From: "Mark P. Line" 
Subject: Re: materialism sucks
Date: 1997/04/14
Message-ID: <33522B35.1CF8654


Phil Roberts, Jr. wrote:
> 
> Mark P. Line wrote:
> >
> > The best a person seems to be able to do in this regard is
> > to capture what appear to be correlations between her _own_ behavior
> > (as perceived by herself) and her _own_ mind (as perceived
> > introspectively), and to ASSUME that those correlations apply to other
> > people as well.
> > It's a well-known observation that such correlations do not always
> > correspond to inferences made by others about that person's mental
> > goings-on, based on her behavior.
> >
> > I don't know of any way of generalizing (in the scientific sense)
> > such apparent correlations to subjects other than oneself.
> 
> I do.  Here's a synopsis.
>
> 
> Is a Science of
> the Mind Possible? A Critique of Empirical Methodology,
> 
> Synopsis: "Of all the endeavors to expand
> the frontiers of knowledge, none has yielded so little to the
> organizing functions of the human mind as the study of the mind
> itself." And yet, some of the misgivings about psychology
> have been founded upon erroneous assumptions. In particular, the
> belief that mental events are unsuitable as data because they
> can't be empirically (i.e., publicly) observed is rendered vacuous
> by the realization that many observations and experiments in the
> physical sciences are conducted by isolated individuals working
> in total privacy. Verification is obviously more a manifestation
> of a collective faith in inter-subjective reproducibility
> (facilitated by the intra-taxonomic order heretofore apparent in
> natural kinds)
> than a matter of public demonstration.

Can you give some examples of observations and experiments in the
physical sciences which have been accepted without public demonstration
of their intersubjective reproducibility?


> As such, there would seem
> little reason in principle for treating first hand introspective
> observations of mental events as methodologically inferior to
> so-called empirical observations of physical events, so long as
> they can pass the muster of reproducibility. Ah! But there's the
> rub.

Indeed.


> Unlike oxygen, honey bees and Mustang convertibles, in humans
> there is a considerable amount of individualization,

What could possibly make you think that? How do you know that individual
variation is greater in humans than in oxygen atoms, bees and Mustangs?
How about the individualization among spiral galaxies?


> Once accomplished (e.g., Diagram
> I), the individualization can then be dealt with by applying
> corresponding amounts of abstraction and generalization to
> those features (both thought and behavior) where
> individualization can be presumed to be most rampant (Diagram
> II).

How could you possibly have the wherewithal to _presume_ what parts of
the human mind are most rampantly individualized? And why would you want
to presume any such thing before making the observations this
methodology of yours is supposed to enable?


-- Mark

(Mark P. Line  --  Bellevue, Washington  --  )