World War II -- Statistics and overview
During the two decades before World War II, the Marine Corps began to develop the doctrine, equipment and organization needed for amphibious warfare. The success of this effort was proven throughout the Pacific during World War II. By the end of the war in 1945, the Marine Corps had grown to include six divisions, five air wings and supporting troops. The Marine Corps strength in World War II peaked at 475,604. The war cost the Marines nearly 87,000 dead and wounded.

Active Duty Marines

Marine Corps combat losses

Prisoners of War (POW) | 348

Wounded in Action (WIA) | 67,207

Killed in Action (KIA) | 19,733

Other deaths | 4,778

Medal of Honor recipients

USMC personnel received 81 of the 433 Medals of Honor awarded during World War II. Fifty-one of the medals were
awarded postumously.

1st Enlisted Marine Recipient: Sergeant Clyde Thomason, Makin Island raid, Aug. 17, 1942.

1st Marine Officer Recipient: 1st Lieutenant George Cannon, Midway Island, Dec. 7, 1941.

Battles
Wake Island -- Dec. 8-23, 1941
Bataan & Corregidor -- Dec. 8, 1941- May 6, 1942
Guadalcanal capture and defense -- Aug. 7, 1942-Feb. 8, 1943
Makin Island Raid -- Aug. 17-18, 1942
New Georgia Occupation June 20, to Aug. 31, 1943
*Tarawa Operation -- Nov. 20 to Nov 23, 1943
Cape Gloucester Operation -- Dec. 26, 1943 to March 1, 1944
Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls Occupation -- Jan. 31 to Feb. 8, 1944
Eniwetok Atoll Occupation Feb. 17 to March 2, 1944
Saipan Capture and Occupation -- June 15 to Aug. 10, 1944
Guam Capture and Occupation -- July 21 to Aug. 15, 1944
Tinian Capture and Occupation -- July 24 to Aug. Aug. 10, 1944
Peleliu Capture and Occupation -- Sept. 15 to Oct. 14, 1944
Leyte Landings (Philippines) Oct. 20, 1944
*Iwo Jima Operation -- Feb. 19 to March 16, 1945
Okinawa Capture and Occupation -- April 1 to June 21, 1945
--There were 1, 556 officers and 26, 369 enlisted in 1940; by 1945, 37,664 officers and 447,399 enlisted were in six Marine divisions.
-- From 1941-1945, nearly 20,000 Marines were killed in action or died of wounds; more than 67,000 were wounded in action.
-- 81 Marines would be awarded the Medal of Honor for their actions in WWII.
-- 18 June, 1945 -- Gen. Roy S. Geiger became commanding general, 10th Army; on Okinawa; first time a Marine would command a field army
Battle for Iwo Jima

"The battle of Iwo Island has been won. The United States Marines by their individual and collective courage have conquered a base which is as necessary to us in our continuing forward movement toward final victory as it was vital to the enemy in staving off ultimate defeat.
   "By their victory, the 3rd, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions and other units of the Fifth Amphibious Corps have made an accounting to their country which only history will be able to value fully. Among the American who served on Iwo Island, uncommon valor was a common virtue."
--Admiral Chester W. Nimitz
   Iwo Jima, which means sulfur island, was strategically important as an air base for fighter escorts supporting long-range bombing missions against mainland Japan. Because of the distance between mainland Japan and U.S. bases in the Mariana Islands, the capture of Iwo Jima would provide an emergency landing strip for crippled B-29s returning from bombing runs.
The seizure of Iwo would allow for sea and air blockades, the ability to conduct intensive air bombardment and to destroy the enemy's air and naval capabilities.
   The seizure of Iwo Jima was deemed necessary, but the prize would not come easy. The fighting that took place during the 36-day assault would be immortalized in the words of Commander, Pacific Fleet/Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who said, "Among the Americans who served on Iwo Island, uncommon valor was a common virtue."
   To the Japanese leadership, the capture of Iwo Jima meant the battle for Okinawa, and the invasion of Japan itself, was not far off .

Commanders

Commanders for the operation, code named Detachment, were assigned as follows:

--Admiral Raymond A. Spruance was the operation's overall commander.
--Joint Expeditionary Force commander was Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner. Second in command of the Joint Expeditionary Force was Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill.
--Lieutenant General Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith was assigned as the commanding general of expeditionary troops.
--The 54th Amphibious Corps was commanded by Major General Harry Schmidt. Under his command fell the 3rd Marine Division commander, Major General Graves B. Erskine; the 4th Marine Division commander, Major General Clifton B. Cates; and the 5th Marine Division commander, Major General Keller E. Rockey.

Bombardment

Initial carrier raids against Iwo Jima began in June 1944. Prior to the invasion, the 8-square-mile island would suffer the longest, most intensive shelling of any Pacific island during the war. The 7th Air Force, working out of the Marianas, supplied the B-24 heavy bombers for the campaign. In addition to the air assaults on Iwo, the Marines requested 10 days of pre-invasion naval bombardment. Due to other operational commitments and the fact that a prolonged air assault had been waged on Iwo Jima, Navy planners authorized only three days of naval bombardment. Unfavorable weather conditions would further hamper the effects of naval bombardment. Despite this, Turner decided to keep the invasion date as planned, and the Marines prepared for the Feb. 19 D-day.

D-day

    More than 450 ships massed off Iwo as the H-hour bombardment pounded the island. Shortly after 9 a.m., Marines of the 4th and 5th divisions hit beaches Green, Red, Yellow and Blue abreast, initially finding little enemy resistance. Coarse volcanic sand hampered the movement of men and machines as they struggled to move up the beach. As the protective naval gunfire subsided to allow for the Marine advance, the Japanese emerged form their fortified underground positions to begin a heavy barrage of fire against the invading force.
   The 4th Marine Division pushed forward against heavy opposition to take the Quarry, a Japanese strong point. The 5th Marine Division's 28th Marines had the mission of isolating Mount Suribachi. Both tasks were accomplished that day.

The Battle Continues

Feb. 20, one day after the landing, the 28th Marines secured the southern end of Iwo and moved to take the summit of Suribachi. By day's end, one third of the island and Motoyama Airfield No. 1 was controlled by the Marines. By Feb. 23, the 28th Marines would reach the top of Mount Suribachi and raise the U.S. flag.
   The 3rd Marine Division joined the fighting on the fifth day of the battle. These Marines immediately began the mission of securing the center sector of the island. Each division fought hard to gain ground against a determined Japanese defender. The  Japanese leaders knew with the fall of Suribachi and the capture of the airfields that the Marine advance on the island could not be stopped; however, they would make the Marines fight for every inch of land they won.
   Lieutenant General Tadamishi Kuribayashi, commander of the ground forces on Iwo Jima, concentrated his energies and his forces in the central and northern sections of the island. Miles of interlocking caves, concrete blockhouses and pillboxes proved to be one of the most impenetrable defenses encountered by the Marines in the Pacific.
   The Marines worked together to drive the enemy from the high ground. Their goal was to capture the area that appropriately became known as the "Meat Grinder." This section of the island included three distinct terrain features, which were the highest point on the northern portion of the island, Hill 382; an elevation known as "Turkey Knob," which had been reinforced with concrete and was home to a large enemy communications center; and the "Amphitheater," a southeastern extension of Hill 382.
   The 3rd Marine Division encountered the most heavily fortified portion of the island in their move to take Airfield No. 2. As with most of the fighting on Iwo Jima, frontal assault was the method used to gain each inch of ground. By nightfall on March 9, the 3rd division reached the island's northeastern beach, cutting the enemy defenses in two.
   On the left of the 3rd Marine Division, the 5th Marine Division pushed up the western coast of Iwo Jima from the central airfield to the island's northern tip. Moving to seize and hold the eastern portion of the island, the 4th Marine Division encountered a "mini banzai" attack from the final members of the Japanese Navy serving on Iwo. This attack resulted in the death of nearly 700 enemy and ended the centralized resistances of enemy forces in the 4th division's sector. The 4th division would join forces with the 3rd and 5th at the coast on March 10.
   A proud moment for those who worked so hard to gain control of the island was when the first emergency landing was made by a B-29 bomber on March 4. Repairs were made, refueling was completed and the aircraft was off to complete its mission.
   Operations entered the final phases March 11, enemy resistance was no longer centralized. Individual pockets of resistance were taken one by one.
   Finally on March 26, following a banzai attack against troops and air corps personnel near the beaches, the island was declared secure. The U.S. Army's 147th Infantry Regiment assumed ground control of the island on April 4, relieving the largest body of Marines committed in combat in one operation during World War II.

Campaign Results

The 36-day assault resulted in more than 26,000 American casualties, including 6,800 dead. Of the 20,000 Japanese defenders, only 1,083 survived. The Marines' efforts, however, provided a vital link in the U.S. chain of bomber bases. By war's end, 2,400 B-29 bombers carrying 27,000 crewman made unscheduled landings on the island.
   Historians described U.S. forces' attack against the Japanese defense as "throwing human flesh against reinforced concrete." In the end, Iwo Jima was won not only by the fighting spirit of the Marines, but by the meticulous planning and support provided by the Navy and Army through supply efforts, medical care, and air and naval gunfire.
   Twenty-seven Medals of Honor were awarded to Marines and sailors, many posthumously more than were awarded for any other single operation during the war.

Two flag-raisings

    At 8 a.m. on Feb. 23, a patrol of 40 men from 3rd Platoon, E Company, 2nd Battalion, 28th Marines, led by 1st Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, assembled at the base of Mount Suribachi. The platoon's mission was to take the crater of Suribachi's peak and raise the U.S. flag.
   The platoon slowly climbed the steep trails to the summit, but encountered no enemy fire. As they reached the top, the patrol members took positions around the crater watching for pockets of enemy resistance as other members of the patrol looked for something on which to raise the flag.
   At 10:20 a.m., the flag was hoisted on a steel pipe above the island by First Lieutenant Harold Schrier, platoon commander, Sergeant Ernest I. Thomas, platoon sergeant, Corporal Charles W. Lindberg, and Private First Class James R. Nicel. This symbol of victory sent a wave of strength to the battle-weary fighting men below, and struck a further mental blow against the island's defenders.

Campaign for Okinawa

By late October 1944, Okinawa, in the Ryukyu Island chain, had been targeted for invasion by Allied forces. Located strategically between Kyushu, the southernmost island of Japan, and Formosa, modern Taiwan, Okinawa was viewed as the base from which assault troops could stage and train for the attack on the Japanese mainland. The island had several Japanese air bases and the only two substantial harbors between Formosa and Kyushu.
   This invasion--code named Operation Iceberg,---would see the assembling of the greatest naval armada ever. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance's 5th fleet was to include more than 40 aircraft carriers, 18 battleships, 200 destroyers and hundreds of assorted support ships. Over 182,000 troops would make up the assault, planned for April 1, 1945, Easter Sunday.

American casualties would exceed 68,000. Of the nearly 16,000 servicemen killed the burden fell to the sea services: 8,343 dead Sailors, Coast Guardsmen and Marines, the highest toll in naval history.

Preparation
The four principal commanders were Admiral Spruance, Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher (Task Force 58), Vice
Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner (Task Force 51) and Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, U.S. Army,
(10th Army). Their battle plan envisioned a week of preliminary air strikes from the fast carriers and by B-29s
from the Mariana Islands, followed by eight days of naval bombardment preceding the landings.
   The invasion force would consist of Marine Major General Roy S. Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps with its three Marine divisions (the 1st, 2nd and 6th) and four infantry divisions of the 24th Army Corps (the 7th, 27th, 77th and 96th). Landings would take place over five miles of beaches on the west coast of southern Okinawa, the "Hagushi beaches," named after a village (actually named "Tosuchi") at the mouth of the Bishigawa River. The river was the boundary between the Marines' sector on the north and the Army's on the south. The location was chosen for its proximity to the Yontan and Kadena airfields, which needed to be captured quickly to help land-based planes fend off enemy air attacks. These forces would then spread out east and south to capture other territory. Northern Okinawa, the Motobu Peninsula and nearby le Shima island and airfield would be captured later.
   Japanese forces at Okinawa hoped to delay the final assault on Japan. Having lost most forward air bases and aircraft carriers, the Japanese high command planned to emphasize kamikaze, suicide-piloted aircraft attacks on Allied ships. A massed air attack by both kamikazes and conventional aircraft was planned as part of the defense.

Preliminaries
In mid-March, the American fleet of over 1,300 ships gathered off Okinawa for the naval bombardment On March 21, the first baka or piloted, suicide rocket bombs, were spotted below Japanese "Betty" bombers. Called oka ("cherry blossom') by the Japanese, these 2,700 pound bombs got their name baka ("screw-ball") from the sailors against whom they were directed. A baka attached to a bomber was released into a high-speed, suicidal dive toward a ship. At the last moment, the pilot pulled out of the dive and glided into the target. While the baka did not prove very effective in the over-all Okinawan campaign as the Japanese had so few of them, with their small size and speed they were nearly impossible to defend against.
   On March 22, Rear Admiral Alexander Sharp's Mine craft Pacific Fleet composed of 122 mine craft, patrol, and associated craft began mine sweeping operations off the Kerama Islands. The importance of their task was explained in their slogan: "No Sweep, No Invasion." Continuing night and day until the invasion began on April 1, Sharp's operation swept 2,500 square miles of ocean, and discovered and destroyed six enemy minefields and 184 mines. These mine craft, mine sweepers and mine layers accounted for more than 15 percent of all naval casualties during Iceberg.

Radar picket duty

Radar picket duty off the shore of Okinawa by destroyers and other vessels was one of the most dangerous duties. Radar picket ships lost their main defense, their mobility, as they were alone and forced to main at fixed stations to warn of approaching enemy aircraft and to direct carrier airplanes to intercept as many as possible. Despite the bravery of these ships, losses were suffered even before the initial landings.
   The first kamikaze attacks of the Okinawan campaign began on March 18, 1945. On March 19, while operating close to the Japanese home islands, the aircraft carrier Wasp was hit by a kamikaze which resulted in explosions and fires that killed 101 and wounded 269 crewmen. Yet within 15 minutes, fires were put out and the remaining crew began recovering airplanes.
Also hit was the carrier Franklin. Coming, to her aid, the cruiser Santa Fe hung in alongside the burning carrier throughout the afternoon, despite exploding ammunition, to rescue those who jumped from the fire and heat. Damage to the Franklin's flight deck was extensive, yet the ship got underway within hours and was able to return to New York under her own power.
Casualties were 724 killed or missing and 265 wounded. Two Medals of Honor were awarded for heroism aboard the carrier.
Lieutenant Junior Grade Donald A. Gary, was awarded the Medal of Honor for leading two sailors below decks to wet down a 5-inch gun that threatened to explode and on finding 300 men trapped in a dark compartment, led them to safety on three consecutive trips.
The Franklin's second Medal of Honor winner, Lieutenant Commander Joseph T. O'Callaban, ship's chaplain, was awarded his medal for directing, fire fighting efforts while administering last rites to the injured. In 1947, President Harry S. Truman presented O'Callahan with the award, the first chaplain so honored.

The Invasion

The Kerama Islands were occupied between March 25-28 for fueling, and ammunition replenishment and as a
seaplane base. Meanwhile, U.S. forces offshore the island of Okinawa had no inkling that the beaches had been left intentionally undefended and that the approximately 100,000 Japanese troops were, dug in, in caves, cement tombs, and fortifications, and well protected from the pre-invasion bombardment.
   After Naval Underwater Demolition Teams 12, 13 and 19 had reconnoitered the Hagushi beaches on Good Friday, March 30, the amphibious assault of Okinawa began at 8:30 a.m., Easter Sunday, April 1, 1945. By 4:00 pm, the beachhead was secured. Over 50,000 troops had been put ashore and were ready to advance, Marines to the north and west and soldiers to the south. The question was, "Where are the Japanese?" The troops were to learn that the bulk of the Japanese were positioned in heavily d above the surrounding territory. However, Marines attacking the Mobotu Peninsula, northwest of the invasion beaches, had met stiff resistance.
   On April 6-7, the first use of massed formations of hundreds of kamikaze aircraft called kikusui, or "floating chrysanthemum," for the imperial symbol of Japan, began. By the end of the Okinawan campaign, 1,465 kamikaze flights were flown from Kyushu to sink 30 American ships and damage 164 others, not including smaller attacks near Kyushu and Formosa.
   Ie Shinia, an island off Mobutu, was invaded on April 16, after three days of naval and aerial bombardment and beach reconnaissance by Underwater Demolition Teams. The Army's 77th Division landed on April 21. In fierce fighting over five days, this small island and airfield were won, but with the loss of 172 American servicemen killed and 902 wounded. Among the fatally wounded was well known combat correspondent Ernie Pyle, hit by machine gun fire on April 18. He was buried on the island.
   On May 1, Marines of the 3rd Amphibious Corps who had overrun the Mobotu Peninsula were transferred to the southern part of the island, where the Army's 24th Corps faced stubborn resistance from strong defensive positions. By April 8, the U.S. forces were stopped cold at the first Japanese defense line by pillboxes with steel doors impervious to flame-throwers.
Casualties were heavy. Reinforcements were landed on April 9, and American troops now numbered 160,000 ashore.

Capturing Shuri

All attention focused now on capturing Shuri Castle, the key defensive position for Japanese resistance. The castle was located in the southern one-third of Okinawa on a high point midway between the eastern and western beaches. Strongly prepared defensive positions with interlocking fields of fire and interconnected tunnels proved extremely difficult and costly to overrun.
Thrown against these fortifications was the firepower of six battleships, six cruisers, nine destroyers, and 650 Navy and Marine aircraft in addition to the Marines and soldiers on the ground.

Commanded by Rear Admiral Morton L.Deyo, Task Force 54 included his flagship, the Tennessee, and battleships Nevada, New York, Texas and Arkansas.. This fire support group and other naval vessels delivered fire and illumination at night for shore parties which proved very effective. Task Force 54 supported the ground troops and complemented the artillery from the first day of combat until late May when action moved to the extreme tip of the island, and the danger of shelling U.S. troops precluded it. Indeed, naval gunfire was employed longer and in greater quantities in the battle of Okinawa than in any other in history; while carrier air support covered for the amphibious forces until land-based planes could take over. Carrier air was responsible for shooting down more enemy planes than anti-aircraft fire during the battle.

The Japanese defense line was finally broken on April 28. Attacking the two flanks of the Japanese forces, Buckner's troops fought fiercely against the enemy. By May 21, the Japanese had withdrawn to the southern tip of the island. The 10th Army occupied the capital, Naha, on May 27. On May 29, Japanese troops began withdrawing from Shuri. Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines captured the remains of Shuri Castle.

Now, Marines made an amphibious assault southeast of the capital, while Buckner's 10th Army moved on the enemy's position at Mabuni, an escarpment located on the southern tip of the island. Its natural and made caves proved nearly impenetrable for any but Buckner's "blow torch and corkscrew" method of fighting, employing flame-throwers and high explosives to force a way into the enemy's defensive positions. In the end, it took hand-to-hand combat, aerial bombardment and tanks with flame-throwers to capture the entrenched and fiercely defiant Japanese force.

Okinawa Secured Buckner was hit and killed by a coral fragment thrown up by a Japanese artillery shell fire on June 18. Geiger assumed temporary command of 10th Army until relieved five days later by Army Lieutenant General Joseph A. Stilwell.
On June 19, the Japanese commander ordered all remaining defenders to fight to the death. On the 21st, the 10th Army pushed through to the southernmost point on Okinawa. Ushijimi and his chief of staff committed hari kari, ritual suicide, rather than accept defeat. Geiger announced the island secured and a formal flag-raising ceremony took place on June 22. The 82-day Okinawan campaign was officially declared over on July 2.

Thus ended the campaign to capture Okinawa, which now became a giant air and naval base destined to play a major role in the planned invasion of Japan. British observers spoke of the Battle for Okinawa as "... the most audacious and complex enterprise ... yet undertaken by the American Amphibious Forces... more ships were used, more troops put ashore, more supplies transported, more bombs dropped, more naval guns fired against shore targets" than any other operation in the Pacific. But not without a severe price for both sides. Thirty-four allied ships and craft of all types had been sunk, mostly by kamikazes, and 368 ships and craft damaged. The fleet had lost 763 aircraft. Over 4,900 sailors and 3,443 Marines were killed or missing in action and 4,824 Sailors and 16,017 Marines were wounded, making this the naval services' most costly campaign of World War II. Army casualties were 7,613 killed or missing and 31,807 wounded or injured. There were also more than 26,000 non-battle casualties. Japanese losses were enormous: 107,539 killed and 23,764 sealed in caves or buried by the Japanese themselves; 10,755 captured or surrendered. On both sides, nearly 170,000 died, over half were civilians.
The Japanese lost 7,830 aircraft and 16 combat ships.

The End of Yamato
The Japanese battleship, Yamato, the largest warship ever built accompanied by the light cruiser Yahagi and eight destroyers, was dispatched to Okinawa on April 6, 1945, with no protective air cover. So badly depleted was the Japanese fleet by this time, Yamato was reported to carry only enough fuel for a one-way trip to Okinawa. Her mission: beach herself at Okinawa and fight until eliminated.

The American submarine Hackleback tracked her movements and alerted carrier-based bombers. Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher launched air strikes on April 7 at 10 a.m. The first hits on Yamato were claimed by the carrier Bennington. San Jacinto planes sunk the destroyer Hamakaze, with a bomb and torpedo hit. The light cruiser Yahagi was hit by bombs and went dead in the water.

Marines in the Atlantic, Europe and Africa

    Overshadowed in history by Marines who fought World War II's Pacific island battles, fewer than 6,000 Marines participated in the Atlantic, North African and European campaigns.
   Before World War II, Marines served in various European and North African embassies as attaches. However, that role changed with the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and the Axis powers in 1941.
   The first Marine unit of combat troops to serve on land in the Atlantic theater was the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade. More than 4,000 Marines commanded by Brigadier General John Marston arrived in Reykjavik, Iceland, in July 1941. The Marines augmented the British forces already in place to prevent Iceland from falling to the Germans. Iceland was strategically located for air and naval control of the North Atlantic lifeline between the British Isles and North America.
   Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Marines assigned under Marston received orders to leave Iceland. They began departing on Jan. 31, 1942, and were completely gone by March 9, 1942.
   Masters of amphibious warfare tactics, Marines served as planners for the North African, Mediterranean and Normandy invasions. The brief and violent raid by a 6,000-man Canadian and British commando force on the French port city of Dieppe on Aug. 19, 1942, was planned in part by Marine Brigadier General Harold D. Campbell, the Marine Corps advisor to the British Staff of Combined Operations. He was awarded a Legion of Merit for his expertise in developing techniques for large-scale amphibious operations against heavily defended beaches.
    Marines trained four Army infantry divisions in assault from the sea tactics prior to the North African landings. Leading the way during Operation Torch, the November 1942 North African invasion, Marines went ashore at Arzeu, Algeria, and moved overland to the port of Oran, where they occupied the strategic Spanish fortress at the northern tip of the harbor.
Another Marine detachment aboard the cruiser USS Philadelphia landed Nov. 10, 1942, at the port of Safi, French Morocco, and secured the airport against sabotage until Army forces arrived the following day.
Nine months earlier, on Jan. 7, Brigadier General Lewis G. Merritt, a Marine Corps pilot serving as an observer with the Royal Air Force in Egypt, was aboard a Wellington bomber shot down by ground fire behind German lines in the Halfya Pass.
He and the crew were rescued by a special United Kingdom armored car unit that broke through enemy lines.
   Assigned to the secretive world of spies and saboteurs were 51 Marines who served with the U.S. Office of Strategic Services to engage in behind-the-lines operations in North Africa and Europe from 1941 to 1945. These OSS Marines served with partisan and resistance groups in France, Germany, Yugoslavia, Italy, Austria, Albania, Greece, Morocco and Egypt; on the islands of Corsica and Sardinia; in Rumania; and in North and West Africa. Ten of these OSS Marines also served with forces in Ceylon, Burma, Malaya and China.
   Marine Colonel Peter J. Ortiz was twice awarded the Navy Cross for heroism while serving with the French Resistance.
Shipboard detachments of Marines served throughout the landings in North Africa, the Mediterranean and the Normandy invasion as gun crews aboard battleships and cruisers. A 200-man detachment was normally carried aboard a battleship, and 80 Marines served aboard cruisers to man the secondary batteries of 5-inch guns providing fire for the landing forces.
   During the June 6, 1944, Normandy invasion, Marines, renowned as expert riflemen, played a vital role reminiscent of the days of the sailing Navy when sharpshooters were sent to the fighting tops. Stationed high in the superstructures of the invasion fleet, Marine riflemen exploded floating mines in the path of the ships moving across the English Channel to the beaches of Normandy.
On Aug. 29, 1944, during the invasion of southern France, Marines from the battleship USS Augusta and the cruiser USS Philadelphia went ashore in Marseilles harbor to accept the surrender of more than 700 Germans who had fortified island garrisons.
   Although few, these proud Marines played a vital role in the Atlantic, African and European campaigns of World War II.

Marines in the Mariana Islands

    In June 1944, the U.S. Navy opened the greatest simultaneous naval expeditions ever attempted. In that month, with Great Britain bearing the greatest share in Europe, the United States mounted Operation Overlord, the invasion of France, and Operation Forager, the invasion of Saipan, Tinian and Guam in the Mariana Islands.
   While Overlord was much the larger campaign, the Marianas posed challenges that were new to the Pacific theater. The island chain's distance from supply bases stretched the Navy's capability to transport and supply an invasion force. The Navy's logistical planners and fleet service force proved both innovative and successful in bringing material forward.
    Once delivered to the theater of operations, men and material faced rugged terrain including cliffs, swamps and mountains honeycombed with caves. These caves offered better protection to the Japanese defenders than they had been able to construct for themselves on sites such as Tarawa.
   Planners deemed the Marianas important because the Army Air Corps needed bases from which its long-range bombers could make non-stop strikes on Japan. Additionally, the Navy wanted Saipan and Guam developed as advance bases, and hoped a Marianas operation would draw out the Japanese Combined Fleet so it could be engaged in a decisive battle. (This hope was realized in the Battle of the Philippine Sea.) The idea of freeing the population of Guam from Japanese occupation (the Japanese had taken Guam, a U.S. territory, just two days after Pearl Harbor) also had great political and psychological appeal.

The Attack Force
The scope of the Marianas operation required a much larger force than any previous Central Pacific amphibious operation.
Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, veteran of Guadalcanal, Tarawa and the Marshall Islands, commanded the approximately 800 ships and 162,000 men of the Marianas Joint Expeditionary Force. Turner also led the Northern Attack Force, designated for Saipan and Tinian. Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly commanded the Southern Attack Force, designated for Guam.

Two amphibious corps had responsibility for the action on land. The V Amphibious Corps under Marine Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith was assigned to take Saipan and Tinian. This corps was made up of the 2nd and 4th Marine divisions, reinforced by the Army's 27th Infantry Division in reserve. The III Amphibious Corps under Marine Major General Roy S. Geiger consisted of the 3rd Marine Division, the First Provisional Marine Brigade and the Army's 77th Infantry Division in reserve. It was assigned to Guam.

Saipan
D-Day for Saipan, headquarters of Japan's Central Pacific Fleet, was June 15, 1944. The island's Japanese defenders numbered almost 30,000. While the Navy landed 8,000 Marines from the 2nd and 4th divisions in the first 20 minutes of the assault, Japanese shoreline defenses kept the invasion force fighting for three days to protect the beachhead.
   Naval bombardment on the first day was insufficient, although it improved to the point that one Japanese officer credited it as the single greatest factor in the American victory. Four battleships, five cruisers and 39 destroyers provided on-call fire, with destroyers taking out enemy gun positions and the larger ships assigned to saturation bombardment. Gunboats, converted infantry landing craft, were especially effective against the caves because their shallow draft allowed them to move in close to shore. Illumination from Navy-launched star shells helped the Marines protect their lines at night.
   Saipan's mountainous terrain made seizure of the approximately 14-mile-long by 6-mile-wide island an arduous process for the Marines and the 27th Infantry Division. Prolonged hand-to-hand combat characterized the campaign. In addition to the fierce enemy resistance and the logistical problems caused by the sheer size of the U.S. force, the mix of unfamiliar Army and Marine units made coordinating their movements difficult.
   From their original beachheads on the island's southwest coast, it took the 4th Division Marines until July 9 to reach Marpi Point at Saipan's northern tip. There, the remaining defenders and a number of Japanese civilians jumped from the high cliffs rather than surrender; estimates of the total number of civilians who killed themselves on Saipan run as high as 22,000. All but a thousand of the Japanese defenders died in battle or by their own hands. U.S. casualties on Saipan were 16,612; 13,000 were Marines. Due to the difficulties on Saipan, the invasion of Guam, scheduled for June 18, was postponed until late July.

Tinian
Three miles to the south of Saipan, Tinian offered the best site in the Marianas for the extra-long runways required by the B-29 Superfortress. The island was defended by about 9,000 Japanese troops, who were well prepared to fight at the shore of the only beach suitable for an amphibious landing, Tinian (Sunharon) Harbor along the southwest coast of the island. In the hope of achieving tactical surprise, expeditionary force commander Turner decided to attempt landings on two tiny beaches at the northwest tip, where the coral cliffs were relatively low and defenses were minimal. The narrowness of the beaches made rapid movement of supplies off the beach a necessity, or the landing would quickly back up. This was accomplished with ingenuity in ship-to-shore and shore party procedures.
   Tinian underwent over 40 days of preliminary naval gunfire and bombing from the air. The Army Air Corps tested napalm bombs, attempting to work out the mix of napalm powder with gasoline or oil. Shore fire-control was improved because fire-control parties spent time working out procedures on board the gunfire ships designated to support the landing.
   On D-Day, July 24, the 4th Marine Division crossed the narrow channel from Saipan, making the initial foray. The 2nd Division provided a convincing diversion off the southwest coast of the island. Shore-based artillery and naval bombardment gave plentiful support to the troops, as did Saipan-based Marine and Army aircraft. Opposition to the landing was not strong, and by the time the Japanese gathered in force to counterattack, the Marines were firmly established. Several counterattacks came during the first night, in which the Japanese lost more than 1,200 men. On the second day of the invasion, the 2nd Marine Division came ashore and joined the 4th, sweeping to the south and pressing the defenders back.
   By August 1, all organized resistance had ceased. The scene in the southern part of the island was a smaller-scale repetition of that on Saipan. Japanese civilians killed themselves by jumping off the cliffs, although more than 13,000 civilians were captured and put in stockades. Marine casualties included 290 killed, 1,515 wounded and 24 missing. After the island was secure, 6,050 Japanese fighting men were counted as killed, and some 500 more died in mop-up operations. The fate of the remaining Japanese force is unknown: they are presumed to have died in caves or escaped in small boats.

Guam
Terrain on Guam, which measured approximately 28 miles long by 4 to 8 miles wide, was similar to that of Saipan. There were about 19,000 fighting men on the island, who, with the five-week delay in the invasion, had the opportunity to construct formidable underwater defenses. The defenders received concentrated bombardment from American air and naval forces, including a 13-day continuous naval bombardment, the most prolonged of the war.
   The invasion force's objective was to quickly take Apra Harbor on the west coast and the Orote Peninsula bounding it to thesouth. The 3rd Division would go in to the north of the harbor, on what were called the Asan beaches. The 1st Provisional Brigade would land about five miles to the south, just below the Orote Peninsula.
   After beach reconnaissance and obstacle clearance by Navy "frogmen" (Underwater Demolition Teams), 20,000 3rd Division Marines landed July 21 on the Asan beaches. The Japanese held the high ground overlooking the landing area, and the Marines took casualties as a result. They fought back with artillery that allowed them to hit the hidden sides of the hills, and were supported by air-spotted naval gunfire. After defeating a Japanese counterattack at dawn July 22, they began pushing up the hills surrounding the beach, clearing caves and ravines of defending Japanese. The most serious counterattack came July 25 and 26, but the Japanese were thrown back with a loss of 3,500 men. By July 28, the Marines had completed the assault
phase in the north.
   On July 21, the 1st Provisional Brigade faced opposition in the form of mortar and artillery fire, beginning at the reef and continuing on the beaches. Unloading did not go smoothly, and ammunition and fuel were in short supply. Despite these difficulties, the Marines reached their initial objectives by afternoon, and were reinforced by GIs from the 77th Infantry Division. The combined force pushed the enemy to Orote Point by July 25, and the U.S. flag went up on the point July 29. On Aug. 12, the last Japanese command post was overrun by units from the 77th Infantry Division, putting an end to organized resistance on Guam.
   Of the 30,214 Marine participants, 1,082 were killed, 125 were missing and 4,852 were wounded. Of the 17,958 men of the 77th Infantry Division, casualties were 193 killed, 20 missing and 704 wounded. More than 17,000 Japanese were killed.

Marines in the Marshall Islands

With the Marshall Islands campaign of late 1944, the Marine Corps 4th Division and the Armys 7th Infantry Division moved into Japanese territory for the first time in World War II. The islands, under Japanese control since World War I, offered U.S. forces bases for reconnaissance, combat staging and logistics. They were the next step in the Allied march to the Japanese home islands.

The Commanders
Once planners chose Kwajalein and Majuro atolls as the targets of Operation Flintlock, as the campaign was code named, forces were assigned as follows:

* Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly commanded the Northern Task Force, responsible for landing troops under Marine Major General Harry Schmidt. These troops were from the Marine 4th Division. Their objectives were Roi and Namur islands in northern Kwajalein Atoll.
* Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner commanded the Southern Task Force, responsible for landing troops under Army Major General Charles H. Corlett. These troops were from the Armys 7th Infantry Division and its attached units. Their objective was Kwajalein Island in the southern Kwajalein Atoll.
* Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill commanded the Majuro Attack Force, responsible for landing troops under Army Lieutenant Colonel Frederick B. Sheldon. The V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company was assigned to pinpoint location of the enemy throughout the atoll; the Armys 2nd Battalion, 106th Infantry Regiment, 27th Division would serve as the main assault force.

D-Day
D-Day in the Marshalls was set for Jan. 31, 1944. On that day, Marines in northern Kwajalein Atoll planned to seize five islands in the vicinity of Roi-Namur, while the 7th Infantry Division hoped to capture four islets near Kwajalein Island. The Majuro Attack Force also targeted four small islands for takeover. All were tactically necessary to the main objectives, scheduled for assault Feb. 1.

Combined Navy, Marine and Army forces successfully accomplished all of these missions on D-Day.

Roi-Namur
The islands of Roi and Namur, linked by a short causeway, are so close that they counted as a single target. Roi-Namur was the primary Japanese air base in the Marshalls.
   Although many ships of the Northern Task Force were combat veterans, neither the troop transport drivers nor the 4th Marine Division, newly created in August 1943, had combat experience. Additionally, participants in the assault had not been able to rehearse as a unit. This combination of factors made for confusion in the launching of the assault.
Three days of naval bombardment and air strikes preceded the 4th Marine Division to Roi-Namur. On Feb. 1, ships responsible for fire support and bombardment moved in to extremely close range, maximizing their effectiveness, killing a significant number of defenders, and earning Conolly the nickname Close-in, along with the gratitude of the troops, who were able to come into the beaches standing up. Navy ships and pilots dropped approximately 6,000 tons of heavy explosives before the Marines landed on Roi-Namur.

Once on the beach, the troops assigned to Roi (the Marine 23rd Regimental Combat Team) advanced rapidly. The Japanese resisted strongly near the airfields runways, but by late afternoon on Feb. 1 equipment was being landed to repair the airfield for American use. Roi was secured the same day.
   Capturing Namur, the job of the Marine 24th Regimental Combat Team, proved more difficult. Over half of the assigned transport craft could not be located when it was time to launch the assault. As a result, the timing of the assault waves was off, and units went in piecemeal. Next, the leading waves were halted by tracked landing vehicles that had stopped in the water, throwing everything behind them into confusion. These problems in the water caused a mixup on the beach. Fortunately, the enemy chose not to fight at the waters edge, so the Marines could regroup.
   Once ashore, the Marines advanced rapidly; at nightfall, only the north shore of the island remained to be captured. The Marines established a defensive perimeter, which the Japanese attacked several times during the night. Fire discipline among the relatively untried troops was not good, and this, rather than the Japanese attacks, posed the greatest danger to the front line. In the morning, the Marines resumed their advance, and by early afternoon they had taken Namur.
    In the seizure of Roi-Namur, Marine 4th Division casualties were 313 killed and 502 wounded. They defeated an estimated 3,563 Japanese garrison forces, taking only about 90 prisoners.

Kwajalein Island
Kwajalein Island was the primary Japanese naval base in the Marshalls.
   Two factors combined to make the Feb. 1 landing on Kwajalein among the most perfectly executed of the Pacific theater. First, the 7th Infantry Division trained superbly before it left Hawaii. Second, task force commander Turner was determined that Navy preliminary bombardment, primarily surface, would deliver a thorough pounding to the islands defenders. Turner and his heavy cruisers, battleships and destroyers delivered throughout the engagement, as did Army artillerymen.
Four days of struggle were required to subdue the Japanese, but the veterans of Attu and Kiska succeeded. Just after 7 p.m. on the fourth day, Corlett, the Army commander, radioed Turner that the island was secure.
   In the seizure of Kwajalein Island and its surrounding islets, Army casualties included 173 killed and 793 wounded in overcoming an estimated 4,823 Japanese garrison troops. Of these, most were killed in combat or committed suicide; approximately 174 were taken prisoner.

Majuro Atoll
The capture of Majuro, intended for use as an air and naval base, occurred without loss of American lives. Early intelligence reports proved erroneous; when Marines from the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company landed on Jan. 31, they found no Japanese on any of the islands slated for preliminary attack. The night of Jan. 31, a Marine platoon landed on Majuro Island itself. All but one Japanese had escaped. The 2nd Battalion, 106th Infantry Regiment did not land on Majuro until Feb. 1; then, with an influx of garrison troops, it began converting Majuro into a U.S. air and naval base.

Eniwetok
The speed with which Kwajalein Atoll fell allowed Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, to move up the timetable for the seizure of Eniwetok Atoll, code named Operation Catchpole.
   Catchpole came under the overall command of Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill. The V Amphibious Corps reserve, made up of the 22nd Marine Regiment (reinforced) under Marine Colonel John T. Walker and the 106th Infantry Regiment(reinforced) under Army Colonel Russell G. Ayers, provided the ground forces.
On Feb. 18, 1944, the Marines landed on Engebi Island, supported by naval gunfire and by shore-based artillery placed the day before on three adjacent islets. Engebi, which contained the atolls airfield, was secured that day.
On Feb. 19, the 106th Infantry faced a tougher situation on Eniwetok Island, but after two days of fighting and help from the 22nd Marines 3rd Battalion, Eniwetok, too, was taken. The 22nd Marines also seized Parry on Feb. 21, closing the action in the Eniwetok Atoll.
In Operation Catchpole, Marine casualties were 254 killed, 555 wounded; Army casualties were 94 killed and 311 wounded.
About 3,400 Japanese died and 66 were taken prisoner. U.S. forces bypassed four remaining Japanese bases in the Marshalls (Jaluit, Maleolap, Mille and Wotje), cutting them off from reinforcement. After the war, it was learned that of approximately 13,700 Japanese left at these bases, 7,440 died from bombing, disease or starvation.

Campaign Results
The capture of the Marshall Islands moved American reconnaissance and land-based strike aircraft within range of the both the Carolines and the Marianas, and opened new bases for the U.S. Navy. It caused the Japanese navy to evacuate Truk Island in the Carolines, which was the bastion of Japanese air and naval power in the Central Pacific.
The rapid victories in the Marshalls added momentum to the Central Pacific drive. The low number of casualties$under 3,000 combined for Marines and Army$shows that the lessons the Marine 2nd Division paid such a high price for at Tarawa were put to good use. Surface and air bombardment and naval gunnery improved in strength and accuracy. Tactics against heavily defended atolls changed and improved. The Marshalls assault forces had more and better transportation to the beach as well.

   Navajo Code Talkers
Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Peleliu, Iwo Jima: the Navajo code talkers took part in every assault the U.S. Marines conducted in the Pacific from 1942 to 1945. They served in all six Marine divisions, Marine Raider battalions and Marine parachute units, transmitting messages by telephone and radio in their native language--a code that the Japanese never broke.
   The idea to use Navajo for secure communications came from Philip Johnston, the son of a missionary to the Navajos and one of the few non-Navajos who spoke their language fluently. Johnston, reared on the Navajo reservation, was a World War I veteran who knew of the military's search for a code that would withstand all attempts to decipher it. He also knew that Native American languages--notably Choctaw--had been used in World War I to encode messages.
   Johnston believed Navajo answered the military requirement for an undecipherable code because Navajo is an unwritten language of extreme complexity. Its syntax and tonal qualities, not to mention dialects, make it unintelligible to anyone without extensive exposure and training. It has no alphabet or symbols, and is spoken only on the Navajo lands of the American Southwest. One estimate indicates that less than 30 non-Navajos, none of them Japanese, could understand the language at the outbreak of World War II.
   Early in 1942, Johnston met with Major General Clayton B. Vogel, the commanding general of Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, and his staff to convince them of the Navajo languages value as a code. Johnston staged tests under simulated combat conditions, demonstrating that Navajos could encode, transmit and decode a three-line message in English in 20 seconds.
Machines of the time required 30 minutes to perform the same job. Convinced, Vogel recommended to the Commandant of the Marine Corps that the Marines recruit 200 Navajos.
In May 1942, the first 29 Navajo recruits attended boot camp. Then, at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California, this first group created the Navajo code. They developed a dictionary and numerous words for military terms. The dictionary and all code words had to be memorized during training.
   Once a Navajo code talker completed his training, he was sent to a Marine unit deployed in the Pacific theater. The code talkers primary job was to talk, transmitting information on tactics and troop movements, orders and other vital battlefield communications over telephones and radios. They also acted as messengers, and performed general Marine duties.
Praise for their skill, speed and accuracy accrued throughout the war. At Iwo Jima, Major Howard Connor, 5th Marine Division signal officer, declared, "Were it not for the Navajos, the Marines would never have taken Iwo Jima." Connor had six Navajo code talkers working around the clock during the first two days of the battle. Those six sent and received over 800 messages, all without error.
The Japanese, who were skilled code breakers, remained baffled by the Navajo language. The Japanese chief of intelligence, Lieutenant General Seizo Arisue, said that while they were able to decipher the codes used by the U.S. Army and Army Air Corps, they never cracked the code used by the Marines. The Navajo code talkers even stymied a Navajo soldier taken prisoner at Bataan. (About 20 Navajos served in the U.S. Army in the Philippines.) The Navajo soldier, forced to listen to the jumbled words of talker transmissions, said to a code talker after the war, "I never figured out what you guys who got me into all that trouble were saying."

In 1942, there were about 50,000 Navajo tribe members. As of 1945, about 540 Navajos served as Marines. From 375 to 420 of those trained as code talkers; the rest served in other capacities.

Navajo remained potentially valuable as code even after the war. For that reason, the code talkers, whose skill and courage saved both American lives and military engagements, only recently earned recognition from the government and the public.

The Battle for Tarawa

In 1943, U.S. forces advanced through the Central Pacific, continuing the offensive thrust aimed ultimately at the
Japanese home islands. The plan of attack called for them to take the Gilbert Islands, then the Marshalls and the Marianas.
   For Operation Galvanic, the seizure of the Gilberts, the 5th Amphibious Corps under Marine Major General Holland M. (Howlin Mad) Smith was chosen as the landing force. The corps consisted of the 2nd Marine Division under Major General Julian C. Smith and the Armys 27th Infantry Division, led by Major General Ralph C. Smith. The 2nd Marine Division would take Tarawa, and the 27th Infantry Division would take Makin Atoll, 100 miles north of Tarawa on a line to the Marshalls.
   The Gilberts were a vital first step in the Central Pacific campaign. Without them, land-based reconnaissance and combat planes could not reach the Marshalls. Carrier-based planes, which had the reach, could not provide the integrated photo reconnaissance necessary for planning the Marshalls operation. The Gilberts also offered Japanese-constructed airstrips and a shortened supply route to the south and southwest areas of the Pacific.
   Tarawa Atoll, specifically Betio Island, was selected as the target of the main assault because it contained an airfield and the bulk of the Japanese defenses. The atoll, at no point higher than 10 feet above sea level, is a triangular string of long, narrow coral islands with Betio at the southwest corner. Surrounded by a barrier reef, Betio presented a serious challenge to amphibious landing craft, which would hang up on the reef if there wasnt a sufficient depth of tide to allow them to cross.
   Once across the reef, the 2nd Division Marines assigned to Betio, which measured roughly 3 miles wide and 600 yards deep, would face formidable defenses. According to naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison, the water around the island was rife with mines, barbed wire and barricades designed to divert landing craft into lanes that were heavily covered by artillery.
   The Japanese had hundreds of guns, among them a system of heavy machine guns protected by coconut logs, sand, concrete and armored plate; 14 coast defense guns, all with underground ammunition storage and fire control systems; 25 37-mm and 75-mm field guns in shelters that were immune to direct hits from all but the largest guns; and an unknown number of antiaircraft guns.
   Japanese defenders on Betio also had built a system of bomb-proof shelters made of coconut logs braced with angle irons.
The roofs of these shelters were at least 6 feet thick and covered over with sand, logs and corrugated iron. Only heavy-caliber armor-piercing or other delayed-action shells could penetrate them. These shelters were also compartmented, so that the defenders enjoyed protection from grenades and explosives hurled through the openings. Altogether, the Japanese occupied 500 pillboxes, bunk-ers and other strong points on the small island. In the words of U.S. Army historians, Tarawa was the most heavily defended atoll that would ever be invaded by Allied forces in the Pacific.
  

Preliminary Attacks

Planners of Operation Galvanic wanted to take Betio quickly, before the Japanese could bring what were believed to be powerful submarine and air forces into the arena. To preserve strategic surprise, they ruled out concentrated air and naval bombardment until immediately before the assault.
   On Nov. 17-18, planes and ships from the Navys Southern Carrier Group bombed islands throughout the Gilberts to keep the enemy confused about where the assault would come. While these raids took out some of Betios guns, their most significant benefit was that they caused the Japanese to shoot off ammunition. On Nov. 20, Betios defenders had only 4,800 rounds of 75-mm and 127-mm antiaircraft ammunition, and 15,000 rounds of 13-mm machine gun bullets.

D-Day

The Marines landed Nov. 20, 1943, on Betios northwest shore. The 2nd Marine Division came up with the innovative idea of using logistical support amphibian tractors (LVTs) as assault craft. LVTs would be effective in crossing the islands fringing reef and man-made obstacles.
Unfortunately, there were enough LVTs only for the first three assault waves. After that, unless the tide was right, the Marines would have trouble getting the remaining waves across the reef in Higgins boats (LCVPs), which had a draft of 3-1/2 feet.
   Betios northwest shore was divided into Red Beach 1, 2 and 3, respectively, from west to east. A 500-yard pier marked the boundary between Red Beach 2 and Red 3 and extended north into the lagoon just beyond the fringing reef. The short western side of the island was designated as Green Beach. The Marines hoped to land a three-battalion front on the Red beaches, sweep across the island (a total distance of about 600 yards), capture the airfield and pin the enemy down on the islands west end.
   Sustained naval bombardment and carrier-based bomber strikes preceded the Marines. Timing and communications problems made these less effective than needed, but Japanese gunners were stopped long enough to allow the first three assault waves to reach the beach relatively unscathed.
The 2nd Scout-Sniper Platoon led by 1st Lieutenant William D. Hawkins landed first, winning the pier from enemy snipers.
Then, the first elements of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines came in on Red Beach 1. On the left of their beach, at the boundary with Red Beach 2, was a Japanese strong point that raked the Marines coming in on the west side of Red 1 with machine gun fire. Once landed, the Marines on Red 1 would take 35-50 percent casualties. Red 3 was the next beach reached, by the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines. Part of this group got as far inland as the airstrip before the Japanese recovered from naval bombardment. This group took only 25 casualties in landing.
   The most violently opposed landing was that of 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines on Red 2. Some of these troops were driven off course by machine gun and antiboat fire and forced to land on Red 1. The remainder, who reached Red 2, managed to carve out a beachhead only about 50 yards deep.
Once the first three assault waves were in, two waves of landing boats were set to follow. These carried additional troops, tanks and artillery. Unfortunately, the irregular tides in the Gilberts worked against the landing force, and there was not enough water depth over the reef for the landing boats to cross. Infantry and howitzer crews had to wade ashore with weapons and equipment.
   These men suffered the worst casualties of D-day. The only cover from Japanese machine gunners and riflemen was the pier; many did not reach it. Many of those who did were separated from their units and chain of command, and were unable to move to their proper beaches. At this point, the momentum of the assault bogged down because the reef effectively barred the landing boats, the number of amphtracs was being rapidly reduced, units were disorganized and communications were spotty. The fierce action on the beach did not stop for the Marines to regroup, establish command posts, move in supplies or carry out their wounded. In the words of one Marine history, only the grim determination of individual Marines, who simply kept coming, in spite of all the enemy could hurl at them, offset the confusion.
   By evening, the Marines situation was tenuous at best. Of about 5,000 men who had gone ashore, 1,500 were either killed or wounded. Marines held a perimeter about 700 yards wide and 300 yards deep at the base of the pier, and an area about 150 yards by 500 yards at the northwest tip of the island. Most believed that a Japanese counterattack was bound to come during the night. If it had, it may well have succeeded. Julian Smith said that the Japanese commander lost the battle of Tarawa that night by failing to attack. Historians say the Japanese counterattack did not come because Japanese communications had been severely damaged by naval gunfire.
At nightfall, Navy ships cruised offshore for protection against air and submarine attack. Throughout D-day, the destroyers  Ringgold, Dashiell, Frazier and Anderson had provided gunfire support on call to Marines ashore, a significant contribution to the course of the battle. Frazier continued this duty throughout the night.
   Bombing and strafing had gone on all day--32 strikes in all, launched from carriers and escort carriers. Navy medical corpsmen continued working throughout the night to ferry the wounded over the reef in rubber rafts, while Marines carried water, pack howitzers, ammunition and medical supplies ashore.
  

D Plus 1 Day

Early on the morning of Nov. 21, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, who had spent almost 20 hours in boats waiting to land, fought their way in to reinforce the beachhead on Red 1. Battalion casualties were severe: while wading ashore, the men took heavy machine gun fire from strong points on the beach, as well as intense sniper fire from Japanese hiding in the hulks of sunken craft along the reef.
The second day of fighting on Betio was a yard-by-yard struggle. By noon, Marines fighting from Red Beach 2 gained the southern coast of the island, cutting the Japanese defenders into two groups. Third Battalion, 2nd Marines of the western end of the island, supported by close naval gunfire and Sherman medium tanks (in their first combat deployment in the Pacific), succeeded in clearing all of Green Beach. This provided a secure beach for landing reinforcements and equipment.
   With both beachheads expanded and the movement of reinforcements and supplies brought under control, Colonel David M. Shoup, senior commander on the island, radioed Julian Smith in late afternoon that the Marines were winning. The unopposed landing of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines at dusk on Green Beach gave Shoup his first fully intact, fully equipped infantry unit to deploy inland.
  

Bairiki

Also on Nov. 21, reports said that the Japanese were crossing from the southeast end of Betio Island to Bairiki, a nearby islet.
Julian Smith committed the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines to halt them and secure Bairiki. These Marines landed in late afternoon, unresisted. Naval gunfire supporting their landing had put a quick end to the small number of Japanese fighters. A strafing plane hit a can of gasoline near the Japanese machine gun nests. The can exploded and burned out the enemy. The Marines then set  up artillery on Bairiki to help in winning Betio.
  

D Plus 2 Day

Early on the morning of Nov. 22, the Japanese defenders of Betio sent a final, desperate message. In part, the message said that their weapons had been destroyed, and they were attempting a final charge. The charge did not come until nightfall. By that time the Japanese-held portion of Betio had diminished radically.
   The Marines swept eastward. Sherman tanks, closely supported by infantry, demolition experts and flamethrowers, pounded enemy pillboxes and bomb shelters. At the end of the day, Japanese still held strong points inland from Red Beach 1, at the eastern end of the airfield and at the eastern end of the island. Three times during the night, Japanese counterattacks surged from the eastern end of the island against two companies of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines; three times they were fought off with artillery, grenades, machine guns, rifles and bayonets. The destroyers Schroeder and Sigsbee also battered Betios defenders. The next morning, 325 Japanese bodies were counted, but about 500 were believed still alive.

D Plus 3 Day

On the fourth day of battle, Nov. 23, the 3rd Battalion 6th Marines successfully stormed the eastern end of the island. The pocket of strong resistance behind Red Beach 1 was also eliminated. Of the estimated 2,800 members of the Japanese Special Naval Landing Force on Betio, only 17 survived to surrender. Of the additional 2,000 Korean construction troops, 129 survived.
   While the goal of clearing the remaining Japanese strongholds was being accomplished, Marine engineers and Navy Seabees (construction battalions) worked to repair Betios airstrip. At noon, a carrier-based plane landed there. Shortly after, Julian Smith declared the island secure.

Securing the Atoll

The 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines continued its sweep through the Tarawa Atoll, securing each island and islet. Other than the Japanese they found on Bairiki, only one island, Buariki, was occupied. On Nov. 26 in the Battle of Buariki, the entire Japanese force of 156 fought to the death. The Marines lost 34 killed, and 56 were wounded.

Campaign Results

Strategically, the victory at Tarawa opened the way to the Marshall Islands. Tactically, it established the amphibious assault as the method used thereafter to defeat Japan in the Pacific campaign.
   Tarawa was the first major amphibious assault in the Pacific in which U.S. troops faced sustained opposition on the beach. The American people were deeply disturbed by reports of high casualties suffered by the 2nd Marine Division (1,027 dead, 88 missing and 2,292 wounded). The high casualties were the cost of making a direct assault against a determined, well-armed and deeply fortified enemy. Inadequate preliminary bombardment, communications problems and inexperienced boat handlers who missed their landing destinations played a part.
   The Navy-Marine Corps team learned much from Tarawa and quickly applied this experience in seizing and defending atolls throughout the Central Pacific. Among the lessons learned at Tarawa were the need for naval gunfire of greater duration and accuracy, coordinated close air support, more LVTs and improved battle communications.
   Pearl Harbor hero lost at TarawaMessman 2nd Class Doris Miller, a black mess attend-ant serving on board the battleship West Virginia at the outbreak of the war with Japan, was one of the Navys first World War II heroes.
   On the morning of Dec. 7, 1941, West Virginia was moored at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked. The ship was bombed and torpedoed, and finally sunk. Miller came up from the mess deck to take his battle station on the signal bridge.
Helping to move the injured, he found and carried his mortally wounded captain, Mervyn S. Bennion, to relative safety. Seeing an unmanned .50-caliber machine gun, Dorie, who had had no training in the guns operation, shot down at least two enemy planes.
    For his courageous actions at Pearl Harbor, Miller received the Navy Cross, the Navys second highest award, from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. He also was meritoriously promoted one grade, to messman 1st class.
     Miller, still a mess steward, was assigned to the escort carrier Liscome Bay during the U.S. campaign to take the Gilbert Islands. During the Battle of Tarawa, Nov. 20-23, 1943, the Liscome Bay was sunk by enemy torpedoes, with a loss of 646 lives. Miller was among those lost.
   As a mess attendant, Miller served in the only Navy rate open to blacks at the beginning of World War II--that of steward. (A steward served food and cleared tables.) This was in contrast to World War I, when blacks were eligible for all ratings.

  The Battle of Bougainville

The Solomon Islands campaign began with the taking of Guadalcanal in December 1942. In February 1943 the Russell Islands fell, and the New Georgia group followed in August 1943. At the end of 1943, the campaign reached its goal when American troops gained a solid foothold on the island of Bougainville. The Russells, New Georgia and Bougainville were objectives because of their value as air bases.
   Objective: Isolate Rabaul

The objective of the Solomon Islands campaign was to cut off Japan's major forward air and naval base at Rabaul, on the island of New Britain. Rabaul was the hub of Japanese air power in the south Pacific--a stopping point for planes coming from New Guinea in the southwest and Truk, the home of the Japanese Combined Fleet, in the south central Pacific. Bougainville was key to neutralizing Rabaul.
  

Preliminary Attacks

The first attack on Bougainville occurred Aug. 15, 1943. Eight Corsairs from Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (later known as the Black Sheep) flew up from the Russell Islands to strafe the Kahili airfield during American amphibious landings on the island of Vella Lavella. The lightning strike--a surprise so complete the Japanese did not have time to shoot back--damaged aircraft and refueling equipment on the ground and forestalled a night attack on the American amphibious force.
   The Solomon Islands air defenses (AirSols), including units from the Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Royal New Zealand Air Force, made many air strikes in October on Bougainville and nearby islands. Although some strikes were designed to keep the enemy guessing as to the Marines' intended landing point, most were planned to reduce air opposition to the Bougainville landings when they finally occurred.

Diversions

Two diversionary amphibious landings were made the night of Oct. 27-28: the 2nd Marine Parachute Battalion landed on Choiseul; and New Zealand's 8th Brigade, together with Navy Seabees (U.S. Naval Construction Battalions), made an unopposed landing on the Treasury Islands on Oct. 27. Both operations served their primary purpose of drawing Japanese troops away from Bougainville, but the positions gained in the Treasuries, including valuable Blanche Harbor, were held and strengthened to provide staging for the landings on Bougainville. The Marines left Choiseul by landing craft after a week of harassing Japanese troops and damaging barge and supply bases.

D-Day: Nov. 1, 1943

Admiral William F. Halsey, Commander South Pacific, ordered Task Force 39 (which included four cruisers and the eight destroyers of Captain Arleigh Burke's Destroyer Squadron 23), under Rear Admiral A.S. Merrill, to bombard airfields on Buka and Bonis northwest of Bougainville. He intended the bombardments to keep the enemy off-balance and prevent air harassment of the landing force. The task force then steamed more than 200 miles to strike at the Shortland Islands, while Rear Admiral F.C. Sherman's Task Force 38 took over the bombardment of Buka, eliminating the threat from those airfields.
   The actual landing by the 3rd Marine Division at Empress Augusta Bay took place at dawn Nov. 1. The bay, located at some distance from the heavily defended airfields at either end of the island, had what appeared to be the most suitable beaches for a landing. The plan was to establish a beachhead, then bring in supplies and equipment to build a landing strip for fighters.
Invasion forces consisted of 14,321 troops (including the 1st Marine Dog Platoon with their 24 Dobermans and German shepherds) in 12 transports, preceded by a minesweeper group. Destroyer Squadron 45, four minelayers and two salvage tugs provided further support.
   The landing met with several obstacles. The Japanese defense of the beaches was stronger than anticipated. The 40,000 troops on the island had been reported stationed mainly around the airfields, and aerial reconnaissance photos did not reveal the extensive system of bunkers in the jungles above the beaches. The Marines who landed west of the mouth of the Koromokina River encountered steep slopes and shoals on which more than 80 of their amphibious craft foundered. Those landing east of the Koromokina were caught in crossfire from machine guns on the offshore islet of Puruata and on Cape Torokina east of the beach. A small contingent of Marines knocked out the gun emplacement on the cape after it had destroyed or damaged 14 landing craft; the 3d Marine Raiders captured Puruata.
   The landing force drove away the rest of the Japanese defenders, while the dog platoon, moving ahead of the main body, sniffed out snipers along the trails of the bog-ridden jungle.
   In spite of the resistance, and two Japanese air assaults launched from Rabaul bases during the day (which were driven off by AirSols fighters), the Marines succeeded. By nightfall, all 14,000 troops, together with 6,200 tons of fuel, rations, and ammunition, were landed along a 200-yard perimeter.

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay

The evening of the landing, Army reconnaissance aircraft reported that a large Japanese surface force was heading for  Bougainville. Task Force 39 intercepted it about 2:30 the following morning 45 miles west of Empress Augusta Bay. The American ships, executing maneuvers at breakneck speeds in the darkness to avoid Japanese long-range torpedoes, sank two enemy ships after three hours of heavy fire. With two other ships damaged in collisions while trying to avoid American torpedoes, the scattered Japanese chose to retreat. The American force had only two ships hit, both of which sustained moderate damage.

The Japanese Response

The initial Japanese reaction to the Bougainville landing was to send a force of 19 ships to strengthen Rabaul. However, a Nov. 5 air attack from Task Force 38 heavily damaged seven cruisers and two destroyers, prompting the withdrawal of the cruisers and eliminating worries about surface attacks on the Bougainville amphibious forces.
   Even so, the night of Nov. 6-7, four Japanese destroyers eluded the Americans and landed 475 troops west of the Marine beachhead. The Japanese hoped to catch the Marines between them and the other troops on the island, but the enemy forces never coordinated their actions. The Marines routed out the counter-landing detachment after two days of artillery barrages. Fewer than 100 Japanese escaped into the jungle; the rest were killed. The Marines sustained under 50 casualties.
Another punishing attack from Task Force 38 on Rabaul Nov. 11 cost the Japanese 68 fighters and three ships. Nevertheless,  Japanese carrier air groups from Rabaul made repeated attacks on the American landing force and the U.S. Navy ships, which continued to ferry in reinforcements, supplies and munitions. The strikes did little damage to the American forces, but the Japanese lost so many planes--121 out of 173--that the remaining carrier-based squadrons were withdrawn Nov. 13.
By that time, the Americans had landed nearly 34,000 troops and over 23,000 tons of cargo on Bougainville, widened the beachhead 7,000 yards, and moved 5,000 yards inland through dense, difficult mangrove swamps.
   Even though two airfields were under construction and the Marines were expanding their perimeter in search of a site to build a bomber strip, the Japanese army commander on Bougainville still believed that the landing was a feint. He continued to think that the primary targets were Buka to the north and the Buin section of the island to the southeast. Thus, no Japanese forces were withdrawn from either end of the island to root out the American invasion, and the Americans had the opportunity to solidify their positions.

Holidays in the Solomons

On Thanksgiving Day, Nov. 25, Burke's DesRon 23 fought the Battle of Cape St. George, sinking three Japanese vessels out of five sent with troops to reinforce Buka. The American ships suffered no hits at all. The same day, the Marines pushing inland along the Piva River virtually destroyed the 23rd Imperial Infantry in the Battle of Piva Forks. This was the last major Japanese ground resistance on Bougainville.
   On Christmas Day, the Army's Americal Division arrived on Bougainville to relieve the 3rd Marine Division. Marine Major General R.J. Mitchell, ComAirSols, moved his headquarters to Bougainville to direct the final air campaign against Rabaul, only 220 miles away. Within a month, the base at Rabaul was of no further use to the Japanese.
   American troops continued to occupy Bougainville, and contain dwindling Japanese troops, until relieved by Australian II Corps troops in late 1944. The Australians attempted to clear the entire island of Japanese, incurring heavy casualties. The end of the Pacific war brought and end to action on Bougainville.

Campaign Results

The Bougainville campaign remains one of the most resounding successes of the war in the Pacific in terms of the smooth coordination between the Navy and Marine Corps.
   The capture of Bougainville successfully isolated Rabaul. In the fight for Bougainville, the Japanese expended more of their air units than they could afford to lose. The Bougainville airstrips constructed at Torokina and Piva by Seabees and engineers made possible fighter-escorted bomber attacks against Rabaul, and other Japanese bases on New Ireland and New Britain.
   In December 1943, AirSols began a massive attack on Rabaul. The ensuing two months of constant air strikes, made possible by the possession of Bougainville, caused the Japanese to withdraw.
   The capture of Bougainville caused Marine casualties of 423 dead and 1,418 wounded.
l
The Battle of Peleliu
The fall of Japan's first line of defense in New Guinea, the Marshalls and the Marianas allowed the Allies to move on to strongholds in Japan's second defensive line. The capture of the Palau Islands became a stepping stone in Army General Douglas MacArthur's plan to invade the Philippines. While it is still debated whether the successful capture of the Palaus was necessary to protect MacArthur's flank, the battle of Peleliu was one of the toughest to be fought during the entire Pacific war.

The Commanders

On May 10, 1944, the Commander and Chief, Pacific Fleet/Pacific Ocean Areas, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, issued the first orders to plan the assault on the Palau Islands of Peleliu and Angaur. Peleliu would become the primary target of the operation code-named Stalemate II. Commanders and forces were assigned as follows:
-- Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson commanded the Third Amphibious Force.
-- Major General Roy S. Geiger commanded the III Amphibious Corps comprised of ground troops from the 1st Marine Division (Peleliu) and the Army's 81st Infantry Division (Angaur).
-- Major General William H. Rupertus commanded the 1st Marine Division. Under his command were 1st Marines commander Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, 5th Marines commander Colonel Harold D. Harris, 7th Marines commander Colonel Herman H. Hanneken and 11th Marines commander Colonel William H. Harrison.
-- Major General Paul J. Mueller, commanded the 81st Infantry Division.

D-Day

D-Day on Peleliu was set for Sept. 15, 1944. On that day, the Marines of the 1st Marine Division planned to land on the western beaches of Peleliu three regiments abreast. 1st Marines were to assault the beaches on the left, which were designated White 1 and White 2, and push through the enemy toward the northwestern peninsula of the island.
In the center, the 5th Marines were to land on Orange beaches 1 and 2 and drive across to the island's eastern shore. They would be responsible for securing the island's airfield before moving to seize the northeastern part of the island.
The 7th Marines on the right were to assault Orange Beach 3 and move to take the southern tip of the island.

The U.S. Navy demonstrated the value of sea power by blocking the Japanese access to sea lanes that would have enabled them to reinforce and resupply their men on Peleliu.

Three days of naval gunfire had preceded the Marines' landing, but it proved inadequate against the type of Japanese defenses created on the island. The Japanese took advantage of the rugged, ridged terrain around Umurbrogol Mountain (unreported by American reconnaissance units) to construct a series of interlocking underground shelters and well-concealed concrete bunkers. As the troops came ashore, they faced enfilading fire from these bunkers and from the high ground above the beaches.
   The enemy fought tenaciously to prevent the Marines from securing a beachhead.
The first night ashore was grueling: small infiltration parties hit the Marine lines repeatedly. The cruiser Honolulu and three destroyers provided star shell illumination to help the Marines turn the infiltrators back, but the rest of the fleet withdrew to avoid enemy submarines. The Marines fought the night away, well dug in, in their foxholes. In the south, the foxholes filled with stinking swamp water. By the morning of the 16th, the Marines were, according to one observer, mean and thirsty. That day, the 5th and 7th Marines advanced relentlessly; the 1st Marines more slowly, encountering fierce resistance from the northern ridges they were assigned to take.
Brigadier General O.P. Smith, assistant division commander, said of the first week of fighting, "Seven days after the landing, all of the southern end of Peleliu was in our possession, as well as the high ground immediately dominating the airfield. All the beaches that were ever used were in use. There was room for the proper deployment of all the artillery, including the Corps artillery. Unloading was unhampered except by the weather and hydrographic conditions. The airfield was available and essential base development work was underway."
   Temperatures on Peleliu rose as high as 115 degrees, and drinking water was scarce during the initial combat. Marines on the front lines were parched, pleading for water. Hearing this, the crews of some of the ships offshore, to the surprise and delight of many Marines, sent cases of fruit and tomato juice ashore for distribution among the front line troops.
The battle for Peleliu provided an opportunity for Marines to practice and perfect their skills in close air support. Marine aviators demonstrated ingenuity and courage, but their efforts would have little effect on the underground fortresses built by the Japanese. Following the fighting, one report estimated the existence of more than 500 caves. Long-range flame throwers mounted on amphibian tractors, employed for the first time on Peleliu, proved to be the most effective weapon against these well-fortified caves.
   In later phases of the operation, the seizure of Umurbrogol Mountain and the northern area of Peleliu was among the most difficult assignments faced by the Marines. This move was tactically important as a means to bypass and isolate enemy pockets of resistance. The northern ground was also to be used as a platform to attack the neighboring small island of Ngesebus. Ngesebus, connected to Peleliu by causeway, was an original campaign objective because of its unfinished fighter air strip.
The seizure of Umurbrogol Mountain took five regiments close to two months of battle to accomplish. The 1st Marine Division had suffered so many casualties as it fought to achieve the objectives that the Army's 81st Infantry Division, known as the "Wildcats," was called in to relieve the diminished 1st Marines. The Wildcats' initial mission to seize Angaur had been accomplished on Oct. 21 when the division overran Angaur's remaining resistance and the island was declared secure.
The Wildcats then began the tough job of relieving the 1st Marines and isolating the enemy pockets of resistance on Umurbrogol Mountain. Over the next weeks, the Wildcats would advance slowly around the Umurbrogol pocket, gradually eliminating all enemy resistance. Unlike earlier battles, the Japanese defenders did not attempt banzai charges. Despite their declining numbers, they fought on to take as many Americans with them as possible.
On Sept. 27, Major General Geiger declared the island secure and raised the American flag over the battlefield. Before it was all over, Operation Stalemate II had become the Pacific's largest amphibious operation thus far, involving more than 800 vessels and 1,600 aircraft.

Campaign Results
Throughout the battle naval forces had prevented the Japanese from reinforcing, allowing ground troops a victory over the well-entrenched Japanese force. That victory denied the Japanese a staging area for attacks on the U.S. fleet in the South Pacific and denied the Japanese the ability to communicate with their forces in the Philippines.

The cost of the battle was high. On Peleliu, Marine casualties were 1,336 killed and 5,450 wounded. The 81st Infantry Division suffered 1,393 casualties including 208 killed in action. On Angaur, the 81st Infantry Division had 1,676 casualties, including 196 killed in action. The Japanese lost an estimated 10,695 men. An additional 301 became prisoners of war.

USMC Raiders
Edsons Raiders

Then-Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson and almost 5,000 Marine Corps Raiders of World War II were legend in the South Pacific.
   Organized in January 1942 and disbanded just two years later, the Raider battalions were developed as a Marine Corps special mission force, based on the success of the British commandos and Chinese guerrillas operating in northern China.

From Guadalcanal and the Makin Atoll to Bougainville and New Georgia, lightly armed and intensely trained Raiders had a three-fold mission: spearhead larger amphibious landings on beaches thought to be inaccessible, conduct raids requiring surprise and high speed, and operate as guerrilla units for lengthy periods behind enemy lines.
Tested first during the Aug. 7, 1942, Guadalcanal landing, Edsons Raiders, the 1st Raider Battalion, struck at Tulagi, an island across the channel from the main landing force.
Ten days later a force of 221 from the 2nd Raider Battalion, named Carlsons Raiders for its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Evans F. Carlson, landed from two submarines on Butaritari Island, Makin Atoll. The raid inflicted heavy damage and forced the Japanese to divert troops from reinforcing Guadalcanal.
   Edson and his Raiders, in conjunction with the Marines 1st Parachute Battalion, left their mark on the Guadalcanal campaign during the night of Sept. 13|14. The intense and vicious close quarters fight is known as the Battle of Edsons Ridge or Bloody Ridge. Among those decorated for heroism was Edson, who received the Medal of Honor.
   Refitted, rested and rearmed, the 2nd Raiders, again led by Carlson, landed on a remote Guadalcanal beach and conducted their famous Thirty Days Behind the Lines operation from Nov. 4 to Dec. 4.
   Moving up the Solomon Island chain after the capture of Guadalcanal, the 4th Raider Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Currin, slipped ashore on New Georgia in late June 1943. For two months the 4th Raiders and their colleagues from the 1st Raider Battalion joined with other Marine and Army units to fight a series of actions in the dense jungle and deep swamps. Bairoko Harbor, New Georgia, in August 1943, was the final action for these men as members of the 1st and 4th Raider battalions.
   Bougainville, the largest of the Solomon Islands at nearly 30 miles wide and 125 miles long, was the assignment of the 2nd and 3rd Raider battalions as they led the way for the Nov. 1 invasion.
The units led by Lieutenant Colonels Joseph S. McCaffery and Fred S. Beans suffered heavy casualties during their more than two months ashore on Bougainville as they fought beside Army and Marine Corps troops. By mid-January the Raiders were withdrawn from Bougainville, and less than a month later the elite Raider battalions were disbanded.
   The 1st, 3rd and 4th Raider battalions became the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions of 4th Marine Regiment when that regiment was re-established on Feb. 1, 1944, bearing the name and honors of the original 4th regiment lost in the Philippines in 1942.
The 2nd Battalion became Weapons Company, 4th Marine Regiment.
   The legacy of the short-lived Raider history lives on in the perpetual memorial of the former USS Edson (DD-946), the destroyer bearing the name of the first Marine Raider. Twenty-two other U.S. Navy ships are named for men of the 1st Raider Battalion who were killed in action.

Raider Facts

* 1st Raider Battalion (designated on Feb. 16, 1942) was commanded by Lt. Col. Merritt A. Edson.
Tulagi, Solomon Islands (Aug. 7|9, 1942)
Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands (Aug. 10|Oct. 16, 1942)
New Georgia (July 5|Aug. 28, 1943)
* 2nd Raider Battalion (designated Feb. 19, 1942) was commanded by Lt. Col. Evans F. Carlson.
Midway Island (June 4|6, 1942)
Butaritari Island, Makin Atoll (Aug. 17|18, 1942)
Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands (Nov. 4|Dec. 17, 1942)
Bougainville, Solomon Islands (Nov. 1, 1943|Jan. 12, 1944)
* 3rd Raider Battalion (designated Sept. 20, 1942) wascommanded by Lt. Col. Harry B. Liversedge. Pavuvu, Russell Islands
(Feb. 20|March 20, 1943) Bougainville, Solomon Islands (Nov. 1, 1943|Jan. 12, 1944)
* 4th Raider Battalion (designated Oct. 23, 1942) was commanded by Major James Roosevelt for 7 months, then Lt. Col. Michael S. Currin took over in May1943.Vangunu Island (June 21|July 11, 1943)New Georgia (July 18|Aug. 28, 1943)
* Battalion strengths varied from 700 to 950 Marines.
* The first of its kind, the Makin Atoll raid used two transport submarines:USS Nautilus (SS-168) and USS Argonaut (APS-1).

Women in the Marine Corps

What? Women Marines? You've got to be kidding.
That was the first reaction from a group of male Marines freed from a prison camp in the Philippines in February 1945. These men could hardly believe that women were in the Corps.
American women in military uniform were rare at the beginning of World War II. On July 30, 1942, the Marine Corps Womens Reserve was established as part of the Marine Corps Reserve. The mission of the Marine Corps Womens Reserve was to provide qualified women for duty at shore establishments of the Marine Corps, releasing men for combat duty.
   By February 1943, American forces wiped out all enemy opposition on Guadalcanal. The bitter fighting there made it apparent that many more Marines would be needed to continue the war in the Pacific. The Marine Corps would soon learn that there were no differences between men and women with respect to their fierce pride in the Marine Corps and that special "Once a Marine, always a Marine" brand of loyalty.
   The first group of women officers was given direct commissions based on ability and civilian expertise. These women were  given no formal indoctrination or schooling, but went on active duty immediately. Women Marines were assigned to over 200 different jobs, among them radio operator, photographer, parachute rigger, driver, aerial gunnery instructor, cook, baker, quartermaster, control tower operator, motion picture operator, auto mechanic, telegraph operator, cryptographer, laundry operator, post exchange (store) manager, stenographer and agriculturist.
   No organization is complete without a leader. The first director of the Marine Corps Womens Reserve was Mrs. Ruth Cheney Streeter from Morristown, New Jersey. By the end of World War II, 85 percent of the enlisted personnel assigned to Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps were women.
   On June 7, 1946, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Alexander A. Vandegrift approved the retention of a small number of women on active duty. They would serve as a trained nucleus for possible mobilization emergencies. The demobilization of the Marine Corps Womens Reserve, 17,640 enlisted and 820 officers, was to be completed by Sept. 1, 1946. Of the 20,000 women who joined the Marine Corps during World War II, only 1,000 remained in the Marine Corps Women's Reserve by July 1, 1946.
   Colonel Ruth Cheney Streeter recommended the position of director of the Marine Corps Women's Reserve be strengthened and placed directly under the office of the commandant. On June 12, 1948, Congress passed legislation giving women regular military status, placing them on a par with their male counterparts in the U.S. armed forces.