From: "Phil Roberts, Jr." 



Although I've read some of Kant's Critique, and all of the Cambridge Companion
to Kant, I'm still not quite certain as to how he arrives at his categorical
imperative.  But I believe I know a much faster route which someone here 
might wish to challenge me on.

Rather than assuming that 'being rational' (in valuative/strategic/practical
affairs) is a matter of 'being efficient' (means/end theory) or of 
'maximizing self-interest' (egoism), abandon the self-interest assumption
and simply assume that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being able 
to "see" what is going on' or 'being objective'.  If such were the case,
then you could justify a valuative version of the imperative, i.e., 'Love 
your neighbor as you love yourself' by bringing the mountain to Mohammed 
so to speak, in that 'being rational' would be equivalent to 'being 
valuatively objective'.

The justification for the "theory" of rationality I am proposing here 
would simply lie in its superior epistemic credentials, not only in its
greater freedom from contradiction, but also in terms of its ability to
"explain" several evolutioanry anomalies (the presence of morality and
emotional instability in homo sapiens).


-- 

                  Phil Roberts, Jr.