Subject: 
            Re: [evol-psych] Evolutionary psychology, dualism and ethics
       Date: 
            Fri, 15 Feb 2002 13:56:47 -0500
      From: 
            "Michael Lamport Commons" 
        To: 
            , "John Cartwright" 
        CC: 
            
 References: 
            1 , 2




What we need instead of a science that posits people are rational or
irrational, or have will or do not, etc. is that people can be sensible,
reasonable, and prudent to varying degrees.  All the above terms can be
grounded in behavior.

My Best,

Michael Lamport Commons, Ph.D.
Research Associate and Lecturer

Program in Psychiatry and the Law
Department of Psychiatry
Harvard Medical School
Massachusetts Mental Health Center
74 Fenwood Road
Boston, Ma 02115-6196

Telephone (617) 497-5270
Facsimile  (617) 491-5270
Facsimile  (617) 547-0874
[email protected]
http://www.tiac.net/users/commons/


----- Original Message -----
From: "Phil Roberts, Jr." 
To: "John Cartwright" 
Cc: 
Sent: Thursday, February 14, 2002 3:32 PM
Subject: Re: [evol-psych] Evolutionary psychology, dualism and ethics


>
> John Cartwright wrote:
> >
> >        I too am surprised that so many in the EP movement
> > subscribe to an ontological dualism when it comes to ethics. If
> > "ought" statements cannot be deduced, inferred or abstracted in
> > some way from "is" statements, then where are ought statements
> > obtained from? Pure logic and reason cannot by themselves, it
> > seems to me, lead us to normative statements. They need
> > something ( axioms, value statements, biological facts etc) to work
> > upon. If ethics were a matter of logic only then I guess we would
> > end up with the same normative principles for all species.
>
> I have often found it helpful to think about this matter in terms
> of the evolution of prudence, i.e., the capacity to override
> short term objectives/values for long term objectives/values,
> which I assume to be highly adaptive.
>
> I don't think prudence is something any of us come by naturally.
> Rather it has to be drummed into us by those who have preceeded
> us into consciousness (e.g., cooling it with the candy, the work
> ethic, etc.) and who,
> in turn, have benefited from the same sort of instruction from
> their parents.  As such, in a certain sense, prudence requires that
> I transcend the will of nature, i.e., the short term appetites
> that were no doubt responsible for our surivival prior to our
> capacity for reflective thought.  Indeed, I suspect that if
> human culture were erased and human organisms were to somehow
> miraculously survive the calamity, that it would probably be
> many millenia before prudence would once again appear on the
> planet.  So in this sense, nature would only be indirectly
> selecting for prudence by simply selecting for a nervous system
> which would be receptive to a cultural invention.
> This would mean that nature would be indirectly selecting
> for a cultural invention cable of overriding her more immediate
> and more directly biologically based mechanisms for determining
> human behavior, in a sense, working against herself, or at
> least against mechanisms for achieving her objectives which
> she has relied on for billions of years.
>
> Perhaps this would arise in the quise of the first post calamity
> human saying to himself/herself, "Hmmmm!  If I don't gather
> food now, I will go hungry come winter."   But it is important
> to understand that this understanding alone would not be sufficient
> for prudence to reappear on the planet.  Before this understanding
> can be implimented into action, there has to be a significant
> shift in values.  In other words, this first prudent individual
> would not only have to understand the long term consequences
> of immediate actions, but would also have to empathize with
> his/her hypothetical future self to a sufficient degree and
> to relativize the values of the immediate self to a sufficient
> degree for the values of the future self to override the values
> of the immediate self.
>
> In common parlance, these hypothized values/objectives of the
> future self constitute what we refer to as one's will, and in the
> sense that we quite commonly think of it as distinct and separate
> from nature's will.  It is also interesting to note that these
> hypothetical values/objectives, these mere representions of
> values and objectives based on inference capable of altering
> the customary course of nature, would undoubtedly arise as
> a result of reasoning, both the cumulative wisdom of one's
> culture and one's own deep reflection on the matter.  And so,
> to this extent, I think Hume simply has to have been wrong in
> his contention that reasoning can only be about truth and
> falsehood, unless of course, you want to think up some sort of
> new term for whatever thinking goes into producing these values.
> As such, I would say that prudence is a rational passion, or
> at least a more rational passion than those passions associated
> with biological impulses.
>
> There are other distinguishing characteristics about whatever
> will or desire impliments a prudent couse of action as well.
> I would say that prudent behavior is more rational, not only
> because prudent intentions are the product of reasoning, but
> also because they are based on MORE COMPREHENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS
> and because they reflect AN INCREASE IN VALUATIVE OBJECTIVITY
> (an equalizing of value between the wants and needs of the
> immediate and future self).  Nor am I alone in this
> conviction.  Indeed, the equal weight criterion
> currently constitutes the paradigm for practical rationality
> among students of the subject:
>
>
>    My feelings a year hence should be just as important to me as
>    my feelings next minute, if only I could make an equally sure
>    forecast of them.  Indeed this equal and impartial concern for
>    all parts of one's conscious life is perhaps the most prominent
>    element in the common notion of the _rational_.  (Henry
>    Sidgwick, 'The Methods of Ethics').
>
>    All these theories [of rational self-interest] also claim that, in
>    deciding what would be best for someone, we should give equal
>    weight to all the parts of this person's future.  Later events may be
>    less predictable; and a predictable event should count for less if
>    it is less likely to happen.  But it should not count for less merely
>    because, if it happens, it will happen later (Derek Parfit, 'Reasons
>    and Persons').
>
>
> Once you acknowledge that values are an intimate component of rationality,
> it also becomes something of a no brainer to deduce an ought from an
> is:
>
> 1. Construct a theory of rationality in which 'being rational' equates
>    with 'being objective'.
> 2. Corroborate the theory's epistemic credentials (the "is" component)
>    in terms of its capacity to maximize explanatory coherence better than
any
>    competing theories (e.g., means/end theory, egoism, utilitarianism,
>    etc.).
> 3. Derive the ought component from the syllogism:
>    'Given that one chooses to be rational, then one ought to be prudent'.
>
>
> Phil Roberts, Jr.
>