From: "Phil Roberts, Jr."
"Robert ASF." wrote:
>
> NG cut
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> On Thu, 05 Jul Phil Roberts, Jr. wrote:
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> snip
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> >Rather than assuming that 'being rational' (in valuative/strategic/practical
> >affairs) is a matter of 'being efficient' (means/end theory) or of
> >'maximizing self-interest' (egoism), abandon the self-interest assumption
> >and simply assume that 'being rational' is simply a matter of 'being able
> >to "see" what is going on' or 'being objective'. If such were the case,
> >then you could justify a valuative version of the imperative, i.e., 'Love
> >your neighbor as you love yourself' by bringing the mountain to Mohammed
> >so to speak, in that 'being rational' would be equivalent to 'being
> >valuatively objective'.
>
> Your redefinition is at best an empircial version of Kant's CI and
> at worst mere altering the words without altering the content.
>
But if, as you say, I'm really that close to Kant's own conclusions on
morality, the fact that I have accomplished it in a single paragraph
of explanation should count for something, shouldn't it?
> >The justification for the "theory" of rationality I am proposing here
> >would simply lie in its superior epistemic credentials, not only in its
> >greater freedom from contradiction, but also in terms of its ability to
> >"explain" several evolutioanry anomalies (the presence of morality and
> >emotional instability in homo sapiens).
>
> You are going to have to fless this out a lot more for it to be
> anymore then mere supposition.
>
A Sketch of a Divergent Theory of Emotional Instability
Objective: To account for self-worth related emotion (i.e., needs for
love, acceptance, moral integrity, recognition, achievement,
purpose, meaning, etc.) and emotional disorder (e.g., depression,
suicide, etc.) within the context of an evolutionary scenario; i.e., to
synthesize natural science and the humanities; i.e., to answer the
question: 'Why is there a species of naturally selected organism
expending huge quantities of effort and energy on the survivalistically
bizarre non-physical objective of maximizing self-worth?'
Observation: The species in which rationality is most developed is
also the one in which individuals have the greatest difficulty in
maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth, often going to
extraordinary lengths in doing so (e.g., Evel Knievel, celibate monks,
self-endangering Greenpeacers, etc.).
Hypothesis: Rationality is antagonistic to psychocentric stability (i.e.,
maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth).
Synopsis: In much the manner reasoning allows for the subordination
of lower emotional concerns and values (pain, fear, anger, sex, etc.)
to more global concerns (concern for the self as a whole), so too,
these more global concerns and values can themselves become
reevaluated and subordinated to other more global, more objective
considerations. And if this is so, and assuming that emotional
disorder emanates from a deficiency in self-worth resulting from
precisely this sort of experiencially based reevaluation, then it can
reasonably be construed as a natural malfunction resulting from
one's rational faculties functioning a tad too well.
Normalcy and Disorder: Assuming this is correct, then some
explanation for the relative "normalcy" of most individuals would
seem necessary. This is accomplished simply by postulating
different levels or degrees of consciousness. From this perspective,
emotional disorder would then be construed as a valuative affliction
resulting from an increase in semantic content in the engram indexed
by the linguistic expression, "I am insignificant", which all persons of
common sense "know" to be true, but which the "emotionally
disturbed" have come to "realize", through abstract thought,
devaluing experience, etc.
Implications: So-called "free will" and the incessant activity presumed
to emanate from it is simply the insatiable appetite we all have for
self-significating experience which, in turn, is simply nature's way of
attempting to counter the objectifying influences of our rational
faculties. This also implies that the engine in the first "free-thinking"
artifact is probably going to be a diesel.
"Another simile would be an atomic pile of less than critical size: an
injected idea is to correspond to a neutron entering the pile from
without. Each such neutron will cause a certain disturbance which
eventually dies away. If, however, the size of the pile is sufficiently
increased, the disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will
very likely go on and on increasing until the whole pile is destroyed.
Is there a corresponding phenomenon for minds?" (A. M. Turing).
Additional Implications: Since the explanation I have proposed
amounts to the contention that the most rational species
(presumably) is beginning to exhibit signs of transcending the
formalism of nature's fixed objective (accomplished in man via
intentional self-concern, i.e., the prudence program) it can reasonably
be construed as providing evidence and argumentation in support of
Lucas (1961) and Penrose (1989, 1994). Not only does this imply
that the aforementioned artifact probably won't be a computer,
but it would also explain why a question such as "Can Human
Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?" (Cohen, 1981)
has led to controversy, in that it presupposes the possibility
of a discrete (formalizable) answer to a question which can only
be addressed in comparative (non-formalizable) terms (e.g. X is
more rational than Y, the norm, etc.). Along these same lines,
the theory can also be construed as an endorsement or
metajustification for comparative approaches in epistemology
(explanationism, plausiblism, etc.)
"The short answer [to Lucas/Godel and more recently, Penrose]
is that, although it is established that there are limitations to the
powers of any particular machine, it has only been stated, without
any sort of proof, that no such limitations apply to human intellect "
(A. M. Turing).
"So even if mathematicians are superb cognizers of mathematical
truth, and even if there is no algorithm, practical or otherwise,
for cognizing mathematical truth, it does not follow that the power
of mathematicians to cognize mathematical truth is not entirely
explicable in terms of their brain's executing an algorithm. Not
an algorhithm for intuiting mathematical truth -- we can suppose that
Penrose [via Godel] has proved that there could be no such thing.
What would the algorithm be for, then? Most plausibly it would be an
algorithm -- one of very many -- for trying to stay alive ... " (D. C.
Dennett).
Oops! Sorry! Wrong again, old bean.
"My ruling passion is the love of literary fame" (David Hume).
"I have often felt as though I had inherited all the defiance and all the
passions with which our ancestors defended their Temple and could
gladly sacrifice my life for one great moment in history" (Sigmund
Freud).
"He, too [Ludwig Wittgenstein], suffered from depressions and for long
periods considered killing himself because he considered his life
worthless, but the stubbornness inherited from his father may have
helped him to survive" (Hans Sluga).
"The inquest [Alan Turing's] established that it was suicide. The
evidence was perfunctory, not for any irregular reason, but because
it was so transparently clear a case" (Andrew Hodges)
REFERENCES
1. Cohen, L. Jonathan, Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally
Demonstrated?, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1981, 4, 317-370.
2. Lucas, J. R., Minds, Machines and Godel, Philosophy, Vol XXXVI (1961).
Reprinted in Anderson's, Minds and Machines, and engagingly explored
in Hofstadter's Pulitzer prize winner, Godel, Escher, Bach: An
Eternal Golden Braid.
3. Penrose, Roger, The Emperor's New Mind, 1989; Shadows of the Mind,
1994.