Subject:     	 Re: Q. on Penrose arg: why new *physics*?
From:         	"Phil Roberts, Jr." 
Date:         	1997/08/04
Message:	33e64ff7

JRStern wrote:
> 
> On Mon, 04 Aug 1997 11:58:27 -0400, "Phil Roberts, Jr."
>  wrote:
> 
> >JRStern wrote:
> >> The physical science explanation is a possibility.  Penrose attempts
> >> to cut off all other possibilities with his Godelian arguments, which
> >> are invalid, inapplicable, and inappropriate, but make good cocktail
> >> chatter in certain circles.
> >
> >Oh yea.  And with the minor aside that there is now empirical evidence
> >to corroborate his position (feelings of worthlessness).
> 
> Surely you aren't serious?
> 


Yep!  And don't call me Shirley!

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 


 Rational Negativism:
A Divergent Theory of Emotional Disorder


Objective: To account for self-worth related
emotion (i.e., needs for love, acceptance, moral integrity, recognition,
achievement, etc.) and emotional disorder (e.g., depression, suicide,
etc.) within the context of an evolutionary scenario.

Observation: The species in which rationality
is most developed is also the One in which individuals have the
greatest difficulty in maintaining an adequate sense of self-
worth, often going to extraordinary lengths in doing so (e.g.,
Evel Knievel, celibate monks, self-endangering Greenpeacers, etc.).

Hypothesis: Rationality is antagonistic to psychocentric
stability (i.e., maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth).

Explanation: In much the manner reasoning allows
for the subordination of lower emotional concerns and values (pain,
fear, anger, sex, etc.) to more global concerns (i.e., concern
for the self as a whole), so too, these more global concerns and
values can themselves become reevaluated and subordinated to other
more global, more objective considerations. And if this is so,
and assuming that emotional disorder emanates from a deficiency
in self-worth resulting from precisely this sort of experiencially
based reevaluation, then it can reasonably be construed as a natural
malfunction resulting from One's rational faculties functioning
a tad too well.

Normalcy and Disorder: Assuming this is correct,
then some explanation for the relative "normalcy" of
most individuals would seem necessary. This is accomplished simply
by postulating different levels or degrees of consciousness. From
this perspective, emotional disorder can then be construed as
a valuative affliction resulting from an increase in semantic
content in the engram indexed by the linguistic expression, "I
am insignificant", which all persons of common sense "know"
to be true, but which the "emotionally disturbed" have
come to "realize", through abstract thought, devaluing
experience, etc.

Implications: So-called "free will"
and the incessant activity presumed to emanate from it is simply
the insatiable appetite we all have for self-significating experience
which, in turn, is simply nature's way of attempting to counter
the objectifying influences of our rational faculties. This also
implies that the engine in the first "free-thinking"
artifact is probably going to be a diesel.

Additional Implications: Since the explanation
I have proposed amounts to the contention that the most rational
species (presumably) is beginning to exhibit signs of transcending
the formalism of nature's fixed objective, it can reasonably be
construed as providing evidence and argumentation in support of
Lucas (1961). Not only does this imply that the aforementiOned
artifact probably won't be a computer, but it would also explain
why a question such as "Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally
Demonstrated?" (Cohen, 1981) has led to controversy, in that
it presupposes the possibility of an absolute answer to that which
can only be addressed in relative terms.


-- 

               Phil Roberts, Jr.

Feelings of Worthlessness from the Perspective 
     of So-Called Cognitive Science
  http://www.geocities.com/Athens/5476