Subject: 
        [evol-psych] the right line on ethics for EP
   Date: 
        Fri, 15 Feb 2002 10:33:56 -0500
   From: 
        "John A. Johnson" 
     To: 
        [email protected]




On Thu, 14 Feb 2002 08:42:50 -0600 David Hill wrote:

  Exactly right.  It ill behooves a partisan of EP to fall into naive
  non-cognitivism when there is an attractive cognitive alternative:  natures
  are explicable in adaptationist terms, functions follow from natures, and
  proper evaluations follow from functions.


Because the concept of mental illness assumes a position on the proper function of mind (i.e., how the
mind "ought" to behave), the approach suggested by David Hill has been used to help reconcile
arguments about the roles of biology and values in mental disorders. (See Wakefield, J. C.  (1992). 
The concept of mental disorder:  On the boundary between biological facts and social values. 
American Psychologist, 47, 373-388.) I am therefore sympathetic toward this type of analysis.

I do, however, have a question about David Hill's jab at non-cognitivism. I wonder if he could provide
an example that contrasts a naive non-cognitivist view of ethics with a non-naive non-cognitivist view of
ethics? Or is he implying that all non-cognitivisms are inherently naive? If so, why? It seems to me that
non-cognitive entities (e.g., the moral emotions) have functions and therefore belong in a complete
evolutionary ethics.

--------------------------------------------------------------------
John A. Johnson http://www.personal.psu.edu/~j5j/
Professor of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University
Penn State is not responsible for my behavior. Nor am I for the university's.

Real Utilitarianism: Moral Goodness as Causal Efficacy:
http://drj.virtualave.net/other/religio/morality.html