In his classic paper, Minds, Machines and Godel, J. R. Lucas has put forward the following thesis:
Godel's theorem states that in any consistent system which is strong enough to produce simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved-in-the- system, but which we [standing outside the system] can see to be true.Godel's theorem must apply to cybernetical machines, because it is of the essence of being a machine, that it should be a concrete instantiation of a formal system. It follows that given any machine which is consistent and capable of doing simple arithmetic, there is a formula which it is incapable of producing as being true -- but which we can see to be true. It follows that no machine can be a complete or adequate model of the mind, that minds are essentially different from machines.
With a little reading between the lines, I believe that Lucas can reasonably be construed as arguing that rationality can not be mechanized and, conversely, that rational creatures are not machines. Not only should this come as good news to moralists and libertarians, but it also suggests a way to put the matter to a test. Since the Lucas thesis predicts that rational creatures should be indetermined (assuming that 'being a machine' is just another way of talking about 'being determined' or 'being consistent'), demonstrate that this is indeed the case and you empirically demonstrate Lucas. Simple, eh?
Of course, this indeterminism business is a notorious party pooper. Even so, there have been some developments in the philosophy of science (Manicas and Secord, Bhaskar, Scriven, Hanson, etc.) which, I believe, offer a somewhat more enlightened perspective from which to approach the matter.
Perhaps most fundamental, the new conception rejects the orthodox assumption that "the world is so constituted that there are descriptions such that for every event, the simple formula 'whenever this, then that' applies" (Bhaskar, 1975). This regulative ideal, Laplacean in origin, in turn supports the thesis, derived from Hume, that scientific laws are statements of constant conjunctions between events. But for the new view of science, there may be no description such that for some event the formula, "whenever this, then that" applies. On this view the world is radically open. In the new heuristic, scientific knowledge is much closer to that knowledge which is more familiarly accessible, through common sense, literature, and other modes of experience.(Manicas and Secord)And so, rather than falling into the same old trap of fixating on Humean constant conjunctions, my concern will be with the more abstract determinism predicted by evolutionary theory. And my quest for evidence of inconsistency with this determinism will be focused, not on rational individuals, but rather on a rational species, homo sapiens. As such, any example of individual thought or behavior I might offer in evidence will always be with the implied understanding that it is merely a vehicle for pointing to what I presume to be an enduring structure of human nature per se.
The short answer to [the Lucas/Godel] argument is that although it is established that there are limitations to the powers of any particular machine, it has only been stated, without any sort of proof, that no such limitations apply to human intellect (Turing).
Humans and baboons have evolved by natural selection. If you look at the way natural selection works, it seems to follow that anything that has evolved by natural selection should be selfish. Therefore we must expect that when we go and look at the behavior of baboons, humans, and all other living creatures, we will find it to be selfish. If we find that our expectation is wrong, if we observe that human behavior is truly altruistic, then we will be faced with something puzzling, something that needs explaining.(Dawkins).
With the advent of the theory of kin selection (Hamilton), a good deal of progress has actually been made in accounting for much of the altruism in lower organisms. However, kin selection is far from the natural science cure-all some have led us to believe (e.g., Wilson, 1975) and, contrary to surprisingly widespread opinion, there is currently no scientific basis for the assumption that one can extrapolate from an explanation of altruism in the social insects and immediate kin to an explanation of the thought and behavior of an Albert Schweitzer.
Fortunately, at least for my purposes, not only is Hamilton's theory endowed with sufficient mathematical rigor to predict where altruism is likely occur, but it can also predict where it should not occur. And where it should not occur turns out to be almost everywhere, just as you might expect:
Clearly from a gene's point of view it is worthwhile to deprive a large number of distant relatives in order to extract a small reproductive advantage (Hamilton).Like successful Chicago gangsters, our genes have survived, in some cases for millions of years, in a highly competitive world. This entitles us to expect certain qualities in our genes. I shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness [metaphorically speaking]. This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behavior. However, as we shall see, there are special circumstances in which a gene can achieve its own selfish goals best by fostering a limited form of altruism at the level of individual animals. 'Special' and 'limited' are important words in the last sentence. Much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal love and the welfare of the species as a whole are concepts which simply do not make evolutionary sense (Dawkins).
Even with the qualifications regarding the possibility of group selection, the portrait of the biologically based social personality that emerges is one of predominantly self-serving opportunism even for the most social species, for all species in which there is genetic competition among the social co-operators, that is, where all members have the chance of parenthood (Campbell).
Some of those who have come to grips with the fact that kin selection simply can't cut the mustard have tried to make it more encompassing by postulating addendums, including at least one interesting psychodynamic one:
Proposed solutions to the mystery range from the highly cynical to the mildly inspiring. At the more inspiring end of the spectrum is a theory by the philosopher Peter Singer. His book The Expanding Circle asks how the range of human compassion grew beyond its primitive bounds -- the family, or perhaps the band. Singer notes that human nature, and the structure of human social life, long ago got people in the habit of publicly justifying their actions in objective terms... Singer believes that once this habit is established (by the evolution of reciprocal altruism, among other things), the "autonomy of reasoning" takes over. "The idea of a disinterested defense of one's conduct" grew out of self-interest, "but in the thought of reasoning beings, it takes on a logic of its own which leads to its extension beyond the bounds of the group (Wright).
While, to some, this might look more like a cop out than a legitimate hypothesis, I would like to suggest that it may not be all that far off the mark, at least not to the extent that old J. R. was basically right about the material implications of Godel and the implied potential for a rational species to eventually transcend the formalism of a natural fixed objective (i.e., physical survival via the vehicle of self-concern).
Presumably, mother nature has gone to a lot of trouble to evolve our capacity for reflective thought precisely because it makes it possible for us to have a fairly good idea of what will be in our overall best interest. But if this is so, why then are there motivational states, such as fear, anger, and sexual arousal, which continually urge us to engage in episodes of strategic stupidity on those innumerable occasions when, at some later point in time, we end up having to ask ourselves, "Now why did I do that?" I mean, if prudence is such hot stuff from an evolutionary standpoint, why isn't mother making it easier for us to exercise it more prudently?
The answer, I believe, is precisely what you might expect. The reason the lower emotions seem so out of context with our more reflective concerns is precisely because they are remnants of a pre-reflective survivalist heritage -- vestigial remains of ancient stimulus response mechanisms which, prior to the advent of prudential insight, were chiefly responsible for perpetuating ourselves and our genetic blueprints. And their lack of continuity with our more reflective concerns is because, at some point in our dark and distant past, survival was not the result of any overall intention or "will" to survive, but simply the non-intentional cumulative effect of a number of independent intentions or "wills" to exhibit stereotyped responses to certain immediate stimuli, but which were probably undertaken with little if any understanding of the overall objective they were designed to achieve.
But isn't this exactly what you would expect? After all, the real mind blower in Darwin's hypothesis has always been the realization that it isn't necessary to postulate the presence of a conscious intention in the mind of a supreme being or what have you in order to account for the existence of phenomenally complex living organisms. And if you don't have to postulate a conscious intention at the level of abstraction that Darwin was working at, then you certainly don't have to postulate it at the level of the individual organism. Simply put, that which best persists persists and, as a simple law of mechanics, that applies irrespective of whether or not anything is intending to do so.
In other words, the reason the lower emotions so often urge us to engage in random acts of stupidity is because, in a manner of speaking, they don't quite know what they are doing. Their strategic incoherence is due to the fact that the id is not so much an evil monster as a bunch of bungling idiots (Larry, Curly and Moe come to mind) and in which case Freud's mistake was not in positing homunculi (the id, ego and superego), as Ryle has contended, as in not positing enough of them.
If, as I have suggested, Darwin and the incoherence of the lower emotions constitute evidence and argumentation against the likelihood of a conscious intention to survive in our pre-reflective ancestors, just where did the one we have come from anyway?
Simple. As with moral concerns, prudence is not something we are endowed with by nature, at least not directly. Instead, it has to be drummed into us by our parents and others who have preceded us into consciousness (e.g., cooling it with the candy). As such, its obviously not so much the product of physical evolution as the product of cultural evolution. Or, more interestingly for present concerns, it can be construed as the product of the evolution of rationality itself facilitated, no doubt, by a combination of nature's constant tinkering with the neural architecture and the eventual ability to transfer what, in the beginning, at least, were probably simple conditioned cognitions (memes, a la Dawkins) from one generation to the next.
What is most interesting here, if indeed we are talking about the evolution of rationality and its bearing on the determinism issue, is that it entails, not merely the transfer of knowledge, but of values as well. For example, there would be little point in coming to possess the knowledge of the long term detriments of eating too much candy if you weren't also able to eventually adopt the practice of overriding the internal mini- program directing you to eat it which, one might speculate, could be accomplished in one of two ways:
1. By simply following the rules handed down to you, based on their having been related to you in terms of one of the mini- programs of the old survival system (you'll get a spanking), and in which case there has been a transfer of benefits if not a transfer of values and insights. The moral analogue of this might be obeying the ten commandments so you don't end up with an eternal spanking.
2. By yourself becoming endowed with the insights which have led to the practice including:
a. Some appreciation for the rationale of the practice, perhaps based on past experience and your resultant ability to empathize with your future self and the position he will be in (rotten teeth) if you don't override the old survival system's mini-program. This would result in an increase in the value attached to those mere representations of distant concerns. The moral analogue for this would be loving others more than the natural ideal (not at all) based on the ability to empathize with the mere represented concerns of others.
b. Some appreciation of the fact that one "ought" to be prudent, based in part on the insight that rational creatures operate from a more global perspective which is, for some abstruse reason, superior (the ego) to that of creatures whose thought and behavior is totally determined by the mini-programs of the old survival system (the id). However, coming up with an explanation for the origin of this insight is a little tougher and would result in straying a little further afield than I care to at this juncture. The moral analogue would be some appreciation for the fact that one "ought" to love others more than the natural ideal (not at all) based in part on the insight that rational creatures operate from a more global perspective which is, for some abstruse reason, superior (the super ego) to that of creatures totally determined by the prudence program (the ego, i.e., self-concern).
c. Finally, it seems to me that before you could override any of the mini-programs of the old survival system you would need one final ingredient. You would need to devalue the necessity of completing the mini-program, that is to say, re- evaluate its necessity relative to other values (e.g., represented future concerns) rather than in the absolute manner of a determined entity. But, before you can do that, it seems likely that you would have to be able to "see" the mini-program from "outside the system", that is to say, from a more objective viewpoint, perhaps as a component in a larger more valued program. Only then might you invoke the option to no longer be determined by it if and when it was, as we say, prudent. And since we are often prudent, or at least some of us are, that must be precisely what has happened in homo sapiens. And so, once again, it appears we have old J. R. riding to the rescue.
The moral analogue of c. is not humility, which comes more under the heading of the insight that a rational creature operates from a more global perspective and therefore "ought" to value itself less than the natural ideal (absolutely), but emotional disorder. And because this is a major naturalistic no no, in that valueless organisms don't survive so good, mother nature appears to have launched a major campaign (higher emotional need) against this relatively recent psychodynamic adversity resulting in a spectacular display of naturalistic fireworks.
I'm referring to the fact that, when I examine my own motivational foundations, which I presume are not atypical, or when I simply defer to the view of human nature depicted in the humanities, I find a species whose dominant interests and concerns appear to be more emotional than physical in nature (e.g., needs for love, attention, wealth, power, respect, honor, moral integrity, meaning, etc.). And, frankly, the existence of an entire species of naturally selected organism expending huge quantities of effort and energy on such a survivalistically bizarre objective as trying to make themselves feel important should be enough to make any competent natural scientist begin to shake in his boots. And this is to say nothing of the plethora of associated phenomena, such as emotional disorder, suicide, Evel Knievel, celibate monks, etc., in which the potential for genetic benefit ranges from obscure to non-existent.
In point of fact, on several occasions I have already submitted a paper on precisely this topic (Rational Negativism), only to be informed by reviewers who should have known better that the anomalies with which I was concerned had already been fully addressed by -- you'll never guess -- the theory of kin selection (Rey and Mathews and tacitly endorsed by Lycan, Dretske, and Dennett). This paper begins somewhat as follows:
Observation: The species in which rationality is most developed is also the one in which individuals have the greatest difficulty in maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth, often going to extraordinary lengths in doing so (e.g., body builders, Admiral Byrd, etc.).Hypothesis: Rationality is antagonistic to psychocentric stability (i.e., maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth).
Explanation: In much the manner rationality allows for the subordination of lower emotional concerns and values (pain, fear, anger, sex, etc.) to more global concerns (i.e., concern for the self as a whole), so too, these more global concerns and values can themselves become reevaluated and subordinated to other more global, more objective considerations. And if this is so, and assuming that emotional disorder emanates from a deficiency in self-worth resulting from precisely this sort of experiencially based reevaluation, then it can reasonably be construed as a natural malfunction resulting from one's rational faculties functioning a tad too well.
It could be argued that, in spite of the evidence that the most rational species has now on at least two occasions transcended natural formalisms, first in the transition from the old survival system (lower emotion, pain and pleasure, etc.) to the new survival system (prudence), and later in the transition from prudence to an even more global perspective characterized by the twin features of morality and emotional instability, that these are still programs nonetheless, and thus we are still determined, even if to a lesser degree. I don't disagree, but would merely point out that whatever determinism we still have is not so much the product of the evolution of rationality, as the result of nature still attempting to maintain control of the situation (e.g., the imposition of the need for self-worth). But the very fact that we, as rational creatures, now have the option of being determined by the old survival system, and are therefore less determined in this regard than other creatures should prove sufficient to give reasonable men pause.
If the proof of the falsity of mechanism is valid, it is of the greatest consequence to the whole of philosophy. Not even Kant could resolve the tension between the two standpoints. No longer will it be incumbent on the natural philosopher to deny freedom in the name of science: no longer will the moralist feel the urge to abolish knowledge to make room for faith. We can even begin to see how there could be room for morality, without its being necessary to abolish the province of science (Lucas).