Subject: 
        RE: [evol-psych] The naturalistic fallacy is itself naturalistic
   Date: 
        Mon, 18 Feb 2002 16:54:43 -0600
   From: 
        "Laurenson, Edwin C." 
     To: 
        'Larry Arnhart' 
    CC: 
        [email protected]




Well I agree with a good deal of this, but I don't think it does the trick,
even though areas of disagreement can be significantly narrowed by applying
the kind of approach that Larry advocates.

It happens that I have been reading Rosalind Hursthouse's fine recent book,
On Virtue Ethics, where she considers, in the third section, the metaethical
issues confronting the project of "naturalizing morality".  Although I don't
agree with everything she says there, I think she does an excellent job of
confronting the issues with which a neo-Aristotelian approach to ethics must
contend, and a good deal of what she says there informs what I will say
below.  Of course, I understand that Larry needn't agree with her, but I do
think it is significant that she is approaching the issues from within the
same tradition in which he is placing himself.

First, however, I should say that I agree with Larry entirely concerning the
first method for resolving disagreements: close attention to "the facts".
With Hursthouse, I regard feminism, for instance, as having done an
excellent job of challenging factual views about men's and women's actual
capacities, thus giving rise to completely different conclusions as to what
is a "natural" distribution of societal roles.  The same, of course, goes
for subjecting any assertion of differences between one group and another
relating to their capacities and basic characteristics to the most rigorous
and skeptical analysis.  I also agree about the importance of prudence
(although I prefer to call it wisdom).  I am not so much in agreement
concerning the role of varying circumstances in moral reasoning (at least as
a matter of principle) although I agree that being in differing positions
frequently makes a large difference regarding the factors that come to a
person's attention (something I particularly observe on a regular basis in
my legal practice).

Resolutions of disagreements based upon a person's being mistaken concerning
her desires and how she should weigh them present one of the classic deep
issues in moral philosophy (including the issue of how much regard one
"should" have for his "future self"), but I will concede for the sake of
argument that frequently a good deal of progress can be made on that front.
On the other hand, I do not believe that differences in temperament, which,
among other things, affect that "identification and weighing" factor, can be
at all readily overcome, and I do believe that those differences are likely
to lead to different emphases, even within the same ethical tradition, that
can be extremely difficult or impossible to resolve.

The virtue ethics tradition has it that the virtues are not inborn but can
be inculcated and fostered (both by others and one's self) and are therefore
subject to substantial variation depending upon the cultural context in
which they are applied.  This emphasis on training is important and
insightful, for it is a fair criticism of the deontological and
consequentialist (utilitarian, if you will, but I prefer the broader term)
traditions that they tend to speak as if we each emerged from the whom as
full-scale moral philosophers.  However, there is a problem here viewed from
the standpoint of ethical rationalism, which, pace  Mr. Sutherland's
accurate citation of Oakeshott, I believe is inescapable.  (We are, after
all, in the business here of trying to think about how things should be, of
trying to decide by reasoned discussion, using the best knowledge available
to us, what we should recommend as to how humanity should solve its multiple
problems and save the world from catastrophe.)

The problem is that the virtues have to come from someplace.  It is part of
the tradition's assertions that the motivation of a virtuous person derives
from the virtue itself, but why sponsor a particular virtue in the first
place?  Here's where the neo-Aristotelians say you can get around the
is-ought problem.  As David Hill points out, if you can say we've go a
"function", as a factual statement, then, just as a knife can be defined as
a "good" knife if it performs its function well, a person can be defined as
a "good" person.  What's the function?  Well, in view of the fact that we're
social animals, one of our "natural" functions is to function well in
society (Hursthouse identifies the others as surviving, perpetuating the
species and achieving pleasure and avoiding pain individually.)  Hence the
function of morality -- where it derives its ought, if you will -- is to
inculcate the characteristics that allow us to do so, and to do so well
(flourish, if you will, as social animals).

Now suppose I provisionally accept this.  (It seems to me to be in any event
clear that that's what morality's "natural" function in fact is.)  It will
still be immediately clear -- and the virtue ethicists admit (indeed insist
upon) it -- that the list of virtues to be inculcated is going to vary, and
vary significantly, from society to society.  So we are immediately infected
by relativism from the standpoint of the cross-societal observer, and it is
not clear (other than by factual investigation and argument, as with the
feminist point about the capacities of women) how we are to resolve
differences if we are thinking of how to design the "best" society or, more
realistically, design world governmental institutions that have the power to
have at least some impact on the lives of individual societies' citizens.

Virtue ethics also must take the view that the characteristics that fit us
for functioning in societies of various types are also characteristics that
it is possible for a person to display consistently and still lead a happy
"flourishing" life. As Hursthouse admits in the last, poignant 7 pages of
her book, this is a conjecture that at least some of the findings of
evolutionary psychology may throw into some doubt, particularly from the
standpoint of selfish gene (or genome) theory.  (My personal view is that
the "fit" is in most ways "good enough", but then again I'm willing to
accept a good deal of imperfection and am skeptical of the need for people
to flourish in a philosophical sense (regardless of my desires for myself)
in order not to have the whole enterprise crash and burn.)

Now the relativism factor fits into another, in my view critical (for
purposes of this posting), admission, at least as to where neo-Aristotelian
thinking has taken things so far: it hasn't produced a characteristic
account a justice, in the sense that that word is used to describe the
manner in which one would like to see a society organized.  (See Hursthouse
p. 58) In my view this can only be done by reference to the kinds of
approaches that inform deontological and consequentialist approaches, as
radically subject to variation and difficult-to-impossible-to-resolve issues
as they are.  Further, in a rationale philosophical undertaking, the design
of the virtues themselves (albeit, it is said not their application) is a
consequentialist undertaking (at least on Hursthouse's account although to
be fair she doesn't put it that way). In addition, since the design of the
society affects the "virtues" that are "fitted" to that society, if we
haven't got a naturalistic account of how a society "should" operate, we
also haven't got a naturalistic account of what (at least some) of the
virtues "should" be.  And, of course, the approach really doesn't do much
for us with regard to such matters as how to value the natural world, the
survival and flourishing of other species, and what not.  (Hursthouse
herself endorses vegetarianism without contending that we can come up with a
good moral argument for it.)

So that's why, well worth considering though it be, I don't think a
neo-Aristotelian approach puts the lie to my contention that the
naturalistic fallacy is a naturalistic fact.  This is not to say that I
don't think there are [very] good reasons to hold particular moral views, to
argue for and foster them and, if necessary in the end, to fight for them.
Or put differently, although I don't think the naturalistic fallacy can be
gainsaid, I also don't think it NEEDS to be gainsaid in order to make moral
philosophy a meaningful enterprise.  In fact, I think, even though it's
valid, that it's frequently a red herring that many people use as an excuse
not to think about and take this stuff seriously.

Respectfully,

Ted Laurenson

Coda -- some quotes from On Virtue Ethics (recall, in reading these, that
Hursthouse is a strong advocate of virtue ethics and of the project of
"naturalizing" morality):

"The pretensions of an Aristotelian naturalism are not, in any ordinary
understanding of the terms, either "scientific" or "foundational".  It does
not seek to establish its conclusions from "a neutral point of view".  Hence
it does not expect what it says to convince anyone whose ethical outlook or
perspective is largely different from the ethical outlook from within which
the naturalistic conclusions are argued for." (p. 1.93)

"[W]hen we come to ethical evaluations we may be inclined to think that, in
theory, there must  be determinate answers, that in every case we must be
able to compare and rank human beings in  respect of their ethical goodness.
But far from promising, or threatening, to provide such answers, naturalism
suggest that they are not always available." (p. 213)

"Nature determines how [other animals] should be, but the idea that nature
could be normative with respect to us, that it could determine how we should
be, is one we will no longer accept." (p. 220)

"By virtue of our rationality -- our free will if you like -- we are
different.  Apart from the obvious physical constraints and possible
psychological constraints, there is no knowing what we can do from what we
do do, because we can assess what we do do and at least try to change it."
(p.221)





  

-----Original Message-----
From: Larry Arnhart [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Friday, February 15, 2002 2:37 PM
To: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [evol-psych] The naturalistic fallacy is itself
naturalistic


In response to Mr. Laurenson, I would say that from the fact of moral
controversy it does not follow that there are no natural standards for
moral judgment.  As I argue in DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT, there are four
sources of moral disagreement: fallible beliefs about circumstances,
fallible beliefs about desires, variable circumstances, and variable
desires.  Consequently, ethics is not a science like mathematics in
which one properly seeks certainty and precision.  Because of its
uncertainty and imprecision, ethics requires the sort of practical
judgment rooted in experience that cannot be reduced to abstract rules. 
But still, the ultimate standard for ethics is the pattern of natural
desires that distinguishes human nature.

1. FALLIBLE BELIEFS ABOUT CIRCUMSTANCES.  Moral judgment is often
uncertain and imprecise because our knowledge of the circumstances of
action is uncertain and imprecise.  We often disagree about moral
questions, even when we agree in our principles, because we have
differing views of the relevant circumstances.  In fact, much of our
moral reasoning is devoted to gathering and assessing the facts
pertinent to our practical decisions.

2. FALLIBLE BELIEFS ABOUT DESIRES. We are often unsure about what we
truly desire.  Even when we think we know what we desire at some
particular moment, it is not always clear whether satisfying that
momentary desire will impede the satisfaction of a more important desire
in the future.  Much of our moral deliberation with ourselves and with
others requires reasoning about the consistency or contradiction of
diverse desires over a complete life.

3. VARIABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. The variability in the practical
circumstances that distinguish one individual from another and one
society from another dictates variability in our moral judgments.

4. VARIABLE DESIRES. There is both normal and abnormal variation in
human desires.  The normal variation arises from age, sexual identity,
and individual temperament.  The abnormal variation arises from
abnormality in innate dispositions or in social circumstances.  So, for
example, while human beings are normally social animals with social
desires that incline them to feel the pleasures and pains of those close
to them, a few human beings are psychopaths, who lack the social desires
that normally characterize human beings as social animals.

Because of these four sources of moral uncertainty and imprecision,
morality depends on the exercise of what Aristotle identified as
prudence--the practical wisdom for judging correctly how to satisfy the
variable desires of human beings in the variable circumstances of
action.  In contrast to many modern moral philosophers who think
morality comes from learning and following explicit norms stated as
definitions and rules, Aristotle rightly saw that prudence cannot be
reduced to definitions and rules.  Sometimes the contingency of moral
situations produce tragic conflicts that cannot be perfectly resolved by
appeal to universal, formal rules.  Much of my DARWINIAN NATURAL RIGHT
book is devoted to case studies that illustrate such tragic conflicts.

The need for prudence is a consequence of human biology in at least two
respects.  First, the variation in human moral experience that makes
prudence necessary manifests a general variability in all biological
phenomena, and particularly in animal behavior.  All plants and animals
are naturally adapted in various ways for flexible responses to the
changing ecological circumstances in which they find themselves.  (Books
based on direct observation of animal behavior--such as Goodall's
CHIMPANZEES OF GOMBE or de Waal's CHIMPANZEE POLITICS--are actually
social histories of animal communities that show the historical
contingencies of each animal community even within the same species.) 

A second biological explanation for the importance of prudence is that
it emerges from the neural structure of the brain.  The brain represents
the world primarily not through rules that can be verbally stated as
principles, but through prototypes that allow for judgments that cannot
be expressed as verbal principles.  For example, we can recognize faces
and the facial expression of emotions even when we cannot translate
these into verbal statements.  Similarly, our practical experience of
the social world gives us prototypes of moral phenomena such as honesty,
love, sympathy, cruelty, and unfairness.  Acquiring and applying such
moral prototypes in our social lives is a practical skill that cannot be
translated into verbal rules, although we may sometimes formulate some
rules as rough abridgments of our practical experience.  In contrast to
the modern view of morality as the learning of abstract rules,
Aristotle's view of morality as founded on practical habituation and
practical judgment conforms to the way the mind works.

Larry Arnhart

Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL 60115