Subject: 
        [evol-psych] The Naturalistic Fallacy and Hope for an Evolutionary Ethic
   Date: 
        Thu, 14 Feb 2002 15:46:57 -0700
   From: 
        Casebeer William D USAFA/DFPY 
     To: 
        [email protected]




Colleagues,


Just a quick note about the sociology of philosophy-while it is true, owing in part to the residual effects of
twentieth century infatuation with analytic and ordinary language philosophy, that many ethicists insist on
observing a hard-line distinction between facts and norms ("Your science shall never mingle with my
ethics!"), there is a vocal group of professional ethicists and philosophers who do not find arguments for the
is/ought dualism persuasive.

 

But even that group (and I count myself a practicing member) can admit that Hume's naturalistic fallacy
and Moore's open question argument might have something useful to tell us about normative ethics.
Namely: we learn from Hume that not every natural fact constitutes a normative fact, and we learn from
Moore that a perfect system of naturalized ethics has not yet been formulated (hence, in part, the success
of the open question argument).  But these are things that no reasonable naturalist about ethics would
deny anyhow.  The purpose of a naturalized moral theory is just to tell us what facts count as normative
facts in a way that respects both the data of morality (e.g., some of our considered moral judgments), and
the canons of reasoning and observation that govern effective theory formation in general.

 

The danger arises when we interpret Hume and Moore as providing "in principle" arguments against any
naturalized ethic (which is how many philosophers, unfortunately, do in fact read them).  If you look at the
second edition of the "Principia Ethica," though, even Moore admits that the argument he provided in the
first edition in fact overstepped its bounds and did not constitute a general attack on naturalized ethics;
instead, it was just an attack on two particular theories of naturalized ethics-hedonism and Spencer's
evolutionary ethic.  We can grant him this weaker point without taking any wind out of the sails of an
evolutionary ethic, happily.  I have a short academic piece where I discuss some of these issues and
provide references; let me know if you'd like an electronic copy.

 

Happy naturalizing!

 

Best wishes,
Bill


William D. Casebeer

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy

2354 Fairchild Lane, Suite 1A10

US Air Force Academy, CO 80840