Subject: 
            Re: [evol-psych] Darwin & Hume's moral sense
       Date: 
            Fri, 15 Feb 2002 20:20:42 +0000
      From: 
            Keith Sutherland 
        To: 
            Irwin Silverman 
        CC: 
            Larry Arnhart , [email protected]
 References: 
            1 , 2




In message , Irwin 
Silverman  writes
>Actually EPs, like Alexander and E.O. Wilson, have had a good deal
>to say about the adaptive function of moral systems.  But if you are
>saying that the "empirical facts of natural human desires" can testify
>to the "correctness" of specific moral positions, than the EPs are
>perfectly justified, both scientifically and morally, in their rigid
>Kantian perspective.  Your Westermarck example is a case in point.  It can
>explain by the "empirical facts" why incest sometimes "naturally" occurs
>(as in siblings separated for a significant time span during the critical
>period)  Would we then conclude that it is thereby morally correct in
>these circumstances?  Of course not.  They are separate domains.

On the contrary. If moral principles are generalised abstractions from 
an empirical base (natural human desires, or whatever) then exceptions 
will always arise. Human subjects will still find such cases abhorrent, 
but it will be mitigated by other moral emotions (understanding, 
sympathy etc.). Kant adds no value to the analysis.
-- 
Keith Sutherland