From: "Phil Roberts, Jr." 




Owleye wrote:
> 
> "Phil Roberts, Jr." wrote:
> 
> 
> >        A Sketch of a Divergent Theory of Emotional Instability
> >
> >
> > Objective: To account for self-worth related emotion (i.e., needs for
> >    love, acceptance, moral integrity, recognition, achievement,
> >    purpose, meaning, etc.) and emotional disorder (e.g., depression,
> >    suicide, etc.) within the context of an evolutionary scenario; i.e., to
> >    synthesize natural science and the humanities; i.e., to answer the
> >    question:  'Why is there a species of naturally selected organism
> >    expending huge quantities of effort and energy on the survivalistically
> >    bizarre non-physical objective of  maximizing self-worth?'
> 
> This is all very presumptuous.  I would hope that the above characterizations,
> particularly, the part hidden in the "etc." is sufficiently understood to be 
> able to approach the problem of synthesis that you take as your challenge.
> 

Not sure what you mean here.  The central objective is simply to "explain"
the role of 'feelings of worthlessness' in the evolutionary scheme of 
things, and from which it is assumed that one would then have insight 
into such things as needs for love, acceptance, etc. and would indeed
be able to go a long way in synthesizing natural science and the 
humanities.  To the extent you believe that needs for purpose, meaning,
moral integrity, etc. have nothing to do with maintaining or attaining
self-worth, then the explanatory pay-off would be much less, naturally.
But that doesn't seem like a particularly reasonable position to take,
if you don't mind my saying so.

> > Observation: The species in which rationality is most developed is
> >    also the one in which individuals have the greatest difficulty in
> >    maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth, often going to
> >    extraordinary lengths in doing so (e.g., Evel Knievel, celibate monks,
> >    self-endangering Greenpeacers, etc.).
> 
> It is also the species in which language is most developed, creativity, 
> technology, spirituality, and a great many other things.  This business of 
> making use of "a sense of self-worth" is entirely too psychological for my 
> purposes, but I'll try to stay awake.

Feelings of worthlessness are an intersubjectively reproducible feature of
nature, and therefore entirely appropriate as a matter of scientific 
sepculation, IMHO.  Indeed, to the extent you regard them as irrelevant
to an understanding of human nature, I would say you are being foolish.

Or are you saying that this is a feature of nature with which you have 
had no experience.  Can you think of something you've thought or done
in the past several years that didn't have a significant self-worth
component in its motivational hierarchy?


> Perhaps some day you will define for me what this means.  If "sense" 
> means something like a feeling, I might imagine a pharmacological 
> solution.
> 

Again, I can only assume you are not a memeber of the humam species if
'feelings of worthlessness' is a phrase which conveys no meaning to 
you.  

  One of the characteristics of the majority of modern psychological 
  theories, aside from the arbitrariness of so many of their claims, 
  is their frequently ponderous _irrelevance_.  The cause, both of 
  the irrelevance and of the arbitrariness, is the evident belief of 
  their exponents that one can have a science of human nature while 
  consistently ignoring man's most significant and distinctive 
  attributes (Nate Brandon).


> > Hypothesis: Rationality is antagonistic to psychocentric stability (i.e.,
> >    maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth).
> 
> This seems counterintutive, but again I'll try to stay with you.
> 

The correlation between the presence of rationality and the presence 
of emotional instability in a species is something I assume you agree
with.  Why would speculating on a causal relationship constitute 
a counterintuitive hypothesis?  Perhaps you mean that it is an 
emotionally repugnant hypothesis (with which I agree).

> >
> >
> > Synopsis: In much the manner reasoning allows for the subordination
> >    of lower emotional concerns and values (pain, fear, anger, sex, etc.)
> >    to more global concerns (concern for the self as a whole), so too,
> >    these more global concerns and values can themselves become
> >    reevaluated and subordinated to other more global, more objective
> >    considerations. And if this is so, and assuming that emotional
> >    disorder emanates from a deficiency in self-worth resulting from
> >    precisely this sort of experiencially based reevaluation, then it can
> >    reasonably be construed as a natural malfunction resulting from
> >    one's rational faculties functioning a tad too well.
> 
> Well, as Sartre says, "We are condemned to be free!" I guess you have a point. 
> However,I have the feeling that it depends on whether the rationality is being 
> used virtuously or viciously.  When we have done our duty we presumably preserve 
> our dignity in doing so, thereby making virtue its own reward.  But a medical 
> doctor, can, for example, use her skill rationally to preserve life or to do 
> harm to it.
> 

I am supposing that vicious would always be LESS RATIONAL than virtuous, in 
that it would entail being caught up more in one's own little sphere of 
wants and needs, and therefore require that one "see" less.  I don't deny
the ability to do evil, just that it is always less rational than doing
good, because it requires being blind to the more comprehensive considerations
that the good person has to take into account.  Morality is very inefficient,
which is no doubt why Hitler and Stalin were able to accomplish so much.  Its
the price we pay for "seeing" a little too much for our own good, IMHO.

> >
> >
> > Normalcy and Disorder: Assuming this is correct, then some
> >    explanation for the relative "normalcy" of most individuals would
> >    seem necessary. This is accomplished simply by postulating
> >    different levels or degrees of consciousness.  From this perspective,
> >    emotional disorder would then be construed as a valuative affliction
> >    resulting from an increase in semantic content in the engram indexed
> >    by the linguistic expression, "I am insignificant", which all persons of
> >    common sense "know" to be true, but which the "emotionally
> >    disturbed" have come to "realize", through abstract thought,
> >    devaluing experience, etc.
> 
> Whoa!  You are going way too fast here.  There is way too much unconnected
> speculation all of which could be challenged.  I realize that space 
> considerations prevent the kind of argument you would need here, but perhaps 
> we can take it one step at a time.  What is normal?  What is disorder?
> 

What society currently regards as normal and disorder?  E.g., the radio 
commercials suggest that if your depression lasts for less than two weeks
its "normal", longer its a "disorder".  But I don't think we need to get
this picky here.  After all, all we really want to do is to try to 
understand the role of 'feelings of worthlessness' in the evolutionary
scheme of things and from which myriads of deductions will ensue.  

> >
> >
> > Implications: So-called "free will" and the incessant activity presumed
> >    to emanate from it is simply the insatiable appetite we all have for
> >    self-significating experience which, in turn, is simply nature's way of
> >    attempting to counter the objectifying influences of our rational
> >    faculties. This also implies that the engine in the first "free-thinking"
> >    artifact is probably going to be a diesel.
> 
> Now you are getting absurd.  It makes no sense whatsoever.  If I say I am acting 
> on the basis of my own free-will (and I surely do say this) I mean by it that I 
> am not being compelled to act.  It is the psychological condition of being 
> compelled or driven to act that tells me I'm not acting freely.  How does what 
> you say relate to this?
> 

The only will which would be completely "free" would be innert, in my humble
opinion.  All will is directed/determined in one way or another.  But this
is not to argue against the possiblity that we might be LESS DETERMINED than
other creatures.  For example, on every occasion you and I decide not to
obey the mandates of fear, anger or sex, in order to accomplish what might
be in our overall best interest, we are LESS DETERMINED and MORE RATIONAL
than other species.  However, we are still determined, since striving to
accomplish what is in one's overall best interest is itself a determined
objective.  But since it is based on more comprehensive considerations, and
is the result of "seeing" more, it is also one which is MORE RATIONAL.

> >    "The short answer [to Lucas/Godel and more recently, Penrose]
> >     is that, although it is established that there are limitations to the
> >    powers of any particular machine, it has only been stated, without
> >    any sort of proof, that no such limitations apply to human intellect "
> >    (A. M. Turing).
> 
> This is not particularly saying anything.  Indeed Goedel's proof of the 
> incompleteness of arithmetic seems ample evidence that human's are not limited 
> by the same things that computers are. 

You know that, and I know that.  Unfortunately, just about everyone in the cog 
sci and AI communities don't agree.  So it would be helpful if one could marshal
EVIDENCE.  I am assuming that far and away the best "explanation" for 'feelings 
of worthlessness' in a naturally selected species is that they are evidence that
the species is beginning to show signs of "standing outside the system", becoming 
LESS DETERMINED by natural selection, and requiring REASONS for continuing to 
survive.  As such, I consider them an intersubjectively reproducible feature of
nature which confirms the opinion you and I share on this matter, and which can
be used to argue against the vast majority in the soft sciences who disagree with
us.

> Notwithstanding this, consciousness is 
> far from being explained and I think we would need to accomplish this 
> before we can approach the problem.
> 

Agreed.  The best way to do this is by finding a scientific anomaly, and 
developing a thesis to explain it, and testing the thesis against reality
in terms of the number of things it can explain.


-- 

                  Phil Roberts, Jr.

       The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism:
Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock
     http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/