The main battle tank

A definition

Introduction:

The battle tank first appeared in the First World War. It is the natural descen dent of the age-old rivalry between projectile and shield. But in 1917, it was used to break the tragic and bloddly deadlock that was created by four years of trench warfare since the autumn of 1914. But the 1917 tank was far from beign a top-notch instrument. It was an inconfortable iron box with a maximum speed of 5 mph. Twelve soldiers worked in it in cramped space with a hot Daimler 75hp mo tor. The exhaust fumes combined with cordite from expended shells gave an un breatable atmosphere. But nevertheless, with this new instrument, the Allies had something to roll forward protected from bullets and splin ters.

Origins:

The tank was a British invention. From the start, the British government or dered the navy to undertake the limited production and deployment of the new land weapon on French soil. When bystanders asked the sailors about those cu rious things, they replied that these were self-propelled naval reservoirs for land use. So, the word tank was applied to the new vehicle. The conservatire British of ficer corps was distrustful of this new toy, but the severe losses and apparent stale ment bother them so much more that they were ready to use any new military ga dget to save the day.

Tactical use:

The tanks were used in combat for the first time in May 1917 at Cambrai, and they made a terrible impression on their opponents. The no-man’s-land was breached in several places, barbed-wire and trench were overcome and limited progression was noted with reduced casualties. The first two models were British-made. The Mk1 nicknamed Mother was the most huge of the two. He smaller one was the MkA nicknamed Whippet, was more agile in ruff terrain. The French in troduced also their Renault model. The first small-scale tank attacks created a initial psychological panic on German soldiers, similar to that experimented by infantrymen facing cavalry. But the initial panic soon faded, and the Germans saw that the tanks could not stand direct cannon fire, nor the explosion of a mine. Furthermore, the Germans introduced their own tank, the A7V, and on both si des, the tank was now a part of the regular war landscape.

Concepts and evolution:

At the end of WW1, the tank was now a new instrument of modern war, like the plane and armored car. During the interwar years, military writers atte mpted to carve a niche for the tank in order to integrate it fully to modern com bat tactics of military establishments; they were not successful. As a new military instrument, the tank had more difficulty to be accepted than the submarine or the bomber. In the mid-20’s, industrialized countries loosly centered their choices on two basic models : a light tank for armed reconnaissance in a risky environ ment, and a heavy tank for infantry support. To a more or less extent, these na tions saw the light reconnaissance tank to practice, in small groups, the kind of ca valry charge on tracks with better efficiency and lesser risks than with horses. Morever, they were quite sure that with a successful penetration by the light tanks, or an arillery bombardment, heavier tanks could do their jobs of protec ting the infantry, just like in 1917-8. Such was the military tought on tanks in London, Paris, Tokyo and Washing ton.

The German approach:

Weimar Germany’s interwar army, the Reichwehr, did support this restric ted use of tanks. However, a minority faction leaded by colonel Heinz Guderian, saw the tank as the way to push forward with minimal losses and break an enemy front. He didn’t see the tank as an occasional commodity or a toy for the new- rich, but as one of two essential elements required in order to acheive decision and success in battle, even a campaign; the other element was the plane. For colo nels Guderian and Student ( later transfer in the Luftwaffe in 1936), the combi ned and complementary use of tanks and planes will be the key of success in futu re militry ventures against larger and slower forces: the planes strike, the tanks rolls, and the infantry takes prisonners. In order to do this, tank numbers must be increased at the expense of their heavier armament and protection. Agility and dependability of numerous machines were now paramount. This was their con ception of Blitzkrieg. However, when German rearmament was proclaimed, the general staff did not endorse Guderian’s and Student’s concept of Blitzkrieg. In fantry generals who directed it did not want the full weight of an attack rested so lely on tanks and planes. Guderian must accept his concept partly diluted in a aero-terrestrial warfare scheme, where air and armored formations must accomo date themselves with the operational requirements of a largely non-mechanized infantry army in a given theater.

What is a tank?

The tank is a armored tracked vehicle designed to attack in sheer numbers far inside enemy territory. It is essentially and offensive weapon of war, designed to break an enemy front with the cooperation of aviation, particulary the ground at tack elements. Its main structural characteristic is its mobility. A comparaison with other tracked vehicles is mandatory in order to identify what is a tank. The criterias used are the relations between protection, mobility and armament :

Tank : mobility - protection - armament

SP destroyer : protection - armament -mobility

SP artillery : armament - mobility - protection

Armored car : mobility - armament -protection

World War II:

Between 1939-41, the average gross weight of tanks vary between 8 and 25 tons. They were responsible of all German tactical success during that period. They had two crew members, which man that these were difficult machines to use effectively during the stress of combat. With further deployments of Models III and IV, the number of crew members increased to five: in the hull sat the dri ver and machine-runner/radio-operator; in the turret sat the gunner, loader and tank commander. The workload is more distributed and crew fatigue is much les ser. Those tanks were more efficient in battle. The US Army also adopted the 5-crew system for their Grant and Sherman tanks.

The tank must also be protected by armor. The tank’s most thickest and resis tant armor is in his turret, especially around the gun’s mantel. Then, it is the front and floor sections that are armored. However, the sides, rear and top are much less armored in order to save weight and produce decent off-road perfor mance. It was powered either by a gasoline engine, which was discarded for a hea vier noisier but more reliable diesel, which in turn do not perform well in cold weather. The transmission’s sprocket was in the front of the vehicle. It had eight forward speeds and four rear ones, all operated with that manual transmission.

Gun caliber was not very important because of the tank’s light armor of the pe riod. However, the rapidity in which a tank turret could turn and lead its oppo nent to shoot it was very important. The shooting distance rarely exceeded 500 meters, because past that distance, projectiles do not perform well on armor. Sighting was done either by vision slits on the turret and hull, or by elaborate pe riscopes. When a tank formation is attacked, the tank and squadron commanders must resist the temptation of shooting every tank in their way. They must move to the already set goal, dealing with enemy vehicles only if need be. The attackers must disperse them on their own flanks where tracked 57mm or 88mm guns will shoot them and cover the attackers’ progression. If a strong pocket resisted and present a threat for the tanks, the squadron commander calls the ground attack plane directly to vector a strike on that position. This was the tactic used by the Germans in 1939-41. Afterwards, the American and Soviet will practice the same tactics against the Nazis. WW2 also saw the rapid increase of the tank’s weight and armaments. In 1945, he average weight of a tank was 45 tons, with some spe cimens weighting 70 tons. But already, new technologies were developed in order to cope with the tank. The sabot projectile and the HEAT charges mounted on light platforms such as a Jeep or plane could deal with most heavy tanks. The cracking power of a 150 lbs TNT air bomb could destroy two Tiger or JS-2 tanks. Armor, however thick, was simply not enough to survive in 1945. Nevertherless, despie its vulnerabilities, the tank was still the only military weapon that could conquer and hold its ground.

The Cold War:

Between 1945-80, the tank’s average weight will be around 40 tons. This pe riod was characterized by thefact that the tank’s gun power reached its zenith; speeds reached and soon exceeds the 1.1 mile per second for a tungsten APDS pro jectile. HEAT projectiles could penetrate 8 inches of armor at 90 degree angle at a range of 1200 meters. This was also the time when new sighting and stabilizing devices enable the tank to hit more accurately when the vehicle is moving. Elec tric pointers and infrared sights were becoming standard items in the modern tank.

After the war, the West’s tank park shrinked dramatically and centered on qua lity products. The British Centurion and Chieftain tanks were the best Western tanks of the 50’s and 60’s combining the best possible power ratio, ergonomy, tar get acquisition, and firepower. During the 70’s, the German Leopard 1 and 2 we re the best Western tanks. As for the Leopard 2, this was a powerful 70 ton and the first of a new generation of so-called supertanks. It combined laminated armor, rapid turret traverse, IR and laser sights, NBC seals and filters, and could cross a small river fully submerged. All of those postwar tanks were powered by reliable diesel engines and semi-automatic transmission gear.

On the Soviet side, the average tank weight was also set around 40 or-so tons, but they continued to design simple tanks that could be easily producable in case of national emergency. Quantity was still preferred over quality. They all have a low silhouette in order to complicate sigh ting by the enemy’s gunner. With their successful experiments with the JS tank series and the T-44 prototype, the Soviets designed the T-54/55 series with a semi-circular turrret thick enough to deflect HEAT projectiles from almost any angles. It house a 115mm gun which surpas sed all Western tank guns with the exception of the 120mm guns of the Chieftain (1961) and the Leopard 2 (1977). The West had improved the standard 105mm tank gun considerably and had reduced the superiority level of the Soviet shell to about 2/3. This improved ammunition was putted to effect during the 1967 and 1973 Middle East campaigns. However, the Soviet guns's greatest weakeness was its miserable accuracy because of crude sighting systems. Add to this, the low sil houette of their vehicles reduced inside space; crw quarters are quite cramped, causing premature fatigue and low-performance battle-waringness. The cramped space also mean that the crew had to share it with the gun's ammunition, and re duce the internal fuel capacity of those tanks. Consequently, extra fuel tanks had to be mounted on the tank's fenders or in a rear drum, all of those not under ar mored protection. Premature engine wear is also a fact of those tanks, because the Soviets had fitted in them engines that were designed in the late thirties, for the T-34. As the size and weight increases, torque and power/weight ratio was re duced drastically on the T-62 and especially on the T-64: the engines would not push the tank on soft angle obstacles. Noticably, the Egyptian Army took the ini tiative of removing all Soviet engines on their T-54/55 and T-62, and replaced them with stronger and more reliable Ford V-8 diesels.

The post-Cold War era:

In the mid-80's, the tank was threatened by a new aerial platform, the helicop ter, and a variety of hollow charge or concussion anti-tank devices. During that period, theWest maintained and increased their qualitative superiority, especially by the introduction of the American Abrams tank. This vehicle had a laminated 12 inch armor made of depleted uranium imperfivous to many hollow charge mix tures, such as those of current RPGs. Furthermore, many Western countries have added a protective cushion of reactive armor on their current tanks to alleviate the effect of hollow charges. The American Abrams, the French Leclerc, and the Russian T-80 are all powered by a gaz turbine that improve their off-road capabi lities dramatically. Furthermore, they all use rapid turret traverse and sighting system which use computerized lasers pointers and IR sensors. But the West's qualitative superiority on tanks lay mainly in battle management. The increasing use of digital transceivers on bord tanks enable the tank commanders to have a clear idea of their tactical situation, with the position of friends and foes on the di gital screen.

By 1990, the tank guns on both sides are equally powerful in terms of armor pe netration and general usefulness, with perhaps a small edge for the Soviet ammu nition. However, the West's current 120mm shell coulf off-shoot the Soviet coun terpart a mile further, and this feature was instrumental in the Western coali tion's tactical victories in the Persian Gulf campaign. At a place called Medina Ri dge, west of Kuwait City, American Abrams engaged and destroyed three dozen tanks before the Iraqis could shoot at their opponents. From 1996 onwards, the duel between the shield and the projectile still continue. All kind of gadjetry was putted to increase the tank's defenses; the goal was to intercept the incoming pro jectiles rather than to deal with a superior tank. The Russians had incorporated to many of their T-80 tanks a device called Arena which intercept an enemy tank round by radar, thrusting to it an explosive panel filled with steel pellets. For IR seeking heads and laser illuminators, the Russians had filled limited quantities of devices dazzlers called Shtora. They emitted wavelenghts in order to confuse IR warheads, hopefully deflecting them. However, these two new Russian technolo gies are expensive and their battle effectiveness remained to be proven. But even without those gadget, it is not easy for a Western tank round or missile to destroy a Russian semi-circular turret from the sides or from the top: during encounters in the Gulf, many rounds and Hellfire missiles simply bounced on them with no ef fect than a headache, the first time.. It took numerous hits to finish the vehicle.

After a near century of existence, the tank is still the king of the bat tlefield. Its place is not to be taken over by the helicopter because of its fragility and dependa bility from repair bases. A tank or a group of tank could assault and hold a given point with minimum aftermath maintenance. So, despite all the existing technolo gy to kill it, the tank is the only military instrument capable of taking and holding ground.

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