From: Owleye 




"Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:

> and IRRESPECTIVE of whether it benefits one personally or directly.  That's
> why I view it as entailing self-sacrifice.

But, for Kant, the only good that is good in itself arises from having a good will.
Benefit is defined in such a way that is pure and not contaminated by interest.  Why is
it a sacrifice to give in to one's desires and fears?

> Yes.  'Valuing others as you value yourself' would be even further from a
> consequentialist position (if I understand the term) than Kant himself, who
> I believe is often seen as juxtaposed to consequentialism.

First, Kant does have an account of the Golden Rule that is consistent with the
Categorical Imperative.  Note that the Golden rule is a categorical imperative, if love
is to be understood in a certain way that Kant himself explains.  Your maxim (Valuing
others as you value yourself) is also a categorical imperative and might even be
consistent with the Categorical Imperative, if valuing is pure (i.e., unconditional).

> As far as my
> objection to Kant, I quess it would simply be whatever objections have been
> raised by others which have resulted in his categorical imperative being
> viewed as highly problematic.

Well, you should probably bone up on the objections before you object.  I personally
don't think it is highly problematic just because of the way in which it was
meticulously arrived at.  Notwithstanding this, I think that its formal character
misleadingly gives the impression that it is a test.  I, along with others, think this
is a mistake.  Kant is rather describing the form of the moral law.

> I believe I can get to a justification for
> valuing others intrinsically much more directly and much less problematically
> than Kant, although conversations with folks such as yourself are necessary
> for me too iron out the murkey details.

We'll see.  Philosophy ought not to be considered an easy subject.

> > What is inclusive fitness?  What does "others" mean?  The same question
> > regarding "one's own?"  What do these things mean, scientifically?
> >
>
> Inclusive fitness refers to the ability to perpetuate one's DNA, not
> only via one's direct offspring, but in terms of copies of one's DNA
> elsewhere in the population, usually intended to mean immediate kin
> (e.g., siblings, etc.).  Altruism, in the technical sense, is usually
> a matter of mathematical analysis of the cost/benefit ratios with
> regard to achieving this end.  However, you don't have to be a genius
> to realize that non-self-serving concern for others would be altruistic
> in the technical sense 9 times out of ten.

What does perpetuation mean?  How can it be measured?  Is it possible to tell which
behavior helps to perpetuate one's DNA and which does not?  When you speak of
cost/benefit analysis, what is being measured?  I'm familiar with the work of Trivers
and Hamilton in the early days of Sociobiology, though their work was based on birds and
other animal orders.  I don't think this analysis translates terribly well to humans,
but perhaps you can enlighten me.

>
> Yes.  Indeed, all reasoning is based on emotions, at least in the sense
> that without emotion there would be no reason to think.  But this is not
> to say that some emotion might not be more rational than others, such
> as Hume's referring to the calmer passions.  But I believe the reason
> we do what is "right" as opposed as what is in our PHYSICAL best interest
> is invariably for emotionally selfish reasons, i.e., enhancing our sense
> of our self-worth, freedom from quilt, etc.

I see.  This would imply that there is no such thing as altruism, say when falling on a
grenade to save a buddy.  How would you define virtue in terms of self-interest.  Note
that you have moved from a biological account to one based on conscious actions. How is
this leap to be understood?

>
>
> > Are we to look at emotions, then, and not to rationality to understand it?
>
> I assume that all emotion is irrational, but that they appear along a
> spectrum of more and less rational.

Do you mean here that some objective observer can determine the biological value of
displays of emotion and that some displays can be determined to be less rational than
others?  I will await your account of this.

> I also believe some emotions are
> produced by reasoning, for example, the motivation to accomplish what
> is in one's overall best interest is probabaly a calm emotion, but an
> emotion nonetheless, and one which would disappear from the planet if
> human culture had to begin anew.  As such, a prudent intention (emotion)
> is MORE RATIONAL than a natural impulse (based on more valuatively
> objective considerations), but BOTH are irrational, just in
> varying degrees.

Here I have some difficulty with your notion of "natural?"  Are you suggesting that some
actions is unnatural?  What would make an action unnatural?  


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