From: "Phil Roberts, Jr."
Subject: Re: materialism sucks
Date: 1997/04/18
Message-ID: <33582546
Mark P. Line wrote:
>
> I doubt there's a physical scientist alive on the planet who thinks that
> 150# teenager necessarily exhibit more individual variation than 1000#
> rocks. That's a lot more than 6 people.
>
As employed in my paper, individualization refers to an _entropy_ in
lateral order in systems which exhibit organized complexity and are
laterally ordered at the holistic level of description. Since rocks are a
classification which exhibits lateral noise at this level, they may exhibit
lots of variation but they can't, by definition, exhibit individuality.
Nor would most scientist in the language community I hang out in be likely
to use that term to refer to their rocks. 'Individuality'
is most commonly (but not exclusively) associated with living organisms
which exhibit some degree of personality, e.g., teenagers.
Here we go round in circles. (Billy Preston)
> > > > > How about the individualization among spiral galaxies?
> > > >
> > > > In these particular cases, the correct term is not individual-
> > > > ization, but lateral noise (lateral order = taxonomic order, vertical =
> > > > dynamic order). Individualization refers to lateral variation
> > > > superimposed on an underlying isomorphism.
> > >
> > > And how is it that you _know_ that this does not obtain for spiral
> > > galaxies?
> > >
I don't. Its just that living organisms and their products
are the only systems I am aware of which appear to violate the
second law of thermodynamics at the macroscopic level. As such,
I merely assume that classifications of inanimate objects, e.g.,
rocks, weather systems, galaxies, etc., exhibit lateral noise
and therefore can not, by my definition, exhibit individuality.
Variation yes, individuality, no.
>
> > > But your methodology presupposes that you have already
> > > objectively observed the mind,
> >
> > No, introspectively observed the mind, restricting my scientific claims
> > to only those features it is reasonable to suppose we have in common.
>
> Then let me rephrase my comment:
>
> Your methodology is supposed to provide the means to employ
> intersubjective reproducibility in introspectively observing the mind.
> But your methodology presupposes that you have _already_ introspectively
> observed the mind.
>
Its actually based on a wide range of considerations, but I believe
I have expressed it about as succinctly as possible in my synopsis.
Once again:
Is a Science of
the Mind Possible? A Critique of Empirical Methodology,
Synopsis: "Of all the endeavors to expand
the frontiers of knowledge, none has yielded so little to the
organizing functions of the human mind as the study of the mind
itself." And yet, some of the misgivings about psychology
have been founded upon erroneous assumptions. In particular, the
belief that mental events are unsuitable as data because they
can't be empirically (i.e., publicly) observed is rendered vacuous
by the realization that many observations and experiments in the
physical sciences are conducted by isolated individuals working
in total privacy. Verification is obviously more a manifestation
of a collective faith in inter-subjective reproducibility
(facilitated by the intra-taxonomic order heretofore apparent in
natural kinds) than a matter of public demonstration. As such,
there would seem
little reason in principle for treating first hand introspective
observations of mental events as methodologically inferior to
so-called empirical observations of physical events, so long as
they can pass the muster of reproducibility. Ah! But there's the
rub.
Unlike oxygen, honey bees and Mustang convertibles, in humans
there is a considerable amount of individualization, no doubt
resulting from nature's increased reliance on imagination and
judgement (reasoning). But since this is an order problem rather
than a privacy problem, the solution is, not to banish introspection,
but to differentiate (stratify)
between the more evolved individualized features (specific reasoning,
specific higher emotional behavior, etc.) and the more mechanical,
isomorphic processes lower in the evolutionary scheme of things
(perception, fear, anger, etc.). Once accomplished (e.g., Diagram
I), the individualization can then be dealt with by applying
corresponding amounts of abstraction and generalization to
those features (both thought and behavior) where
individualization can be presumed to be most rampant (Diagram
II). For example, individualized conclusions for why one selected
product A over product B could not serve as a data base, whereas
feelings of anger, worthlessness, etc. (enduring structures)
could.
Quote:
I am conscious in myself of a series of facts connected by
an uniform sequence, of which the beginning is modifications of
my body, the middle is feelings, the end is outward demeanour.
Experience (with intra-taxonomic order throughout the rest of
nature), therefore, obliges me to conclude that there must be an
intermediate link; which must either be the same in others as in
myself, or a different one; By supposing the link to be of the
same nature (see my diagrams)....I conform to
the legitimate rules of experimental enquiry (John Stuart Mill).
Diagram I
Phylogeny of Psychical Function
Organic Kingdom
Cognitive Functions (phylum) Conative Functions (phylum)
Reasoning (class) Higher Emotion (class)
(homo sapiens) (homo sapiens)
Categorical and causal assoc- Self-worth (ego) related need and
iations employing individual disorder(depression, suicide, etc
imagination and judgement. serving no obvious biological
Highly individualized. purpose. Specific objectives and
behavior highly individualized and
frequently involved with abstract
notions(love, honor, purpose, etc).
Conditioning (class) Lower Emotion (class)
Contiguity associations. Some Short term motivational states
degree of individualization (fear, anger, sexual arousal, etc)
resulting from variations in serving obvious biological purpose.
environmental experience. Non-volitional psychical states
evoked by singular relatively well
^ more evolved functions ^ defined events (stimuli), with
^ more individualization ^ some degree of individualization
v less evolved functions v superimposed on stereotyped
v less individualization v evoking events and responses.
(more isomorphism)
Perception (class) Pain and Pleasure (class)
Stereo-typical associations Short term stereotypd motivational
of stable low level states resulting from biologically
information significant tactile experience.
^ observed functions (introspection) ^
v inferred functions v
Instinctive Functions (phylum)
Likely progenator of cognitive and conative functions found in the
human psyche. Highest probability of psychical isomorphism inferred
from isomorphic behavior within classifications of lower animals.
Inorganic Kingdom
Postulated pan-psychism as proto-mental origin of observed
functions. Extreme isomorphism likely and inferred from
isomorphic behavior within classifications of inorganic matter.
Diagram II
The Domains of Credibility
pertaining to the kinematics
(thought and behavior)
of systems at the holistic
level of description
^
^ | n
more evolved | o
functions c | n
(individual- r | c
ization) e | r
physical events d | e psychical events
less evolved (behavior) i | d (thought)
functions b | i
(isomorphism) l | b
v e | l
v | e
IIa. Behaviorist/Positivist Conception
highest degrees of generalization in descriptions
statements, theories, etc. about member of a class
^
^ least credible (gradient)
more evolved - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
functions
(individual- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ization) physical events psychical events
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
less evolved (behavior) (thought)
functions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(isomorphism)
v - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
v most credible (gradient)
highest degrees of specificity in descriptions
statements, theories, etc. about members of a class
IIb. Revised Conception
--
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Feelings of Worthlessness from the Perspective of
So-Called Cognitive Science
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/5476