Subject: 
        RE: [evol-psych] the right line on ethics for EP
   Date: 
        Fri, 15 Feb 2002 11:40:07 -0600
   From: 
        "Hill, David" 
     To: 
        "'John A. Johnson'" , [email protected]




Reply to Johnson: 

I do, however, have a question about David Hill's jab at non-cognitivism. I
wonder if he could provide an example that contrasts a naive non-cognitivist
view of ethics with a non-naive non-cognitivist view of ethics? Or is he
implying that all non-cognitivisms are inherently naive? If so, why? It
seems to me that non-cognitive entities (e.g., the moral emotions) have
functions and therefore belong in a complete evolutionary ethics.

_______

The contrast here is between careful work in metaethics, which provides us
with an abundance of sophisticated theories of both types, and the standard
dogma of the intelligentsia, which blithely assumes that ethical claims are
expressions of feeling or preference and therefore neither true nor false.
Although I find the standard dogma poorly grounded and naive -- as naive as
the faith-based cognitivism it opposes and holds in contempt -- I am more
than willing to admit that there are sophisticated non-cognitivists
(Stevenson and Hare are still my favorites) and naive cognitivists (most
good Christian souls).  As to the second point, ethical cognitivism is
consistent with the existence of functioning non-cognitive states.  Indeed,
it can concede that such states may function in part to generate cognitive
states.  But however that may be, the core claim of ethical cognitivism is
that ethical judgments, like biological judgments, are frequently knowable,
and hence bearers of truth value.  Emotional states are typically
constituted, in part, by certain beliefs, from which they cannot be
separated.  These beliefs, whether about ordinary facts ("he hit me") or
morals ("it was wrong of him to hit me"), are typically true or false.

 David Hill