Subject: 
            Re: [evol-psych] Evolutionary psychology, dualism and ethics
       Date: 
            Thu, 14 Feb 2002 15:32:46 -0500
      From: 
            "Phil Roberts, Jr." 
        To: 
            John Cartwright 
        CC: 
            [email protected]
 References: 
            1




John Cartwright wrote:
> 
>        I too am surprised that so many in the EP movement
> subscribe to an ontological dualism when it comes to ethics. If
> "ought" statements cannot be deduced, inferred or abstracted in
> some way from "is" statements, then where are ought statements
> obtained from? Pure logic and reason cannot by themselves, it
> seems to me, lead us to normative statements. They need
> something ( axioms, value statements, biological facts etc) to work
> upon. If ethics were a matter of logic only then I guess we would
> end up with the same normative principles for all species.

I have often found it helpful to think about this matter in terms
of the evolution of prudence, i.e., the capacity to override 
short term objectives/values for long term objectives/values, 
which I assume to be highly adaptive.
 
I don't think prudence is something any of us come by naturally.
Rather it has to be drummed into us by those who have preceeded
us into consciousness (e.g., cooling it with the candy, the work
ethic, etc.) and who,
in turn, have benefited from the same sort of instruction from
their parents.  As such, in a certain sense, prudence requires that 
I transcend the will of nature, i.e., the short term appetites
that were no doubt responsible for our surivival prior to our
capacity for reflective thought.  Indeed, I suspect that if 
human culture were erased and human organisms were to somehow
miraculously survive the calamity, that it would probably be
many millenia before prudence would once again appear on the 
planet.  So in this sense, nature would only be indirectly
selecting for prudence by simply selecting for a nervous system
which would be receptive to a cultural invention.
This would mean that nature would be indirectly selecting 
for a cultural invention cable of overriding her more immediate
and more directly biologically based mechanisms for determining
human behavior, in a sense, working against herself, or at 
least against mechanisms for achieving her objectives which
she has relied on for billions of years.

Perhaps this would arise in the quise of the first post calamity 
human saying to himself/herself, "Hmmmm!  If I don't gather
food now, I will go hungry come winter."   But it is important
to understand that this understanding alone would not be sufficient 
for prudence to reappear on the planet.  Before this understanding 
can be implimented into action, there has to be a significant
shift in values.  In other words, this first prudent individual
would not only have to understand the long term consequences
of immediate actions, but would also have to empathize with
his/her hypothetical future self to a sufficient degree and
to relativize the values of the immediate self to a sufficient
degree for the values of the future self to override the values
of the immediate self.  

In common parlance, these hypothized values/objectives of the 
future self constitute what we refer to as one's will, and in the 
sense that we quite commonly think of it as distinct and separate 
from nature's will.  It is also interesting to note that these
hypothetical values/objectives, these mere representions of 
values and objectives based on inference capable of altering
the customary course of nature, would undoubtedly arise as
a result of reasoning, both the cumulative wisdom of one's 
culture and one's own deep reflection on the matter.  And so,
to this extent, I think Hume simply has to have been wrong in
his contention that reasoning can only be about truth and 
falsehood, unless of course, you want to think up some sort of
new term for whatever thinking goes into producing these values.
As such, I would say that prudence is a rational passion, or
at least a more rational passion than those passions associated
with biological impulses.

There are other distinguishing characteristics about whatever
will or desire impliments a prudent couse of action as well.
I would say that prudent behavior is more rational, not only
because prudent intentions are the product of reasoning, but
also because they are based on MORE COMPREHENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
and because they reflect AN INCREASE IN VALUATIVE OBJECTIVITY  
(an equalizing of value between the wants and needs of the
immediate and future self).  Nor am I alone in this 
conviction.  Indeed, the equal weight criterion
currently constitutes the paradigm for practical rationality 
among students of the subject:


   My feelings a year hence should be just as important to me as 
   my feelings next minute, if only I could make an equally sure 
   forecast of them.  Indeed this equal and impartial concern for 
   all parts of one's conscious life is perhaps the most prominent 
   element in the common notion of the _rational_.  (Henry 
   Sidgwick, 'The Methods of Ethics').

   All these theories [of rational self-interest] also claim that, in 
   deciding what would be best for someone, we should give equal 
   weight to all the parts of this person's future.  Later events may be 
   less predictable; and a predictable event should count for less if 
   it is less likely to happen.  But it should not count for less merely
   because, if it happens, it will happen later (Derek Parfit, 'Reasons 
   and Persons').


Once you acknowledge that values are an intimate component of rationality,
it also becomes something of a no brainer to deduce an ought from an
is:

1. Construct a theory of rationality in which 'being rational' equates
   with 'being objective'.
2. Corroborate the theory's epistemic credentials (the "is" component)
   in terms of its capacity to maximize explanatory coherence better than any 
   competing theories (e.g., means/end theory, egoism, utilitarianism,
   etc.).
3. Derive the ought component from the syllogism:
   'Given that one chooses to be rational, then one ought to be prudent'.


Phil Roberts, Jr.