From: "Phil Roberts, Jr." 




Owleye wrote:
> 
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:
> 
> >
> > I see the Golden Rule as one of many implicit appeals to self-interest, and as
> > such not a moral rule at all.
> 
> Wow!  You may be the only one on the planet who sees it that way.  Have you 
> ever spoken with a Christian on this subject? 

Christians think that it is moral to do what it right to avoid being punished
in eternal hellfire, etc., which is also rather missing the point on the issue
of morality.  Under such conditions, doing what is right is simply prudent.

> How do you see it as self-interest?
> 

"As you would have them do unto you" is not quite as unconditional as I think
the maxim should be, and which is captured more by the unconditional 'love
your neighbor' IRRESPECTIVE of the returns.  Technically, I suppose you can
read the Golden Rule as unconditional, but the self-interest is lurking about
just under the surface in a way that I don't think captures the essence of
morality in its purest form.  It seems to imply that we will all be better
off if we do this, which is not what I think morality is about (valuative
objectivity, rather than advantages which accrue).

> >
> > I suppose, but I don't really see it as an imperative but rather as a 
> > THEORY about rationality which just happens to entail that 'being rational' 
> > is synonymous with 'being moral', i.e., that 'being rational' equates with 
> > 'being valuatively objective'.
> 
> No.  Kant permits us to have an evil will.  

So does my theory.  It just supposes that the will of an evil person is 
because the person "sees" less than the virtuous person, and is therefore
more focused on his own picky uny little wants and needs.  BTW, this is
also the way nature wants him to be.  But than nature is irrational, so
what else would you expect.

> Moreover, rationality used as a means to some
> end is problematic in connection with the end, according to Kant.  

I couldn't agree more, which is why I find Kant's maxim a little 
disengenuous, in that it refers to an end in its formulation, and
unlike 'love your neighbor as you love yourself', which is more
about what you are than about an end.

> Only actions based on
> categorical maxims (i.e., categorical intentions or policies) can be moral 
> for Kant.  

I must confess I don't know exactly what this means, but if it simply 
means unconditional, I believe the maxim I favor is squarely in that
encampment.

> Duty
> to the moral law is an imperative for humans because they are not 
> entirely rational creatures.  

As naturally selected organisms, I would say this is an understatement.
My view is that we are organisms with a little bit of rationality 
sitting astride a half a billion years of arational motivaitonal
foundation (e.g., self-interest).


> 
> >
> > GIVEN that 'being rational' is a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on',
> > i.e., of 'being objective, then it follows that 'being rational' is a matter
> > of 'being valuatively objective', i.e., 'being good'.  What could be simpler?
> 
> Well, you will have to tell me how we are able to see what is going on objectively.  If
> you deviate from Kant's account I will be able to notice it.  In particular Kant reasoned
> that we are not able to understand or "see" moral conduct.  That is, we can't "see" our
> intentions.  If you think humans can do this, I welcome how its possible.
> 

Like most epistemologists, I don't believe we can have certainty.  We can merely
hope for versimiltude.  As far as "seeing" moral conduct, I believe most of us
can "see" the difference between right and wrong, but that this is far from
infallible.  But then so is science.

> > Then you should also be aware that none of your questions are problematic for
> > sociobiologists, or at least are manageable and have already been workded out
> > to scientists satisfaction.  My theory BEGINS where sociobiology leave off.
> 
> In that case you should have no trouble telling me what sociobiologists are 
> saying.  I have grave reservations about the subject matter, particularly since 
> I don't have any idea what it could be.  Could it be a gene, a population, or 
> some other.  


    Like Chicago gangsters, our genes have survived, in 
    some cases for millions of years, in a highly competitive 
    world.  This entitles us to expect certain qualities in our 
    genes.  I shall argue that a predominent quality
    to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness.  
    This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness 
    in individual behavior.  However, as we shall see, there are 
    special circumstances in which a gene can achieve its own 
    selfish goals best by fostering a limited form
    of altruism.  'Special' and 'limited' are important words in 
    the last sentence.  Much as we might wish to believe otherwise, 
    universal love and the welfare of the species as a whole are 
    concepts which simply do not make evolutionary sense (Dawkins).


> I have seen Hamilton's metric and it makes some sense.  

  Clearly from a gene's point of view it is worthwhile 
  to deprive a large number of distant relatives in order
  to extract a small reproductive advantage. (W. D. Hamilton)

> Trivers as 
> well makes sense.  But these scientists are very careful not to 
> extrapolate from their findings.  Indeed venturing into human behavior 
> is fraught with difficulties.
> 

That's because they run into problems with genetic determinism 
assumptions, both because humans don't look very biologically 
determined (e.g., benevolent selfishness as opposed to ruthless 
selfishness) and because what natural selection predicts is
emotionally repulsive.  My theory bridges the gap by showing
how genetic indeterminism could come into the universe as 
a result of natural selection.  It steers neatly between
the Scylla and Charybdis, as they say.

> As I indicated, I will be focussing on how you
> overcome the problem of the Naturalist Fallacy, which in case 
> you are wondering, is the fallacy that occurs from reasoning 
> about the world as it is and concluding something about
> the world as it should be.
> 


First of all, this fallacy, going back to Moore, I believe, is not
one that many moral philosophers place much stock in as I recall.
But even so, there is a bit of a problem here as you point out.

There are actually two avenues for bridging the is ought gulf 
in my theory.  The first is the notion of objectivity as 
applied, not only to beliefs (epistemic or cognitive objectivity),
but to values as well (valuative impartiality, etc.).  Both
types convey the essence of "seeing" better.

Annother avenue for bridging the gulf arises from my theory of
rationality as based on an evolutionary anomaly.  To the extent
that my theory better fits the facts of the world, for example
its ability to explain morality and emotional instability in 
nature's most rational species, it establishes the "is" side of
the equation.  Then, as a deduction, the theory also lays claim 
to the contention that 'being rational' equates or correaltes with
'being good'.  They way you go from these "is"s is via the 
following:

GIVEN that one chooses to be rational (and remember, in my theory 
this is not always wise, in that one can become too rational for 
one's own good), and GIVEN that my proposed theory of rationality
is "true", then one "ought" to be good.



-- 

                  Phil Roberts, Jr.

       The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism:
Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock
     http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/