From: [email protected] In article <[email protected]>, [email protected] wrote: > > > [email protected] wrote: > > > > In article <[email protected]>, > > [email protected] wrote: > > > > > > As a maladaptive by-product of an adaptation which is sufficiently > > > advatageous to warrant a significant down side. The physical cost/ > > > benefit analysis still comes out in the black, because the massive > > > increase in the FACILITY to survive (the epistemic component of > > > our rationality, e.g., printing, the scientific method, etc.) > > > is sufficiently beneificial to outweigh the negative effects of > > > a significant reduction in THE WILL to survive (a red-shift > > > away from the optimal valuative profile for maximizing reproductive > > > success) which must be tolerated to reap those benefits. > > > > Now, I'm not big on this whole 'rationality' idea to start with > > Probably because you have grown very accustomed to the idea that > natural selection is supposed to be a PHYSICAL theory, whereas I think of it as a theory regarding the persistence of attributes - those attributes cannot be simply summarised as 'physical' to me and the theory does not account for all attributes which persist. "rationality" doesn't make a lot of sense to me because I've never grasped a detailed definition of it which made sense to me. > I am supposing it can be employed as a starting point for a > psycho-philosophical theory of human nature. This takes some > getting used to, but the fact that Dawkins has acknowledged > the need for an addendum to natural selction (a memetics) should > give you at least some sympathy for the possiblity that I might > not be completely off the beam here. Well, it has struck me before that I don't understand how behaviour is encoded genetically... > > and I'm > > still not sure what 'holistic rationbality' is about so I'd appreciate a > > restatement of that... > > > > Its a term for referring to a new theory of rationalty which is > a deduction from my explanation of the role of 'feelings of > worthlessness' in the evolutionary scheme of things. Its another > way of talking about a concept or attribute, a hypothetical X, > which can not be constrained within a formal structure (e.g., > reduced to logic, algorithms, maxims, principles, etc), similar > to the conclusions entertained by Godel, and championed by J. R. > Lucas and Roger Penrose as a means for casting some light on > the mind body problem, indeterminism, etc., although without > much success so far. > > Metaphorically, its a phrase which refers to my conclusion that > 'being rational' is not a matter of 'being efficient' (the means/ > end theory), or a matter of 'maximizing self-interest' (egoism), > and certainly not a matter of 'being logical' (computationalism), > but simply a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on'. Okay, this seems very much like the views of various Eastern systems and of some American Indian systems whereby you have to be 'in tune with' reality rather than have a reductionist understanding of it in order to be mentally/emotionally stable. Most spiritual traditions seem to have something like this, as far as I know. > Less metaphorically, I am simply supposing that 'being rational' > is a matter of 'being objective'. But here's the catch. I > am supposing that it is true, not only with regard to the objectivity > of one's beliefs (not their justification, by the way, but their > correctness, completenesss, etc.), but THE OBJECTIVITY (impartiality) > OF ONE'S VALUES as well. That's where the claim that you can be too > rational comes in, in that I am supposing that you can be too > valuatively objective 'too valuatively objective' for what? For your own health or sense of well-being? What if this is an evolutionarily acceptable element of psychological development - ie, if you can withstand the 'too valuatively objective' stage for long enough you come out the other side _stronger_ in 'rationality' and this counts as an evolutionary advantage? when it comes to the value you attach to yourself, > and experience a catastrophic loss of self-esteem, resulting in > sucide, depression, etc. IOW, I am supposing that emotional > disorder is not a physiological malfunction of the brain (although > that too is involved in many cases), but rather a > VALUATIVE DISORDER, or at least that a valuative component is a > significant aspect of emotional disorder -- that 'feelings of > worthlessness' lie at its core and are not a symptom of emotioanl > disorder (DSM III) but its CAUSE (a loss of the will to survive, > which in man is synonymous with the value he attaches to himself). You think this would apply to just about _all_ non-physiological disorders? Some seem to be based on extraordinary feelings of immunity to pain, or fearlessness, or superiority and so on... are you presuming all these are compensatory? That honestly doesn't seem likely. Your suggestion would be a reasonable possibility to consider (IMO) for depression and various other things which seem to diminish functioning but there's a lot more to the list of disorders than those. > > ...but, having said that, let me say this - in common usage it's > > frequently so that 'objectivity', 'rationality' and 'sanity' are > > interchangeable. We seem to think that someone who is 'sane' (mentally, > > psychologically, psychiatrically, emotionally healthy) will be > > 'objective' (make accurate observations about the world and have a > > consistently accurate cognitive model of the world) and 'rational' (make > > wise and logical decisions about themselves and the world, well > > contextualised and justified within an accurate model of the world). > > Yes. This is the beliefs part, the theoretical rationality of Kant, > and whole enchilada for Hume. It is contrasted with practical rationality, > which refers, not to the rationality (actually the objectivity in > my theory) of beliefs, logic, etc. > but the rationality of action. And, then too, within the domain of > the rationality of action we have a further bifurcation in which their > is the matter of the rationaity of means (e.g., instrumental values) > and the ratioality of the > ends (intrinsic values). > > This theory is a deduction from my attempt to account > for the evolutionary anomaly of 'feelings of worhtlessness' in nature's > most rational naturally selected species. I'm still not convinced that this is reasonably described as an anomaly. Why can't 'feelings of worthlessness' be decribed analogously with 'feelings of hunger'? They are evolutionarily selected becaue by having them we seek 'worth' which means we're more likely to keep ourselves alive and more likely to reproduce since we'll be more attractive to the opposite sex. It flows from that explanation, > and puts epistemic, valuative, and strategic rationality in a new light, > in that you no longer treat rationality as a strategic attribute, in > which your rationality correlates with your efficiency with achieveing > and end, but rather with the extent you cognitive and valuative > profiles approach objectivity (correctness and completeness for beliefs, > impartiality for values). I think the latter is a wiser understanding of rationality but I don't know that it's very different to the sort of generalised wisdom that it can be painful to learn about life and a relief to limit your reasoning and information. > > Empirical evidence from psychology suggests this is not so, IIRC. I can't > > remember references right now but Seligman's 'learned helplessness' > > research had something about it. > > The problem with Seligman's model, which is a worthy attempt to reduce > emotional disorder to a biologically tracticible phenomena, is > that he never comes to grips with the fact that almost all occasions > of human "learned helplessness" is in the pursuit of an adequate sense > of self-worth. As such, he merely postpones answering the central > quation with which I begin, in that I would have to suppose that we > have learned helplessness in the course of trying to appease the > feelings we have acquired from learned helplessness. IOW, it all > gets a little cirular. IOW Seligman doesn't help us to undertand why so much > of this learned helpless appears to be in the purusit of such biologically > bizarre objectives as purpose, meaning, moral integrity, attention, etc. I think he just 'takes it as read' that these things are wanted because he believed that people are happier and healthier with them. To justify being happier and healthier with them doesn't seem difficult to me within the context of a social animal where these are indicators of strengths that have status value as well as practical value for some of them. After all, the plumage of the peacock is a thorough waste and hindrance practically but I'm unaware of arguments that it's an evolutionary anomaly since it seems to serve a purpose within mating. > > If my memory's being nice to me it goes > > something like this: People who are depressed or pessimistic score better > > on accuracy of observation and recall than controls or people who are > > optimistic. > > That, of course, would be entirely compatible with my own conclusion > that the emotioanl instability in homo sapiens is evidence that the > species is beginning to show signs of becoming TOO RATIONAL (too > valuatively objective) for its own good. Can you explain how you get from the theory that rationality and self- worthlessness have the relationship you're suggesting to this predictive idea? I don't get how you've made that jump. BTW, I would appreciate > a reference on any studies you are aware of on this. Sorry, I don't have them. > > People who are consistently optimistic, however, tend to live > > longer and are not 'mentally disordered' or less than 'sane'. > > That's because, according to my theory, they are LESS RATIONAL (valuatively, > but which is causally linked with epistemically), and therefore > less likely to begin to question mother nature's mandate that they > maintain a rationally inordinate conception of their own importance. I think I agree with you there. > > People who > > are depressed do not always score well on logic and reasoning, though, > > ordinary controls do better there than either depressed or optimistic > > people. > > When they are IN the depression. However, how do they do when they > are not depressed, according to the studies you are referring to. I don't remember any followup being done. > Also, I am supposing that reasoning, at its core, is ANAlogical, > which might not be a problem for my theory, even if such patients > are less adept with logic when no longer depressed. Both inductive and dedutive reasoning are 'analogical'? I don't really know what you mean by this. > > Interesting, isn't it? Perhaps we get to choose whether to be > > 'right' objectively, 'intelligent' rationally or 'sane' and live > > longer... It doesn't seem that we can excel in all three or that they can > > easily co-exist. > > > > Very. And at an even more general level, where we don't have to worry > about idosyncracies in the testing procedure, it is abundently clear > that there is a correlation between the rationality of the species and > the presence of both morality and emotioanl instability in the species, > suggesting, to me at least, a causal relationship, that ratioality > "causes" an increase in emotional instability, i.e., an increased > volatility in self-worth, often with a life-threatening reduction > in self-interest. Why is the suggestion not be the other way around - emotional instability means that rationality becomes more valuable as a controlling factor? again I'm struck by the interactive possibility - the two serving each other in equilibrium. > > I haven't picked up what features of human nature are being referred to > > here. FWIW I am having trouble with the apparent presumption that we are > > generally a 'nice' social animal. > > Benevolently selfish, rather than ruthlessly selfish, but with the > realization that probably most if not all acts of PHYSICAL selfishness > are emotionally selfish, in that they are invariably motivated by > the need to maintain self-esteem (e.g., my commitment to my mom, > based on my belief that I owe my parents a debt that can never be fully > repayed), e.g., avoidance of guilt. > > -- > > Phil Roberts, Jr. > > The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism: > Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock > http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/ Mick. -- "Many a mickle makes a muckle". [email protected] [email protected] Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/ Before you buy.