From: "Phil Roberts, Jr." 




[email protected] wrote:
> 
> In article <[email protected]>,
>   [email protected] wrote:
> >
> > As a maladaptive by-product of an adaptation which is sufficiently
> > advatageous to warrant a significant down side.  The physical cost/
> > benefit analysis still comes out in the black, because the massive
> > increase in the FACILITY to survive (the epistemic component of
> > our rationality, e.g., printing, the scientific method, etc.)
> > is sufficiently beneificial to outweigh the negative effects of
> > a significant reduction in THE WILL to survive (a red-shift
> > away from the optimal valuative profile for maximizing reproductive
> > success) which must be tolerated to reap those benefits.
> 
> Now, I'm not big on this whole 'rationality' idea to start with 

Probably because you have grown very accustomed to the idea that
natural selection is supposed to be a PHYSICAL theory, whereas 
I am supposing it can be employed as a starting point for a 
psycho-philosophical theory of human nature.  This takes some
getting used to, but the fact that Dawkins has acknowledged 
the need for an addendum to natural selction (a memetics) should 
give you at least some sympathy for the possiblity that I might 
not be completely off the beam here.

> and I'm
> still not sure what 'holistic rationbality' is about so I'd appreciate a
> restatement of that...
> 

Its a term for referring to a new theory of rationalty which is 
a deduction from my explanation of the role of 'feelings of
worthlessness' in the evolutionary scheme of things.  Its another
way of talking about a concept or attribute, a hypothetical X,
which can not be constrained within a formal structure (e.g., 
reduced to logic, algorithms, maxims, principles, etc), similar
to the conclusions entertained by Godel, and championed by J. R. 
Lucas and Roger Penrose as a means for casting some light on
the mind body problem, indeterminism, etc., although without
much success so far.

Metaphorically, its a phrase which refers to my conclusion that
'being rational' is not a matter of 'being efficient' (the means/
end theory), or a matter of 'maximizing self-interest' (egoism), 
and certainly not a matter of 'being logical' (computationalism),
but simply a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on'.
Less metaphorically, I am simply supposing that 'being rational' 
is a matter of 'being objective'.  But here's the catch.  I 
am supposing that it is true, not only with regard to the objectivity
of one's beliefs (not their justification, by the way, but their
correctness, completenesss, etc.), but THE OBJECTIVITY (impartiality) 
OF ONE'S VALUES as well.  That's where the claim that you can be too
rational comes in, in that I am supposing that you can be too
valuatively objective when it comes to the value you attach to yourself,
and experience a catastrophic loss of self-esteem, resulting in
sucide, depression, etc.  IOW, I am supposing that emotional
disorder is not a physiological malfunction of the brain (although
that too is involved in many cases), but rather a 
VALUATIVE DISORDER, or at least that a valuative component is a
significant aspect of emotional disorder -- that 'feelings of
worthlessness' lie at its core and are not a symptom of emotioanl
disorder (DSM III) but its CAUSE (a loss of the will to survive,
which in man is synonymous with the value he attaches to himself).


> ...but, having said that, let me say this - in common usage it's
> frequently so that 'objectivity', 'rationality' and 'sanity' are
> interchangeable. We seem to think that someone who is 'sane' (mentally,
> psychologically, psychiatrically, emotionally healthy) will be
> 'objective' (make accurate observations about the world and have a
> consistently accurate cognitive model of the world) and 'rational' (make
> wise and logical decisions about themselves and the world, well
> contextualised and justified within an accurate model of the world).

Yes.  This is the beliefs part, the theoretical rationality of Kant,
and whole enchilada for Hume.  It is contrasted with practical rationality,
which refers, not to the rationality (actually the objectivity in 
my theory) of beliefs, logic, etc.
but the rationality of action.  And, then too, within the domain of
the rationality of action we have a further bifurcation in which their
is the matter of the rationaity of means (e.g., instrumental values)
and the ratioality of the 
ends (intrinsic values).  

This theory is a deduction from my attempt to account 
for the evolutionary anomaly of 'feelings of worhtlessness' in nature's
most rational naturally selected species.  It flows from that explanation,
and puts epistemic, valuative, and strategic rationality in a new light,
in that you no longer treat rationality as a strategic attribute, in
which your rationality correlates with your efficiency with achieveing
and end, but rather with the extent you cognitive and valuative 
profiles approach objectivity (correctness and completeness for beliefs,
impartiality for values).

> Empirical evidence from psychology suggests this is not so, IIRC. I can't
> remember references right now but Seligman's 'learned helplessness'
> research had something about it. 

The problem with Seligman's model, which is a worthy attempt to reduce
emotional disorder to a biologically tracticible phenomena, is 
that he never comes to grips with the fact that almost all occasions
of human "learned helplessness" is in the pursuit of an adequate sense
of self-worth.  As such, he merely postpones answering the central 
quation with which I begin, in that I would have to suppose that we
have learned helplessness in the course of trying to appease the 
feelings we have acquired from learned helplessness.  IOW, it all
gets a little cirular.  IOW Seligman doesn't help us to undertand why so much
of this learned helpless appears to be in the purusit of such biologically
bizarre objectives as purpose, meaning, moral integrity, attention, etc.

> If my memory's being nice to me it goes
> something like this: People who are depressed or pessimistic score better
> on accuracy of observation and recall than controls or people who are
> optimistic. 

That, of course, would be entirely compatible with my own conclusion 
that the emotioanl instability in homo sapiens is evidence that the
species is beginning to show signs of becoming TOO RATIONAL (too
valuatively objective) for its own good.  BTW, I would appreciate
a reference on any studies you are aware of on this.


> People who are consistently optimistic, however, tend to live
> longer and are not 'mentally disordered' or less than 'sane'. 

That's because, according to my theory, they are LESS RATIONAL (valuatively,
but which is causally linked with epistemically), and therefore 
less likely to begin to question mother nature's mandate that they
maintain a rationally inordinate conception of their own importance.

> People who
> are depressed do not always score well on logic and reasoning, though,
> ordinary controls do better there than either depressed or optimistic
> people. 

When they are IN the depression.  However, how do they do when they
are not depressed, according to the studies you are referring to. 
Also, I am supposing that reasoning, at its core, is ANAlogical,
which might not be a problem for my theory, even if such patients
are less adept with logic when no longer depressed.  

> Interesting, isn't it? Perhaps we get to choose whether to be
> 'right' objectively, 'intelligent' rationally or 'sane' and live
> longer... It doesn't seem that we can excel in all three or that they can
> easily co-exist.
> 

Very.  And at an even more general level, where we don't have to worry 
about idosyncracies in the testing procedure, it is abundently clear
that there is a correlation between the rationality of the species and
the presence of both morality and emotioanl instability in the species,
suggesting, to me at least, a causal relationship, that ratioality 
"causes" an increase in emotional instability, i.e., an increased
volatility in self-worth, often with a life-threatening reduction 
in self-interest.

> 
> I haven't picked up what features of human nature are being referred to
> here. FWIW I am having trouble with the apparent presumption that we are
> generally a 'nice' social animal. 

Benevolently selfish, rather than ruthlessly selfish, but with the 
realization that probably most if not all acts of PHYSICAL selfishness
are emotionally selfish, in that they are invariably motivated by
the need to maintain self-esteem (e.g., my commitment to my mom,
based on my belief that I owe my parents a debt that can never be fully
repayed), e.g., avoidance of guilt.


-- 

                  Phil Roberts, Jr.

       The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism:
Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock
     http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/