Ministry of Transport Accident Report

Between Grayrigg and Oxenholme, L.M.S.R., May 18, 1947

(from "The Railway Gazette", October 17, 1947)

Lt.-Col. G. R. S. Wilson inquired into the accident which occurred at 2.7 p.m. on May 18, 1947, at Lambrigg Crossing signal box between Grayrigg and Oxenholme, L.M.S.R., when the 10 a.m. express No. 96, Glasgow to Euston, composed of 13 bogie coaches drawn by 4-6-2 engine No. 6235, City of Birmingham, which should have stopped for the purpose of setting back over to the down line to proceed under single-line working (the up line from the crossing to Oxenholme No. 2 signal box being out of use on account of relaying work near the latter) failed to do so, and collided with a 4-4-0-type light engine, standing 440 yd. beyond the home signal in readiness to assist the train to set back. The three detonators protecting the obstructed line were just beyond this engine and were exploded as it was driven forward 77 yd. by the collision, which took place on the Docker Viaduct. The engine and three leading coaches of the express were derailed all wheels, but fortunately remained close to the track alignment without touching the parapet, helped probably by the guiding effect of the light engine, with only one pair of wheels derailed, as it was pushed forward interlocked with the express engine.

The driver of the light engine, realising that the express could not stop in time, had set it in motion, materially reducing the force of impact. Three passengers were detained in hospital and 30 others subsequently complained of minor injuries and shock. A dining-car cook was detained in hospital and another sustained minor injuries, as did the driver and fireman of the light engine. There was light drizzling rain, but visibility was good.

The line falls in the up direction for two miles at 1 in 106 towards Lambrigg Crossing, with continuous but easy curvature. An intermediate box, Mosedale Hall, was switched out. The up distant signal for the crossing has a tall post with lower quadrant arm and comes into view with a with a good sky background at 425 yd. Colonel Wilson seldom had seen a signal more conspicuous in daylight. The home signal, 1,184 yds. in advance, recently renewed and re-sited, comes into view at 520 yd., but has a hillside back-ground and is not so conspicuous as the distant.

In accordance with rules, the home signal was maintained continuously at danger, and trains were drawn past by hand signal. The light engine was provided to assist heavy trains to back against the gradient, and the Grayrigg stationmaster, acting as pilotman, had placed it far enough in advance to allow trains to be accepted under ordinary "line clear," B.T. Regulation 4. The fortnightly notice, dated May 13, 1947, gave particulars of the single-line working, which worked smoothly until the collision.

THE COURSE OF EVENTS

The last train to set back to the down line was the No. 98 express, 9.35 a.m. from Glasgow, which did not need assistance in doing so. The signalman, who had been 11 years at the crossing box. and said single-line working had been in force many times over the down line (including the provision of an assisting light engine) without incident, accepted express No.96 directly it was offered. He, with the stationmaster and a flagman, saw it come into view at about 600 yd. and all three realised that it was not going to stop, The flagman waved a red flag from the 4ft. way until he had to move clear. None of them could give an estimate of the speed, but all agreed that the train was slowing down, with steam off and brakes hard on, as it passed them. The signal-man at Grayrigg thought it passed him rather more slowly than other expresses that morning, none of which was travelling particularly fast.

The driver of the light engine saw the express as it was passing the box about 400 yd. away. The fireman released the tender hand brake and the driver succeeded in getting into forward gear and starting the engine just before the collision.

The driver of the express an experienced man in a mixed passenger and goods link, was relieving a regular driver and had worked over the route regularly for many years, as fireman and driver. His evidence was brief and perfectly straightforward, and he accepted full responsibility for the I accident, for which he expressed regret.

He received his fortnightly notice on May 16, two days before, studied it that afternoon and on the morning before starting, marking the reference to the single-line working, the only part of the notice that affected him. He noticed the signals at Mosedale Hall box, where he shut off steam, but could not explain how he came to miss the Lambrigg distant, except to say that he "forgot two things at once, the signals and the notice." He knew well where to look for the Lambrigg signals and said they were easy to see.

He recollected that after Mosedale Hall he turned to get his handkerchief out of his food box. He was a little time searching for it and on turning forward again found himself 50 yd. from the home signal. He made an emergency brake application and reversed. He thought speed was between 50 and 60 m.p.h., and this is supported by consideration of stopping distances, as recorded in pre-war tests, in relation to the probable speed at the moment of collision, the nature and extent of the damage suggesting 25 to 30 m.p.h. The driver was in good health, had had 24 hours rest before taking duty, and had nothing on his mind which might have distracted his attention.

The fireman also worked regularly over the route. The Lambrigg signals being so much easier to see from the driver's side, he took advantage of the falling gradient to get coal forward with the steam pusher. He saw the home signal at a range of about 30 yd. He was unable to confirm the driver's statement that he turned round after passing Mosedale Hall.

The guard was travelling in the last vehicle but two, a brake third, with brake compartment in rear. He had had long experience of the route and was aware from the notice of the single-line working being in force He said that after they passed Tebay a number of passengers came to him complaining that they had been unable to find seats, and he spent the next few minutes, during which the train passed Grayrigg in getting some seated in his own vehicle.

He then realised that they would be approaching Lambrigg, where single-line working was in force, and he tried to get hack to his compartment. telling the other standing passengers to wait till he returned. and, delayed by the crowd in the corridor, had just reached it when he saw the vacuum was already falling. He repeated that he remembered the single-line working and thought he would have time to deal with the passengers before getting to Lambrigg. Had he not been so engaged he would have made it his business to look for the signals and see that the driver was going to stop, applying the brake if necessary.

INSPECTING OFFICER'S CONCLUSION

Except for the presence of the light engine the ordinary arrangements for single-line working had been made and were being carried out in accordance with rules. The engine was necessary, to deal with heavy trains, and with 440 yd. between it and the home signal the signalman was justified in accepting the express in the ordinary way.

The collision was solely due to the driver's inattention. He stated quite simply that he forgot the Lambrigg signals. It is to his credit that he attempted no excuses, but it is the primary duty, of a driver, in the exercise of his profession, to avoid forgetfulness of this kind, and Colonel Wilson can only conclude, after reviewing all the circumstances, that this driver may be unfitted temperamentally for the responsibilities of main-line work. He is 51. with 34 years' service, 10 years as a driver. His record shows some evidence of past unreliability, though it has improved considerably during the last 7 years. He required no assistance from his mate in observing signals at this point, and no blame can be attributed to the fireman.

The guard's evidence, however, was unsatisfactory, and Colonel Wilson feels that he did not do all that might have been expected of him. There is no question that he should have been at his post during the backing movement over Lambrigg cross-over, and as his train was approaching a special stop, his excuse that he was prevented, by pre-occupation with passengers in the corridor, from watching its running a minute or two before, cannot be accepted,

REMARKS

The situation would not have been affected had the distant signal been a colour-light. With ordinary attention the driver should not have failed to observe and obey it. Automatic train control, providing an audible signal and brake application, would have prevented the collision.

It was suggested to Colonel Wilson that a detonator at the distant signal would have brought the driver to his senses, one being provided, by rule, at the down distant at the other end of the single-line section. This he thinks to be very likely, but points out that the conditions were no different in principle from that obtaining when a train approaches a home signal with 440 yd. clear ahead of it in the ordinary course of traffic. At the other end of the section a train overrunning the home signal would be entering a section used as a single-line, with risk of collision with an opposing train, and hence the rules provide for a detonator at the distant signal at that end (also acceptance under the warning arrangement when the pilotman is not there) unless there is an outer home signal.

Colonel Wilson considers there is no justification for alteration in the rules to provide a flagman with detonators at the distant signal at both ends of a section during single-line working. Obedience to signals is fundamental, and provided that discipline is conscientiously maintained, as it generally is, the reminder by the fort-nightly notice of the need for an unusual stop should be sufficient, even in the absence of automatic train control.

Accident Between Grayrigg and Oxenholme May 18, 1947 "The Railway Gazette", October 17, 1947

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