From: [email protected] (malenor)


"Phil Roberts, Jr."  wrote in message news:<[email protected]>...


{snipped - see 129a}


> Yes.  Here is the reason YOU AND I (as opposed to an ideally rational
> agent)  "ought" to conform.  Because, as interminably 
> self-interested organisms, the self-worth which ensues from conforming
> to the CI will make us happier more contented beings.  Yeaaaaaahh!!! 
> In other words, on many occasions it is emotionally selfish to be
> physically unselfish (e.g., Mother Teresa). 

Altruism is not total self-sacrifice but the attempt to symbolize in
practice transcendent principles of goodwill toward other living
beings. It is just a way of "sacrificing" certain lower, empirical
principles for higher, transcendent ones. The emotional results are
often very pleasant, sometimes a bit exquisite to the point of almost
suffering. But if these results are your goal, you are far less likely
to achieve them. The goal is not the emotion, but the symbolization of
Ideas.

> > This is interesting because it demonstrates the connection between
> > duty, self-worth and free will. Doing your duty brings positive
> > feelings of self-worth because you sense that you are a free,
> > undetermined being in control of yourself and your life. When you get
> > used to this state of being, soon you begin to dread the opposite
> > state ("worthless and contemptible"). When you feel high self-worth,
> > and this is an established state of mind such that you begin to dread
> > the opposite state of self-esteem, you develop a good moral
> > disposition, meaning, you become more and more predisposed to doing
> > your duty to reason. It is a self-sustaining cycle. 
> >
> > On the other hand,
> > you have the being whose morality is contingent on external or
> > psychological factors (forces), who does not feel in control of
> > himself or his life, whose self-esteem is low and who has little
> > consciousness of his own freedom. To such a being the CI makes its
> > presence felt still through his awareness of his own contemptuousness,
> > despite the fact that the CI is hardly ever practiced. 
 
> > Such a being is
> > motivated merely by a hedonism either short-term (pleasure) or
> > long-term (happiness). Since the Ideas of reason still reign in all
> > human life, this being seeks a higher perfection, only it becomes
> > lower, empirical, and thus impossible to attain, as there is no such
> > thing as empirical perfection. 
> > It's not that happiness should be
> > rejected by the person of high moral worth, only, it does not become a
> > motivating factor. And the feeling that results from doing one's duty
> > is not the (imperfect) happiness created by the satisfaction of one's
> > lower needs (mitigated by the anxiety of knowing that the future might
> > not bring happiness), but the perfect *contentment* (which is more an
> > aesthetic feeling than moral) derived from achieving an accord, a
> > balance, a state of harmony within.
> 
> I think we are possibly in agreement here.  I would say that to
> the extent that the purpose in conforming to the CI was strictly
> the increase in pleasure and contentment it brings, that that would
> be a LESS RATIONAL motive than if it were done out of a genuine 
> concern for the well-fare of others.  In other words, I would maintain,
> somewhat similarly to like Kant I believe, and contra to the utilarians,
> that the rationality/morality 
> stems, not from the increase in happiness which ensues, not even in
> the world, but rather from THE INCREASE IN OBJECTIVITY.  That's 
> because 'being rational' isn't a matter of being
> happy, but rather a matter of 'being able to "see" what is going on',
> i.e., 'being objective'.
> 
The objective realization of transcendent principles is the goal. But
you are omitting a great deal of theory on how this goal is to be
achieved.
> 
> P.S.  I'm still wondering where all this leaves us with regard to
> my original contention however.  Isn't the CI contingent on the
> premis, 'Given one chooses to be rational' blah blah blah.?
> Wouldn't this be so, even though we both might agree that it
> is not rational because it makes one happy, or even increases
> the sum total of happiness in the world, but rather because
> of the nature of rationality itself.

The CI isn't contingent on anything except the very existence of free
agents themselves. (You can't very well choose *not* to be a free
agent, because this implies your free agency.) I have tried to show in
the past that there is a lower CI and a higher CI. The lower CI isn't
really a CI, but it has some of its features. It's concern, though, is
primarily in the empirical realm, but it makes its presence known in
the statements and attitudes of people who become rigid on some issue
because "its the principle of the thing." But once their emotional
rigidity passes, you will notice so do the alleged, unspoken
principles behind them. This is a rather base reflection on the actual
CI which is a part of our nature, and attempts to make itself felt
even on empirical and psychological grounds, although always and
necessarily imperfectly. That's because the grounding of these
principles is not transcendental, but empirical or psychological
(conditioned by circumstances and emotions). What you are asking for
is a transcendental grounding of the CI, and this is what Kant gives
in the CPR2.