From: "Phil Roberts, Jr." 




Owleye wrote:
> 
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:
> 
> > Although I've read some of Kant's Critique, and all of the Cambridge Companion
> > to Kant, I'm still not quite certain as to how he arrives at his categorical
> > imperative.  But I believe I know a much faster route which someone here
> > might wish to challenge me on.
> >
> > Rather than assuming that 'being rational' (in valuative/strategic/practical
> > affairs) is a matter of 'being efficient' (means/end theory) or of
> > 'maximizing self-interest' (egoism), abandon the self-interest assumption
> > and simply assume that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being able
> > to "see" what is going on' or 'being objective'.  If such were the case,
> > then you could justify a valuative version of the imperative, i.e., 'Love
> > your neighbor as you love yourself' by bringing the mountain to Mohammed
> > so to speak, in that 'being rational' would be equivalent to 'being
> > valuatively objective'.
> >
> > The justification for the "theory" of rationality I am proposing here
> > would simply lie in its superior epistemic credentials, not only in its
> > greater freedom from contradiction, but also in terms of its ability to
> > "explain" several evolutioanry anomalies (the presence of morality and
> > emotional instability in homo sapiens).
> >
> > --
> 
> Perhaps there is some merit to your position, but what I'm unsure about is how
> you would approach "love" as in :"Love thy neighbor as thyself?"  Are you taking
> a Kantian approach to this?
>

I am supposing that you can replace the term 'love' with the term 'value',
and therefore you end up with a maxim for valuative objectivity/impartiality
in which you 'Value your neighbor as you value yourself'.  This is not
quite the categorical imperative, which was more a matter of DOING something
rather than of BEING something, but its pretty damn close, and certainly a 
long way from the sort of social contract theory often juxtaposed to
Kant.  And its compatible with the assumption that 'being rational' is
simply a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on', in that I 
am supposing that a valuatively impartial person "sees" more than a 
partial one, which is why it is an attribute we try to find in potential
jurors.  One's view of the situtation is not clouded with passion, etc.
when one if valuatively objective/impartial.

-- 

                  Phil Roberts, Jr.

       The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism:
Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock
     http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/