LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY

Sir,

In compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 5th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the collision that occurred on the 27th November last at Shap summit on the London and North-western Railway.

One lady is reported to have been shaken.

Shap summit is about 2 � miles south of Shap station. Several good sidings join the passenger lines at this place. The point and signal levers are arranged on the locking principle, and are worked by a man, who is stationed in a raised signal-cabin. All goods trains proceeding southwards stop at Shap summit, so that the breaksman can put down as many breaks as thinks desirable, before proceeding down the incline to Tebay junction. The gradient is about 1 in 75 for the first 4 � miles, and 1 in 147 for the last mile next to Tebay.

On the day in question, a train, which consisted on an engine and tender, 50 empty waggons, and a break-van, with a guard, arrived at Shap summit about 5-40 p.m. The cotter that held the drawbar of an old Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company’s waggon, gave way, and the train, about the 40th waggon from the engine, separated into two parts, just before the engine and the front part of the train came to a stand. This breaking of the cotter and separation of the train must have occurred from the breaksman putting on his break just before the train stopped, of by a jerk from the engine. I could ascertain exactly which.

The signalman in the signal-cabin, and some person holding a red light on the ground, stopped the engine-driver immediately after the train separated, and then signalled to him to push back to the loose part of his train. The men that called to the engine-driver to put back his train, did not know at the time what had caused the train to separate. The drawbar that had been pulled out was hanging to the back of the last waggon of the front part of the train, and as soon as this part of the train was pushed back, the end of the drawbar was forced down into the ballast and acted as a prop, to lift the waggon off the rails. Two after waggons were also pushed off, and the down line of rails was obstructed before the empty waggon train could be stopped. The 10 a.m. express train from London was approaching at the time.

The engine of the express train had passed the distant-signal, which, together with the home-signal, had been lowered for it to come on.

The signalman on duty at the summit cabin as soon as he was aware that the waggon had left the rails, threw up the signals to danger to stop the express, which was within 400 yards of the home-signal by this time. The driver of the express shut off steam, reversed, whistled for the guard’s break, and did his best to stop, but could not do so, before he struck the empty waggons at speed which he estimated at 12 to 15 miles an hour.

The express consisted of an engine and tender, a guard’s can with a guard, four composites, a second guard’s van with a guard. Four more composite carriages, and a guard’s van with a third guard at the tail of the train. Eight vehicles of the express had rubbed past the waggons that obstructed the down line, before the passenger trains was brought to a stand. The steps and handles of these eight vehicles were torn off, and the passenger engine was slightly damaged, but no part of this train left the rails. Three goods waggons were damaged. The engine-driver and fireman of the passenger train remained at their posts and were not hurt.

The accident was caused by the giving way of the drawbar of an empty waggon.

I do not think that any blame can be attached to any of the company’s servants who were in charge on either trains.

The signalman on duty at the summit cabin appears to have shown presence of mind, and to have done his best to prevent the collision, but putting up his signals to danger the moment he observed that a waggon had left the rails.

I think that goods trains should not depend on single couplings, the soundness of which can never be satisfactorily examined while the waggons are in use. The risk becomes all the greater on lines where the gradients are steep, and where the trains are very long.

BoT report 13 ^th January 1873

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