From: "Phil Roberts, Jr." 
Subject: Re: materialism sucks
Date: 1997/04/13
Message-ID: <33512B43

Mark P. Line wrote:
> 
> Ken Morton wrote:
> 
> > I think the analogy with water may break down here. (Please bear with
> > me, I didn't get much sleep last night). First, can't we infer things
> > about the mind by observing behavior (which would include listening to
> > people talk about the "content" of their mind)?
> 
> We can try. The best a person seems to be able to do in this regard is
> to capture what appear to be correlations between her _own_ behavior (as
> perceived by herself) and her _own_ mind (as perceived introspectively),
> and to ASSUME that those correlations apply to other people as well.
> It's a well-known observation that such correlations do not always
> correspond to inferences made by others about that person's mental
> goings-on, based on her behavior.
> 
> I don't know of any way of generalizing (in the scientific sense)
> such apparent correlations to subjects other than oneself.
> 

I do.  Here's a synopsis.




Is a Science of
the Mind Possible? A Critique of Empirical Methodology,

Synopsis: "Of all the endeavors to expand
the frontiers of knowledge, none has yielded so little to the
organizing functions of the human mind as the study of the mind
itself." And yet, some of the misgivings about psychology
have been founded upon erroneous assumptions. In particular, the
belief that mental events are unsuitable as data because they
can't be empirically (i.e., publicly) observed is rendered vacuous
by the realization that many observations and experiments in the
physical sciences are conducted by isolated individuals working
in total privacy. Verification is obviously more a manifestation
of a collective faith in inter-subjective reproducibility
(facilitated by the intra-taxonomic order heretofore apparent in 
natural kinds) 
than a matter of public demonstration. As such, there would seem
little reason in principle for treating first hand introspective
observations of mental events as methodologically inferior to
so-called empirical observations of physical events, so long as
they can pass the muster of reproducibility. Ah! But there's the
rub.

Unlike oxygen, honey bees and Mustang convertibles, in humans
there is a considerable amount of individualization, no doubt
resulting from nature's increased reliance on imagination and
judgement (reasoning). But since this is an order problem rather
than a privacy problem, the solution is, not to banish introspection,
but to differentiate (stratify)
between the more evolved individualized features (specific reasoning,
specific higher emotional behavior, etc.) and the more mechanical,
isomorphic processes lower in the evolutionary scheme of things
(perception, fear, anger, etc.). Once accomplished (e.g., Diagram
I), the individualization can then be dealt with by applying 
corresponding amounts of abstraction and generalization to
those features (both thought and behavior) where
individualization can be presumed to be most rampant (Diagram
II). For example, individualized conclusions for why one selected
product A over product B could not serve as a data base, whereas
feelings of anger, worthlessness, etc. (enduring structures)
could.

I am conscious in myself of a series of facts connected by 
an uniform sequence, of which the beginning is modifications 
of my body, the middle is feelings, the end is outward demeanour.  
Experience (with intra-taxonomic order throughout the rest of nature), 
therefore, obliges me to conclude that there must be an 
intermediate link; which must either be the same in others as in 
myself, or a different one; By supposing the link to be of the 
same nature (see my diagrams)....I conform to 
the legitimate rules of experimental enquiry 
(John Stuart Mill).


                               Diagram I
                    Phylogeny of Psychical Function

                            Organic Kingdom

  Cognitive Functions (phylum)     Conative Functions (phylum)

        Reasoning (class)            Higher Emotion (class)
         (homo sapiens)                  (homo sapiens)

  Categorical and causal assoc-   Self-worth (ego) related need and
  iations employing individual    disorder(depression, suicide, etc
  imagination and judgement.      serving no obvious biological
  Highly individualized.          purpose. Specific objectives and
                                  behavior highly individualized and
                                  frequently involved with abstract
                                  notions(love, honor, purpose, etc).

      Conditioning (class)            Lower Emotion (class)

  Contiguity associations. Some   Short term motivational states
  degree of individualization     (fear, anger, sexual arousal, etc)
  resulting from variations in    serving obvious biological purpose.
  environmental experience.       Non-volitional psychical states
                                  evoked by singular relatively well
  ^ more evolved functions ^      defined events (stimuli), with
  ^ more individualization ^      some degree of individualization
  v less evolved functions v      superimposed on stereotyped
  v less individualization v      evoking events and responses.
      (more isomorphism)

      Perception (class)             Pain and Pleasure (class)

  Stereo-typical associations     Short term stereotypd motivational
  of stable low level             states resulting from biologically
  information                     significant tactile experience.

               ^    observed functions (introspection)  ^
               v          inferred functions            v

                   Instinctive Functions (phylum)

  Likely progenator of cognitive and conative functions found in the
  human psyche. Highest probability of psychical isomorphism inferred
  from isomorphic behavior within classifications of lower animals.





                         Inorganic Kingdom

  Postulated pan-psychism as proto-mental origin of observed 
  functions.  Extreme isomorphism likely and inferred from 
  isomorphic behavior within classifications of inorganic matter.






                                 Diagram II

                         The Domains of Credibility

                        pertaining to the kinematics
                           (thought and behavior)
                         of systems at the holistic
                            level of description


      ^
      ^                                                | n
  more evolved                              | o
  functions                                  c | n
 (individual-                                r | c
  ization)                                      e | r
                   physical events     d | e      psychical events
  less evolved    (behavior)       i | d       (thought)
  functions                                 b | i
 (isomorphism)                           l | b
      v                                            e | l
      v                                               | e


                   IIa. Behaviorist/Positivist Conception




                highest degrees of generalization in descriptions
                statements, theories, etc. about member of a class
      ^
      ^                      least credible (gradient)
  more evolved  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
  functions
 (individual-   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
  ization)         physical events              psychical events
                - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
  less evolved       (behavior)                     (thought)
  functions     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 (isomorphism)
      v         - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
      v                       most credible (gradient)

                highest degrees of specificity in descriptions
                statements, theories, etc. about members of a class


                            IIb. Revised Conception


Full paper available from my web site.

-- 

Phil Roberts, Jr.

Feelings of Worthlessness from the Perspective of
So-Called Cognitive Science

http://www.geocities.com/Athens/5476