From: [email protected] In article <[email protected]>, [email protected] wrote: > > > [email protected] wrote: > > > > In article <[email protected]>, > > [email protected] wrote: > > > > > > As a maladaptive by-product of an adaptation which is sufficiently > > > advatageous to warrant a significant down side. The physical cost/ > > > benefit analysis still comes out in the black, because the massive > > > increase in the FACILITY to survive (the epistemic component of > > > our rationality, e.g., printing, the scientific method, etc.) > > > is sufficiently beneificial to outweigh the negative effects of > > > a significant reduction in THE WILL to survive (a red-shift > > > away from the optimal valuative profile for maximizing reproductive > > > success) which must be tolerated to reap those benefits. > > > > Now, I'm not big on this whole 'rationality' idea to start with and I'm > > still not sure what 'holistic rationbality' is about so I'd appreciate a > > restatement of that... > > > > We need to go back to an earlier part of the conversation. I begin > with the intersubjectively reproducible feature of nature indexed > by the linguistic expression, 'feelings of worthlessness'. Here's > a refresher: > > A Sketch of a Divergent Theory of Emotional Instability > > Objective: To account for self-worth related emotion (i.e., needs for > love, acceptance, moral integrity, recognition, achievement, > purpose, meaning, etc.) and emotional disorder (e.g., depression, > suicide, etc.) within the context of an evolutionary scenario; i.e., to > synthesize natural science and the humanities; i.e., to answer the > question: 'Why is there a species of naturally selected organism > expending huge quantities of effort and energy on the survivalistically > bizarre non-physical objective of maximizing self-worth?' I haven't yet seen why 'maximizing self-worth' cannot be seen as a mechanism to drive us towards status (thus maximizing reproductive potential in mating) as in other social animals. ie, 'self-worthless' feels lousy so that (and 'because' once comparison is available) 'self- worth' feels good since 'self-worth' will attract mates. Is status- attainment disputed? > Observation: The species in which rationality is most developed is > also the one in which individuals have the greatest difficulty in > maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth, How can you support this? How do you gauge the degree of self-worth my goldfish maintain, or prairie dog? often going to > extraordinary lengths in doing so (e.g., Evel Knievel, celibate monks, > self-endangering Greenpeacers, etc.). As you've said elsewhere it's easy to suggest emotional reasons for apparently physically selfless acts. You are suggesting 'self- worthlessness' as a very broad underlying reason but might you not be only playing semantics? > Hypothesis: Rationality is antagonistic to psychocentric stability (i.e., > maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth). 'Antagonistic to'..? Okay, fair enough, but I'm wondering if this really translates to 'the more you know the less you know' and similar. I would probably prefer that 'objective knowledge' be used in place of your 'rationality' and that 'wisdom' be proffered as the solution to the impasse. > Synopsis: In much the manner reasoning allows for the subordination > of lower emotional concerns and values (pain, fear, anger, sex, etc.) > to more global concerns (concern for the self as a whole), so too, > these more global concerns and values can themselves become > reevaluated and subordinated to other more global, more objective > considerations. And if this is so, and assuming that emotional > disorder emanates from a deficiency in self-worth resulting from > precisely this sort of experiencially based reevaluation, then it can > reasonably be construed as a natural malfunction resulting from > one's rational faculties functioning a tad too well. I keep getting the feeling that you're saying "Reality's depressing" in a roundabout way :) > Normalcy and Disorder: Assuming this is correct, then some > explanation for the relative "normalcy" of most individuals would > seem necessary. Hmmm, how do you support the idea that most individuals are 'normal' in a 'not-disordered' sense? To me, most individuals are less- and more- disordered. Some psychologists and psychiatrists have argued that virtually everyone would be diagnoseable under the DSM if you interviewed them extensively and many sociologists consider that a majority of those diagnoses can be considered politically or soci0-culturally based and have little to do with 'disorder'. This is accomplished simply by postulating > different levels or degrees of consciousness. From this perspective, > emotional disorder would then be construed as a valuative affliction > resulting from an increase in semantic content in the engram indexed 'engram indexed by the linguistic expression' - would 'belief expressed in' be acceptable? I'm finding some of your wording difficult, what's your main vocabulary drawn from? > by the linguistic expression, "I am insignificant", which all persons of > common sense "know" to be true, but which the "emotionally > disturbed" have come to "realize", through abstract thought, > devaluing experience, etc. Essentially it's 'too true' or 'so true it's unhealthy' for some, yes? > Implications: So-called "free will" and the incessant activity presumed > to emanate from it is simply the insatiable appetite we all have for > self-significating experience which, in turn, is simply nature's way of > attempting to counter the objectifying influences of our rational > faculties. I don't se that it could be summarised so simply. "Self-signification" is common throughout nature, and as far as I know is usually more complex and subtle in social species; I don't argue with the suggestion that it is _used_ to balance the emotionally debilitating effects of a very rational mind but to say that one is simply the cause of another seems too simplistic when the possibility that they develop congruently hasn't been dismissed as far as I know. Why can't they be a symbiosis, a dynamic equilibrium? This also implies that the engine in the first "free-thinking" > artifact is probably going to be a diesel. How do you derive this? > "Another simile would be an atomic pile of less than critical size: an > injected idea is to correspond to a neutron entering the pile from > without. Each such neutron will cause a certain disturbance which > eventually dies away. If, however, the size of the pile is sufficiently > increased, the disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will > very likely go on and on increasing until the whole pile is destroyed. > Is there a corresponding phenomenon for minds?" (A. M. Turing). > > Additional Implications: Since the explanation I have proposed > amounts to the contention that the most rational species > (presumably) is beginning to exhibit signs of transcending the > formalism of nature's fixed objective (accomplished in man via > intentional self-concern, i.e., the prudence program) Surely this is only one factor - 'the prudence program' did not lead us to have an opposable thumb, did it? it can reasonably > be construed as providing evidence and argumentation in support of > Lucas (1961) and Penrose (1989, 1994). Not only does this imply > that the aforementioned artifact probably won't be a computer, > but it would also explain why a question such as "Can Human > Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?" (Cohen, 1981) > has led to controversy, It has? I would have thought that the answer was that such experiments are done daily by bookmakers with a resounding answer. Ah, but that depends on your definition of 'irrationality', doesn't it? in that it presupposes the possibility > of a discrete (formalizable) answer to a question which can only > be addressed in comparative (non-formalizable) terms (e.g. X is > more rational than Y, the norm, etc.). Which is why a lot of physical scientists think psychology and sociology is bunk... Along these same lines, > the theory can also be construed as an endorsement or > metajustification for comparative approaches in epistemology > (explanationism, plausiblism, etc.) > > "The short answer [to Lucas/Godel and more recently, Penrose] > is that, although it is established that there are limitations to the > powers of any particular machine, it has only been stated, without > any sort of proof, that no such limitations apply to human intellect " > (A. M. Turing). > > "So even if mathematicians are superb cognizers of mathematical > truth, and even if there is no algorithm, practical or otherwise, > for cognizing mathematical truth, it does not follow that the power > of mathematicians to cognize mathematical truth is not entirely > explicable in terms of their brain's executing an algorithm. Not > an algorhithm for intuiting mathematical truth -- we can suppose that > Penrose [via Godel] has proved that there could be no such thing. > What would the algorithm be for, then? Most plausibly it would be an > algorithm -- one of very many -- for trying to stay alive ... " (D. C. > Dennett). Bit of a dodgy use of the word 'algorithm' IMO, but anyway... > Oops! Sorry! Wrong again, old bean. > > "My ruling passion is the love of literary fame" (David Hume). Not if he somehow associated literary fame with staying alive... > "I have often felt as though I had inherited all the defiance and all the > passions with which our ancestors defended their Temple and could > gladly sacrifice my life for one great moment in history" (Sigmund > Freud). Pretty much as above - yes, I did notice he said 'sacrifice my life' but I seriously doubt it had literal cognitive content. > "He, too [Ludwig Wittgenstein], suffered from depressions and for long > periods considered killing himself because he considered his life > worthless, but the stubbornness inherited from his father may have > helped him to survive" (Hans Sluga). > > "The inquest [Alan Turing's] established that it was suicide. The > evidence was perfunctory, not for any irregular reason, but because > it was so transparently clear a case" (Andrew Hodges) Erm, lots of highly _ir_rational _un_mathematical people have been depressed and/or committed suicide too, y'know... I don't think that suicide is particularly good evidence that someone has no drive to stay alive, only that their drive not to outweighed it at one point. Mick. -- "Many a mickle makes a muckle". [email protected] [email protected] Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/ Before you buy.