From: "Phil Roberts, Jr." 




Owleye wrote:
> 
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:
> 
> > Right.  Kant felt morality was a matter of doing one's duty, that rationality was
> > a matter of following rules.  But, like my notion of valuative objectivity, his
> > imperative mandates self-sacrifice.  And, in this sense, "love your neighbor as
> > you love yourself' and the categorical imperative are bedfellows, and on the
> > opposite side of the fence from those theories of morality which attempt to
> > justify it in terms of enlightened self interest.  Where you see difference I
> > see similarity, perhaps.  Both would entail treating others and one's self
> > more less equally, the one out of duty, the other out of love or value.
> 
> I don't see how it is called self-sacrifice to do one's duty, though it depends 
> on what you think sacrifice is (and perhaps what self-interest is).  Doing one's 
> duty for its own sake or doing what's right because it's right is based on 
> imperatives being categorical, not hypothetical.  

and IRRESPECTIVE of whether it benefits one personally or directly.  That's
why I view it as entailing self-sacrifice.

> Kant would disavow any notion 
> that we ought to do something out of love or value.  His is not a 
> consequentialist theory, which yours seems to be.  On the other  hand, if
> you are not thinking of this along the lines of consequentialism, then it might 
> very well be the case that you are the same as Kant in treating people as ends 
> and not merely as a means to an end.  If this is the case, then I'm not sure what 
> you are objecting to in Kant.
> 

Yes.  'Valuing others as you value yourself' would be even further from a 
consequentialist position (if I understand the term) than Kant himself, who 
I believe is often seen as juxtaposed to consequentialism.  As far as my 
objection to Kant, I quess it would simply be whatever objections have been
raised by others which have resulted in his categorical imperative being
viewed as highly problematic.  I believe I can get to a justification for
valuing others intrinsically much more directly and much less problematically
than Kant, although conversations with folks such as yourself are necessary
for me too iron out the murkey details.

> >
> > Strictly as a scientific point, sacrifice would be anything which tends
> > to benefit the inclusive fitness of others at the expense of one's own
> > inclusive fitness.
> 
> What is inclusive fitness?  What does "others" mean?  The same question 
> regarding "one's own?"  What do these things mean, scientifically?
> 

Inclusive fitness refers to the ability to perpetuate one's DNA, not 
only via one's direct offspring, but in terms of copies of one's DNA 
elsewhere in the population, usually intended to mean immediate kin
(e.g., siblings, etc.).  Altruism, in the technical sense, is usually
a matter of mathematical analysis of the cost/benefit ratios with 
regard to achieving this end.  However, you don't have to be a genius
to realize that non-self-serving concern for others would be altruistic
in the technical sense 9 times out of ten.

> > However, for purposes of understanding this a little
> > better, it is extremely important to understand that most occasions of
> > PHYSICAL self-sacrifice, which IS naturalistically anomalous, are motivated
> > by EMOTIONAL self-interest.
> 
> Are you suggesting that morality is based on emotions?  

Yes.  Indeed, all reasoning is based on emotions, at least in the sense
that without emotion there would be no reason to think.  But this is not
to say that some emotion might not be more rational than others, such
as Hume's referring to the calmer passions.  But I believe the reason
we do what is "right" as opposed as what is in our PHYSICAL best interest 
is invariably for emotionally selfish reasons, i.e., enhancing our sense
of our self-worth, freedom from quilt, etc.

> Are we to look at emotions, then, and not to rationality to understand it? 

I assume that all emotion is irrational, but that they appear along a 
spectrum of more and less rational.  I also believe some emotions are
produced by reasoning, for example, the motivation to accomplish what
is in one's overall best interest is probabaly a calm emotion, but an
emotion nonetheless, and one which would disappear from the planet if
human culture had to begin anew.  As such, a prudent intention (emotion) 
is MORE RATIONAL than a natural impulse (based on more valuatively 
objective considerations), but BOTH are irrational, just in 
varying degrees.  This goes along with my view that 'being rational' 
is not about doing something, but simply a matter of 'being able to
"see".  

> What does "self" mean in "self-interest?"  

As with the distinction between physical best interest and emotional 
best interest, I assume physical pertains to one's physical body, 
whereas emotional pertains to one's psychical self, and particularly,
in terms of self-worth/self-esteem, etc.  

> Does it bear
> any resemblance to "one's own" and is to be treated as opposing "others?"  
> If so, I await with interest your response to the previous questions.
> 

Not quite sure of where you are coming from on this, or where you think
it will lead us.

> >
> > The entire theory began, not with an attempt to do philosophy, but rather
> > with an attempt to understand a naturalistic anomaly, the presence of 'feelings
> > of worthlessness' in nature's most rational naturally selected species.
> 
> Perhaps you might be able to explain the role of biology in instances of 
> domestic violence?  

I believe the dominant motivational factor in most human thought and 
behavior is the need to attain or maintain an adequate sense of self-
worth/self-esteeem/self-value, etc.  Domestic violence is simply the
result of mother nature enlisting a number of natural emotions (fear,
anger, sex, etc.) in the cause of maintaining self-worth, but which
are highly unsuitable for the purpose.  They are examples of exaption,
to use Gould's term, and are more often than not harmful rather than
helpful in maintaining self-worth, and the human relationships upon
which self-worth depends. 


> How would you approach this as if biology told you 
> something about it being right or wrong?
> 

I would view it as not necessarily rational, since what is normal
and natural and what is rational may be entirely different.  Indeed,
I believe the reason that man is troubled with both emotional 
instability and moral concerns is because the species is beginning 
to show signs of becoming TOO RATIONAL (too valuatively objective)
for its own good.

-- 

                  Phil Roberts, Jr.

       The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism:
Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock
     http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/