Subject: 
        Re: [evol-psych] Huxleyan dualism of Dawkins and EP
   Date: 
        Sat, 16 Feb 2002 19:11:45 -0800
   From: 
        "Ian Montgomerie" 
     To: 
        [email protected]




On 12 Feb 2002, at 15:05, Larry Arnhart wrote:

> I continue to be surprised by the fact that those defending EP
> generally reject Darwin's claim that ethics can be rooted in the moral
> sentiments of human biological nature.  Edward Westermarck remains one
> of the few social theorists who adopted Darwin's naturalistic view of
> ethics.  Since Westermarck, E. O. Wilson and de Waal have continued
> his tradition of thought.  But most of the theorists of EP (such as
> Steven Pinker and David Buss)  have insisted on a simple-minded
> is/ought dichotomy--natural facts versus moral values--that presents
> morality as a product of human culture that transcends human nature.

In my experience, those who propose some form of "ethical 
naturalism" tend to display an inability to seperate normative, 
prescriptive, and descriptive ethics.  (Normative - the definition of an 
ideal, the yardstick against which actual events are judged; 
prescriptive - real-world strategies which can be used for more 
moral decision-making; descriptive - the data set composed of 
actual human moral behavior).

The typical goal of ethical philosophy is to reason about normative 
(sometimes prescriptive) morality according to rules of rational 
inference.  That is, to produce a morality which can be justified 
based on some set of premises.

It is simply obvious, not "simple-minded", to point out that "people 
believe X is moral" or "people act as if X is moral", let alone less 
morality-specific information, cannot be used in a rational 
justification of ethical principles.  Unless you start including explicit 
premises like "whatever people believe is moral, is".  And those 
premises don't tend to support the sort of "naturalistic" 
interpretation that would be influenced by biology, they lead more 
towards nihilism, moral relativism, or plain inconsistency.

Basically the only way you get an ought from an is, is to create a 
set of ethical premises which include something along the general 
lines of "whatever is, ought to be".  (Except for some suitably 
specific subset of "whatever is").  Much simpler, more "easy to 
accept" premises tend to lead to radical departures from what you 
refer to as naturalistic ethics.  It is remarkably easy, for example, 
to derive utilitarianism.

> This radically narrows the intellectual power of Darwinian theory
> because it puts morality beyond the realm of Darwinian science.

Descriptive and normative morality are entirely different things.  Using
evolutionary psychology to study the psychological underpinnings 
of human moral behavior and ethical systems is descriptive 
morality, an entirely different matter from what one proposes as an 
actual normative ethical system (standard for right and wrong, or 
more/less ethical behaviors).