evidence in many developing
countries that a larger (though not fully known) number of couples would
like to have fewer children than possible generally there -- and that
there is a large unsatisfied demand by these couples for family planning
services. It is also now widely believed that something more that family
planning services will be needed to motivate other couples to want smaller
families and all couples to want replacement levels essential to the
progress and growth of their countries.
There is also evidence, although it is not conclusive, that certain
aspects of economic development and modernization are more directly
related to lowered birth rates than others, and that selective
developmental policies may bring about a demographic transition at
substantially lower per capita income levels than in Europe, North
America, and Japan.13 Such selective policies would focus on improved
health care and nutrition directed toward reduced infant and child
mortality; universal schooling and adult literacy, especially for women;
increasing the legal age of marriage; greater opportunities for female
employment in the money economy; improved old-age social security
arrangements; and agricultural modernization focussed on small farmers. It
is important that this focus be made in development programs because,
given today's high population densities, high birth rates, and low income
levels in much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, if the demographic
transition has to await overall development and modernization, the vicious
circle of poverty, people, and unemployment may never be broken.
The causes of high birth rates in low income societies are generally
explained in terms of three factors:
a. Inadequacy of information and means. Actual family size in many
societies is higher than desired family size owing to ignorance of
acceptable birth control methods or unavailability of birth control
devices and services. The importance of this factor is evidenced by many
sociological investigations on "desired family size" versus actual size,
and by the substantial rates of acceptance for contraceptives when
systematic family planning services are introduced. This factor has been a
basic assumption in the family planning programs of official bilateral and
multilateral programs in many countries over the past decade. Whatever the
actual weight of this factor, which clearly varies from country to country
and which shifts with changes in economic and social conditions, there
remains without question a significant demand for family planning
services.
b. Inadequacy of motivation for reduced numbers of children.
Especially in the rural areas of underdeveloped countries, which account
for the major share of today's population growth, parents often want large
numbers of children (especially boys) (i) to ensure that some will survive
against the odds of high child mortality, (ii) to provide support for the
parents in their old age, and (iii) to provide low cost farm labor. While
these elements are present among rural populace, continued urbanization
may reduce the need for sons in the longer term. The absence of
educational and employment opportunities for young women intensifies these
same motivations by encouraging early marriage and early and frequent
maternity. This factor suggests the crucial importance of selective
development policies as a means of accelerating the reduction of
fertility.
c. The "time lag". Family preferences and social institutions that
favor high fertility change slowly. Even though mortality and economic
conditions have improved significantly since World War II in LDCs, family
expectations, social norms, and parental practice are slow to respond to
these altered conditions. This factor leads to the need for large scale
programs of information, education, and persuasion directed at lower
fertility.
The three elements are undoubtedly intermixed in varying proportions
in all underdeveloped countries with high birth rates. In most LDCs, many
couples would reduce their completed family size if appropriate birth
control methods were more easily available. The extent of this reduction,
however, may still leave their completed family size at higher than mere
replacement levels -- i.e., at levels implying continued but less rapid
population growth. Many other couples would not reduce their desired
family size merely if better contraceptives were available, either because
they see large families as economically beneficial, or because of cultural
factors, or because they misread their own economic interests.
Therefore, family planning supply (contraceptive technology and
delivery systems) and demand (the motivation for reduced fertility) would
not be viewed as mutually exclusive alternatives; they are complementary
and may be mutually reinforcing. The selected point of focus mentioned
earlier -- old age security programs, maternal and child health programs,
increased female education, increasing the legal age of marriage,
financial incentives to "acceptors", personnel, -- are important, yet
better information is required as to which measures are most
cost-effective and feasible in a given situation and how their
cost-effectiveness compares to supply programs.
One additional interesting area is receiving increasing attention:
the distribution of the benefits of development. Experience in several
countries suggests that the extent to which the poor, with the highest
fertility rates, reduce their fertility will depend on the extent to which
they participate in development. In this view the average level of
economic development and the average amount of modernization are less
important determinants of population growth than is the specific structure
of development. This line of investigation suggests that social
development activities need to be more precisely targeted than in the past
to reach the lowest income people, to counteract their desire for high
fertility as a means of alleviating certain adverse conditions.
IV. Employment and Social Problems
Employment, aside from its role in production of goods and services,
is an important source of income and of status or recognition to workers
and their families. The inability of large segments of the economically
active population in developing countries to find jobs offering a minimum
acceptable standard of living is reflected in a widening of income
disparities and a deepening sense of economic, political and social
frustration.
The most economically significant employment problems in LDCs
contributed to by excessive population growth are low worker productivity
in production of traditional goods and services produced, the changing
aspirations of the work force, the existing distribution of income, wealth
and power, and the natural resource endowment of a country.
The political and social problems of urban overcrowding are directly
related to population growth. In addition to the still-high fertility in
urban areas of many LDC's, population pressures on the land, which
increases migration to the cities, adds to the pressures on urban job
markets and political stability, and strains, the capacity to provide
schools, health facilities, and water supplies.
It should be recognized that lower fertility will relieve only a
portion of these strains and that its most beneficial effects will be felt
only over a period of decades. Most of the potential migrants from
countryside to city over the coming 15 to 20 years have already been born.
Lower birth rates do provide some immediate relief to health and
sanitation and welfare services, and medium-term relief to pressures on
educational systems. The largest effects on employment, migration, and
living standards, however, will be felt only after 25 or 30 years. The
time lags inherent in all aspects of population dynamics only reinforce
the urgency of adopting effective policies in the years immediately ahead
if the formidable problems of the present decade are not to become utterly
unmanageable in the 1990s and beyond the year 2000.
Chapter V -- Implications of Population Pressures for National Security
It seems well understood that the impact of population factors on the
subjects already considered -- development, food requirements, resources,
environment -- adversely affects the welfare and progress of countries in
which we have a friendly interest and thus indirectly adversely affects
broad U.S. interests as well.
The effects of population factors on the political stability of these
countries and their implications for internal and international order or
disorder, destructive social unrest, violence and disruptive foreign
activities are less well understood and need more analysis. Nevertheless,
some strategists and experts believe that these effects may ultimately be
the most important of those arising from population factors, most harmful
to the countries where they occur and seriously affecting U.S. interests.
Other experts within the U.S. Government disagree with this conclusion.
A recent study14 of forty-five local conflicts involving Third World
countries examined the ways in which population factors affect the
initiation and course of a conflict in different situations. The study
reached two major conclusions:
1. ". . . population factors are indeed critical in, and often
determinants of, violent conflict in developing areas. Segmental
(religious, social, racial) differences, migration, rapid population
growth, differential levels of knowledge and skills, rural/urban
differences, population pressure and the spacial location of population in
relation to resources -- in this rough order of importance -- all appear
to be important contributions to conflict and violence...
2. Clearly, conflicts which are regarded in primarily political terms
often have demographic roots: Recognition of these relationships appears
crucial to any understanding or prevention of such hostilities."
It does not appear that the population factors act alone or, often,
directly to cause the disruptive effects. They act through intervening
elements -- variables. They also add to other causative factors turning
what might have been only a difficult situation into one with disruptive
results.
This action is seldom simple. Professor Philip Hauser of the
University of Chicago has suggested the concept of "population complosion"
to describe the situation in many developing countries when (a) more and
more people are born into or move into and are compressed in the same
living space under (b) conditions and irritations of different races,
colors, religions, languages, or cultural backgrounds, often with
differential rates of population growth among these groups, and (c) with
the frustrations of failure to achieve their aspirations for better
standards of living for themselves or their children. To these may be
added pressures for and actual international migration. These population
factors appear to have a multiplying effect on other factors involved in
situations of incipient violence. Population density, the "overpopulation"
most often thought of in this connection, is much less important.
These population factors contribute to socio-economic variables
including breakdowns in social structures, underemployment and
unemployment, poverty, deprived people in city slums, lowered
opportunities for education for the masses, few job opportunities for
those who do obtain education, interracial, religious, and regional
rivalries, and sharply increased financial, planning, and administrative
burdens on governmental systems at all levels.
These adverse conditions appear to contribute frequently to harmful
developments of a political nature: Juvenile delinquency, thievery and
other crimes, organized brigandry, kidnapping and terrorism, food riots,
other outbreaks of violence; guerilla warfare, communal violence,
separatist movements, revolutionary movements and counter-revolutionary
coups. All of these bear upon the weakening or collapse of local, state,
or national government functions.
Beyond national boundaries, population factors appear to have had
operative roles in some past politically disturbing legal or illegal mass
migrations, border incidents, and wars. If current increased population
pressures continue they may have greater potential for future disruption
in foreign relations.
Perhaps most important, in the last decade population factors have
impacted more severely than before on availabilities of agricultural land
and resources, industrialization, pollution and the environment. All this
is occurring at a time when international communications have created
rising expectations which are being frustrated by slow development and
inequalities of distribution.
Since population factors work with other factors and act through
intervening linkages, research as to their effects of a political nature
is difficult and "proof" even more so. This does not mean, however, that
the causality does not exist. It means only that U.S. policy decisions
must take into account the less precise and programmatic character of our
knowledge of these linkages.
Although general hypotheses are hard to draw, some seem reasonably
sustainable:
1. Population growth and inadequate resources. Where population size
is greater than available resources, or is expanding more rapidly than the
available resources, there is a tendency toward internal disorders and
violence and, sometimes, disruptive international policies or violence.
The higher the rate of growth, the more salient a factor population
increase appears to be. A sense of increasing crowding, real or perceived,
seems to generate such tendencies, especially if it seems to thwart
obtaining desired personal or national goals.
2. Populations with a high proportion of growth. The young people,
who are in much higher proportions in many LDCs, are likely to be more
volatile, unstable, prone to extremes, alienation and violence than an
older population. These young people can more readily be persuaded to
attack the legal institutions of the government or real property of the
"establishment," "imperialists," multinational corporations, or other --
often foreign -- influences blamed for their troubles.
3. Population factors with social cleavages. When adverse population
factors of growth, movement, density, excess, or pressure coincide with
racial, religious, color, linguistic, cultural, or other social cleavages,
there will develop the most potentially explosive situations for internal
disorder, perhaps with external effects. When such factors exist together
with the reality or sense of relative deprivation among different groups
within the same country or in relation to other countries or peoples, the
probability of violence increases significantly.
4. Population movements and international migrations. Population
movements within countries appear to have a large role in disorders.
Migrations into neighboring countries (especially those richer or more
sparsely settled), whether legal or illegal, can provoke negative
political reactions or force.
There may be increased propensities for violence arising simply from
technological developments making it easier -- e.g., international
proliferation and more ready accessibility to sub-national groups of
nuclear and other lethal weaponry. These possibilities make the disruptive
population factors discussed above even more dangerous.
Some Effects of Current Population Pressures
In the 1960s and 1970s, there have been a series of episodes in which
population factors have apparently had a role -- directly or indirectly --
affecting countries in which we have an interest.
El Salvador-Honduras War. An example was the 1969 war between El
Salvador and Honduras. Dubbed the "Soccer War", it was sparked by a riot
during a soccer match, its underlying cause was tension resulting from the
large scale migration of Salvadorans from their rapidly growing, densely
populated country to relatively uninhabited areas of Honduras. The
Hondurans resented the presence of migrants and in 1969 began to enforce
an already extant land tenancy law to expel them. El Salvador was angered
by the treatment given its citizens. Flaring tempers on both sides over
this issue created a situation which ultimately led to a military clash.
Nigeria. The Nigerian civil war seriously retarded the progress of
Africa's most populous nations and caused political repercussions and
pressures in the United States. It was fundamentally a matter of tribal
relationships. Irritations among the tribes caused in part by rapidly
increasing numbers of people, in a situation of inadequate opportunity for
most of them, magnified the tribal issues and may have helped precipitate
the war. The migration of the Ibos from Eastern Nigeria, looking for
employment, led to competition with local peoples of other tribes and
contributed to tribal rioting. This unstable situation was intensified by
the fact that in the 1963 population census returns were falsified to
inflate the Western region's population and hence its representation in
the Federal Government. The Ibos of the Eastern region, with the oil
resources of the country, felt their resources would be unjustly drawn on
and attempted to establish their independence.
Pakistan-India-Bangladesh 1970-71. This religious and nationalistic
conflict contains several points where a population factor at a crucial
time may have had a causal effect in turning events away from peaceful
solutions to violence. The Central Government in West Pakistan resorted to
military suppression of the East Wing after the election in which the
Awami League had an overwhelming victory in East Pakistan. This election
had followed two sets of circumstances. The first was a growing discontent
in East Pakistan at the slow rate of economic and social progress being
made and the Bengali feeling that West Pakistan was dealing unequally and
unfairly with East Pakistan in the distribution of national revenues. The
first population factor was the 75 million Bengalis whom the 45 million
West Pakistanis sought to continue to dominate. Some observers believe
that as a recent population factor the rapid rate of population growth in
East Pakistan seriously diminished the per capita improvement from the
revenues made available and contributed significantly to the discontent. A
special aspect of the population explosion in East Pakistan (second
population factor) was the fact that the dense occupation of all good
agricultural land forced hundreds of thousands of people to move into the
obviously unsafe lowlands along the southern coast. They became victims of
the hurricane in 1970. An estimated 300,000 died. The Government was
unable to deal with a disaster affecting so many people. The leaders and
people of East Pakistan reacted vigorously to this failure of the
Government to bring help.
It seems quite likely that these situations in which population
factors played an important role led to the overwhelming victory of the
Awami League that led the Government to resort to force in East Pakistan
with the massacres and rapes that followed. Other experts believe the
effects of the latter two factors were of marginal influence in the Awami
League's victory.
It further seems possible that much of the violence was stimulated or
magnified by population pressures. Two groups of Moslems had been
competing for jobs and land in East Bengal since the 1947 partition.
"Biharis" are a small minority of non-Bengali Moslems who chose to
resettle in East Pakistan at that time. Their integration into Bengali
society was undoubtedly inhibited by the deteriorating living conditions
of the majority Bengalis. With the Pakistan army crackdown in March, 1971,
the Biharis cooperated with the authorities, and reportedly were able
thereby to improve their economic conditions at the expense of the
persecuted Bengalis. When the tables were turned after independence, it
was the Biharis who were persecuted and whose property and jobs were
seized. It seems likely that both these outbursts of violence were induced
or enlarged by the population "complosion" factor.
The violence in East Pakistan against the Bengalis and particularly
the Hindu minority who bore the brunt of Army repression led to the next
population factor, the mass migration during one year of nine or ten
million refugees into West Bengal in India. This placed a tremendous
burden on the already weak Indian economy. As one Indian leader in the
India Family Planning Program said, "The influx of nine million people
wiped out the savings of some nine million births which had been averted
over a period of eight years of the family planning program."
There were other factors in India's invasion of East Bengal, but it
is possible that the necessity of returning these nine or ten million
refugees to east Bengal -- getting them out of India -- may have played a
part in the Indian decision to invade. Certainly, in a broader sense, the
threat posed by this serious, spreading instability on India's eastern
frontier -- an instability in which population factors were a major
underlying cause -- a key reason for the Indian decision.
The political arrangements in the Subcontinent have changed, but all
of the underlying population factors which influenced the dramatic acts of
violence that took place in 1970-71 still exist, in worsening dimensions,
to influence future events.
Additional illustrations. Population factors also appear to have had
indirect causal relations, in varying degrees, on the killings in
Indonesia in 1965-6, the communal slaughter in Rwanda in 1961-2 and 1963-4
and in Burundi in 1972, the coup in Uganda in 1972, and the insurrection
in Sri Lanka in 1971.
Some Potential Effects of Future Population Pressures
Between the end of World War II and 1975 the world's population will
have increased about one and a half billion -- nearly one billion of that
from 1960 to the present. The rate of growth is increasing and between two
and a half and three and a half billion will be added by the year 2000,
depending partly on the effectiveness of population growth control
programs. This increase of the next 25 years will, of course, pyramid on
the great number added with such rapidity in the last 25. The population
factors which contributed to the political pressures and instabilities of
the last decades will be multiplied.
PRC - The demographic factors of the PRC are referred to on page 79
above. The Government of the PRC has made a major effort to feed its
growing population.
Cultivated farm land, at 107 million hectares, has not increased
significantly over the past 25 years, although farm output has
substantially kept pace with population growth through improved yields
secured by land improvement, irrigation extension, intensified cropping,
and rapid expansion in the supply of fertilizers.
In 1973 the PRC adopted new, forceful population control measures. In
the urban areas Peking claimed its birth control measures had secured a
two-child family and a one percent annual population growth, and it
proposes to extend this development throughout the rural areas by 1980.
The political implications of China's future population growth are
obviously important but are not dealt with here.
Israel and the Arab States. If a peace settlement can be reached, the
central issue will be how to make it last. Egypt with about 37 million
today is growing at 2.8% per year. It will approximate 48 million by 1985,
75 million by 1995, and more than 85 million by 2000. It is doubtful that
Egypt's economic progress can greatly exceed its population growth. With
Israel starting at today's population of 3.3 million, the disparity
between its population and those of the Arab States will rapidly increase.
Inside Israel, unless Jewish immigration continues, the gap between the
size of the Arab and Jewish populations will diminish. Together with the
traditional animosities -- which will remain the prime determinants of
Arab-Israeli conflict -- these population factors make the potential for
peace and for U.S. interests in the area ominous.
India-Bangladesh. The Subcontinent will be for years the major focus
of world concern over population growth. India's population is now
approximately 580 million, adding a million by each full moon. Embassy New
Delhi (New Delhi 2115, June 17, 1974) reports:
"There seems no way of turning off the faucet this side of 1 billion
Indians, which means India must continue to court economic and social
disaster. It is not clear how the shaky and slow-growing Indian economy
can bear the enormous expenditures on health, housing, employment, and
education, which must be made if the society is even to maintain its
current low levels."
Death rates have recently increased in parts of India and episodes
like the recent smallpox epidemic have led Embassy New Delhi to add:
"A future failure of the India food crop could cause widespread death
and suffering which could not be overcome by the GOI or foreign
assistance. The rise in the death rate in several rural areas suggests
that Malthusian pressures are already being felt."
And further:
"Increasing political disturbances should be expected in the future, fed
by the pressures of rising population in urban areas, food shortages,
and growing scarcities in household commodities. The GOI has not been
very successful in alleviating unemployment in the cities. The recent
disturbances in Gujarat and Bihar seem to be only the beginning of
chronic and serious political disorders occurring throughout India."
There will probably be a weakening, possibly a breakdown, of the
control of the central government over some of the states and local areas.
The democratic system will be taxed and may be in danger of giving way to
a form of dictatorship, benevolent or otherwise. The existence of India as
a democratic buttress in Asia will be threatened.
Bangladesh, with appalling population density, rapid population
growth, and extensive poverty will suffer even more. Its population has
increased 40% since the census 13 years ago and is growing at least 3% per
year. The present 75 million, or so, unless slowed by famine, disease, or
massive birth control, will double in 23 years and exceed 170 million by
2000.
Requirements for food and other basic necessities of life are growing
at a faster rate than existing resources and administrative systems are
providing them. In the rural areas, the size of the average farm is being
reduced and there is increasing landlessness. More and more people are
migrating to urban areas. The government admits a 30% rate of unemployment
and underemployment. Already, Embassy Dacca reports (Dacca 3424, June 19,
1974) there are important economic-population causes for the landlessness
that is rapidly increasing and contributing to violent crimes of murder
and armed robbery that terrorize the ordinary citizen.
"Some of the vast army of unemployed and landless, and those strapped by
the escalating cost of basic commodities, have doubtless turned to
crime."
Three paragraphs of Embassy Dacca's report sharply outline the effect
on U.S. political interests we may anticipate from population factors in
Bangladesh and other countries that, if present trends are not changed,
will be in conditions similar to Bangladesh in only a few years.
"Of concern to the U.S. are several probable outcomes as the basic
political, economic and social situation worsens over the coming
decades. Already afflicted with a crisis mentality by which they look to
wealthy foreign countries to shore up their faltering economy, the BDG
will continue to escalate its demands on the U.S. both bilaterally and
internationally to enlarge its assistance, both of commodities and
financing. Bangladesh is now a fairly solid supporter of third world
positions, advocating better distribution of the world's wealth and
extensive trade concessions to poor nations. As its problems grow and
its ability to gain assistance fails to keep pace, Bangladesh's
positions on international issues likely will become radicalized,
inevitably in opposition to U.S. interests on major issues as it seeks
to align itself with others to force adequate aid.
"U.S. interests in Bangladesh center on the development of an
economically and politically stable country which will not threaten the
stability of its neighbors in the Subcontinent nor invite the intrusion
of outside powers. Surrounded on three sides by India and sharing a
short border with Burma, Bangladesh, if it descends into chaos, will
threaten the stability of these nations as well. Already Bengalis are
illegally migrating into the frontier provinces of Assam and Tripura,
politically sensitive areas of India, and into adjacent Burma. Should
expanded out-migration and socio-political collapse in Bangladesh
threaten its own stability, India may be forced to consider
intervention, although it is difficult to see in what way the Indians
could cope with the situation.
"Bangladesh is a case study of the effects of few resources and
burgeoning population not only on national and regional stability but
also on the future world order. In a sense, if we and other richer
elements of the world community do not meet the test of formulating a
policy to help Bangladesh awaken from its economic and demographic
nightmare, we will not be prepared in future decades to deal with the
consequences of similar problems in other countries which have far more
political and economic consequences to U.S. interests."
Africa -- Sahel Countries. The current tragedy of the Sahel
countries, to which U.S. aid in past years has been minimal, has suddenly
cost us an immense effort in food supplies at a time when we are already
hard pressed to supply other countries, and domestic food prices are
causing strong political repercussions in the U.S. The costs to us and
other donor countries for aid to help restore the devastated land will run
into hundreds of millions. Yet little attention is given to the fact that
even before the adverse effect of the continued drought, it was population
growth and added migration of herdsmen to the edge of the desert that led
to cutting the trees and cropping the grass, inviting the desert to sweep
forward. Control of population growth and migration must be a part of any
program for improvement of lasting value.
Panama. The troublesome problem of jurisdiction over the Canal Zone
is primarily due to Panamanian feelings of national pride and a desire to
achieve sovereignty over its entire territory. One Panamanian agreement in
pursuing its treaty goals is that U.S. control over the Canal Zone
prevents the natural expansion of Panama City, an expansion needed as a
result of demographic pressures. In 1908, at the time of the construction
of the Canal, the population of the Zone was about 40,000. Today it is
close to the same figure, 45,000. On the other hand, Panama City, which
had some 20,000 people in 1908, has received growing migration from rural
areas and now has over 500,000. A new treaty which would give Panama
jurisdiction over land now in the Zone would help alleviate the problems
caused by this growth of Panama City.
Mexico and the U.S. Closest to home, the combined population growth
of Mexico and the U.S. Southwest presages major difficulties for the
future. Mexico's population is growing at some 3.5% per year and will
double in 20 years with concomitant increases in demands for food,
housing, education, and employment. By 1995, the present 57 million will
have increased to some 115 million and, unless their recently established
family planning program has great success, by 2000 will exceed 130
million. More important, the numbers of young people entering the job
market each year will expand even more quickly. These growing numbers will
increase the pressure of illegal emigration to the U.S., and make the
issue an even more serious source of friction in our political relations
with Mexico.
On our side, the Bureau of the Census estimates that as more and more
Americans move to the Southwestern States the present 40,000,000
population may approximate 61,000,000 by 1995. The domestic use of
Colorado River water may again have increased the salinity level in Mexico
and reopened that political issue.
Amembassy Mexico City (Mexico 4953, June 14, 1974) summarized the
influences of population factors on U.S. interests as follows:
"An indefinite continuation of Mexico's high population growth rate
would increasingly act as a brake on economic (and social) improvement.
The consequences would be noted in various ways. Mexico could well take
more radical positions in the international scene. Illegal migration to
the U.S. would increase. In a country where unemployment and
under-employment is already high, the entry of increasing numbers into
the work force would only intensify the pressure to seek employment in
the U.S. by whatever means. Yet another consequence would be increased
demand for food imports from the U.S., especially if the rate of growth
of agricultural production continues to lag behind the population growth
rate. Finally, one cannot dismiss the spectre of future domestic
instability as a long term consequence, should the economy, now strong,
falter."
UNCTAD, the Special UNGA, and the UN. The developing countries, after
several years of unorganized maneuvering and erratic attacks have now
formed tight groupings in the Special Committee for Latin American
Coordination, the Organization of African States, and the Seventy-Seven.
As illustrated in the Declaration of Santiago and the recent Special
General Assembly, these groupings at times appear to reflect a common
desire to launch economic attacks against the United States and, to a
lesser degree, the European developed countries. A factor which is common
to all of them, which retards their development, burdens their foreign
exchange, subjects them to world prices for food, fertilizer, and
necessities of life and pushes them into disadvantageous trade relations
is their excessively rapid population growth. Until they are able to
overcome this problem, it is likely that their manifestations of
antagonism toward the United States in international bodies will increase.
Global Factors
In industrial nations, population growth increases demand for
industrial output. This over time tends to deplete national raw materials
resources and calls increasingly on sources of marginal profitability and
foreign supplies. To obtain raw materials, industrial nations seek to
locate and develop external sources of supply. The potential for
collisions of interest among the developing countries is obvious and has
already begun. It is visible and vexing in claims for territorial waters
and national sovereignty over mineral resources. It may become intense in
rivalries over exploring and exploiting the resources of the ocean floor.
In developing countries, the burden of population factors, added to
others, will weaken unstable governments, often only marginally effective
in good times, and open the way for extremist regimes. Countries suffering
under such burdens will be more susceptible to radicalization. Their
vulnerability also might invite foreign intervention by stronger nations
bent on acquiring political and economic advantage. The tensions within
the Have-not nations are likely to intensify, and the conflicts between
them and the Haves may escalate.
Past experience gives little assistance to predicting the course of
these developments because the speed of today's population growth,
migrations, and urbanization far exceeds anything the world has seen
before. Moreover, the consequences of such population factors can no
longer be evaded by moving to new hunting or grazing lands, by conquering
new territory, by discovering or colonizing new continents, or by
emigration in large numbers.
The world has ample warning that we all must make more rapid efforts
at social and economic development to avoid or mitigate these gloomy
prospects. We should be warned also that we all must move as rapidly as
possible toward stabilizing national and world population growth.
CHAPTER VI - WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE
From the standpoint of policy and program, the focal point of the
World Population Conference (WPC) at Bucharest, Romania, in August 1974,
was the World Population Plan of Action (WPPA). The U.S. had contributed
many substantive points to the draft Plan. We had particularly emphasized
the incorporation of population factors in national planning of developing
countries' population programs for assuring the availability of means of
family planning to persons of reproductive age, voluntary but specific
goals for the reduction of population growth and time frames for action.
As the WPPA reached the WPC it was organized as a demographic
document. It also related population factors to family welfare, social and
economic development, and fertility reduction. Population policies and
programs were recognized as an essential element, but only one element of
economic and social development programs. The sovereignty of nations in
determining their own population policies and programs was repeatedly
recognized. The general impression after five regional consultative
meetings on the Plan was that it had general support.
There was general consternation, therefore, when at the beginning of
the conference the Plan was subjected to a slashing, five-pronged attack
led by Algeria, with the backing of several African countries; Argentina,
supported by Uruguay, Brazil, Peru and, more limitedly, some other Latin
American countries; the Eastern European group (less Romania); the PRC and
the Holy See. Although the attacks were not identical, they embraced three
central elements relevant to U.S. policy and action in this field:
1.Repeated references to the importance (or as some said, the
pre-condition) of economic and social development for the reduction of
high fertility. Led by Algeria and Argentina, many emphasized the "new
international economic order" as central to economic and social
development.
2.Efforts to reduce the references to population programs, minimize
their importance and delete all references to quantitative or time goals.
3.Additional references to national sovereignty in setting population
policies and programs.
The Plan of Action
Despite the initial attack and continuing efforts to change the
conceptual basis of the world Population Plan of Action, the Conference
adopted by acclamation (only the Holy See stating a general reservation) a
complete World Population Plan of Action. It is less urgent in tone than
the draft submitted by the U.N. Secretariat but in several ways more
complete and with greater potential than that draft. The final action
followed a vigorous debate with hotly contested positions and forty-seven
votes. Nevertheless, there was general satisfaction among the participants
at the success of their efforts.
a. Principles and Aims
The Plan of Action lays down several important principles, some for
the first time in a U.N. document.
1. Among the first-time statements is the assertion that the
sovereign right of each nation to set its own population policies is "to
be exercised ... taking into account universal solidarity in order to
improve the quality of life of the peoples of the world." (Para 13) This
new provision opens the way toward increasing responsibility by nations
toward other nations in establishing their national population policies.
2. The conceptual relationship between population and development is
stated in Para 13(c):
Population and development are interrelated: population variables
influence development variables and are also influenced by them; the
formulation of a World Population Plan of Action reflects the
international community's awareness of the importance of population
trends for socio-economic development, and the socio-economic nature of
the recommendations contained in this Plan of Action reflects its
awareness of the crucial role that development plays in affecting
population trends.
3. A basic right of couples and individuals is recognized by Para
13(f), for the first time in a single declarative sentence:
All couples and individuals have the basic human right to decide freely
and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the
information, education and means to do so;
4. Also for the first time, a U.N. document links the responsibility
of child-bearers to the community [Para 13(f) continued]:
The responsibility of couples and individuals in the exercise of this
right takes into account the needs of their living and future children,
and their responsibilities towards the community.
It is now possible to build on this newly-stated principle as the right of
couples first recognized in the Tehran Human Rights Declaration of 1968
has been built on.
5. A flat declaration of the right of women is included in Para
13(h):
Women have the right to complete integration in the development process
particularly by means of an equal participation in educational, social,
economic, cultural and political life. In addition, the necessary
measures should be taken to facilitate this integration with family
responsibilities which should be fully shared by both partners.
6. The need for international action is accepted in Para 13(k):
The growing interdependence of countries makes the adoption of measures
at the international level increasingly important for the solution of
problems of development and population problems.
7. The "primary aim" of the Plan of Action is asserted to be "to
expand and deepen the capacities of countries to deal effectively with
their national and subnational population problems and to promote an
appropriate international response to their needs by increasing
international activity in research, the exchange of information, and the
provision of assistance on request."
b. Recommendations
The Plan of Action includes recommendations for: population goals and
policies; population growth; mortality and morbidity; reproduction; family
formation and the status of women; population distribution and internal
migration; international migration; population structure; socio-economic
policies; data collection and analysis; research; development and
evolution of population policies; the role of national governments and of
international cooperation; and monitoring, review and appraisal.
A score of these recommendations are the most important:
1. Governments should integrate population measures and programs into
comprehensive social and economic plans and programs and their integration
should be reflected in the goals, instrumentalities and organizations for
planning within the countries. A unit dealing with population aspects
should be created and placed at a high level of the national
administrative structure. (Para 94)
2. Countries which consider their population growth hampers
attainment of their goals should consider adopting population policies --
through a low level of birth and death rates. (Para 17, 18)
3. Highest priority should be given to reduction in mortality and
morbidity and increase of life expectancy and programs for this purpose
should reach rural areas and underprivileged groups. (Para 20-25)
4. Countries are urged to encourage appropriate education concerning
responsible parenthood and make available to persons who so desire advice
and means of achieving it. [Para 29(b)]
5. Family planning and related services should aim at prevention of
unwanted pregnancies and also at elimination of involuntary sterility or
subfecundity to enable couples to achieve their desired number of
children. [Para 29 (c)]
6. Adequately trained auxiliary personnel, social workers and
non-government channels should be used to help provide family planning
services. [Para 29(e)]
7. Governments with family planning programs should consider
coordinating them with health and other services designed to raise the
quality of life.
8. Countries wishing to affect fertility levels should give priority
to development programs and health and education strategies which have a
decisive effect upon demographic trends, including fertility. [Para 31]
International cooperation should give priority to assisting such national
efforts. Such programs may include reduction in infant and child
mortality, increased education, particularly for females, improvement in
the status of women, land reform and support in old age. [Para 32]
9. Countries which consider their birth rates detrimental to their
national purposes are invited to set quantitative goals and implement
policies to achieve them by 1985. [Para 37]
10. Developed countries are urged to develop appropriate policies in
population, consumption and investment, bearing in mind the need for
fundamental improvement in international equity.
11. Because the family is the basic unit of society, governments
should assist families as far as possible through legislation and
services. [Para 39]
12. Governments should ensure full participation of women in the
educational, economic, social and political life of their countries on an
equal basis with men. [Para 40] (A new provision, added at Bucharest.)
13. A series of recommendations are made to stabilize migration
within countries, particularly policies to reduce the undesirable
consequences of excessively rapid urbanization and to develop
opportunities in rural areas and small towns, recognizing the right of
individuals to move freely within their national boundaries. [Para 44-50]
14. Agreements should be concluded to regulate the international
migration of workers and to assure non-discriminatory treatment and social
services for these workers and their families; also other measures to
decrease the brain drain from developing countries. [Para 51-62]
15. To assure needed information concerning population trends,
population censuses should be taken at regular intervals and information
concerning births and deaths be made available at least annually. [Para
72-77]
16. Research should be intensified to develop knowledge concerning
the social, economic and political interrelationships with population
trends; effective means of reducing infant and childhood mortality;
methods for integrating population goals into national plans, means of
improving the motivation of people, analysis of population policies in
relation to socio-economic development, laws and institution; methods of
fertility regulation to meet the varied requirement of individuals and
communities, including methods requiring no medical supervision; the
interrelations of health, nutrition and reproductive biology; and
utilization of social services, including family planning services. [Para
78-80]
17. Training of management on population dynamics and administration,
on an interdisciplinary basis, should be provided for medical,
paramedical, traditional health personnel, program administrators, senior
government officials, labor, community and social leaders. Education and
information programs should be undertaken to bring population information
to all areas of countries. [Paras 81-92]
18. An important role of governments is to determine and assess the
population problems and needs of their countries in the light of their
political, social, cultural, religious and economic conditions; such an
undertaking should be carried out systematically and periodically so as to
provide informed, rational and dynamic decision-making in matters of
population and development. [Para 97]
20. The Plan of Action should be closely coordinated with the
International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations
Development Decade, reviewed in depth at five year intervals, and modified
as appropriate. [Paras 106-108]
The Plan of Action hedges in presenting specific statements of
quantitative goals or a time frame for the reduction of fertility. These
concepts are included, however, in the combination of Paras 16 and 36,
together with goals [Para 37] and the review [Para 106]. Para 16 states
that, according to the U.N low variant projections, it is estimated that
as a result of social and economic development and population policies as
reported by countries in the Second United Nations Inquiry on Population
and Development, population growth rates in the developing countries as a
whole may decline from the present level of 2.4% per annum to about 2% by
1985; and below 0.7% per annum in the developed countries. In this case
the worldwide rate of population growth would decline from 2% to about
1.7%. Para 36 says that these projections and those for mortality decline
are consistent with declines in the birth rate of the developing countries
as a whole from the present level of 38 per thousand to 30 per thousand by
1985. Para 36 goes on to say that "To achieve by 1985 these levels of
fertility would require substantial national efforts, by those countries
concerned, in the field of socio-economic development and population
policies, supported, upon request, by adequate international assistance."
Para 37 then follows with the statement that countries which consider
their birth rates detrimental to their national purposes are invited to
consider setting quantitative goals and implementing policies that may
lead to the attainment of such goals by 1985. Para 106 recommends a
comprehensive review and appraisal of population trends and policies
discussed in the Plan of Action should be undertaken every five years and
modified, wherever needed, by ECOSOC.
Usefulness of the Plan of Action
The World Population Plan of Action, despite its wordiness and often
hesitant tone, contains all the necessary provisions for effective
population growth control programs at national and international levels.
It lacks only plain statements of quantitative goals with time frames for
their accomplishment. These will have to be added by individual national
action and development as rapidly as possible in further U.N. documents.
The basis for suitable goals exists in paragraphs 16, 36, 37, and 106,
referred to above. The U.N. low variant projection used in these
paragraphs is close to the goals proposed by the United States and other
ECAFE nations:
For developed countries -
replacement levels of fertility by 1985;
stationary populations as soon as practicable.
For developing countries -
replacement levels in two or three decades.
For the world -
a 1.7% population growth rate by 1985 with 2% average for the developing
countries and 0.7% average for developed countries;
replacement level of fertility for all countries by 2000.
The dangerous situation evidenced by the current food situation and
projections for the future make it essential to press for the realization
of these goals. The beliefs, ideologies and misconceptions displayed by
many nations at Bucharest indicate more forcefully than ever the need for
extensive education of the leaders of many governments, especially in
Africa and some in Latin America. Approaches leaders of individual
countries must be designed in the light of their current beliefs and to
meet their special concerns. These might include:
1. Projections of population growth individualized for countries and
with analyses of relations of population factors to social and economic
development of each country.
2. Familiarization programs at U.N. Headquarters in New York for
ministers of governments, senior policy level officials and comparably
influential leaders from private life.
3. Greatly increased training programs for senior officials in the
elements of demographic economics.
4. Assistance in integrating population factors in national plans,
particularly as they relate to health services, education, agricultural
resources and development, employment, equitable distribution of income
and social stability.
5. Assistance in relating population policies and family planning
programs to major sectors of development: health, nutrition, agriculture,
education, social services, organized labor, women's activities, community
development.
6. Initiatives to implement the Percy amendment regarding improvement
in the status of women.
7. Emphasis in assistance and development programs on development of
rural areas.
All these activities and others particularly productive are
consistent with the Plan of Action and may be based upon it.
Beyond these activities, essentially directed at national interests,
a broader educational concept is needed to convey an acute understanding
of the interrelation of national interests and world population growth.
P A R T T W O
Policy Recommendations
I. Introduction - A U.S. Global Population Strategy
There is no simple single approach to the population problem which
will provide a "technological fix." As the previous analysis makes clear
the problem of population growth has social, economic and technological
aspects all of which must be understood and dealt with for a world
population policy to succeed. With this in mind, the following broad
recommended strategy provides a framework for the development of specific
individual programs which must be tailored to the needs and
particularities of each country and of different sectors of the population
within a country. Essentially all its recommendations made below are
supported by the World Population Plan of action drafted at the World
Population Conference.
A. Basic Global Strategy
The following basic elements are necessary parts of a comprehensive
approach to the population problem which must include both bilateral and
multilateral components to achieve success. Thus, USG population
assistance programs will need to be coordinated with those of the major
multilateral institutions, voluntary organizations, and other bilateral
donors.
The common strategy for dealing with rapid population growth should
encourage constructive actions to lower fertility since population growth
over the years will seriously negate reasonable prospects for the sound
social and economic development of the peoples involved.
While the time horizon in this NSSM is the year 2000 we must
recognize that in most countries, especially the LDCs, population
stability cannot be achieved until the next century. There are too many
powerful socio-economic factors operating on family size decisions and too
much momentum built into the dynamics of population growth to permit a
quick and dramatic reversal of current trends. There is also even less
cause for optimism on the rapidity of socio-economic progress that would
generate rapid fertility reduction in the poor LDCs than on the
feasibility of extending family planning services to those in their
populations who may wish to take advantage of them. Thus, at this point we
cannot know with certainty when world population can feasibly be
stabilized, nor can we state with assurance the limits of the world's
ecological "carrying capability". But we can be certain of the desirable
direction of change and can state as a plausible objective the target of
achieving replacement fertility rates by the year 2000.
Over the past few years, U.S. government-funded population programs
have played a major role in arousing interest in family planning in many
countries, and in launching and accelerating the growth of national family
planning programs. In most countries, there has been an initial rapid
growth in contraceptive "acceptors" up to perhaps 10% of fertile couples
in a few LDCs. The acceleration of previous trends of fertility decline is
attributable, at least in part, to family planning programs.
However, there is growing appreciation that the problem is more long
term and complex than first appeared and that a short term burst of
activity or moral fervor will not solve it. The danger in this realization
is that the U.S. might abandon its commitment to assisting in the world's
population problem, rather than facing up to it for the long-run difficult
problem that it is.
From year to year we are learning more about what kind of fertility
reduction is feasible in differing LDC situations. Given the laws of
compound growth, even comparatively small reductions in fertility over the
next decade will make a significant difference in total numbers by the
year 2000, and a far more significant one by the year 2050.
The proposed strategy calls for a coordinated approach to respond to
the important U.S. foreign policy interest in the influence of population
growth on the world's political, economic and ecological systems. What is
unusual about population is that this foreign policy interest must have a
time horizon far beyond that of most other objectives. While there are
strong short-run reasons for population programs, because of such factors
as food supply, pressures on social service budgets, urban migration and
social and political instability, the major impact of the benefits - or
avoidance of catastrophe - that could be accomplished by a strengthened
U.S. commitment in the population area will be felt less by those of us in
the U.S. and other countries today than by our children and grandchildren.
B. Ppriorities in U.S. and Multilateral Population Assistance
One issue in any global population strategy is the degree of emphasis
in allocation of program resources among countries. The options available
range from heavy concentration on a few vital large countries to a
geographically diverse program essentially involving all countries willing
to accept such assistance. All agencies believe the following policy
provides the proper overall balance.
In order to assist the development of major countries and to maximize
progress toward population stability, primary emphasis would be placed on
the largest and fastest growing developing countries where the imbalance
between growing numbers and development potential most seriously risks
instability, unrest, and international tensions. These countries are:
India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, The
Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Colombia. Out of a
total 73.3 million worldwide average increase in population from 1970-75
these countries contributed 34.3 million or 47%. This group of priority
countries includes some with virtually no government interest in family
planning and others with active government family planning programs which
require and would welcome enlarged technical and financial assistance.
These countries should be given the highest priority within AID's
population program in terms of resource allocations and/or leadership
efforts to encourage action by other donors and organizations.
However, other countries would not be ignored. AID would provide
population assistance and/or undertake leadership efforts with respect to
other, lower priority countries to the extent that the availability of
funds and staff permits, taking into account of such factors as : long run
U.S. political interests; impact of rapid population growth on its
development potential; the country's relative contribution to world
population growth; its financial capacity to cope with the problem;
potential impact on domestic unrest and international frictions (which can
apply to small as well as large countries); its significance as a test or
demonstration case; and opportunities for expenditures that appear
particularly cost-effective (e.g. it has been suggested that there may be
particularly cost-effective opportunities for supporting family planning
to reduce the lag between mortality and fertility declines in countries
where death rates are still declining rapidly); national commitment to an
effective program.
For both the high priority countries and the lower priority ones to
which funds and staff permit aid, the form and content of our assistance
or leadership efforts would vary from country to country, depending on
each nation's particular interests, needs, and receptivity to various
forms of assistance. For example, if these countries are receptive to U.S.
assistance through bilateral or central AID funding, we should provide
such assistance at levels commensurate with the recipient's capability to
finance needed actions with its own funds, the contributions of other
donors and organizations, and the effectiveness with which funds can be
used.
In countries where U.S. assistance is limited either by the nature of
political or diplomatic relations with those countries or by lack of
strong government desire. In population reduction programs, external
technical and financial assistance (if desired by the countries) would
have to come from other donors and/or from private and international
organizations, many of which receive contributions from AID. The USG
would, however, maintain an interest (e.g. through Embassies) in such
countries' population problems and programs (if any) to reduce population
growth rates. Moreover, particularly in the case of high priority
countries, we should be alert to opportunities for expanding our
assistance efforts and for demonstrating to their leaders the consequences
of rapid population growth and the benefits of actions to reduce
fertility.
In countries to which other forms of U.S. assistance are provided but
not population assistance, AID will monitor progress toward achievement of
development objectives, taking into account the extent to which these are
hindered by rapid population growth, and will look for opportunities to
encourage initiation of or improvement in population policies and
programs.
In addition, the U.S. strategy should support in these LDC countries
general activities (e.g. bio-medical research or fertility control
methods) capable of achieving major breakthroughs in key problems which
hinder reductions in population growth.
C. Instruments and Modalities for Population Assistance
Bilateral population assistance is the largest and most invisible
"instrument" for carrying out U.S. policy in this area. Other instruments
include: support for and coordination with population programs of
multilateral organizations and voluntary agencies; encouragement of
multilateral country consortia and consultative groups to emphasize family
planning in reviews of overall recipient progress and aid requests; and
formal and informal presentation of views at international gatherings,
such as food and population conferences. Specific country strategies must
be worked out for each of the highest priority countries, and for the
lower priority ones. These strategies will take account of such factors
as: national attitudes and sensitivities on family planning; which
"instruments" will be most acceptable, opportunities for effective use of
assistance; and need of external capital or operating assistance.
For example, in Mexico our strategy would focus on working primarily
through private agencies and multilateral organizations to encourage more
government attention to the need for control of population growth; in
Bangladesh we might provide large-scale technical and financial
assistance, depending on the soundness of specific program requests; in
Indonesia we would respond to assistance requests but would seek to have
Indonesia meet as much of program costs from its own resources (i.e.
surplus oil earnings) as possible. In general we would not provide
large-scale bilateral assistance in the more developed LDCs, such as
Brazil or Mexico. Although these countries are in the top priority list
our approach must take account of the fact that their problems relate
often to government policies and decisions and not to larger scale need
for concessional assistance.
Within the overall array of U.S. foreign assistance programs,
preferential treatment in allocation of funds and manpower should be given
to cost-effective programs to reduce population growth; including both
family planning activities and supportive activities in other sectors.
While some have argued for use of explicit "leverage" to "force"
better population programs on LDC governments, there are several practical
constraints on our efforts to achieve program improvements. Attempts to
use "leverage" for far less sensitive issues have generally caused
political frictions and often backfired. Successful family planning
requires strong local dedication and commitment that cannot over the long
run be enforced from the outside. There is also the danger that some LDC
leaders will see developed country pressures for family planning as a form
of economic or racial imperialism; this could well create a serious
backlash.
Short of "leverage", there are many opportunities, bilaterally and
multilaterally, for U.S. representations to discuss and urge the need for
stronger family planning programs. There is also some established
precedent for taking account of family planning performance in appraisal
of assistance requirements by AID and consultative groups. Since
population growth is a major determinant of increases in food demand,
allocation of scarce PL 480 resources should take account of what steps a
country is taking in population control as well as food production. In
these sensitive relationships, however, it is important in style as well
as substance to avoid the appearance of coercion.
D. Provision and Development of Family Planning Services, Information and
Technology
Past experience suggests that easily available family planning
services are a vital and effective element in reducing fertility rates in
the LDCs.
Two main advances are required for providing safe and effective
fertility control techniques in the developing countries:
1. Expansion and further development of efficient low-cost systems to
assure the full availability of existing family planning services,
materials and information to the 85% of LDC populations not now
effectively reached. In developing countries willing to create special
delivery systems for family planning services this may be the most
effective method. In others the most efficient and acceptable method is to
combine family planning with health or nutrition in multi-purpose delivery
systems.
2. Improving the effectiveness of present means of fertility control,
and developing new technologies which are simple, low cost, effective,
safe, long-lasting and acceptable to potential users. This involves both
basic developmental research and operations research to judge the utility
of new or modified approaches under LDC conditions.
Both of these goals should be given very high priority with necessary
additional funding consistent with current or adjusted divisions of labor
among other donors and organizations involved in these areas of population
assistance.
E. Creating Conditions Conducive to Fertility Decline
It is clear that the availability of contraceptive services and
information is not a complete answer to the population problem. In view of
the importance of socio-economic factors in determining desired family
size, overall assistance strategy should increasingly concentrate on
selective policies which will contribute to population decline as well as
other goals. This strategy reflects the complementarity between population
control and other U.S. development objectives, particularly those relating
to AID's Congressional mandate to focus on problems of the "poor majority"
in LDC's.
We know that certain kinds of development policies -- e.g., those
which provide the poor with a major share in development benefits -- both
promote fertility reductions and accomplish other major development
objectives. There are other policies which appear to also promote
fertility reduction but which may conflict with non-population objectives
(e.g., consider the effect of bringing a large number of women into the
labor force in countries and occupations where unemployment is already
high and rising).
However, AID knows only approximately the relative priorities among
the factors that affect fertility and is even further away from knowing
what specific cost-effective steps governments can take to affect these
factors.
Nevertheless, with what limited information we have, the urgency of
moving forward toward lower fertility rates, even without complete
knowledge of the socio-economic forces involved, suggests a three-pronged
strategy:
1. High priority to large-scale implementation of programs affecting
the determinants of fertility in those cases where there is probable
cost-effectiveness, taking account of potential impact on population
growth rates; other development benefits to be gained; ethical
considerations; feasibility in light of LDC bureaucratic and political
concerns and problems; and timeframe for accomplishing objectives.
2. High priority to experimentation and pilot projects in areas where
there is evidence of a close relationship to fertility reduction but where
there are serious questions about cost-effectiveness relating either to
other development impact (e.g., the female employment example cited above)
or to program design (e.g., what cost-effective steps can be taken to
promote female employment or literacy).
3. High priority to comparative research and evaluation on the
relative impact on desired family size of the socio-economic determinants
of fertility in general and on what policy scope exists for affecting
these determinants.
In all three cases emphasis should be given to moving action as much
as possible to LDC institutions and individuals rather than to involving
U.S. researchers on a large scale.
Activities in all three categories would receive very high priority
in allocation of AID funds. The largest amounts required should be in the
first category and would generally not come from population funds.
However, since such activities (e.g., in rural development and basic
education) coincide with other AID sectoral priorities, sound project
requests from LDC's will be placed close to the top in AID's funding
priorities (assuming that they do not conflict with other major
development and other foreign policy objectives).
The following areas appear to contain significant promise in
effecting fertility declines, and are discussed in subsequent sections.
providing minimal levels of education especially for women;
reducing infant and child mortality;
expanding opportunities for wage employment especially for women;
developing alternatives to "social security" support provided by
children to aging parents;
pursuing development strategies that skew income growth toward the poor,
especially rural development focusing on rural poverty;
concentrating on the education and indoctrination of the rising
generation of children regarding the desirability of smaller family
size.
The World Population Plan of Action includes a provision (paragraph
31) that countries trying for effective fertility levels should give
priority to development programs and health and education strategies which
have a decisive effect upon demographic trends, including fertility. It
calls for international information to give priority to assisting such
national efforts. Programs suggested (paragraph 32) are essentially the
same as those listed above.
Food is another of special concern in any population strategy.
Adequate food stocks need to be created to provide for periods of severe
shortages and LDC food production efforts must be reenforced to meet
increased demand resulting from population and income growth. U.S.
agricultural production goals should take account of the normal import
requirements of LDC's (as well as developed countries) and of likely
occasional crop failures in major parts of the LDC world. Without improved
food security, there will be pressure leading to possible conflict and the
desire for large families for "insurance" purposes, thus undermining other
development and population control efforts.
F. Development of World-Wide Political and Popular Commitment to
Population Stabilization and Its Associated Improvement of Individual
Quality of Life.
A fundamental element in any overall strategy to deal with the
population problem is obtaining the support and commitment of key leaders
in the developing countries. This is only possible if they can clearly see
the negative impact of unrestricted population growth in their countries
and the benefits of reducing birth rates - and if they believe it is
possible to cope with the population problem through instruments of public
policy. Since most high officials are in office for relatively short
periods, they have to see early benefits or the value of longer term
statesmanship. In each specific case, individual leaders will have to
approach their population problems within the context of their country's
values, resources, and existing priorities.
Therefore, it is vital that leaders of major LDCs themselves take the
lead in advancing family planning and population stabilization, not only
within the U.N. and other international organizations but also through
bilateral contacts with leaders of other LDCs. Reducing population growth
in LDCs should not be advocated exclusively by the developed countries.
The U.S. should encourage such a role as opportunities appear in its high
level contact with LDC leaders.
The most recent forum for such an effort was the August 1974 U.N.
World Population Conference. It was an ideal context to focus concerted
world attention on the problem. The debate views and highlights of the
World Population Plan of action are reviewed in Chapter VI.
The U.S. strengthened its credibility as an advocate of lower
population growth rates by explaining that, while it did not have a single
written action population policy, it did have legislation, Executive
Branch policies and court decisions that amounted to a national policy and
that our national fertility level was already below replacement and seemed
likely to attain a stable population by 2000.
The U.S. also proposed to join with other developed countries in an
international collaborative effort of research in human reproduction and
fertility control covering bio-medical and socio-economic factors.
The U.S. further offered to collaborate with other interested donor
countries and organizations (e.g., WHO, UNFPA, World Bank, UNICEF) to
encourage further action by LDC governments and other institutions to
provide low-cost, basic preventive health services, including maternal and
child health and family planning services, reaching out into the remote
rural areas.
The U.S. delegation also said the U.S. would request from the
Congress increased U.S. bilateral assistance to population-family planning
programs, and additional amounts for essential functional activities and
our contribution to the UNFPA if countries showed an interest in such
assistance.
Each of these commitments is important and should be pursued by the
U.S. Government.
It is vital that the effort to develop and strengthen a commitment on
the part of the LDC leaders not be seen by them as an industrialized
country policy to keep their strength down or to reserve resources for use
by the "rich" countries. Development of such a perception could create a
serious backlash adverse to the cause of population stability. Thus the
U.S. and other "rich" countries should take care that policies they
advocate for the LDC's would be acceptable within their own countries.
(This may require public debate and affirmation of our intended policies.)
The "political" leadership role in developing countries should, of course,
be taken whenever possible by their own leaders.
The U.S. can help to minimize charges of an imperialist motivation
behind its support of population activities by repeatedly asserting that
such support derives from a concern with:
(a) the right of the individual couple to determine freely and
responsibly their number and spacing of children and to have
information, education, and 1means to do so; and
(b) the fundamental social and economic development of poor countries in
which rapid population growth is both a contributing cause and a
consequence of widespread poverty.
Furthermore, the U.S. should also take steps to convey the message that
the control of world population growth is in the mutual interest of the
developed and developing countries alike.
Family planning programs should be supported by multilateral
organizations wherever they can provide the most efficient and acceptable
means. Where U.S. bilateral assistance is necessary or preferred, it
should be provided in collaboration with host country institutions -- as
is the case now. Credit should go to local leaders for the success of
projects. The success and acceptability of family planning assistance will
depend in large measure on the degree to which it contributes to the
ability of the host government to serve and obtain the support of its
people.
In many countries today, decision-makers are wary of instituting
population programs, not because they are unconcerned about rapid
population growth, but because they lack confidence that such programs
will succeed. By actively working to demonstrate to such leaders that
national population and family planning programs have achieved progress in
a wide variety of poor countries, the U.S. could help persuade the leaders
of many countries that the investment of funds in national family planning
programs is likely to yield high returns even in the short and medium
term. Several examples of success exist already, although regrettably they
tend to come from LDCs that are untypically well off in terms of income
growth and/or social services or are islands or city states.
We should also appeal to potential leaders among the younger
generations in developing countries, focusing on the implications of
continued rapid population growth for their countries in the next 10-20
years, when they may assume national leadership roles.
Beyond seeking to reach and influence national leaders, improved
world-wide support for population-related efforts should be sought through
increased emphasis on mass media and other population education and
motivation programs by the U.N., USIA, and USAID. We should give higher
priorities in our information programs world-wide for this area and
consider expansion of collaborative arrangements with multilateral
institutions in population education programs.
Another challenge will be in obtaining the further understanding and
support of the U.S. public and Congress for the necessary added funds for
such an effort, given the competing demands for resources. If an effective
program is to be mounted by the U.S., we will need to contribute
significant new amounts of funds. Thus there is need to reinforce the
positive attitudes of those in Congress who presently support U.S.
activity in the population field and to enlist their support in persuading
others. Public debate is needed now.
Personal approaches by the President, the Secretary of State, other
members of the Cabinet, and their principal deputies would be helpful in
this effort. Congress and the public must be clearly informed that the
Executive Branch is seriously worried about the problem and that it
deserves their further attention. Congressional representatives at the
World Population Conference can help.
An Alternative View
The above basic strategy assumes that the current forms of assistance
programs in both population and economic and social development areas will
be able to solve the problem. There is however, another view, which is
shared by a growing number of experts. It believes that the outlook is
much harsher and far less tractable than commonly perceived. This holds
that the severity of the population problem in this century which is
already claiming the lives of more than 10 million people yearly, is such
as to make likely continued widespread food shortage and other demographic
catastrophes, and, in the words of C.P. Snow, we shall be watching people
starve on television.
The conclusion of this view is that mandatory programs may be needed
and that we should be considering these possibilities now.
This school of thought believes the following types of questions need
to be addressed:
Should the U.S. make an all out commitment to major limitation of world
population with all the financial and international as well as domestic
political costs that would entail?
Should the U.S. set even higher agricultural production goals which
would enable it to provide additional major food resources to other
countries? Should they be nationally or internationally controlled?
On what basis should such food resources then be provided? Would food be
considered an instrument of national power? Will we be forced to make
choices as to whom we can reasonably assist, and if so, should
population efforts be a criterion for such assistance?
Is the U.S. prepared to accept food rationing to help people who
can't/won't control their population growth?
Should the U.S. seek to change its own food consumption patterns toward
more efficient uses of protein?
Are mandatory population control measures appropriate for the U.S.
and/or for others?
Should the U.S. initiate a major research effort to address the growing
problems of fresh water supply, ecological damage, and adverse climate?
While definitive answers to those questions are not possible in this
study given its time limitations and its implications for domestic policy,
nevertheless they are needed if one accepts the drastic and persistent
character of the population growth problem. Should the choice be made that
the recommendations and the options given below are not adequate to meet
this problem, consideration should be given to a further study and
additional action in this field as outlined above.
Conclusion
The overall strategy above provides a general approach through which
the difficulties and dangers of population growth and related problems can
be approached in a balanced and comprehensive basis. No single effort will
do the job. Only a concerted and major effort in a number of carefully
selected directions can provide the hope of success in reducing population
growth and its unwanted dangers to world economic will-being and political
stability. There are no "quick-fixes" in this field.
Below are specific program recommendations which are designed to
implement this strategy. Some will require few new resources; many call
for major efforts and significant new resources. We cannot simply buy
population growth moderation for nearly 4 billion people "on the cheap."
II. Action to Create Conditions for Fertility Decline: Population and a
Development Assistance Strategy
II. A. General Strategy and Resource Allocations for AID Assistance
Discussion:
1. Past Program Actions
Since inception of the program in 1965, AID has obligated nearly $625
million for population activities. These funds have been used primarily to
(1) draw attention to the population problem, (2) encourage multilateral
and other donor support for the worldwide population effort, and (3) help
create and maintain the means for attacking the problem, including the
development of LDC capabilities to do so.
In pursuing these objectives, AID's population resources were
focussed on areas of need where action was feasible and likely to be
effective. AID has provided assistance to population programs in some 70
LDCs, on a bilateral basis and/or indirectly through private organizations
and other channels. AID currently provides bilateral assistance to 36 of
these countries. State and AID played an important role in establishing
the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) to spearhead
multilateral effort in population as a complement to the bilateral actions
of AID and other donor countries. Since the Fund's establishment, AID has
been the largest single contributor. Moreover, with assistance from AID a
number of private family planning organizations (e.g., Pathfinder Fund,
International Planned Parenthood Foundation, Population Council) have
significantly expanded their worldwide population programs. Such
organizations are still the main supporters of family planning action in
many developing countries.
AID actions have been a major catalyst in stimulating the flow of
funds into LDC population programs - from almost nothing ten years ago,
the amounts being spent from all sources in 1974 for programs in the
developing countries of Africa, Latin America, and Asia (excluding China)
will total between $400 and $500 million. About half of this will be
contributed by the developed countries bilaterally or through multilateral
agencies, and the balance will come from the budgets of the developing
countries themselves. AID's contribution is about one-quarter of the total
- AID obligated $112.4 million for population programs in FY 1974 and
plans for FY 1975 program of $137.5 million.
While world resources for population activities will continue to
grow, they are unlikely to expand as rapidly as needed. (One rough
estimate is that five times the current amount, or about $2.5 billion in
constant dollars, will be required annually by 1985 to provide the 2.5
billion people in the developing world, excluding China, with full-scale
family planning programs). In view of these limited resources AID's
efforts (in both fiscal and manpower terms) and through its leadership the
efforts of others, must be focussed to the extent possible on high
priority needs in countries where the population problem is the most
acute. Accordingly, AID last year began a process of developing geographic
and functional program priorities for use in allocating funds and staff,
and in arranging and adjusting divisions of labor with other donors and
organizations active in the worldwide population effort. Although this
study has not yet been completed, a general outline of a U.S. population
assistance strategy can be developed from the results of the priorities
studied to date. The geographic and functional parameters of the strategy
are discussed under 2. and 3. below. The implications for population
resource allocations are presented under 4.
2. Geographic Priorities in U.S. Population Assistance
The U.S. strategy should be to encourage and support, through
bilateral, multilateral and other channels, constructive actions to lower
fertility rates in selected developing countries. Within this overall
strategy and in view of funding and manpower limitations, the U.S. should
emphasize assistance to those countries where the population problem is
the most serious.
There are three major factors to consider in judging the seriousness
of the problem:
The first is the country's contribution to the world's population
problem, which is determined by the size of its population, its
population growth rate, and its progress in the "demographic transition"
from high birth and high death rates to low ones.
The second is the extent to which population growth impinges on the
country's economic development and its financial capacity to cope with
its population problem.
The third factor is the extent to which an imbalance between growing
numbers of people and a country's capability to handle the problem could
lead to serious instability, international tensions, or conflicts.
Although many countries may experience adverse consequences from such
imbalances, the troublemaking regional or international conditions might
not be as serious in some places as they are in others.
Based on the first two criteria, AID has developed a preliminary rank
ordering of nearly 100 developing countries which, after review and
refinement, will be used as a guide in AID's own funding and manpower
resource allocations and in encouraging action through AID leadership
efforts on the part of other population assistance instrumentalities.
Applying these three criteria to this rank ordering, there are 13
countries where we currently judge the problem and risks to be the most
serious. They are: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines,
Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia.
Out of a total 67 million worldwide increase in population in 1972 these
countries contributed about 45%. These countries range from those with
virtually no government interest in family planning to those with active
government family planning programs which require and would welcome
enlarged technical and financial assistance.
These countries should be given the highest priority within AID's
population program in terms of resource allocations and/or leadership
efforts to encourage action by other donors and organizations. The form
and content of our assistance or leadership efforts would vary from
country-to-country (as discussed in 3. below), depending on each country's
needs, its receptivity to various forms of assistance, its capability to
finance needed actions, the effectiveness with which funds can be used,
and current or adjusted divisions of labor among the other donors and
organizations providing population assistance to the country. AID's
population actions would also need to be consistent with the overall U.S.
development policy toward each country.
While the countries cited above would be given highest priority,
other countries would not be ignored. AID would provide population
assistance and/or undertake leadership efforts with respect to other
countries to the extent that the availability of funds and staff permits,
taking account of such factors as: a country's placement in AID's priority
listing of LDCs; its potential impact on domestic unrest and international
frictions (which can apply to small as well as large countries); its
significance as a test or demonstration case; and opportunities for
expenditures that appear particularly cost-effective (e.g. its has been
suggested that there may be particularly cost-effective opportunities for
supporting family planning to reduce the lag between mortality and
fertility declines in countries where death rates are still declining
rapidly).
3. Mode and Content of U.S. Population Assistance
In moving from geographic emphases to strategies for the mode and
functional content of population assistance to both the higher and lower
priority countries which are to be assisted, various factors need to be
considered: (1) the extent of a country's understanding of its population
problem and interest in responding to it; (2) the specific actions needed
to cope with the problem; (3) the country's need for external financial
assistance to deal with the problem; and (4) its receptivity to various
forms of assistance.
Some of the countries in the high priority group cited above (e.g.
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand) and some lower
priority countries have recognized that rapid population growth is a
problem, are taking actions of their own to deal with it, and are
receptive to assistance from the U.S. (through bilateral or central AID
funding) and other donors, as well as to multilateral support for their
efforts. In these cases AID should continue to provide such assistance
based on each country's functional needs, the effectiveness with which
funds can be used in these areas, and current or adjusted divisions of
labor among other donors and organizations providing assistance to the
country. Furthermore, our assistance strategies for these countries should
consider their capabilities to finance needed population actions.
Countries which have relatively large surpluses of export earning and
foreign exchange reserves are unlikely to require large-scale external
financial assistance and should be encouraged to finance their own
commodity imports as well as local costs. In such cases our strategy
should be to concentrate on needed technical assistance and on attempting
to play a catalytic role in encouraging better programs and additional
host country financing for dealing with the population problem.
In other high and lower priority countries U.S. assistance is limited
either by the nature of political or diplomatic relations with those
countries (e.g. India, Egypt), or by the lack of strong government
interest in population reduction programs (e.g. Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mexico,
Brazil). In such cases, external technical and financial assistance, if
desired by the countries, would have to come from other donors and/or from
private and international organizations (many of which receive
contributions from AID). The USG would, however, maintain an interest
(e.g. through Embassies) in such countries' population problems and
programs (if any) to reduce population growth rates. Moreover,
particularly in the case of high priority countries to which U.S.
population assistance is now limited for one reason or another, we should
be alert to opportunities for expanding our assistance efforts and for
demonstrating to their leaders the consequences of rapid population growth
and the benefits of actions to reduce fertility.
In countries to which other forms of U.S. assistance are provided but
not population assistance, AID will monitor progress toward achievement of
development objectives, taking into account the extent to which these are
hindered by rapid population growth, and will look for opportunities to
encourage initiation of or improvement in population policies and
programs.
In addition, the U.S. strategy should support general activities
capable of achieving major breakthroughs in key problems which hinder
attainment of fertility control objectives. For example, the development
of more effective, simpler contraceptive methods through bio-medical
research will benefit all countries which face the problem of rapid
population growth; improvements in methods for measuring demographic
changes will assist a number of LDCs in determining current population
growth rates and evaluating the impact over time of population/family
planning activities.
4. Resource Allocations for U.S. Population Assistance
AID funds obligated for population/family planning assistance rose
steadily since inception of the program ($10 million in the FY 1965-67
period) to nearly $125 million in FY 1972. In FY 1973, however, funds
available for population remained at the $125 million level; in FY 1974
they actually declined slightly, to $112.5 million because of a ceiling on
population obligations inserted in the legislation by the House
Appropriations Committee. With this plateau in AID population obligations,
worldwide resources have not been adequate to meet all identified,
sensible funding needs, and we therefore see opportunities for significant
expansion of the program.
Some major actions in the area of creating conditions for fertility
decline, as described in Section IIB, can be funded from AID resources
available for the sectors in question (e.g., education, agriculture).
Other actions come under the purview of population ("Title X") funds. In
this latter category, increases in projected budget requests to the
Congress on the order of $35-50 million annually through FY 1980 -- above
the $137.5 million requested by FY 1975 -- appear appropriate at this
time. Such increases must be accompanied by expanding contributions to the
worldwide population effort from other donors and organizations and from
the LDCs themselves, if significant progress is to be made. The USG should
take advantage of appropriate opportunities to stimulate such
contributions from others.
Title X Funding for Population
+----------------------------------------------------+
| Year Amount ($ million) |
+----------------------------------------------------+
| FY 1972 - Actual Obligations 123.3 |
| FY 1973 - Actual Obligations 125.6 |
| FY 1974 - Actual Obligations 112.4 |
| FY 1975 - Request to Congress 137.5 |
| FY 1976 - Projection 170 |
| FY 1977 - Projection 210 |
| FY 1978 - Projection 250 |
| FY 1979 - Projection 300 |
| FY 1980 - Projection 350 |
+----------------------------------------------------+
These Title X funding projections for FY 1976-80 are general
magnitudes based on preliminary estimates of expansion or initiation of
population programs in developing countries and growing requirements for
outside assistance as discussed in greater detail in other sections of
this paper. These estimates contemplated very substantial increases in
self-help and assistance from other donor countries.
Our objective should be to assure that developing countries make
family planning information, educational and means available to all their
peoples by 1980. Our efforts should include:
Increased A.I.D. bilateral and centrally-funded programs, consistent
with the geographic priorities cited above.
Expanded contributions to multilateral and private organizations that
can work effectively in the population area.
Further research on the relative impact of various socio-economic
factors on desired family size, and experimental efforts to test the
feasibility of larger-scale efforts to affect some of these factors.
Additional bio-medical research to improve the existing means of
fertility control and to develop new ones which are safe, effective,
inexpensive, and attractive to both men and women.
Innovative approaches to providing family planning services, such as the
utilization of commercial channels for distribution of contraceptives,
and the development of low-cost systems for delivering effective health
and family planning services to the 85% of LDC populations not now
reached by such services.
Expanded efforts to increase the awareness of LDC leaders and publics
regarding the consequences of rapid population growth and to stimulate
further LDC commitment to actions to reduce fertility.
We believe expansions in the range of 35-50 million annually over the
next five years are realistic, in light of potential LDC needs and
prospects for increased contributions from other population assistance
instrumentalities, as well as constraints on the speed with which AID (and
other donors) population funds can be expanded and effectively utilized.
These include negative or ambivalent host government attitudes toward
population reduction programs; the need for complementary financial and
manpower inputs by recipient governments, which must come at the expense
of other programs they consider to be high priority; and the need to
assure that new projects involve sensible, effective actions that are
likely to reduce fertility. We must avoid inadequately planned or
implemented programs that lead to extremely high costs per acceptor. In
effect, we are closer to "absorptive capacity" in terms of year-to-year
increases in population programs than we are, for example, in annual
expansions in food, fertilizer or generalized resource transfers.
It would be premature to make detailed funding recommendations by
countries and functional categories in light of our inability to predict
what changes -- such as in host country attitudes to U.S. population
assistance and in fertility control technologies -- may occur which would
significantly alter funding needs in particular geographic or functional
areas. For example, AID is currently precluded from providing bilateral
assistance to India and Egypt, two significant countries in the highest
priority group, due to the nature of U.S. political and diplomatic
relations with these countries. However, if these relationships were to
change and bilateral aid could be provided, we would want to consider
providing appropriate population assistance to these countries. In other
cases, changing U.S.-LDC relationships might preclude further aid to some
countries. Factors such as these could both change the mix and affect
overall magnitudes of funds needed for population assistance. Therefore,
proposed program mixes and funding levels by geographic and functional
categories should continue to be examined on an annual basis during the
regular USG program and budget review processes which lead to the
presentation of funding requests to the Congress.
Recognizing that changing opportunities for action could
substantially affect AID's resource requirements for population
assistance, we anticipate that, if funds are provided by the Congress at
the levels projected, we would be able to cover necessary actions related
to the highest priority countries and also those related to lower priority
countries, moving reasonably far down the list. At this point, however,
AID believes it would not be desirable to make priority judgments on which
activities would not be funded if Congress did not provide the levels
projected. If cuts were made in these levels we would have to make
judgments based on such factors as the priority rankings of countries,
then-existing LDC needs, and divisions of labor with other actors in the
population assistance area.
If AID's population assistance program is to expand at the general
magnitudes cited above, additional direct hire staff will likely be
needed. While the expansion in program action would be primarily through
grants and contracts with LDC or U.S. institutions, or through
contributions to international organizations, increases in direct hire
staff would be necessary to review project proposals, monitor their
implementation through such instrumentalities, and evaluate their progress
against pre-established goals. Specific direct hire manpower requirements
should continue to be considered during the annual program and budget
reviews, along with details of program mix and funding levels by country
and functional category, in order to correlate staffing needs with
projected program actions for a particular year.
Recommendations
1. The U.S. strategy should be to encourage and support, through
bilateral, multilateral and other channels, constructive action to lower
fertility rates in selected developing countries. The U.S. should apply
each of the relevant provisions of its World Population Plan of Action and
use it to influence and support actions by developing countries.
2. Within this overall strategy, the U.S. should give highest
priority, in terms of resource allocation (along with donors) to efforts
to encourage assistance from others to those countries cited above where
the population problem is most serious, and provide assistance to other
countries as funds and staff permit.
3. AID's further development of population program priorities, both
geographic and functional, should be consistent with the general strategy
discussed above, with the other recommendations of this paper and with the
World Population Plan of Action. The strategies should be coordinated with
the population activities of other donors countries and agencies using the
WPPA as leverage to obtain suitable action.
4. AID's budget requests over the next five years should include a
major expansion of bilateral population and family planning programs (as
appropriate for each country or region), of functional activities as
necessary, and of contributions through multilateral channels, consistent
with the general funding magnitudes discussed above. The proposed budgets
should emphasize the country and functional priorities outlined in the
recommendations of this study and as detailed in AID's geographic and
functional strategy papers.
II. B. Functional Assistance Programs to Create Conditions for Fertility
Decline
Introduction
Discussion
It is clear that the availability of contraceptive services and
information, important as that is, is not the only element required to
address the population problems of the LDCs. Substantial evidence shows
that many families in LDCs (especially the poor) consciously prefer to
have numerous children for a variety of economic and social reasons. For
example, small children can make economic contributions on family farms,
children can be important sources of support for old parents where no
alternative form of social security exists, and children may be a source
of status for women who have few alternatives in male-dominated societies.
The desire for large families diminishes as income rises. Developed
countries and the more developed areas in LDCs have lower fertility than
less developed areas. Similarly, family planning programs produce more
acceptors and have a greater impact on fertility in developed areas than
they do in less developed areas. Thus, investments in development are
important in lowering fertility rates. We know that the major
socio-economic determinants of fertility are strongly interrelated. A
change in any one of them is likely to produce a change in the others as
well. Clearly development per se is a powerful determinant of fertility.
However, since it is unlikely that most LDCs will develop sufficiently
during the next 25-30 years, it is crucial to identify those sectors that
most directly and powerfully affect fertility.
In this context, population should be viewed as a variable which
interacts, to differing degrees, with a wide range of development
programs, and the U.S. strategy should continue to stress the importance
of taking population into account in "non-family planning" activities.
This is particularly important with the increasing focus in the U.S.
development program on food and nutrition, health and population, and
education and human resources; assistance programs have less chance of
success as long as the numbers to be fed, educated, and employed are
increasing rapidly.
Thus, to assist in achieving LDC fertility reduction, not only should
family planning be high up on the priority list for U.S. foreign
assistance, but high priority in allocation of funds should be given to
programs in other sectors that contribute in a cost-effective manner in
reduction in population growth.
There is a growing, but still quite small, body of research to
determine the socio-economic aspects of development that most directly and
powerfully affect fertility. Although the limited analysis to date cannot
be considered definitive, there is general agreement that the five
following factors (in addition to increases in per capita income) tend to
be strongly associated with fertility declines: education, especially the
education of women; reductions in infant mortality; wage employment
opportunities for women; social security and other substitutes for the
economic value of children; and relative equality in income distribution
and rural development. There are a number of other factors identified from
research, historical analysis, and experimentation that also affect
fertility, including delaying the average age of marriage, and direct
payments (financial incentive) to family planning acceptors.
There are, however, a number of questions which must be addressed
before one can move from identification of factors associated with
fertility decline to large-scale programs that will induce fertility
decline in a cost-effective manner. For example, in the case of female
education, we need to consider such questions as: did the female education
cause fertility to decline or did the development process in some
situations cause parents both to see less economic need for large families
and to indulge in the "luxury" of educating their daughters? If more
female education does in fact cause fertility declines, will poor
high-fertility parents see much advantage in sending their daughters to
school? If so, how much does it cost to educate a girl to the point where
her fertility will be reduced (which occurs at about the fourth-grade
level)? What specific programs in female education are most cost-effective
(e.g., primary school, non-formal literacy training, or vocational or
pre-vocational training)? What, in rough quantitative terms, are the
non-population benefits of an additional dollar spent on female education
in a given situation in comparison to other non-population investment
alternatives? What are the population benefits of a dollar spent on female
education in comparison with other population-related investments, such as
in contraceptive supplies or in maternal and child health care systems?
And finally, what is the total population plus non-population benefit of
investment in a given specific program in female education in comparison
with the total population plus non-population benefits of alternate
feasible investment opportunities?
As a recent research proposal from Harvard's Department of Population
Studies puts this problem: "Recent studies have identified more specific
factors underlying fertility declines, especially, the spread of
educational attainment and the broadening of non-traditional roles for
women. In situations of rapid population growth, however, these run
counter to powerful market forces. Even when efforts are made to provide
educational opportunities for most of the school age population, low
levels of development and restricted employment opportunities for
academically educated youth lead to high dropout rates and
non-attendance..."
Fortunately, the situation is by no means as ambiguous for all of the
likely factors affecting fertility. For example, laws that raise the
minimum marriage age, where politically feasible and at least partially
enforceable, can over time have a modest effect on fertility at negligible
cost. Similarly, there have been some controversial, but remarkably
successful, experiments in India in which financial incentives, along with
other motivational devices, were used to get large numbers of men to
accept vasectomies. In addition, there appear to be some major activities,
such as programs aimed to improve the productive capacity of the rural
poor, which can be well justified even without reference to population
benefits, but which appear to have major population benefits as well.
The strategy suggested by the above considerations is that the volume
and type of programs aimed at the "determinants of fertility" should be
directly related to our estimate of the total benefits (including
non-population benefits) of a dollar invested in a given proposed program
and to our confidence in the reliability of that estimate. There is room
for honest disagreement among researchers and policy-makers about the
benefits, or feasibility, of a given program. Hopefully, over time, with
more research, experimentation and evaluation, areas of disagreement and
ambiguity will be clarified, and donors and recipients will have better
information both on what policies and programs tend to work under what
circumstances and how to go about analyzing a given country situation to
find the best feasible steps that should be taken.
Recommendations:
1. AID should implement the strategy set out in the World Population
Plan of Action, especially paragraphs 31 and 32 and Section I
("Introduction - a U.S. Global Population Strategy") above, which calls
for high priority in funding to three categories of programs in areas
affecting fertility (family-size) decisions:
a. Operational programs where there is proven cost-effectiveness,
generally where there are also significant benefits for non-population
objectives;
b. Experimental programs where research indicates close relationships to
fertility reduction but cost-effectiveness has not yet been demonstrated
in terms of specific steps to be taken (i.e., program design); and
c. Research and evaluation on the relative impact on desired family size
of the socio-economic determinants of fertility, and on what policy
scope exists for affecting these determinants.
2. Research, experimentation and evaluation of ongoing programs
should focus on answering the questions (such as those raised above,
relating to female education) that determine what steps can and should be
taken in other sectors that will in a cost-effective manner speed up the
rate of fertility decline. In addition to the five areas discussed in
Section II. B 1-5 below, the research should also cover the full range of
factors affecting fertility, such as laws and norms respecting age of
marriage, and financial incentives. Work of this sort should be undertaken
in individual key countries to determine the motivational factors required
there to develop a preference for small family size. High priority must be
given to testing feasibility and replicability on a wide scale.
3. AID should encourage other donors in LDC governments to carry out
parallel strategies of research, experimentation, and (cost-effective
well-evaluated) large-scale operations programs on factors affecting
fertility. Work in this area should be coordinated, and results shared.
4. AID should help develop capacity in a few existing U.S. and LDC
institutions to serve as major centers for research and policy development
in the areas of fertility-affecting social or economic measures, direct
incentives, household behavior research, and evaluation techniques for
motivational approaches. The centers should provide technical assistance,
serve as a forum for discussion, and generally provide the "critical mass"
of effort and visibility which has been lacking in this area to date.
Emphasis should be given to maximum involvement of LDC institutions and
individuals.
The following sections discuss research experimental and operational
programs to be undertaken in the five promising areas mentioned above.
II. B. 1. Providing Minimal Levels of Education, Especially for Women
Discussion
There is fairly convincing evidence that female education especially
of 4th grade and above correlates strongly with reduced desired family
size, although it is unclear the extent to which the female education
causes reductions in desired family size or whether it is a faster pace of
development which leads both to increased demand for female education and
to reduction in desired family size. There is also a relatively widely
held theory -- though not statistically validated -- that improved levels
of literacy contribute to reduction in desired family size both through
greater knowledge of family planning information and increasing
motivational factors related to reductions in family size. Unfortunately,
AID's experience with mass literacy programs over the past 15 years has
yielded the sobering conclusion that such programs generally failed (i.e.
were not cost-effective) unless the population sees practical benefits to
themselves from learning how to read -- e.g., a requirement for literacy
to acquire easier access to information about new agricultural
technologies or to jobs that require literacy.
Now, however, AID has recently revised its education strategy, in
line with the mandate of its legislation, to place emphasis on the spread
of education to poor people, particularly in rural areas, and relatively
less on higher levels of education. This approach is focused on use of
formal and "non-formal" education (i.e., organized education outside the
schoolroom setting) to assist in meeting the human resource requirements
of the development process, including such things as rural literacy
programs aimed at agriculture, family planning, or other development
goals.
Recommendations
1. Integrated basic education (including applied literacy) and family
planning programs should be developed whenever they appear to be
effective, of high priority, and acceptable to the individual country. AID
should continue its emphasis on basic education, for women as well as men.
2. A major effort should be made in LDCs seeking to reduce birth
rates to assure at least an elementary school education for virtually all
children, girls as well as boys, as soon as the country can afford it
(which would be quite soon for all but the poorest countries). Simplified,
practical education programs should be developed. These programs should,
where feasible, include specific curricula to motivate the next generation
toward a two-child family average to assure that level of fertility in two
or three decades. AID should encourage and respond to requests for
assistance in extending basic education and in introducing family planning
into curricula. Expenditures for such emphasis on increased practical
education should come from general AID funds, not population funds.
II. B. 2. Reducing Infant and Child Mortality
Discussion:
High infant and child mortality rates, evident in many developing
countries, lead parents to be concerned about the number of their children
who are likely to survive. Parents may overcompensate for possible child
losses by having additional children. Research to date clearly indicates
not only that high fertility and high birth rates are closely correlated
but that in most circumstances low net population growth rates can only be
achieved when child mortality is low as well. Policies and programs which
significantly reduce infant and child mortality below present levels will
lead couples to have fewer children. However, we must recognize that there
is a lag of at least several years before parents (and cultures and
subcultures) become confident that their children are more likely to
survive and to adjust their fertility behavior accordingly.
Considerable reduction in infant and child mortality is possible
through improvement in nutrition, inoculations against diseases, and other
public health measures if means can be devised for extending such services
to neglected LDC populations on a low-cost basis. It often makes sense to
combine such activities with family planning services in integrated
delivery systems in order to maximize the use of scarce LDC financial and
health manpowder (sic.) resources (See Section IV). In addition, providing
selected health care for both mothers and their children can enhance the
acceptability of family planning by showing concern for the whole
condition of the mother and her children and not just for the single
factor of fertility.
The two major cost-effective problems in maternal-child health care
are that clinical health care delivery systems have not in the past
accounted for much of the reduction in infant mortality and that, as in
the U.S., local medical communities tend to favor relatively expensive
quality health care, even at the cost of leaving large numbers of people
(in the LDC's generally over two-thirds of the people) virtually uncovered
by modern health services.
Although we do not have all the answers on how to develop
inexpensive, integrated delivery systems, we need to proceed with
operational programs to respond to ODC requests if they are likely to be
cost-effective based on experience to date, and to experiment on a large
scale with innovative ways of tackling the outstanding problems.
Evaluation mechanisms for measuring the impact of various courses of
action are an essential part of this effort in order to provide feedback
for current and future projects and to improve the state of the art in
this field.
Currently, efforts to develop low-cost health and family planning
services for neglected populations in the LDC's are impeded because of the
lack of international commitment and resources to the health side. For
example:
A. The World Bank could supply low-interest credits to LDCs for the
development of low-cost health-related services to neglected populations
but has not yet made a policy decision to do so. The Bank has a population
and health program and the program's leaders have been quite sympathetic
with the above objective. The Bank's staff has prepared a policy paper on
this subject for the Board but prospects for it are not good. Currently,
the paper will be discussed by the Bank Board at its November 1974
meeting. Apparently there is some reticence within the Bank's Board and in
parts of the staff about making a strong initiative in this area. In part,
the Bank argues that there are not proven models of effective, low-cost
health systems in which the Bank can invest. The Bank also argues that
other sectors such as agriculture, should receive higher priority in the
competition for scarce resources. In addition, arguments are made in some
quarters of the Bank that the Bank ought to restrict itself to "hard loan
projects" and not get into the "soft" area.
A current reading from the Bank's staff suggests that unless there is
some change in the thinking of the Bank Board, the Bank's policy will be
simply to keep trying to help in the population and health areas but not
to take any large initiative in the low-cost delivery system area.
The Bank stance is regrettable because the Bank could play a very
useful role in this area helping to fund low-cost physical structures and
other elements of low-cost health systems, including rural health clinics
where needed. It could also help in providing low-cost loans for training,
and in seeking and testing new approaches to reaching those who do not now
have access to health and family planning services. This would not be at
all inconsistent with our and the Bank's frankly admitting that we do not
have all the "answer" or cost-effective models for low-cost health
delivery systems. Rather they, we and other donors could work together on
experimentally oriented, operational programs to develop models for the
wide variety of situations faced by LDCs.
Involvement of the Bank in this area would open up new possibilities
for collaboration. Grant funds, whether from the U.S. or UNFPA, could be
used to handle the parts of the action that require short lead times such
as immediate provision of supplies, certain kinds of training and rapid
deployment of technical assistance. Simultaneously, for parts of the
action that require longer lead times, such as building clinics, World
Bank loans could be employed. The Bank's lending processes could be
synchronized to bring such building activity to a readiness condition at
the time the training programs have moved along far enough to permit
manning of the facilities. The emphasis should be on meeting low-cost
rather than high-cost infrastructure requirements.
Obviously, in addition to building, we assume the Bank could fund
other local-cost elements of expansion of health systems such as
longer-term training programs.
AID is currently trying to work out improved consultation procedures
with the Bank staff in the hope of achieving better collaborative efforts
within the Bank's current commitment of resources in the population and
health areas. With a greater commitment of Bank resources and improved
consultation with AID and UNFPA, a much greater dent could be made on the
overall problem.
B. The World Health Organization (WHO) and its counterpart for Latin
America, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), currently provide
technical assistance in the development and implementation of health
projects which are in turn financed by international funding mechanisms
such as UNDP and the International Financial Institutions. However, funds
available for health actions through these organizations are limited at
present. Higher priority by the international funding agencies to health
actions could expand the opportunities for useful collaborations among
donor institutions and countries to develop low-cost integrated health and
family planning delivery systems for LDC populations that do not now have
access to such services.
Recommendations:
The U.S. should encourage heightened international interest in and
commitment of resources to developing delivery mechanisms for providing
integrated health and family planning services to neglected populations at
costs which host countries can support within a reasonable period of time.
Efforts would include:
1. Encouraging the World Bank and other international funding
mechanisms, through the U.S. representatives on the boards of these
organizations, to take a broader initiative in the development of
inexpensive service delivery mechanisms in countries wishing to expand
such systems.
2. Indicating U.S. willingness (as the U.S. did at the World
Population Conference) to join with other donors and organizations to
encourage and support further action by LDC governments and other
institutions in the low-cost delivery systems area.
A. As offered at Bucharest, the U.S. should join donor countries,
WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF and the World Bank to create a consortium to offer
assistance to the more needy developing countries to establish their own
low-cost preventive and curative public health systems reaching into all
areas of their countries and capable of national support within a
reasonable period. Such systems would include family planning services as
an ordinary part of their overall services.
B. The WHO should be asked to take the leadership in such an
arrangement and is ready to do so. Apparently at least half of the
potential donor countries and the EEC's technical assistance program are
favorably inclined. So is the UNFPA and UNICEF. The U.S., through its
representation on the World Bank Board, should encourage a broader World
Bank initiative in this field, particularly to assist in the development
of inexpensive, basic health service infrastructures in countries wishing
to undertake the development of such systems.
3. Expanding Wage Employment Opportunities, Especially for Women
Discussion
Employment is the key to access to income, which opens the way to
improved health, education, nutrition, and reduced family size. Reliable
job opportunities enable parents to limit their family size and invest in
the welfare of the children they have.
The status and utilization of women in LDC societies is particularly
important in reducing family size. For women, employment outside the home
offers an alternative to early marriage and childbearing, and an incentive
to have fewer children after marriage. The woman who must stay home to
take care of her children must forego the income she could earn outside
the home. Research indicates that female wage employment outside the home
is related to fertility reduction. Programs to increase the women's labor
force participation must, however, take account of the overall demand for
labor; this would be a particular problem in occupations where there is
already widespread unemployment among males. But other occupations where
women have a comparative advantage can be encouraged.
Improving the legal and social status of women gives women a greater
voice in decision-making about their lives, including family size, and can
provide alternative opportunities to childbearing, thereby reducing the
benefits of having children.
The U.S. Delegation to the Bucharest Conference emphasized the
importance of improving the general status of women and of developing
employment opportunities for women outside the home and off the farm. It
was joined by all countries in adopting a strong statement on this vital
issue. See Chapter VI for a fuller discussion of the conference.
Recommendation:
1. AID should communicate with and seek opportunities to assist
national economic development programs to increase the role of women in
the development process.
2. AID should review its education/training programs (such as U.S.
participant training, in-country and third-country training) to see that
such activities provide equal access to women.
3. AID should enlarge pre-vocational and vocational training to
involve women more directly in learning skills which can enhance their
income and status in the community (e.g. paramedical skills related to
provision of family planning services).
4. AID should encourage the development and placement of LDC women as
decision-makers in development programs, particularly those programs
designed to increase the role of women as producers of goods and services,
and otherwise to improve women's welfare (e.g. national credit and finance
programs, and national health and family planning programs).
5. AID should encourage, where possible, women's active participation
in the labor movement in order to promote equal pay for equal work, equal
benefits, and equal employment opportunities.
6. AID should continue to review its programs and projects for their
impact on LDC women, and adjust them as necessary to foster greater
participation of women - particularly those in the lowest classes - in the
development process.
4. Developing Alternatives to the Social Security Role Provided By
Children to Aging Parents
Discussion:
In most LDCs the almost total absence of government or other
institutional forms of social security for old people forces dependence on
children for old age survival. The need for such support appears to be one
of the important motivations for having numerous children. Several
proposals have been made, and a few pilot experiments are being conducted,
to test the impact of financial incentives designed to provide old age
support (or, more tangentially, to increase the earning power of fewer
children by financing education costs parents would otherwise bear).
Proposals have been made for son-insurance (provided to the parents if
they have no more than three children), and for deferred payments of
retirement benefits (again tied to specified limits on family size), where
the payment of the incentive is delayed. The intent is not only to tie the
incentive to actual fertility, but to impose the financial cost on the
government or private sector entity only after the benefits of the avoided
births have accrued to the economy and the financing entity. Schemes of
varying administrative complexity have been developed to take account of
management problems in LDCs. The economic and equity core of these
long-term incentive proposals is simple: the government offers to return
to the contracting couple a portion of the economic dividend they generate
by avoiding births, as a direct trade-off for the personal financial
benefits they forego by having fewer children.
Further research and experimentation in this area needs to take into
account the impact of growing urbanization in LDCs on traditional rural
values and outlooks such as the desire for children as old-age insurance.
Recommendation:
AID should take a positive stance with respect to exploration of
social security type incentives as described above. AID should encourage
governments to consider such measures, and should provide financial and
technical assistance where appropriate. The recommendation made earlier to
establish an "intermediary" institutional capacity which could provide LDC
governments with substantial assistance in this area, among several areas
on the "demand" side of the problem, would add considerably to AID's
ability to carry out this recommendation.
5. Pursuing Development Strategies that Skew Income Growth Toward the
Poor, Especially Rural Development Focusing on Rural Poverty
Income distribution and rural development: The higher a family's
income, the fewer children it will probably have, except at the very top
of the income scale. Similarly, the more evenly distributed the income in
a society, the lower the overall fertility rate seems to be since better
income distribution means that the poor, who have the highest fertility,
have higher income. Thus a development strategy which emphasizes the rural
poor, who are the largest and poorest group in most LDCs would be
providing income increases to those with the highest fertility levels. No
LDC is likely to achieve population stability unless the rural poor
participate in income increases and fertility declines.
Agriculture and rural development is already, along with population,
the U.S. Government's highest priority in provision of assistance to LDCs.
For FY 1975, about 60% of the $1.13 billion AID requested in the five
functional areas of the foreign assistance legislation is in agriculture
and rural development. The $255 million increase in the FY 1975 level
authorized in the two year FY 1974 authorization bill is virtually all for
agriculture and rural development.
AID's primary goal in agriculture and rural development is
concentration in food output and increases in the rural quality of life;
the major strategy element is concentration on increasing the output of
small farmers, through assistance in provision of improved technologies,
agricultural inputs, institutional supports, etc.
This strategy addresses three U.S. interests: First, it increases
agricultural output in the LDCs, and speeds up the average pace of their
development, which, as has been noted, leads to increased acceptance of
family planning. Second, the emphasis on small farmers and other elements
of the rural poor spreads the benefits of development as broadly as is
feasible among lower income groups. As noted above spreading the benefits
of development to the poor, who tend to have the highest fertility rates,
is an important step in getting them to reduce their family size. In
addition, the concentration on small farmer production (vs., for example,
highly mechanized, large-scale agriculture) can increase on and off farm
rural job opportunities and decrease the flow to the cities. While
fertility levels in rural areas are higher than in the cities, continued
rapid migration into the cities at levels greater than the cities' job
markets or services can sustain adds an important destabilizing element to
development efforts and goals of many countries. Indeed, urban areas in
some LDCs are already the scene of urban unrest and high crime rates.
Recommendation
AID should continue its efforts to focus not just on agriculture and
rural development but specifically on small farmers and on labor-intensive
means of stimulating agricultural output and on other aspects of improving
the quality of life of the rural poor, so that agriculture and rural
development assistance, in addition to its importance for increased food
production and other purposes, can have maximum impact on reducing
population growth.
6. Concentration on Education and Indoctrination of The Rising Generation
of Children Regarding the Desirability of Smaller Family Size
Discussion:
Present efforts at reducing birth rates in LDCs, including AID and
UNFPA assistance, are directed largely at adults now in their reproductive
years. Only nominal attention is given to population education or sex
education in schools and in most countries none is given in the very early
grades which are the only attainment of 2/3-3/4 of the children. It should
be obvious, however, that efforts at birth control directed toward adults
will with even maximum success result in acceptance of contraception for
the reduction of births only to the level of the desired family size --
which knowledge, attitude and practice studies in many countries indicate
is an average of four or more children.
The great necessity is to convince the masses of the population that
it is to their individual and national interest to have, on the average,
only three and then only two children. There is little likelihood that
this result can be accomplished very widely against the background of the
cultural heritage of today's adults, even the young adults, among the
masses in most LDCs. Without diminishing in any way the effort to reach
these adults, the obvious increased focus of attention should be to change
the attitudes of the next generation, those who are now in elementary
school or younger. If this could be done, it would indeed be possible to
attain a level of fertility approaching replacement in 20 years and
actually reaching it in 30.
Because a large percentage of children from high-fertility,
low-income groups do not attend school, it will be necessary to develop
means to reach them for this and other educational purposes through
informal educational programs. As the discussion earlier of the
determinants of family size (fertility) pointed out, it is also important
to make significant progress in other areas, such as better health care
and improvements in income distribution, before desired family size can be
expected to fall sharply. If it makes economic sense for poor parents to
have large families twenty years from now, there is no evidence as to
whether population education or indoctrination will have sufficient impact
alone to dissuade them.
Recommendation
1. That U.S. agencies stress the importance of education of the next
generation of parents, starting in elementary schools, toward a two-child
family ideal. 2. That AID stimulate specific efforts to develop means
of educating children of elementary school age to the ideal of the
two-child family and that UNESCO be asked to take the lead through formal
and informal education. General Recommendation for UN Agencies
As to each of the above six categories State and AID should make
specific efforts to have the relevant UN agency, WHO, ILO, FAO, UNESCO,
UNICEF, and the UNFPA take its proper role of leadership in the UN family
with increased program effort, citing the World Population Plan of Action.
II.
C. Food for Peace Program and Population
Discussion:
One of the most fundamental aspects of the impact of population
growth on the political and economic well-being of the globe is its
relationship to food. Here the problem of the interrelationship of
population, national resources, environment, productivity and political
and economic stability come together when shortages of this basic human
need occur.
USDA projections indicate that the quantity of grain imports needed
by the LDCs in the 1980s will grow significantly, both in overall and per
capita terms. In addition, these countries will face year-to-year
fluctuations in production due to the influence of weather and other
factors.
This is not to say that the LDCs need face starvation in the next two
decades, for the same projections indicate an even greater increase in
production of grains in the developed nations. It should be pointed out,
however, that these projections assume that such major problems as the
vast increase in the need for fresh water, the ecological effects of the
vast increase in the application of fertilizer, pesticides, and
irrigation, and the apparent adverse trend in the global climate, are
solved. At present, there are no solutions to these problems in sight.
The major challenge will be to increase food production in the LDCs
themselves and to liberalize the system in which grain is transferred
commercially from producer to consumer countries. We also see food aid as
an important way of meeting part of the chronic shortfall and emergency
needs caused by year-to-year variation at least through the end of this
decade. Many outside experts predict just such difficulties even if major
efforts are undertaken to expand world agricultural output, especially in
the LDCs themselves but also in the U.S. and in other major feed grain
producers. In the longer run, LDCs must both decrease population growth
and increase agricultural production significantly. At some point the
"excess capacity" of the food exporting countries will run out. Some
countries have already moved from a net food exporter to a net importer of
food.
There are major interagency studies now progressing in the food area
and this report cannot go deeply into this field. It can only point to
serious problems as they relate to population and suggest minimum
requirements and goals in the food area. In particular, we believe that
population growth may have very serious negative consequences on food
production in the LDCs including over-expectations of the capacity of the
land to produce, downgrading the ecological economics of marginal areas,
and overharvesting the seas. All of these conditions may affect the
viability of the world's economy and thereby its prospects for peace and
security.
Recommendations:
Since NSC/CIEP studies are already underway we refer the reader to
them. However the following, we believe, are minimum requirements for any
strategy which wishes to avoid instability and conflict brought on by
population growth and food scarcity:
(1) High priority for U.S. bilateral and multilateral LDC
Agricultural Assistance; including efforts by the LDCs to improve food
production and distribution with necessary institutional adjustments and
economic policies to stimulate efficient production. This must include a
significant increase in financial and technical aid to promote more
efficient production and distribution in the LDCs.
(2) Development of national food stocks15 (including those needed for
emergency relief) within an internationally agreed framework sufficient to
provide an adequate level of world food security;
(3) Expansion of production of the input elements of food production
(i.e., fertilizer, availability of water and high yield seed stocks) and
increased incentives for expanded agricultural productivity. In this
context a reduction in the real cost of energy (especially fuel) either
through expansion in availability through new sources or decline in the
relative price of oil or both would be of great importance;
(4) Significant expansion of U.S. and other producer country food
crops within the context of a liberalized and efficient world trade system
that will assure food availability to the LDCs in case of severe shortage.
New international trade arrangements for agricultural products, open
enough to permit maximum production by efficient producers and flexible
enough to dampen wide price fluctuations in years when weather conditions
result in either significant shortfalls or surpluses. We believe this
objective can be achieved by trade liberalization and an internationally
coordinated food reserve program without resorting to price-oriented
agreements, which have undesirable effects on both production and
distribution;
(5) The maintenance of an adequate food aid program with a clearer
focus on its use as a means to make up real food deficits, pending the
development of their own food resources, in countries unable to feed
themselves rather than as primarily an economic development or foreign
policy instrument; and
(6) A strengthened research effort, including long term, to develop
new seed and farming technologies, primarily to increase yields but also
to permit more extensive cultivation techniques, particularly in LDCs.
III. International Organizations and other Multilateral Population
Programs
A. UN Organization and Specialized Agencies
Discussion
In the mid-sixties the UN member countries slowly began to agree on a
greater involvement of the United Nations in population matters. In 1967
the Secretary-General created a Trust Fund to finance work in the
population field. In 1969 the Fund was renamed the United Nations Fund for
Population Activities (UNFPA) and placed under the overall supervision of
the United Nations Development Program. During this period, also, the
mandates of the Specialized Agencies were modified to permit greater
involvement by these agencies in population activities.
UNFPA's role was clarified by an ECOSOC resolution in 1973: (a) to
build up the knowledge and capacity to respond to the needs in the
population and family planning fields; (b) to promote awareness in both
developed and developing countries of the social, economic, and
environmental implications of population problems; (c) to extend
assistance to developing countries; and (d) to promote population programs
and to coordinate projects supported by the UNFPA.
Most of the projects financed by UNFPA are implemented with the
assistance of organizations of the Untied Nations system, including the
regional Economic Commission, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF),
International Labour Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO). Collaborative arrangements
have been made with the International Development Association (IDA), an
affiliate of the World Bank, and with the World Food Programme.
Increasingly the UNFPA is moving toward comprehensive country
programs negotiated directly with governments. This permits the
governments to select the implementing (executing) agency which may be a
member of the UN system or a non-government organization or company. With
the development of the country program approach it is planned to level off
UNFPA funding to the specialized agencies.
UNFPA has received $122 million in voluntary contributions from 65
governments, of which $42 million was raised in 1973. The Work Plan of
UNFPA for 1974-77 sets a $280 million goal for fund-raising, as follows:
1974 - $54 million
1975 - $64 million
1976 - $76 million
1977 - $86 million
Through 1971 the U.S. had contributed approximately half of all the funds
contributed to UNFPA. In 1972 we reduced our matching contribution to 48
percent of other donations, and for 1973 we further reduced our
contribution to 45%. In 1973 requests for UNFPA assistance had begun to
exceed available resources. This trend has accelerated and demand for
UNFPA resources is now strongly outrunning supply. Documented need for
UNFPA assistance during the years 1974-77 is $350 million, but because the
UNFPA could anticipate that only $280 million will be available it has
been necessary to phase the balance to at least 1978.
Recommendations
The U.S. should continue its support of multilateral efforts in the
population field by:
a) increasing, subject to congressional appropriation action, the
absolute contribution to the UNFPA in light of 1) mounting demands for
UNFPA Assistance, 2) improving UNFPA capacity to administer projects, 3)
the extent to which UNFPA funding aims at U.S. objectives and will
substitute for U.S. funding, 4) the prospect that without increased U.S.
contributions the UNFPA will be unable to raise sufficient funds for its
budget in 1975 and beyond;
b) initiating or participating in an effort to increase the resources
from other donors made available to international agencies that can work
effectively in the population area as both to increase overall population
efforts and, in the UNFPA, to further reduce the U.S. percentage share of
total contributions; and
c) supporting the coordinating role which UNFPA plays among donor and
recipient countries, and among UN and other organizations in the
population field, including the World Bank.
B. Encouraging Private Organizations
Discussion:
The cooperation of private organizations and groups on a national,
regional and world-wide level is essential to the success of a
comprehensive population strategy. These groups provide important
intellectual contributions and policy support, as well as the delivery of
family planning and health services and information. In some countries,
the private and voluntary organizations are the only means of providing
family planning services and materials.
Recommendations:
AID should continue to provide support to those private U.S. and
international organizations whose work contributes to reducing rapid
population growth, and to develop with them, where appropriate, geographic
and functional divisions of labor in population assistance.
IV. Provision and Development of Family Planning Services, Information and
Technology
In addition to creating the climate for fertility decline, as
described in a previous section, it is essential to provide safe and
effective techniques for controlling fertility.
There are two main elements in this task: (a) improving the
effectiveness of the existing means of fertility control and developing
new ones; and (b) developing low-cost systems for the delivery of family
planning technologies, information and related services to the 85% of LDC
populations not now reached.
Legislation and policies affecting what the U.S. Government does
relative to abortion in the above areas is discussed at the end of this
section.
IV. A. Research to Improve Fertility Control Technology
Discussion
The effort to reduce population growth requires a variety of birth
control methods which are safe, effective, inexpensive and attractive to
both men and women. The developing countries in particular need methods
which do not require physicians and which are suitable for use in
primitive, remote rural areas or urban slums by people with relatively low
motivation. Experiences in family planning have clearly demonstrated the
crucial impact of improved technology on fertility control.
None of the currently available methods of fertility control is
completely effective and free of adverse reactions and objectionable
characteristics. The ideal of a contraceptive, perfect in all these
respects, may never be realized. A great deal of effort and money will be
necessary to improve fertility control methods. The research to achieve
this aim can be divided into two categories:
1. Short-term approaches: These include applied and developmental work
which is required to perfect further and evaluate the safety and role of
methods demonstrated to be effective in family planning programs in the
developing countries.
Other work is directed toward new methods based on well established
knowledge about the physiology of reproduction. Although short term
pay-offs are possible, successful development of some methods may take 5
years and up to $15 million for a single method.
2. Long-term approaches: The limited state of fundamental knowledge of
many reproductive processes requires that a strong research effort of a
more basic nature be maintained to elucidate these processes and provide
leads for contraceptive development research. For example, new knowledge
of male reproductive processes is needed before research to develop a
male "pill" can come to fruition. Costs and duration of the required
research are high and difficult to quantify.
With expenditures of about $30 million annually, a broad program of
basic and applied bio-medical research on human reproduction and
contraceptive development is carried out by the Center for Population
Research of the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development. The Agency for International Development annually funds
about $5 million of principally applied research on new means of
fertility control suitable for use in developing countries.
Smaller sums are spent by other agencies of the U.S. Government.
Coordination of the federal research effort is facilitated by the
activities of the Interagency Committee on Population Research. This
committee prepares an annual listing and analyses of all government
supported population research programs. The listing is published in the
Inventory of Federal Population Research.
A variety of studies have been undertaken by non-governmental experts
including the U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American
Future. Most of these studies indicate that the United States effort in
population research is insufficient. Opinions differ on how much more
can be spent wisely and effectively but an additional $25-50 million
annually for bio-medical research constitutes a conservative estimate.
Recommendations:
A stepwise increase over the next 3 years to a total of about $100
million annually for fertility and contraceptive research is recommended.
This is an increase of $60 million over the current $40 million expended
annually by the major Federal Agencies for bio-medical research. Of this
increase $40 million would be spent on short-term, goal directed research.
The current expenditure of $20 million in long-term approaches consisting
largely of basic bio-medical research would be doubled. This increased
effort would require significantly increased staffing of the federal
agencies which support this work. Areas recommended for further research
are:
1. Short-term approaches: These approaches include improvement and field
testing of existing technology and development of new technology. It is
expected that some of these approaches would be ready for use within
five years. Specific short term approaches worthy of increased effort
are as follows:
a. Oral contraceptives have become popular and widely used; yet the
optimal steroid hormone combinations and doses for LDC populations need
further definition. Field studies in several settings are required.
Approx. Increased Cost: $3 million annually.
b. Intra-uterine devices of differing size, shape, and bioactivity
should be developed and tested to determine the optimum levels of
effectiveness, safety, and acceptability. Approx. Increased Cost: $3
million annually.
c. Improved methods for ovulation prediction will be important to those
couples who wish to practice rhythm with more assurance of effectiveness
than they now have. Approx. Increased Cost: $3 million annually.
d. Sterilization of men and women has received wide-spread acceptance in
several areas when a simple, quick, and safe procedure is readily
available. Female sterilization has been improved by technical advances
with laparoscopes, culdoscopes, and greatly simplifies abdominal
surgical techniques. Further improvements by the use of tubal clips,
trans-cervical approaches, and simpler techniques can be developed. For
men several current techniques hold promise but require more refinement
and evaluation. Approx. Increased Cost $6 million annually.
e. Injectable contraceptives for women which are effective for three
months or more and are administered by para-professionals undoubtedly
will be a significant improvement. Currently available methods of this
type are limited by their side effects and potential hazards. There are
reasons to believe that these problems can be overcome with additional
research. Approx. Increased Cost: $5 million annually.
f. Leuteolytic and anti-progesterone approaches to fertility control
including use of prostaglandins are theoretically attractive but
considerable work remains to be done. Approx. Increased Cost: $7 million
annually.
g. Non-Clinical Methods. Additional research on non-clinical methods
including foams, creams, and condoms is needed. These methods can be
used without medical supervision. Approx. Increased Cost; $5 million
annually.
h. Field studies. Clinical trials of new methods in use settings are
essential to test their worth in developing countries and to select the
best of several possible methods in a given setting. Approx. Increased
Cost: $8 million annually.
2. Long-term approaches: Increased research toward better understanding
of human reproductive physiology will lead to better methods of
fertility control for use in five to fifteen years. A great deal has yet
to be learned about basic aspects of male and female fertility and how
regulation can be effected. For example, an effective and safe male
contraceptive is needed, in particular an injection which will be
effective for specified periods of time. Fundamental research must be
done but there are reasons to believe that the development of an
injectable male contraceptive is feasible. Another method which should
be developed is an injection which will assure a woman of regular
periods. The drug would be given by para-professionals once a month or
as needed to regularize the menstrual cycle. Recent scientific advances
indicate that this method can be developed. Approx. Increased Cost: $20
million annually.
Development of Low-cost Delivery Systems
Discussion
Exclusive of China, only 10-15% of LDC populations are currently
effectively reached by family planning activities. If efforts to reduce
rapid population growth are to be successful it is essential that the
neglected 85-90% of LDC populations have access to convenient, reliable
family planning services. Moreover, these people -- largely in rural but
also in urban areas -- not only tend to have the highest fertility, they
simultaneously suffer the poorest health, the worst nutritional levels,
and the highest infant mortality rates.
Family planning services in LDCs are currently provided by the
following means:
1. Government-run clinics or centers which offer family planning
services alone;
2. Government-run clinics or centers which offer family planning as part
of a broader based health service;
3. Government-run programs that emphasize door to door contact by family
planning workers who deliver contraceptives to those desiring them
and/or make referrals to clinics;
4. Clinics or centers run by private organizations (e.g., family
planning associations);
5. Commercial channels which in many countries sell condoms, oral
contraceptives, and sometimes spermicidal foam over the counter;
6. Private physicians.
Two of these means in particular hold promise for allowing significant
expansion of services to the neglected poor:
1. Integrated Delivery Systems. This approach involves the provision of
family planning in conjunction with health and/or nutrition services,
primarily through government-run programs. There are simple logistical
reasons which argue for providing these services on an integrated basis.
Very few of the LDCs have the resources, both in financial and manpower
terms, to enable them to deploy individual types of services to the
neglected 85% of their populations. By combining a variety of services
in one delivery mechanism they can attain maximum impact with the scarce
resources available.
In addition, the provision of family planning in the context of broader
health services can help make family planning more acceptable to LDC
leaders and individuals who, for a variety of reasons (some ideological,
some simply humanitarian) object to family planning. Family planning in
the health context shows a concern for the well-being of the family as a
whole and not just for a couple's reproductive function.
Finally, providing integrated family planning and health services on a
broad basis would help the U.S. contend with the ideological charge that
the U.S. is more interested in curbing the numbers of LDC people than it
is in their future and well-being. While it can be argued, and argued
effectively, that limitation of numbers may well be one of the most
critical factors in enhancing development potential and improving the
chances for well-being, we should recognize that those who argue along
ideological lines have made a great deal of the fact that the U.S.
contribution to development programs and health programs has steadily
shrunk, whereas funding for population programs has steadily increased.
While many explanations may be brought forward to explain these trends,
the fact is that they have been an ideological liability to the U.S. in
its crucial developing relationships with the LDCs. A.I.D. currently
spends about $35 million annually in bilateral programs on the provision
of family planning services through integrated delivery systems. Any
action to expand such systems must aim at the deployment of truly
low-cost services. Health-related services which involve costly physical
structures, high skill requirements, and expensive supply methods will
not produce the desired deployment in any reasonable time. The basic
test of low-cost methods will be whether the LDC governments concerned
can assume responsibility for the financial, administrative, manpower
and other elements of these service extensions. Utilizing existing
indigenous structures and personnel (including traditional medical
practitioners who in some countries have shown a strong interest in
family planning) and service methods that involve simply-trained
personnel, can help keep costs within LDC resource capabilities.
2. Commercial Channels. In an increasing number of LDCs, contraceptives
(such as condoms, foam and the Pill) are being made available without
prescription requirements through commercial channels such as
drugstores.16 The commercial approach offers a practical, low-cost means
of providing family planning services, since it utilizes an existing
distribution system and does not involve financing the further expansion
of public clinical delivery facilities. Both A.I.D. and private
organizations like the IPPF are currently testing commercial
distribution schemes in various LDCs to obtain further information on
the feasibility, costs, and degree of family planning acceptance
achieved through this approach. A.I.D. is currently spending about $2
million annually in this area.
In order to stimulate LDC provision of adequate family planning
services, whether alone or in conjunction with health services, A.I.D. has
subsidized contraceptive purchases for a number of years. In FY 1973
requests from A.I.D. bilateral and grantee programs for contraceptive
supplies -- in particular for oral contraceptives and condoms -- increased
markedly, and have continued to accelerate in FY 1974. Additional rapid
expansion in demand is expected over the next several years as the
accumulated population/family planning efforts of the past decade gain
momentum.
While it is useful to subsidize provision of contraceptives in the
short term in order to expand and stimulate LDC family planning programs,
in the long term it will not be possible to fully fund demands for
commodities, as well as other necessary family planning actions, within
A.I.D. and other donor budgets. These costs must ultimately be borne by
LDC governments and/or individual consumers. Therefore, A.I.D. will
increasingly focus on developing contraceptive production and procurement
capacities by the LDCs themselves. A.I.D. must, however, be prepared to
continue supplying large quantities of contraceptives over the next
several years to avoid a detrimental hiatus in program supply lines while
efforts are made to expand LDC production and procurement actions. A.I.D.
should also encourage other donors and multilateral organizations to
assume a greater share of the effort, in regard both to the short-term
actions to subsidize contraceptive supplies and the longer-term actions to
develop LDC capacities for commodity production and procurement.
Recommendations:
1. A.I.D. should aim its population assistance program to help achieve
adequate coverage of couples having the highest fertility who do not now
have access to family planning services.
2. The service delivery approaches which seem to hold greatest promise
of reaching these people should be vigorously pursued. For example:
a. The U.S. should indicate its willingness to join with other donors
and organizations to encourage further action by LDC governments and
other institutions to provide low-cost family planning and health
services to groups in their populations who are not now reached by such
services. In accordance with Title X of the AID Legislation and current
policy, A.I.D. should be prepared to provide substantial assistance in
this area in response to sound requests.
b. The services provided must take account of the capacities of the LDC
governments or institutions to absorb full responsibility, over
reasonable timeframes, for financing and managing the level of services
involved.
c. A.I.D. and other donor assistance efforts should utilize to the
extent possible indigenous structures and personnel in delivering
services, and should aim at the rapid development of local (community)
action and sustaining capabilities.
d. A.I.D. should continue to support experimentation with commercial
distribution of contraceptives and application of useful findings in
order to further explore the feasibility and replicability of this
approach. Efforts in this area by other donors and organizations should
be encouraged. Approx. U.S. Cost: $5-10 million annually.
3. In conjunction with other donors and organizations, A.I.D. should
actively encourage the development of LDC capabilities for production
and procurement of needed family planning contraceptives. 17
C. Utilization of Mass Media and Satellite Communications Systems for
Family Planning
1. Utilization of Mass Media for Dissemination of Family Planning Services
and Information
The potential of education and its various media is primarily a
function of (a) target populations where socio-economic conditions would
permit reasonable people to change their behavior with the receipt of
information about family planning and (b) the adequate development of the
substantive motivating context of the message. While dramatic limitations
in the availability of any family planning related message are most severe
in rural areas of developing countries, even more serious gaps exist in
the understanding of the implicit incentives in the system for large
families and the potential of the informational message to alter those
conditions.
Nevertheless, progress in the technology for mass media
communications has led to the suggestion that the priority need might lie
in the utilization of this technology, particularly with large and
illiterate rural populations. While there are on-going efforts they have
not yet reached their full potential. Nor have the principal U.S. agencies
concerned yet integrated or given sufficient priority to family planning
information and population programs generally.
Yet A.I.D.'s work suggests that radio, posters, printed material, and
various types of personal contacts by health/family planning workers tend
to be more cost-effective than television except in those areas (generally
urban) where a TV system is already in place which reaches more than just
the middle and upper classes. There is great scope for use of mass media,
particularly in the initial stages of making people aware of the benefits
of family planning and of services available; in this way mass media can
effectively complement necessary interpersonal communications.
In almost every country of the world there are channels of
communication (media) available, such, as print media, radio, posters, and
personal contacts, which already reach the vast majority of the
population. For example, studies in India - with only 30% literacy, show
that most of the population is aware of the government's family planning
program. If response is low it is not because of lack of media to transmit
information.
A.I.D. bel
POPULATION CONTROL
AS A MILITARY ISSUE
The U.S. foreign policy officials who export "family planning" to less developed nations openly admit that their real goal is to reduce the over-all birthrates of affected populations. While agencies engaged in "development" promote population programs on the grounds that they will improve family health and facilitate economic development, the experts at other institutions -- those branches of government that actually determine foreign policy toward the developing world -- recommend the same actions to contain the growing political, military, and economic strength of developing nations. In fact, demographic research undertaken by these institutions invariably casts the less-developed countries in the role of adversaries or competitors. Two important military reports illustrate clearly how population control serves western military and political interests at the expense of the developing world.
|
Since the early part of the century, fertility has consistently and steadily fallen in the industrial world. In all of western Europe and north America, as well as in Japan, Australia and New Zealand, birthrates are now so low that these societies can project a future shrinkage in their actual human numbers. When average family size is under two children per household, it is considered to be "below replacement level," meaning that the current generation of children will be numerically smaller than the generation to which their parents belong. The impact of such unprecedented low birthrates will be felt both inside and outside of the affected nations.
When fertility falls to the point that a society produces ever- smaller numbers of youth with each successive generation, young people become a smaller and smaller proportion of the over-all population, while, at the same time, the elderly constitute a larger share of the country's people. This means that the national wealth must be produced by a workforce that is smaller than in the past, and that the government must supply social services to a relatively large and growing number of retired and elderly citizens. The result is not only a shrinking economy, but also an economy upon which there will be increasing demands to meet the relatively greater needs of the old-age population.
Policies to encourage immigration offer one alternative to declining numbers of workers and a response to the growing need for an income base upon which to assess taxes. Most new immigrants to an industrial nation, after all, are young adults who offer years of productive participation in the workforce. But opponents of mass immigration point out that large numbers of migrants entering a country's labor market tend to produce marked changes in the society's dominant culture and can thus profoundly influence politics.
From the viewpoint of foreign policy, low-birthrate nations will have to contend with greater domestic spending, which will compete with the military for a share of the national budget. In addition to pressures for decreased military spending is the fact that youth, from whom combat forces are drawn, will be fewer in absolute numbers. Thus, at some point in the future, these nations must anticipate having both fewer troops and smaller military budgets. Many western military leaders feel that this situation will lead to a loss of power and prestige in the immediate future.
This is occurring against a backdrop of generally-high fertility in most developing regions, often accompanied by rapid development. In those nations where per capita income and population are increasing significantly, as is the case with many countries in Asia and Latin America, national prestige and the actual ability to project power can be expected to rise substantially. In others, such as Nigeria, where natural wealth is abundant but development has been slow, governments will have an incentive to use their growing numbers of youth to build larger standing armies as an employment option, thus increasing the probability that they will successfully use military action or the threat of military force to bring about political changes that will favor better terms of trade or other political objectives. The consequences for today's powerful nations is likely to be great, indeed. According to some scholars, the current situation could lead to a near-total reversal of leadership roles in a future world where today's dominant groups constitute only a tiny part of the world's people.
In the late 1980s, the U.S. Department of Defence commissioned several studies into the effects of worldwide population trends for America's ability to influence events abroad. One of these was published in summary form in the Spring 1989 issue of the Washington Quarterly, a journal of the influential Center for Strategic and International Studies. The overview, which was compiled by Gregory D. Foster, an instructor at the National Defence University in Washington, was described in the publication as having been "drawn, sometimes verbatim, from commissioned papers" which were presented to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, under the direction of the Office of the Director of Net Assessment at DOD.
That study began with a statement on the importance of planning for the future.
Circumstances do not permit Americans the luxury of ignoring events until they occur simply because the tools of prognosis at their disposal are so ill developed. In fact, looming resource constraints demand heightened levels of prescience by the United States in its handling of global affairs. It is appropriate, therefore, even if somewhat daunting, to look once again into the future -- perhaps to the end of the first decade of the next century -- to ascertain how important population matters might be to the security interests of the United States.
The published report warned that "demographic developments promise to have a material effect on the general complexion of the world over the next two decades." It predicted that by the year 2010, just over 15 years from now, the world will have roughly 7 billion inhabitants. While less-developed countries ("LDCs") now have "slightly less than 76 percent of current world population," it continued, "fully 81 percent of the population two decades from now will reside in the Third World." Thus, it stated that...
One of the most important issues in the years ahead will be the extent to which demographic developments are likely to affect the size and composition of military establishments around the world. On the whole, demographic factors will produce completely different concerns in the developed world than in the developing world. Declining fertility rates will make it increasingly difficult for the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies alike to maintain military forces at current levels. In contrast, exceptionally high fertility rates in most LDCs, if not matched by a commensurate growth of jobs, could lead to expanded military establishments in affected countries as a productive alternative to unemployment. In other words, where labor forces are significantly under- employed, military establishments may have a built-in momentum to capitalize on unused manpower for purposes of both internal and external security.
The report finds that "population change may or may not produce shifts in the international balance of power over the next two decades," but that, because "the types of conflicts likely to predominate in the years ahead are manpower-intensive regional conflicts, developing states may indeed accrue added power and influence."
The same study reveals that today's wealthy nations will increasingly be burdened by the growing needs of the elderly. It found that "more than 286 million people in the world are 65 years of age or older, a figure that will increase to 418 million by 2000." This trend, the document concluded, will be "especially pronounced in the developed world, where the median age by the year 2025 will be almost 39." This is compared with a median age in less-developed nations of 30 or less. It explained the disadvantages to the industrial world:
The significance of this pattern lies in the fact that aging implies a reduction in productivity and the possibility of economic stagnation. It produces a high ratio of retirees to workers and thus increased taxes and social security expenditures. Armed forces must compete for both money and people, but less overall money exists because the productive population base has shrunk. Such conditions seem likely to have their most demonstrable effect in the years ahead among NATO nations and in Japan, all of which have sizable welfare spending programs.
The report advises that United States is at present the fourth most populous nation in world, but that total population is likely to begin declining in the early 21st century. Moreover, it adds, the U.S. accounted for six percent of total world population in 1950, but it is expected to have no more than four percent of the earth's people by the year 2010. Moreover, the numbers of U.S. citizens in the 18-24 age bracket "peaked in 1981 at 30.5 million," and is expected to decline by about seven million by 1996.
At the same time, the population of the United States is growing older. Persons above the age of 65 numbered just less than 29 million in the United States at the time the study was done, an increase of 100 percent since 1955. Fully 39 million elderly persons are expected to live in the U.S. by the year 2010. This will have a profound effect on the nation's economy, advise the experts:
The nation's elderly currently receive 28 percent of the federal budget (almost double the share 25 years earlier) and nearly half of all domestic program spending. Most of the money goes to Social Security (received by 93 percent of the elderly), and about 23 percent of the total is spent on Medicare. The number of people requiring formal or informal long-term, care is expected at least to double to 2020
The Pentagon research explains the importance of these trends for the future military:
As the population continues to shrink, competition to fill vacancies undoubtedly will intensify between the military, colleges, and civilian employers. As this competition intensifies, recruiting costs seem likely to escalate, and pay levels will have to be increased to keep pace with the civilian job market. Pumped-up pay or bonuses for enlistment and reenlistment, when combined with other defense expenditures, could seriously squeeze the federal budget.
Per capita military costs, in other words, will increase at a time when skyrocketing social expenses "are likely to increase pressures to trim defense," explains the published report.
Similar situations are seen elsewhere in the industrial world. According to the military researchers, the former Soviet Union will also face problems of low fertility and population aging. And in Europe, the situation of declining population will pose particularly severe problems. Population decline among ethnic Europeans, the military document states,
...is expected to continue, falling below 0.2 percent around 2000 and close to zero by 2025. By 2025 four important West European states now among the 16 most populous nations in the world -- West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France -- will plummet in the rankings. France is expected to rank twenty-fifth in total population by that time; the others will rank yet lower.
Giving West Germany as an example, the study advises that birthrates among this group have fallen to "virtually unprecedented levels." The West German family produced just 1.38 children per couple up until 1984, at which time fertility fell even further to 1.27, a level that is "35 to 40 percent below replacement," according to the military analysts. Thus, West Germany's actual population can be expected to "decline by over 2 million between 1989 and 2010, and its 18-22-year-old male cohort will drop from 2.6 million to 1.6 million," according to the publication.
Population aging will compound the problem, by placing "extraordinary demands on the welfare state," says the Department of Defence report. It adds that "old-age pensions and medical insurance account for about two-thirds of West Germany's total welfare spending, which has ballooned within three decades to more than $250 billion, or about one-third of the nation's total economic output." The researchers project that, by the year 2030, "nonworkers will outnumber workers" in Germany. As a result -- in Germany and other similarly-situated western countries -- "fewer taxpayers will foot the enormous costs of the welfare state, and tensions between defense spending and social spending will be exacerbated."
In terms of actual numbers of potential combat troops available, Germany is again cited as an example of future hardships that await the superpowers of today:
Militarily, there seems little doubt but that West Germany will find it virtually impossible to field the size force it does today... [Therefore] NATO members are likely to feel increased tension over conventional burden sharing... [and there is] a heightened possibility that the alliance's forward defense posture will unravel.
These trends suggest that western leaders, especially those who have historically relied on military strength to influence global affairs, will try to compensate by placing greater emphasis on political measures to increase the share of global resources diverted to the use of the wealthy. But even if this remains an option, it promises a backlash among those nations who enjoy less than their fair share of the world's goods. As the summary report notes, "increasing disparities between have and have-not countries and regions of the world" is likely to produce a new set of problems -- either accelerated rates of international migration or higher levels of hostility toward the west:
Perhaps the most critical movements of humanity will occur where low-growth areas lie in close proximity to high-growth areas: the United States with the Caribbean Basin and Europe with the Middle East and North Africa. Where immigrants cannot be assimilated readily due to cultural differences and where they are perceived to be taking jobs from host-country citizens, political instability may ensue.
As the United States and its western allies attempted to ensure their continued hold on the dominant share of the world s wealth, they will face increasing competition from the south. According to the Pentagon researchers, the population of Latin America grew from about 165 million in 1950 to well over 400 million by 1985, and will probably reach 546 million by the year 2000, and 778 million a mere 25 years later. By that time, says the report, the U.S. population is expected to be less than twice as large as Brazil's and less than three times Mexico s," despite the fact that the U.S. had a population size almost equal to that of all Latin America only four decades ago.
Population growth in the Middle East, too, is expected to posed increased risks for U.S. interests in that area. According to the Pentagon study, the region's population was estimated at 233 million in 1987. It is expected is expected to reach 323 million by 2000 and 418 million by 2010. "Egypt and Iran, the two largest states, will add 35 million and 49 million respectively by 2010," the report predicts. Moreover, intervention to decrease fertility in the region faces strong political obstacles:
...Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain to some extent, and the Palestinians... tend to prefer high growth rates... [and] members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries desire rapid population growth in order to provide necessary manpower for service and development tasks now carried out by imported labor. .....
In Africa, too, population is expected to grow substantially in coming years. According to the Pentagon advisors, "Between 1988 and 2010 Africa's population will more than double to 1.2 billion, about 16.6 percent of the global total. Between 1985- 2030 the total increase will be 1.1 billion." Broken down to demographic growth within certain larger countries, they find that...
Nigeria, with an estimated 103 million people in 1988, is expected to double in size by 2009, triple by 2024, and quadruple by 2035, adding 312 million people to the world s population in 50 years. By 2035 Nigeria is expected to surpass both the United States and the Soviet Union to become the third largest country in the world. ... Kenya's population of slightly over 20 million is expected to double in approximately 17 years. Four other states in the region Ethiopia, Zaire, Tanzania, and South Africa are likely to be among the top 25 nations in population by the year 2025.
Moreover, high birthrates lead to "large increases in the size of the economically active population (EAP)," in the words of the published summary. And if the distribution of global resources remains unchanged in the face of such astounding demographic shifts, the result could be rising discontent. In reference to Latin America, for example, the study report: "Reputable estimates put combined unemployment and under-employment in the region at 40 percent of the working-age population." Besides producing economically-motivated migration, the situation could spark rebellions and threaten U.S. economic and commercial interests:
Competition for land, fed by rapid population growth, could serve as a continuing source of conflict, particularly between large landholders and poor peasants. Land scarcity in the region is likely to result not from physical constraints but from such factors as the misuse of political and economic power in the dominant classes... Moreover, the commercialization of agriculture has produced a greater concentration of land holdings...
Such occurrences are less likely in Africa, where population is sparse, foreign investments relatively few, and modern "agri-business" has yet to get a foothold. The study notes, for instance,
In the aggregate and by comparison with other parts of the developing world, sub-Saharan Africa is land rich. The World Bank estimates that as much as a third of the region's land is potentially cultivable, yet less than 6 percent was in use in the late 1970s.
Nonetheless, the region is a vital source of key strategic minerals which would be jeopardized by attempts at political reform that inhibit foreign access.
Another military report on demographic trends was prepared in 1991 for the U.S. Army Conference on Long Range Planning by Nicholas Eberstadt of the Harvard University Center for Population Studies. According to Eberstadt, who is also a Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, the changing distribution of population in the world constitutes nothing less than a mortal threat to western domination. The Army Conference study, which was reprinted in the Summer 1991 edition of the Council on Foreign Relations journal, Foreign Affairs, notes, for example, that ...
...virtually all current population projections anticipate comparatively slow population growth in today's more developed regions (Europe, the Soviet Union, Japan, North America and Oceania) and comparatively rapid growth for the less developed regions (the rest of the world). With variations, these projections point to a continuation of trends evident since the end of World War II. If these trends continue for another generation or two, the implications for the international political order and the balance of world power could be enormous.
The changes foreseen in "the balance of world power" by Eberstadt include a significant loss of economic advantage. Citing statistics from the Development Research Center at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Army population study advises that per-capita income in most developing countries has risen with population, thus giving this nations a vastly greater share of global economic resources. Citing the examples of Asia and Latin America, the study acknowledges that per-capita output in that region...
... rose by a factor of more than four between 1900 and 1987. Though the populations of the nine Asian countries in the sample more than tripled during this period, and the population of the six Latin American countries rose by a factor of nearly seven, per-capita output is estimated to have risen dramatically as well -- by a factor of more than three for the Asian group and by nearly five for the Latin American group.
In other words, taking the Latin American example, the population increased nearly seven-fold in the first eight decades of the century, while per-capita income rose by a factor of five. This means that the period saw Latin American nations on the average enjoy a thirty-five fold increase in wealth -- the result of having seven times more people and a gross national product five times greater, measured on a per- person basis.
Like the Department of Defence study, the Army Conference paper cautions that today's powerful states will, as populations age and shrink, gradually lose the ability to mold the politics and culture of the world.
Current population trends are redistributing global population and moving it away from today's industrial democracies. In 1950 two of the top five, and seven of the top 20 countries by population could be described as industrial democracies. Their combined populations accounted for nearly a quarter of this big-country total. By 1985 industrial democracies accounted for only one of the top five, and six of the top 20; they comprised less than a sixth of the group's total population. In the year 2025 only one of today's industrial democracies -- the United States -- is projected to rank among the top five, and only two -- Japan and the United States -- among the top 20. In this future world today's industrial democracies would account for less than one- fourteenth of the total population of the big countries, yet they would rank among the top in the world's population of geriatrics. By one recent U.S. Census Bureau projection, for example, today's industrial democracies would account for eight of the top 18 national populations of persons aged 80 and older by the year 2025.
Several small-scale examples of population change and its national impact are cited in the 1991 report. In Lebanon, for instance, political change is seen as the inevitable result of fertility differences between the Christian and Muslim population groups; and in South Africa, a higher birthrates among the African majority has made the white minority even smaller by comparison, thus eroding apartheid-style rule. In the former case, says Eberstadt,
An unwritten 1943 agreement, later known as the National Pact, stipulated that political authority be shared among [Lebanon s] `confessional or religious groups in accordance with their strength in the national population. Top ministers were to be divided in a six-to-five ration between Christians and Muslims (including the Druze sect), corresponding to the breakdown reported in the country's 1932 population census. Subsequent surveys, however, underscored a pronounced difference between Christian and Muslim fertility. In the early 1970s the Christian community was estimated to have a total fertility rate of less than four children per woman, as compared with an estimated fertility rate of nearly six children per woman for the Muslim community. By 1975 Lebanon is widely believed to have become a Muslim-majority country.
And the impact of high black birthrates for white power in South Africa is summed up as follows:
In 1951, as the laws and practices of `Grand Apartheid were being formalized, South Africa's whites accounted for slightly more than one-fifth of the country's enumerated population. By the early 1980s whites accounted for less than a seventh of the population within the country's 1951 boundaries. By 2020, according to official government projections, the white population would amount to no more than a ninth of the total population, barring massive net migration of whites from abroad. Adjusting the projections to 1951 borders, whites might comprise less than one-eleventh of the country's total. South Africa's current liberalizations may not have been motivated by these trends, but they are surely informed by them.
As the two military studies suggest, population growth can work in a country's favor in a variety of ways -- by increasing the numbers of economically-active persons and providing a larger income base from which to extract taxes; by offering a growing pool of younger persons from which armies and navies can be formed; and by generally increasing the political status of the group. A comparative advantage is added when one's potential adversaries are experiencing relatively slow population growth or none at all. The Army Conference research describes the probable political outcome of the present demographic situation in these words.
By these projections a very different world would seem to be emerging. Such trends speak to pressures for a systematically diminished role and status for today's industrial democracies. Even with relatively unfavorable assumptions about Third World economic growth, the share of global economic output of today s industrial democracies could decline. With a generalized and progressive industrialization of current low-income areas, the Western diminution would be all the more rapid.
Lest there be any doubt that the report views developing nations as being in an adversarial relationship with the industrial bloc, the 1991 military document advises...
Imagine a world, indeed, very much like the United Nations today, but with rhetoric in the General Assembly informing policy on a global scale, directing actions affecting the lives of millions of people on a daily basis. Even without an aggressive or hostile Soviet bloc, or the invention of new weapons, this world could be a very dangerous and confused place.
In fact, the Army Conference compares the demographic situation to the "dangers" of the cold war era:
Thus, one can easily envision a world more unreceptive, and ultimately more threatening, to the interests of the United States and its allies. The population and economic-growth trends described could create an international environment even more menacing to the security prospects of the Western alliance than was the Cold War for the past generation.
While the study prepared for the Army Conference on Long Range Planning does not specifically address a strategy to influence birthrates, the 1988 study prepared for the Defence Department's office of Net Assessment calls for a huge commitment of resources to "population planning." It also reveals that such policies are to be pursued despite the notorious unreliability of population forecasting.
Indeed, the CSIS summary acknowledges that population trends are virtually impossible to project because of unknown factors that can have tremendous effects on fertility and mortality. It cites, for example, the possibility that the AIDS epidemic will radically alter current trends, even conceding that some nations might be entirely "wiped out" by the death toll.
Although embryonic efforts are underway to forecast the future prevalence and effects of AIDS, it remains an ill-understood phenomenon of pandemic proportions that could easily invalidate all existing population projections. According to the World Health Organization, more than 71,000 cases of AIDS have been reported worldwide by 129 countries... The World Health Organization estimates that 5-10 million people are infected with the virus worldwide, a count that could reach as high as 100 million by 1991. Some analysts argue that if 100 million people, or 2 percent of the world's population, were infected, total deaths from AIDS in the 1990s could be 50 million. The number infected then could double several more times after that and wipe out some countries in 10 to 20 years.
Despite the unreliability of current population statistics, the unscientific nature of projections, and the possibility of a demographic disaster associated with AIDS, the summary version of the Department of Defence study nonetheless recommends that population control be accorded an extraordinarily high priority on the national security agenda. Moreover, the report forcefully portrays the population control program as a key element in a larger strategy to curb the strength of the emerging nations of the southern hemisphere, and as a tactic intended solely to inhibit the political and economic growth of aid-recipient nations. Indeed, the report accords population control activities a level of importance that is essentially equal to the development and procurement of advanced weapons:
As difficult and uncertain as the task may be, policymakers and strategic planners in this country have little choice in the coming decades but to pay serious attention to population trends, their causes, and their effects. Already the United States has embarked on an era of constrained resources. It thus becomes more important than ever to do those things that will provide more bang for every buck spent on national security. To claim that decreased defense spending must lead to strategic debilitation is fatuous. Rather, policymakers must anticipate events and conditions before they occur. They must employ all the instruments of statecraft at their disposal (development assistance and population planning every bit as much as new weapon systems). Furthermore, instead of relying on the canard that the threat dictates one's posture, they must attempt to influence the form that threat assumes.