From: "Mark P. Line" 
Subject: Re: materialism sucks
Date: 1997/04/17
Message-ID: <3355DEB7

Phil Roberts, Jr. wrote:
> 
> Mark P. Line wrote:
> >
> > Can you give some examples of observations and experiments in the
> > physical sciences which have been accepted without public demonstration
> > of their intersubjective reproducibility?
> >
> 
> No one has ever publicly demonstrated that the intertaxonmic order in
> nature is inviolable.  Reasonable men everywhere simply assume that
> nature is orderly and therefore that all samples of pure oxygen,
> hydrogen, etc. throughout the universe will be isomorphic and isonomic,
> and therefore that private observations and experiements conducted with
> these taxonomes can be reproduced by other interested parties.

In what way is that an instance of observations or experiments which
have been accepted without public demonstration of their intersubjective
reproducibility?

This just sounds like a plain old everyday application of Ockham's razor
to me: don't assume that every sample of pure oxygen under identical
environmental conditions is _different_ unless _find_ differences. It is
the lack of observable differences that guides the classification, not
some deductive framework. There was a time when every gas was just
"air", because no differences had been observed. But more and more
differences were found down through the centuries, and that leaves us
with the taxonomy we have today. And no quantum chemist would accept the
premise, anyway, that two oxygen atoms are identical to each other;
maybe the future will bring even more observable differences that are
systematic, and the taxonomy will become even more finely
differentiated.

So we still don't have an answer to my request: Can you give some
examples of observations and experiments in the physical sciences which
have been accepted without public demonstration of their intersubjective
reproducibility?


> > > Unlike oxygen, honey bees and Mustang convertibles, in humans
> > > there is a considerable amount of individualization,
> >
> > What could possibly make you think that? How do you know that
> > individual variation is greater in humans than in oxygen atoms, bees
> > and Mustangs?
> 
> Pehaps there might be two or three others on the planet who consider the
> issue of whether or not automobiles have more individuality then humans
> worthy of discussion but I'm not one of them.   You're doing it again
> Mark, you know, the talking in circles thing.

Don't be so patronizing, perfesser, if you wish to continue this
discussion. If you don't wish to, just say so.

When you consider the number of quarks, leptons and carrier particles
interacting to make what we call an automobile, it is not at all
reasonable to assume that the degree of individual variation is less
than in a living organism of only a fraction of the mass.

So whatever it is you'd like to establish with this ostensible greater
individual variation of humans, you'll have to find another way to
establish it.


> > How about the individualization among spiral galaxies?
> 
> In these particular cases, the correct term is not individual-
> ization, but lateral noise (lateral order = taxonomic order, vertical =
> dynamic order).  Individualization refers to lateral variation
> superimposed on an underlying isomorphism.

And how is it that you _know_ that this does not obtain for spiral
galaxies?


> > > Once accomplished (e.g., Diagram
> > > I), the individualization can then be dealt with by applying
> > > corresponding amounts of abstraction and generalization to
> > > those features (both thought and behavior) where
> > > individualization can be presumed to be most rampant (Diagram
> > > II).
> >
> > How could you possibly have the wherewithal to _presume_ what parts of
> > the human mind are most rampantly individualized?
> 
> By identifying the "cause" of the individualization, as I have explained
> in the paper itself.

I should have known. You know because you've figured it out. Silly me.


> > And why would you want
> > to presume any such thing before making the observations this
> > methodology of yours is supposed to enable?
> >
> 
> Sounds a little circular, don't you think?

Your methodology is supposed to provide the means to objectively observe
the mind. But your methodology presupposes that you have already
objectively observed the mind, thus leading you to claim that you've
identified the "cause" of individualization. Yes, your approach is
circular -- you're trying to base a methodology for objective
observation of the mind on the results of previously transpired,
ostensibly objective observation of the mind.


-- Mark

(Mark P. Line  --  Bellevue, Washington  --  )