From: "Phil Roberts, Jr." 
Subject: Re: materialism sucks
Date: 1997/04/17
Message-ID: <3355AFC6


Mark P. Line wrote:
> 
> Phil Roberts, Jr. wrote:
> >
> > Is a Science of
> > the Mind Possible? A Critique of Empirical Methodology,
> >
> > Synopsis: "Of all the endeavors to expand
> > the frontiers of knowledge, none has yielded so little to the
> > organizing functions of the human mind as the study of the mind
> > itself." And yet, some of the misgivings about psychology
> > have been founded upon erroneous assumptions. In particular, the
> > belief that mental events are unsuitable as data because they
> > can't be empirically (i.e., publicly) observed is rendered vacuous
> > by the realization that many observations and experiments in the
> > physical sciences are conducted by isolated individuals working
> > in total privacy. Verification is obviously more a manifestation
> > of a collective faith in inter-subjective reproducibility
> > (facilitated by the intra-taxonomic order heretofore apparent in
> > natural kinds)
> > than a matter of public demonstration.
> 
> Can you give some examples of observations and experiments in the
> physical sciences which have been accepted without public demonstration
> of their intersubjective reproducibility?
>

No one has ever publicly demonstrated that the intertaxonmic order in
nature is inviolable.  Reasonable men everywhere simply assume that 
nature is orderly and therefore that all samples of pure oxygen, hydrogen,
etc. throughout the universe will be isomorphic and isonomic, and therefore
that private observations and experiements conducted with these taxonomes
can be reproduced by other interested parties.

> > As such, there would seem
> > little reason in principle for treating first hand introspective
> > observations of mental events as methodologically inferior to
> > so-called empirical observations of physical events, so long as
> > they can pass the muster of reproducibility. Ah! But there's the
> > rub.
> 
> Indeed.
> 
> > Unlike oxygen, honey bees and Mustang convertibles, in humans
> > there is a considerable amount of individualization,
> 
> What could possibly make you think that? How do you know that individual
> variation is greater in humans than in oxygen atoms, bees and Mustangs?

Pehaps there might be two or three others on the planet who consider the
issue of whether or not automobiles have more individuality then humans
worthy of discussion but I'm not one of them.   You're doing it again 
Mark, you know, the talking in circles thing.

> How about the individualization among spiral galaxies?
>

In these particular cases, the correct term is not individual-
ization, but lateral noise (lateral order = taxonomic order, vertical = 
dynamic order).  Individualization refers to lateral variation superimposed
on an underlying isomorphism.  Its different from random aggregations such
as rocks, weather systems, and spiral galaxies which are examples of lateral
noise, and where science is satisfied simply to study systems as gross 
random aggregates.

> > Once accomplished (e.g., Diagram
> > I), the individualization can then be dealt with by applying
> > corresponding amounts of abstraction and generalization to
> > those features (both thought and behavior) where
> > individualization can be presumed to be most rampant (Diagram
> > II).
> 
> How could you possibly have the wherewithal to _presume_ what parts of
> the human mind are most rampantly individualized? 

By identifying the "cause" of the individualization, as I have explained in
the paper itself.

> And why would you want
> to presume any such thing before making the observations this
> methodology of yours is supposed to enable?
>

Sounds a little circular, don't you think?

-- 

Phil Roberts, Jr.
Feelings of Worthlessness from the Perspective of
So-Called Cognitive Science
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/5476