Subject: 
        Re: [evol-psych] Huxleyan dualism of Dawkins and EP
   Date: 
        Wed, 13 Feb 2002 10:57:45 -0600
   From: 
        Steven Ravett Brown 
     To: 
        Dorothy Tennov ,
        , Larry Arnhart 




Dorothy Tennov2/12/02 6:41 PM

> Larry, I don't follow you.The origins of moral sentiments might be
> understood in terms of evolutionary development, but morality as decisions
> about what is good and bad are cultural inventions derived from human
> intelligence that has evolved through evolution. To use our nature in making
> moral decisions is not to transcend biological nature. That would be
> impossible.
> 

It's very difficult and upsetting for me to follow this discussion, for the
following reason. 

1) Consider the above statement, "The origins of moral sentiments might be
understood in terms of evolutionary development, but morality as decisions
about what is good and bad are cultural inventions derived from human
intelligence that has evolved through evolution."

2) Now, consider that, sometimes, people can become aware of certain of
their actions and motivations and change those as a result of that
awareness.

Are the two statements above contradictory? Whether they are depends in part
on what is meant by terms like "cultural inventions", "evolution", "human
intelligence". But more importantly, and getting to the root of what is
upsetting about exchanges such as the above, is that this issue is *not* a
theoretical, philosophical one. It is an *empirical* issue. Where are the
studies supporting or undermining statements such as the above? If they have
not been carried out, then Dawkins' statements were at best well-intentioned
rhetoric, pointing out a direction that investigation should proceed. If
they have been carried out, then it behooves us to base our discussions on
them. 


Steven Ravett Brown
[email protected]